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THE REFIGURATION OF SPACES 
Angela Million, Christian Haid, 
Ignacio Castillo Ulloa, and Nina Baur 
From “turning to space” to thinking spatially 
Over the course of the past three decades, space and spatial research furthering 
spatial thinking have become increasingly popular both within and—though in 
a more nuanced manner—beyond academic circles. By and large, it has been a 
gradual process of recognition that, “as many people have been saying, ‘Space is 
hot’” (Bertsch and Sterne 1994; cited in Crang and Thrift 2000a, xi). Such wea-
sel words eventually led to what came to be known as the “spatial turn,” which, 
rather than emerging in the shape and form of “intellectual magnifcence,” put 
space at the core of critical analysis to shed light on economic, social, political, 
and cultural transformations to which the world is continuously subjected. Prior 
to the spatial turn, academic discourse typically afrmed space as an a priori exter-
nal to human thinking and conceptualized space as a Kantian-absolute analytical 
category. As a result, jigsaw-like Euclidean conceptions of space emerged, under-
pinned by an understanding of space as a form of “outer sense,” whereby objects 
are represented as existing outside of us—that is to say, “in space.” Such static 
understandings of space were eventually rendered insufcient by the accelerating 
dynamics of spatial transformations such as globalization, progressively giving way 
to alternative approaches asserting that spatiality cannot be comprehended sepa-
rately from its production. Moreover, humans do not just perceive and act within 
space as an immutable frame of reference; rather, by inhabiting, living, and all the 
while changing space, they render it relational (Lefebvre 1991; Massey 2005). In 
other words, far-reaching takes on contemporary phenomena must appeal to both 
social and spatial circumstances in order to move beyond the truism that “every-
thing happens somewhere,” for it is, in efect, the where what allows the how to be 
fathomed—the inextricable fusion of context and causality (Warf and Arias 2009; 




























2 Angela Million et al. 
Furthermore, several disciplines—above all, geography—were stripped of their
epiphenomenal status. Concurrently, initiated by the pioneering works of Anthony
Giddens (1979, 1981) and Michel Foucault (1980), eforts to interlace, for instance, a
(concrete and descriptive) “geographical” with an (abstract and explanatory) “socio-
logical” imagination started to fourish (Agnew and Duncan 1989, 1). Accordingly, a
shift from “a sense of space as a practico-inert container of action towards space as a
socially produced set of manifolds” took place, indicating not only that space cannot be
envisaged “outside the realm of social practice” but also that “the ecology of thought is
no longer seen as somehow standing outside of the spatial” (Crang and Thrift 2000b, 2). 
From the mid-1980s onwards, space has been reasserted and emplaced within 
a multifarious, inter-, and transdisciplinary purview covering (and thereby mak-
ing relevant) aspects such as everyday life, identity, and human subjectivity, which 
are integral to a coherent analysis of social life and lived experience. There have 
been insightful attempts to integrate the diverse strands of existing academic work. 
Diverse disciplines—such as geography, architecture, urban planning, philosophy, 
sociology, political sciences, anthropology, historical sciences, communication sci-
ences, and many more—have either constantly been or are increasingly dealing 
with issues of spatiality and, in this context, have discussed space in their own 
particular manner—whether metonymically (“spaces of language”), introspectively 
(“spaces of the self ”), socio-politically (“spaces of agitation”), culturally (“spaces of 
modernity”), or aesthetically (“artistic and architectural spaces”). 
Nevertheless, these preceding eforts to systematize spatial concepts have ended
up indexing and, in consequence, replicating disciplinary boundaries. Furthermore,
while the interest in space, spatiality, and spatial research has been steadily growing and
spawning across felds of thought, there have rarely been any attempts either to iden-
tify convergences and intersections amid the variety of spatial conceptualizations or to
synthetize modes of spatial thinking. Showing how fruitful intersecting and synthetiz-
ing would be is precisely the purpose of this book. More specifcally, Martina Löw’s
(2016) conceptualization of relational space ofers a conducive approach that illustrates
how assorted understandings of space and/or forms of spatial inquiry could be astutely
brought together. According to Löw (2016), space may be envisaged as relational
arrangements in which actors, objects, and technologies are both placing and being
placed. These arrangements, moreover, are based on two analytically distinct social
processes: spacing—in other words, specifc practices of placing—and synthesizing. 
Building on similar theoretical considerations as well as empirical outcomes stem-
ming from a variety of disciplines engaged with spatial research and thinking, the aim
of this book is twofold: opening spatial analysis and broadening the understanding of ongoing
social processes as a whole. In addition, a long-term goal, whereof this book serves as an
initial stepping stone, is to develop an empirically grounded theory of society that can best
be defned as a “spatio-communicative fguration.” In this regard, moving from “turning to
space” to “thinking spatially” plays a fundamental role in theory production, “not only
in the ways that theory might apply to a spatially distributed world, but in the spatiali-
ties that allow thought to develop particular efectivities and intensities” (Crang and














	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
3 Navigating spatial transformations 
and discussion, the book focuses on a key principle of the social order: exploring, frst,
various social transformations regarding their spatial dimensions and links; and, sub-
sequently, restructured subjective actions, spatial knowledge, and spatial experience.
On that account, spatial transformations are conceived not as abstract, unfathomable
processes, but rather as processes of communicative actions and social practices embed-
ded in people’s everyday lives. What people experience, want, believe, know, do, and
how they interact in turn engenders new institutions and novel forms of localization,
interconnectedness, and spatially shaped (self-)experience. 
In order to clearly present how the refguration of spaces operates as an analyti-
cal angle, the structure of this book systematically follows a set of subthemes and 
questions. The assemblage of chapters in this book reveals, by and large, not only 
that space does not constitute a neutral entity existing a priori as regards its concep-
tion, but also how it is possible to delve into spatial transformations pointedly and 
discern or even contend their inherent intricacies. 
Spatiality and temporality 
It has long been known that space and time are intrinsically intertwined and nei-
ther concept can be thought of and written about without refecting on the other. 
For example, spatial constructions change over time; humans interact in space and 
in certain times; it also takes time to move in and through space; and so on. There-
fore, the assorted contributions in this book purposefully focus on both “the spa-
tial” in general and spatial transformations specifcally. 
In order to discuss the specifc entanglement of spatiality and temporality, it is
necessary to refect upon temporality frst. As process theory has shown, two key
concepts—duration and temporal pattern—are central when thinking about time
(Baur 2005; Norkus and Baur 2020). “Duration” (durée; Braudel 1958) or “time
layer” (Zeitschicht; Koselleck 2018) indicates that social processes difer in the amount
of time they need to unfold: Whereas some phenomena must be examined over a
long period, others need a more precisely delineated length of time. Heuristically,
three types of duration can be distinguished (Baur 2005; Norkus and Baur 2020): 
1	 Short-term social processes unfold in moments, hours, or days 
2	 Medium-term processes (“time of generations”) cover the memory of the living and 
usually cover years or decades 
3	 Long-term processes (longue durée) go beyond the memory of the living and cover 
centuries or millennia 
In addition to a process’s duration, its pattern over time is also important. To this 
efect, three basic temporal patterns of social change can be identifed from a heuristic 
standpoint (Baur 2005; Norkus and Baur 2020): 




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
4 Angela Million et al. 
2	 Turning points occur between different phases of a process or after abrupt 
changes such as innovations or crises 
3	 Cycles describe social processes that are characterized by repetition 
Against this backdrop, authors in the frst section discuss how spatiality and temporal-
ity are entwined as well as what spatial transformations arise therefrom. 
Besides the abovementioned, more abstract considerations about space and 
time, a more specifc question is what type of spatial transformations can be empiri-
cally observed over the course of history. Empirical evidence suggests that social 
change and spatial transformations are interlinked. For example, Norbert Elias 
([1939] 1997) has shown that in Europe, ever since the middle ages, civilizing and 
nation-building processes have been mutually stabilizing, driving each other along 
established trajectories with typical trends and countertrends. Accordingly, Elias 
(1986) coined the concept of “fguration” to express that diferent scales—namely 
the micro level (Elias [1969] 2002) and the macro level (Elias [1939] 1997)—are 
intertwined, co-develop, and, within this process, (re-)produce social inequality by 
including (“insiders”) and excluding (“outsiders”) people (Elias and Scotson [1965] 
2002). Following this line of thought, in this book, Martina Löw and Hubert Kno-
blauch kick of the debate on spatiality and temporality by arguing that the second 
half of the twentieth century marked a turning point, contending that the specifc 
pattern whereby social and spatial transformations are interwoven has fundamen-
tally changed. Within this “refguration of spaces” (Knoblauch and Löw 2017; 2020; 
in this volume), three processes unfold in parallel: 
1	 The relations of spaces as social contexts of different activities, forms of commu-
nication, and societal functions are turning into a polycontexturalization of space. 
This means that, at both a particular and structural level, different arrangements 
of space are simultaneously put into effect. Individual and collective actors are 
thus faced with the challenge of having to cope with different spatial logics at 
the same time; a condition that adds to, as Fredric Jameson (1991, 44) sharply 
asserts, “the incapacity of our minds . . . to map the great global multinational 
and decentered communicational network in which we find ourselves caught 
as individual subjects.” 
2	 Space is increasingly constituted in mediated forms spurred by hastily deep-
ening advances in digital technologies of communication. Consequently, 
a mediatization—in the form of proactive and reflexive communicative acts 
unfolding on different scales and at different levels—arises and results in a 
simultaneity of digital and face-to-face interactions. 
3	 Humans, objects, and technologies are circulating more frequently, resulting in 
a translocalization and globalization of the economy, politics, culture, and every-
day as well as urban planning/design practices. Hence, individual and collec-
tive actors and spaces, at variegated (geographically distant) locations, become 
progressively interconnected, coupled, and more interdependent alongside a 
prominent gain in the relevance of individual locations. 
 
 
5 Navigating spatial transformations 
These processes in turn alter societies—and thereby typical patterns of social inter-
actions—and, given that social and spatial changes are consubstantial, prompt spa-
tial modifcations (i.e. refgurations of spaces). 
Therefore, Knoblauch and Löw’s (2017; 2020; in this volume) concept of “the 
refguration of spaces” emphasizes the overarching theoretical assumption of this 
book, namely that social transformations become particularly clear by looking at 
the restructuring of spaces and combining the knowledge, purviews, and research 
outcomes of diverse spatial disciplines. By concentrating on the efects of mediati-
zation, mobility, and social dislocation in spatial transformations, contributions by 
other authors also aim at deconstructing the notion of refguration of spaces—as 
a specifc interpretative vehicle to explore spatial transformations—from diferent 
theoretical and empirical angles. 
A frst general criticism concerning spatiality and temporality, expressed in 
several chapters of this section, is that, conceptually, Knoblauch and Löw (2017; 
2020; in this volume) restrict themselves to mid-term or even (in actual empirical 
research) short-term processes. However, when it comes to spatial transformations, 
many of the most important and conspicuous changes only unfold over extended 
periods, that is, in the longue durée. Likewise, all chapters in this section demon-
strate, on the one hand, that the past lingers on well into the present and thereby 
impacts current communicative action (Knoblauch 2020) and, on the other hand, 
how to conceptually grasp, from diferent angles, the entanglements of spatial trans-
formations occurring in and throughout diverse time layers. 
Karl-Siegbert Rehberg illustrates not only that humans construct space but also 
that that space itself afects humans. To elucidate how physical space is shaping 
society and how this relates to social and power structures, he scrutinizes spatial 
transformations that have taken place since 70,000 BC. Rehberg’s analysis reveals 
that the extent to which humans can construct and change space is much more 
limited than current social-science, spatial-planning, and spatial-design discourses 
suggest. By solely focusing on shorter-term processes, these discourses systemati-
cally underestimate the impact of physical space on social life. 
Looking into the manners in which current communicative action (short-term 
processes) is infuenced by historicity (long-term processes), Fraya Frehse introduces 
a four-step methodology inspired by Henri Lefebvre’s (2001, 73–74) regressive– 
progressive method. Using homelessness as an empirical example, she demonstrates 
that the way homeless people in São Paulo (Brazil) produce space as part of their 
everyday life is infuenced by both past communicative action and urban structure 
and topology. Against this empirical backdrop, Frehse criticizes Knoblauch and 
Löw’s assumption of a transformative conversion from a somewhat dawdling past 
to a remarkably hastened present. In contrast, the refguration of spaces seems to be 
less linear and much more complex: The production of space by homeless people 
indicates that new patterns of increasing mobility (“circulation”) coexist alongside 
long-established patterns of (im)mobility. 
Similarly, Susanne Rau departs from examples of people’s experiences of space 
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allows scholars—in her particular case, historians—to comprehend the space–time 
connection. She argues that (modern) theories of space have to be integrated into 
the historical sciences, inasmuch as spatial studies also need to incorporate the per-
spective of the longue durée. 
Finally, drawing on the work of the Architecture Principe group—namely 
Claude Parent and Paul Virilio—from the 1960s, Christian Sander gives an example 
of how a deeply spatial discipline (architecture) is shaped by temporality. According 
to the theory of the oblique function, the city is exclusively built with horizontal and 
inclined surfaces for pedestrians to circulate in order to drastically reduce the speed 
of movement. Circulation, Sander suggests, thereby becomes a principal organiza-
tional category in the transformation of space through time. 
Spatiality, social inequality, and the economy 
It is a well-known fact, especially in the social and political sciences, that the econ-
omy is a key factor in (re-)producing social inequality, inequity, discrimination, and 
exclusion. These interconnected phenomena obviously have a spatial dimension 
and manifest themselves on multiple scales. At a global level, the world-system 
is characterized by a global division of labor that reinforces (post)colonial divi-
sions between the Global North and South. At a supranational and national level, 
regional disparities can be observed. At a community level, urban geographies of 
production as well as gentrifcation are discernible citywide. 
There is strong empirical evidence to suggest that the relationship between
spatiality, social inequality, and the economy is surprisingly stable in the long
durée—powerful actors and locations consistently have managed to reproduce
their advantageous position in the world-system over centuries. Hardly any war-
related, economic, or political crisis manages to disturb this cycle of reproduc-
tion, and only rarely does a disadvantaged locality manage to upgrade its position
(Heidenreich 2003). The chapters contained within this section explore possible
reasons for this stability in order to identify ways of breaking the cycles of repro-
duction of social inequality and correspondingly bringing about social and spatial
transformations. In doing so, the frst chapters bridge the thematic gulf between
the temporality and spatiality of social inequality and the economy. All chapters,
moreover, fnd common ground by claiming that key actors reafrming global
inequality include states, other political players, and companies owned by trans-
national elites. 
Gurminder K. Bhambra shows that current global inequalities were created dur-
ing colonialism between the ffteenth and nineteenth centuries and, at the same 
time, criticizes the fact that economic analyses of long-term social change—such as 
the modeling of incomes over time—typically apply categories that implicitly reaf-
frm the logic of territorial thinking used by former colonial powers. Her historical 
sociological analysis reveals challenges for today, such as the need for concepts of 
diferentiated citizenship and an ongoing acknowledgement of history “through 
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Also adopting a historical-sociological perspective, Manuela Boatca argues that 
citizenship awarded by nation states is a category of social inequality in and of itself, 
dividing the world-system into cores, semi-peripheries, and peripheries. Conse-
quently, Boatca contends, citizens of peripheral countries not only sufer from 
economic deprivation but also, as a result, are racially stereotyped. The seemingly 
neutral capitalist economy is thus based on racism and global inequality and over-
laid with populist, nationalist, fascist, and racist ideologies. Accordingly, increasing 
global inequality both within countries—represented by social class—and across 
countries—represented by citizenship—are driving spatial transformations, because 
the fastest way of improving living standards is to move from a peripheral to a core
country. However, nation states privilege the very rich of any country by allowing 
them to move freely and keep the very poor from immigrating—thereby reproduc-
ing the structure of the world-system. 
Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz and Corey R. Payne, along with Elke Beyer, Lucas-
Andrés Elsner, and Anke Hagemann, go beyond the analytical boundaries and 
apparent ubiquity of the nation-state by taking a closer look at how transnational 
economic elites manage to stabilize—or even increase—their wealth and thus con-
tribute to either sustaining the world-system or triggering spatial transformations, 
depending on which strategy better serves their needs. 
Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz and Corey R. Payne show that, in the longue durée, 
political spaces and territorial boundaries have continuously changed. For rich 
families, these spatial transformations have brought about the issue of how to best 
preserve their assets. As the authors demonstrate, rich families met this challenge 
by engaging translocally as a key economic investment practice. The refguration of 
spaces is therefore characterized by “interacting, longue durée geographies of social 
and political contestation, cooperation, and identity-formation that, precisely as a 
consequence of their very interactions, have constantly undergone change.” 
Investigating current economic actors’ fuctuating roles and engagement in the 
process of establishing industries and logistics for global commodity production, 
Elke Beyer, Lucas-Andrés Elsner, and Anke Hagemann come to similar conclusions. 
Using the example of infrastructure and industrial development projects in Ethio-
pia and Argentina, which are implemented in cooperation with Chinese compa-
nies and fnancial institutions, the authors contend that novel transnational actor 
constellations are fostered. A commodity chain analysis reveals how diferent spaces 
of production and distribution are interlinked and how they generate uneven spa-
tialities. Moreover, the authors indicate the intensive involvement in the fnancing, 
ownership, operation, or construction of the infrastructures based on global fows 
of commodities and argue that spatial transformation in certain territories can only 
be fully understood if examined from a transnational and relational perspective. 
Up to this point, analyses have focused on the relationship of the nation state
and transnational circulation on a global scale. In contrast, Michael Storper illustrates
that social and economic inequalities are also apparent at a supranational level and
take the form of increasing regional disparities, for example, at the very core of
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characterized by diverging qualifcations, educational outcomes, labor force par-
ticipation, and incomes. In addition, polarization of both political preferences and
electoral choices is also perceptible in nationalist–populist and social liberalist–
multiculturalist attitudes throughout various regions. Explaining these developments
in their key mechanisms poses challenges for research on economic geography and
regional and urban economy, which can only be solved through a multi-disciplinary
approach that combines “micro-economic analyses of employment location, wages,
the role of housing and amenities, skills and migration and place[s] them within
a broad structural and developmental framework.” This is ultimately a multi- and
interdisciplinary efort. The stakes are high, because geographical polarization is a
threat to social and economic stability and justice in the contemporary world. 
Elmar Kulke and Nina Baur scale down the analytical scope by focusing on the 
urban economy and providing an additional explanation for the sluggishness of spa-
tial transformations in the economy: the spatial and temporal coupling of institu-
tions. Using the example of consumer–retailer interactions in West German cities, 
they show how consumers (demand side) combine shopping with other everyday 
activities and how retailers (supply side) couple their outlets with other retailers 
and social institutions. Further, the authors demonstrate not only how demand and 
supply are coupled together but also how such combination becomes embedded in 
the material urban structure, in turn slowing down spatial transformations. 
Digitization and visualization of space 
The next section turns to another key hypothesis of Knoblauch and Löw’s (2017; 
2020; in this volume) concept of the refguration of spaces, namely that digitiza-
tion drives spatial transformations. Hence, this section focuses on the function 
space performs in the formation of public spheres and their interaction with the 
digital and physical world. Additionally, several central questions are addressed: To 
what degree are actors and topics locally bounded or rather translocally infuenced 
and connected? Does online communication infuence the constitution of spaces 
ofine? In what ways do actors push certain perceptions of spaces to advance their 
strategic goals? 
In line with Marco Bastos’ contribution, there is growing evidence that social 
media depend on physical spaces. The COVID-19 pandemic has even increased 
the interdependencies between online and ofine social networks. Although they 
might seem unrelated at frst glance, online and ofine social activities reinforce 
each other. Furthermore, while social media interaction can develop without phys-
ical ties, interactions developed online can afect our perception of what is “real” 
ofine and online. Bastos illustrates this by revealing that homophily is infuenced 
by both online and ofine social networks as well as the spatial dimensions of social 
media, which results from a tendency to associate oneself with other similar people. 
Likewise, Daniel Maier, Daniela Stoltenberg, Barbara Pfetsch, and Annie Waldherr
point out that digitization enables larger communities with shared imagination,
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people move around the world much more than ever before, they can still relate
to their groups at home via digital communication. Therefore, communities not
only continue to be spatially rooted but also form translocally distributed social
pillars for public spheres to enhance their strength through communication in
social media. Moreover, digital communication regularly breaks up national ter-
ritories and, at the meso level, reorganizes translocal communities and the rela-
tionship between the public sphere and space. The authors urge for research to
incorporate the translocal as a key category to delve into social media commu-
nication. Their call resonates with planning, design, and policymaking circles, in
which, though the power of Internet-based communication is widely acknowl-
edged, the translocal potential and infuence of communities has not been con-
sidered in the least. 
Eric Lettkemann and Ingo Schulz-Schaefer take a diferent stance at investigating
how the digital and physical world are entangled by investigating whether the
increasing use of locative media—such as Foursquare City Guide or Swarm— 
creates new inclusive public meeting places or reinforces urban segregation by
creating exclusive places. Their study reveals that locative media encourage the
exploration of unknown places and could therefore lead to a decentralization of
social milieus in the public urban fabric. Urban data circulations thus result in a
constant modifcation and recombination of communicative action in public space
and, at least currently, practices of inclusion and exclusion seem to balance each
other out. 
Now, not only digital communication and data fows but also visual repre-
sentations of space portray powerful spatial transformations and thereby modify
and suggest distinctive spatial images and experiences, which may in fact alter
the physicality of cities. Gillian Rose investigates how, in digitally mediated cit-
ies, people change their way of “looking at images of other people, on digital
screens large and small, pictured in that city or another.” She identifes a form of
co-production of embodiments at the interface between diferent technologies
that oscillates between representational and animated forms—best described as
“animated embodiment.” Whereas representational bodies denote existing social
categories, animatic bodies are emergent, mobile, fuid, and mutating. Both con-
stitute diferent organizations of urban space—in order to understand mediated
cities, entanglements, transformations, and mixtures of urban circulations must be
part of the equation. 
Spatial transformations become visible in the photo essay by artist and researcher 
Stefanie Bürkle, who weaves together images of various places within diferent cul-
tural settings to display the infuence of migration and tourism on both space 
and individual spatial perception. The continued fow of images shows not only 
surprising links but also new compositional and content-related connections and 
transitions, which go well beyond the images themselves and between the depicted 
spaces. The photo essay comprises, altogether, a mode of spatial representation, 
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Imagining, producing, and negotiating space 
The chapters in this book’s last section explore how medium- and long-term spatial 
transformations have modifed the relationship between humans and the produc-
tion of space in contemporary society. To that end, a series of interlaced concepts— 
such as globalization, materiality, appropriation, afordance—are scrutinized, 
alongside the dynamics and logics of the production of physical space unfolding 
amid local–global tensions. Against this backdrop, the contributions grapple with 
questions such as: how the linking and coupling of spaces impact planning, con-
struction, and appropriation processes; which alternative options for action and 
conficts arise; the ways in which individuals cope with the notion of (in)security; 
and how multi-directionality forges new spatial knowledge and urban practices in 
addition to building new translocal alliances. 
Since the 1970s, mounting economic exchange, migration fuxes, and commu-
nication technologies have not only amplifed subjective uncertainty and insecurity 
but also paved the way for them to permeate identity politics. Consequently, politi-
cal actors more often than not instrumentalize uncertainty and insecurity to legiti-
mize their agendas and exert economic, political, and technical control over certain 
space—for instance, when designated “dangerous zones” in cities are put under 
surveillance to allegedly improve “security.” Using Ronald D. Laing (1960) and 
Anthony Giddens’ (1991) concept of “ontological security,” Ilse Helbrecht, Janina 
Dobrusskin, Carolin Genz, and Lucas Pohl identify social practices that counteract the 
lack of ontological security, such as geopolitically positioning yourself (i.e. develop-
ing an understanding of the world by subjectively evaluating events happening all 
over the world), homemaking, and nature-related routines. 
In line with such spatial strategies, Talja Blokland, Daniela Krüger, Robert Vief, and 
Henrik Schultze stress the importance of the neighborhood in mastering everyday 
life. The authors propose a research approach that takes into account not only sub-
jective defnitions of support needs but also from where and in what form support 
actually comes. This would eventually result in geographies of support that, sure 
enough, are also susceptible to the efects of mobility and digitization. Hence, in 
order to fully grasp spatial transformations at the neighborhood level, both local 
and translocal networks have to be analyzed, and spatiality, as pointed out by the 
authors, needs to be considered within network data studies, while factors other 
than proximity have to come into play. 
Similarly, Jennifer Robinson argues that new territories of urban politics— 
including city-regions, operational landscapes, and large-scale development 
projects—cannot be fully understood without contemplating transnational actors 
and practices, circulating policies, and material and fnancial fows as key drivers 
of urban development. Robinson looks for the spatiality in urban policy action by 
making territories and territorializations of the politics an access key for analyses 
and theorization. 
Ayham Dalal, Aline Fraikin, and Antonia Noll explore the tensions between urban 
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migrants. The authors explore refugees’ ability to adapt temporary homes gradu-
ally and thereby imbue them with “meaning beyond the [ofcially] envisioned 
planning.” Refugees, the authors sustain, appropriate and reassign through subtle 
practices of forming soft and temporary spaces such as “hanging curtains, plac-
ing carpets, dismantling beds, assembling fridges, storing luggage, and relocating 
mattresses, chairs and tables.” Refugees’ material modifcations constitute as much 
a political act as a spatial practice aimed at, somewhat stealthily, overcoming and 
undermining the arbitrariness of spatial regulations—which may even result in the 
erosion of disciplinary powers exerted through space. 
In the last chapter of this section, Ignacio Castillo, Angela Million, and Jona Schwerer
inquire into the discrepancy between experts’ abstract conceptions and people’s 
everyday uses of space in their study of children’s “deviant” use of public space. 
Drawing on the concepts of afordance, relational space, spatial knowledge, and 
spatial pedagogization, public space is seen as an arrangement of multiple material 
objects and actors with varying degrees of spatial knowledge and physical quali-
ties. The authors sustain that, whereas design and planning experts seek to assert a 
specifc and ultimate purpose of public space’s constitutive material elements (i.e. 
a spatial pedagogization), children subvert such eforts by “uncovering,” through 
their intuitive actions, dormant afordances (i.e. a performative articulation of their 
spatial knowledge). In view of such a conundrum, the authors pose the question of 
how children’s spatial knowledge, objectifed in their uses of spatial arrangements, 
could be substantively integrated into the design process. Accordingly, the chapter 
deconstructs, as an empirical case study, the intervention of a public space on the 
outskirts of the city of Lima, which has followed a fairly unorthodox approach 
towards child participation and seems to have moved from a “prescriptive” to a 
“responsive” posture regarding the uses with which public space is to be instilled. 
Towards an interdisciplinary scholarship of spatial research 
The previously discussed overview of the sundry chapters comprising this volume 
illustrates the potential of multi- and interdisciplinary spatial research and spatial 
thinking—for both theory and practice. Overall, the contributions of this volume 
indicate that spatial transformations are characterized by three key aspects: 
1	 Space-time entanglements, which, though they are already comprehensible in the 
notions of “spatial transformations” and “refiguration of spaces,” in order to 
fully understand them, it is important to keep in mind that spaces are refigured 
on different spatial scales—from specific localities and neighborhoods to cit-
ies, regions, and nation states, throughout the entire world-system—and that 
processes of refiguration unfold within different time layers. It is therefore espe-
cially important not only to carefully consider spatial transformations in the 
longue durée, but also to pay closer attention to the interactions of spatial trans-
formations across different scales and time layers, as the patterns of refiguration 
become more specific and distinguishable. 
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2	 The processes of refiguration of spaces are characterized by power struggles, and existing 
power relations contained therein are often reproduced and reinforced—perhaps 
the most conspicuous example being the postcolonial structures of inequality 
within the world-system. Several chapters direct a critical perspective towards 
the effects of spatial refigurations by concentrating either on the impacts of the 
economy of the spatial division of labor and social inequality or on spatial aspects 
of social inequality, inclusion, and exclusion. In doing so, they bring to the fore 
the upshots of the refiguration of spaces along the lines of class, gender, and eth-
nic relations and ask who is included or excluded, where, when, why, how, and 
to what effect. However, as powerless and disenfranchised as some actors—such 
as refugees and children—may seem, they are far from passive. They are fully 
capable of developing counterstrategies to undermine the very attempts at con-
trolling them. The power (im)balances and ensuing spatial practices among the different
social groups in turn drive the process of refiguration of spaces. 
3	 When looking into the manifold ways in which offline and online public spaces are 
designed, it needs to be taken into account that spaces are systematically related 
to and become entangled with one another. In this context, the entanglement 
of three fields needs to be taken into account more effectively in future plan-
ning and design processes: 
a Planning and appropriation of urban space 
b Translocal planning processes and procedures 
c The role of spatiality in online and offline public spheres 
Examinations of spatial production consider the relationships and tensions 
between planned space and appropriated space, and thereby, implicitly, the interac-
tions between (urban) planning, architecture, and people’s interactions in every-
day lives. In this context, the question as to how materiality, affordance, and 
refiguration of spaces are interrelated remains open. The contributions in this 
book reveal that planning processes and procedures can be tackled as a translo-
cally circulating planning practice with similar expectations of spatial constitution 
and furnished with challenges on spatial production. Also, the ways and extent 
to which planning, in and of itself, contributes instrumentally to triggering the 
refiguration of spaces are explored, inasmuch as spaces in and beyond (the prac-
tice of ) planning are conspicuously mediated through visualizations. Shedding 
light on the production of (new kinds of ) imagery arguably reveals how spaces 
are refigured. Last but not least, the relationship between spatial constitution and 
the public sphere is examined. Based on the differentiation between diverse types 
of publicity in the literature, their spatial concepts are juxtaposed and compared 
to each other in terms of leading questions and empirical characteristics. The 
analytical gist, moreover, is the influence that processes of spatial constitution 
exert on the emergence and dynamics of distinctive sorts and forms of publics. 
The inherent complexity of investigating these convoluted refgurations of spaces
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practices and within institutional frameworks. To conduct, substantively, socio-scientifc
spatial research, in its broad sense, interdisciplinary cooperation is essential. This volume
as a whole, along with each of the contributions, makes manifest that space, across the
diferent disciplines covered, does not simply enable a relatively uncritical passive refec-
tion on social phenomena, but rather constitutes both a representational and constitutive
analytical strategy that allows bridges to be built across disciplines. 
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PART I 
Spatiality and temporality 

2 
THE REFIGURATION OF SPACE, 
CIRCULATION, AND MOBILITY 
Martina Löw and Hubert Knoblauch 
Introduction: social changes are spatial changes 
“Re-Figuration of Spaces” is the title of our research consortium, which is designed 
to work for up to 12 years. When writing this text, the Collaborative Research 
Center (in German: “Sonderforschungsbereich”) had only just started a year ear-
lier, at a time when we could not have imagined what would ensue during the 
current corona crisis (which we will address in an afterword added during the 
editing of this article.) Any attempt to provide a semblance of empirical results 
would therefore be utterly premature at this point. We do not wish to start with a 
speculative catchline aimed at attracting public attention for the next two or three 
weeks. Rather, we prefer to sketch a notion of refguration that can serve as a 
framework for a number of chapters within this volume. As this notion has already 
been outlined elsewhere in some detail (Knoblauch and Löw 2017; Knoblauch 
2020; Knoblauch and Löw 2020a), our objective is to explain how it can be under-
stood as a sensitizing concept for empirical inquiries on the current transformation 
of space not only for the contributions in this volume but also for future research 
relating to the consortium and its questions. With the notion of refguration, we 
address the following questions: How do the current societal transformations and 
their ensuing conficts, crises, and uncertainties afect the relationship between 
humans and spaces, their spatial practices, and the means they use to negotiate and 
construct spatial orders? How do changes in spatial practices and spatial formations 
transform society? 
These questions presuppose some theoretical refections on the social consti-
tution and the communicative construction of space (see Löw 2016; Knoblauch 
2020), of which we can only articulate the basic result: That space is the medium 
in which the transformation of any society or social change takes place. This holds 
even more true for contemporary society, which is characterized, on the one hand, 
DOI: 10.4324/9781003036159-3 
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by functional diferentiation, a vertical hierarchical order, and a tendency towards 
homogeneity and which, on the other hand, is often in tension with heterogeneity, 
heterarchies, and fat networks. The idea of refguration is taken to describe the 
confictual dynamic between these poles underlying societal transformation. 
In this very short introduction, rather than outlining the general relational 
theory of space, we (1) sketch the notion of refguration as a model for recent 
societal development. In the second part (2), we strive to delineate the approach 
to the questions of social and spatial transformation in our collaborative research 
group. As the title of the chapter suggests, we wish (3) to specifcally inquire about 
the efects of mediatization of space on circulation and mobility. As refguration 
is a sensitive concept, it is formulated in an abstract manner, thus leaving suf-
cient “space” and openness for specifcations, modifcations, and diferentiations by 
means of empirical research. 
In empirical research, we start from the methodological premise that what is 
social always takes on spatial forms. As much as this view came to be shared in the 
aftermath of the “spatial turn,” it neglects the fact that current social changes and 
their ensuing conficts, crises, and increasing uncertainties pose a common prob-
lem, namely that these crises, conficts, and uncertainties afect the relationship 
between humans and spaces, their spatial practices, and the means they use to nego-
tiate and construct spatial orders. We claim that a common pattern can be found in 
these transformations and conficts, which we designate refguration. 
Refguration 
By refguration, we mean that the social order of present-day societies results from 
two conficting spatial logics based on two diferent dominant spatial fgurations. 
While the notion of fguration builds on Elias’ (1982) analysis of both societal and 
subjective changes in the civilization process, we use the term logic here in the 
sense of Bourdieu (1990) as a structural principle resulting from practicalities of 
action. To us, this praxeology depends on the spatial relations of (knowledgeable) 
bodies acting, interacting, and communicating with each other. Space is generally 
understood as a relational arrangement of living beings and social goods in places. 
As Mol and Law (1994) suggest, one can clearly distinguish such logics from 
one another. Yet, the contemporary refguration of society seems to be driven by 
the diferentiation of institutionalized, specialized systems and the homogenization 
and centralization of bounded container spaces, which is probably best exemplifed 
by the modern nation state. The second logic is characterized by relationality and 
refers to fguration represented by fuidity, hybridization, and transgression, some-
times symbolized by the network model. An important example of this may be the 
network society as suggested by Castells (2000). He links the rise of digitalization 
to a concept of network as a set of interconnected nodes at which diferent threads 
cross. 
The notion of refguration does not follow the linear argument implied in 
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follows modern national society. Instead, it underlines the (1) persistence of these 
two dominant fgurations (which are, of course, complemented by other spatial 
fgurations, such as places and tracks), (2) the dynamics of confict resulting from 
and caused by these fgurations, and (3) the new forms, fgurations, and spatial 
orders that result from these dynamics and are so often ignored by modernists and 
postmodernists, globalists and nationalists, structuralists and poststructuralists, and, 
more recently, unilateralists and multilateralists. 
When addressing these encompassing dynamics, we refer to what Couldry and 
Hepp (2017, 57) call a fguration of fgurations; that is to say, a model of society 
that covers the various orders within society. Changes in these fgurations of fgura-
tions correspond to what Krotz (2001) has labeled a “megatrend.” By refguration, 
however, we want to avoid the implied container metaphor, which is still implicit 
in Elias’ notion of the encapsulation of fguration. 
As mentioned earlier, we understand refguration as a process, which is caused 
and driven by the dynamics of confict resulting from the spatial tension between 
dominant fgurations and spatial logics. In order to understand the confictual 
dynamics, we can juxtapose certain features within each fguration in an exagger-
ated, characteristic manner as follows: 
This conceptual opposition is simply a way to grasp the dynamics of refgura-
tion in a tentative and hypothetical manner, which should not be misunderstood 
as propagating refguration to be a desirable state. Rather, we presume that the two 
fgurations serve as a reasonable basis for studying empirical diferences, similarities, 
and changes in socio-spatial forms, which make it possible to explain the reasons 
behind the social crises and subjective uncertainties we have been witnessing over 
the last decades. There is a quite confict-laden polarity between the tendency 
towards transnationalization, for example in the European Union, and the emphasis 
on territorial borders in modern nation states, between the ethnic or cultural con-
ceptions of purity (for example, in Poland) and multi-ethnicity or multiculturalism 
(for example, in France), and between the national rejection of regional autonomy 
(in Spain) and the provision of autonomy (for example, in Great Britain). 








DIAGRAM 2.1 Conficting fgurations and spatial logics 
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If we search for a recent example of the dynamics in the confictual spatial 
fgurations, the current corona crisis would seem to provide a natural experiment 
(which is elaborated in Knoblauch and Löw 2020b). In fact, the tension between 
territorial and network logics, between hierarchy and heterarchy, between limi-
tation and delimitation, and between homogeneity and heterogeneity has been 
particularly acute during the corona crisis. Refguration explains the simultaneity 
and tension of the corona crisis, which is essentially a global risk. Thus, it is quite 
remarkable that the global expansion has not been met with a global response, and 
even in Europe the national states have clearly overruled transnational cooperation. 
Instead, unilateral decisions to close the borders of national and even regional terri-
tories were made. Borders, for decades neither controlled nor fortifed, were closed 
without prior notice or consultation between states, such as France and Germany. 
Not only have national territories been closed of, national citizens stranded out-
side their countries were quickly “brought home” in unprecedented “repatriation” 
actions. 
This closure of territorial space is met with the opposing principle of mediating 
spaces by networks. Those who cannot meet face to face resort to video confer-
ences. Those who cannot work in the ofce work at their newly established home 
ofce, and those who do not want to go out to eat order via an app and hope 
that the packages are as clean as the Internet. In the current hyper-compressed 
emergency order, digital space compensates for public presence, where music is 
played, groups meet, and games are played. But it also replaces the other functions 
of society: Universities are to be completely converted to digital communication, 
as is public administration. The home ofce allows the majority of other organiza-
tions to operate with digital communication technologies. Internet, emails, and the 
video conferences keep us in international circles, allowing us to launch initiatives, 
maintain bubbles of bounded communication networks, and establish new rituals. 
The basic idea behind refguration consists of the assumption of confictual but 
interdependent dynamics between these diferent logics, or in a more metaphorical 
sense, refguration denotes the forms resulting from the “energy” between these 
opposite poles of these two logics. Every logic is, of course, in itself heterogeneous. 
What was once called modern and what used to be called postmodern is in itself 
an array of diferent elements that can be investigated (in our case, by comparing 
diferent space studies). Moreover, Norbert Elias’ idea of interdependencies allows 
us to add that these dynamics afect all social felds and society at all (micro, meso, 
and macro) levels, including the individual actors along with their knowledge, 
bodies, and emotions. We expect diferent expressions of refguration in various 
societal spheres (i.e. economy, politics, arts, etc.) and levels (from the individual 
to an organization and cultural areas), as well as interdependencies between them. 
In addition, in non-Western societies, the lines of confict may be quite diferent. 
Thus, in the “compressed modernity” of South Korea and likely China, we assume 
the refguration to be driven by the confict between a rapid process of economic 
and technological instrumentalism with its networked logic, on the one hand, 
and on the other by a familialism based on the container space model. Chang 
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(2010) calls this “individualization without individualism,” supporting a specifc 
East Asian form of nationalism, the reinvention of traditional values and kinship 
structures. Diferent lines of confict may also be found in Muslim countries or 
Hinduist India—where confict has been linked to religion—or, of course, South 
America and Africa. While the concept of refguration is sensitive to these varieties 
of modernity, in the context of Western thinking, it allows us to adjust the epochal 
diagnosis in theories of modernization, globalization, and late and postmodernity. 
Refguration difers from a dialectical relation in that we do not assume that 
the confictual poles are substituted (as Marx’ dialectical materialism suggests) but, 
rather, are only changed and adopt new spatial forms. If their extreme character-
istics come into direct contact with each other, this leads to changes, connections, 
or conficts. The empirical studies are tasked with identifying these new forms so 
as to deduce the specifc form of refguration. 
Refguration of spaces 
While there seems to be little doubt in social science discourse about the trans-
formation of temporal structures and the acceleration of lives, communication, or 
markets, space has received much less attention when it comes to the diagnosis of 
contemporary society. Starting from the assumption that any social action fnds its 
expression in space, we use the notion of refguration of space to stress that the 
most diverging ongoing processes result in new fgurations of space, such as the 
synthesis of virtual and real space in teleconferencing. To put it diferently: Space is 
the medium of transformation for contemporary society as much as time. There-
fore, the analysis of space provides an integrative starting point for the analysis of 
the emerging patterns of society. 
If we focus on spatiality by using the concept of refguration of spaces, we can 
see that the process of globalization is in confict with the centralized fguration of 
the nation state with its bounded territory, clearly defned by enlightened cartogra-
phy (Schlögel 2011), and characterized by its increased centralization of power, the 
monopolization of violence, and the diferentiation of social structures. However, 
diferences in spatial logics do not necessarily only result in confict; territorial spa-
tial forms (such as designated zones, camps, colonies, etc.) may co-exist, interlock 
with, or spread out alongside/over/beneath more fuid and more explicitly rela-
tional spatial assemblages (networks, layers, clouds, trajectories, etc.). 
In similar terms, the homogenization of modern spaces, their clear functional 
diferentiation (for example, modern cities divided into functional areas) or their 
vertical hierarchical order (e.g., in administrative architecture) is in tension with the 
heterogeneity of hybrid spaces, third or non-places, heterotopias, and the fatness 
of heterarchical orders so much underlined by theories of late, second, or post-
modernity. The homogenizing top-down planning of smart cities in the Global 
South or in Asia, for instance, contrasts with the logic of networking and fuidity in 
the so-called smart infrastructure in the same countries. Similarly, the transgressive 
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virtual military conficts, as institutionalized in the European Union for example, 
are confronted with the reafrmation of principles of re-nationalization, the return 
of modern wars, and forms of regionalization that explicitly try to avoid the forms 
of adaptation postmodern theories call “glocalization.” 
This refguration of society is articulated in fghts over the meaning of spaces, 
in imaginary models of security and risk, and in processes of closure and exclusion, 
such as the erection of new frontiers, such as those between the UK and the EU, 
between Mexico and the U.S., or even between France and Germany during the 
corona crisis. These conficts result in unpredictability and a lack of security and 
orientation. The most obvious transformation consists in what came to be known 
as globalization, meaning the increase in interdependencies and connectivity, such 
as the worldwide explosion of mobility, including groups of refugees, the circula-
tion of commodities, free trade agreements between Japan and the EU, technical 
procedures and technologies, and the corresponding political, military, and legal 
strategies of control. At the same time, we are faced by opposing anti-globalizing 
tendencies such as Brexit, the abandonment of free trade agreements by the U.S. 
government, and “only eat local products” movements. 
Translocalization, polycontexturalization, and mediatization 
Refguration can be tentatively characterized by three sub-processes, which func-
tion as sensitizing concepts for empirical investigations. The most well known of 
these concepts is that of translocalization. In using translocalization as a sensitizing 
concept, we assume that diferent places are increasingly linked, simultaneously 
increasing the relevance of constructions of locality because places are no longer 
assumed to be self-evident. For example, in our project on public space in the social 
web (coordinated by Barbara Pfetsch and Annie Waldherr, Pfetsch et al. 2019), we 
observed that U.S. politics is an important topic in the Twittersphere in Jerusalem 
(more important than in Berlin). The strong connection to U.S. topics seems to be 
driven by the Anglo-American population in Jerusalem, refecting translocal ties. 
The concept of polycontexturalization expresses our assumption that space, circu-
lation, networks, and places, for example, are being connected in a new way by what
we call communicative action (Knoblauch 2020). In the course of performing these
embodied actions, more and more spaces, and potentially new spaces, are afected
(or themselves afect these actions) and become efective at the same time. Take, for
example, the massive change in control rooms (e.g., for the surveillance of crowds
or monitoring mobility infrastructures). Control rooms constitute a paradigmatic
form of modernity to control not only populations but also technological, natural
resources, and risks. Surprisingly, digitalization with its assumed tendency towards
networking and decentralization has not led to a substitution of spatially centralized
control rooms, but rather has fostered the rapid integration of very diferent function-
alities, such as water resources, health services, trafc, and electricity. The integration
of diferent infrastructures into one local center and into a single control room con-
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by a scopic regime of multiple monitors and screens but also become relevant in con-
texts of actions—which take on what we believe to be a polycontextural character.
This polycontexturalization, however, is not just a postmodern transgression of space;
it appears to contribute to the bounding of certain spaces, such as smart cities, and to
help accentuate the diferences between urban and rural areas, nations and cultural
areas, in a way conforming to our defnition of refguration. 
In addition to translocalization and polycontexturalization, there is another 
concept that represents a major pillar for our understanding of refguration: media-
tization. Mediatization refers to the ways media and technology afect embodied 
communicative action, the relations constituted by them, and thus spatial structure. 
Its relevance can be easily understood if one recalls the substantial social transforma-
tion from oral cultures to literal cultures—in terms of settlements (cities) or politi-
cal order (central power) (Soja 2011). One should also keep in mind that printing 
provided large masses of people with written and visual information (including 
maps very early on) several hundred years before the advent of the industrial soci-
ety in England. Moreover, the electrifcation of industrial mass products and pro-
duction in the 19th century was preceded by the dissemination of the telegraph, 
which made it possible to separate the means of communication and transport in 
a way that noticeably afected the spatial order immensely. In contrast to earlier 
spatial transformations, the current refguration of space is related to and driven 
by the recent digital mediatization, which at the same time is a communication 
medium (computer). Digitalization has not led to the despatialization of society, as 
many had expected. Yet, digital mediatization quite obviously afects space, social 
action, and spatial imagination, as indicated by the study of locative media, such as 
dating apps, investigated in another research project (coordinated by Ingo Schulz-
Schaefer; Lettkemann and Schulz-Schaefer, 2021). There is little doubt that late 
and postmodern visions, including the network society and its space of fows (see 
Castells 2015), have been countered by insights into the communicative power of 
the new media monopoles and their capacity to centralize information. These new 
communicative fgurations are addressed by Couldry and Hepp (2017) as “deep 
mediatization.” Digital media ubiquitously permeate the whole of society and 
increase interdependencies through their technical connectivity, extending pro-
cesses of social communication locally by speeding up communication. Although 
digital mediatization quite clearly reshapes and substitutes the rather centralized 
and hierarchical order of mass media, it is not restricted to media communication. 
Being based on the revolutionary connection of information and communication 
technologies, digitalization is increasingly afecting every feld of society. 
It is not just the media system, as communication theorists assume, but all indus-
tries, technologies, and infrastructures that are refgured by digital mediatization. In 
the economy, for example, this becomes apparent in the production of commodi-
ties like 3D printing, their dissemination on the market, and their consumption (or 
combination of production and consumption, i.e. prosumption) in ways that have 
been labeled—somewhat one-sidedly—“digital capitalism,” because most indus-
tries are still strongly tied to materiality. 
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However, mediatization also afects politics, sports, and, as we are currently 
seeing, science. By changing the relations between subjects as well as between 
subjects and objects, mediatization contributes to the refguration of subjective 
aspects of space. Institutions as well as actors and subjectivities are being refgured, 
too: Research on the socialization of children suggests that while spatial environ-
ments were perceived as fairly homogenous in the past, they are now increasingly 
experienced as isolated pockets of space (Zeiher and Zeiher 1994). Instead of one 
coherent unity, space appears as an accumulation of multiple interconnected, net-
worked spatial fragments. These shifts are associated sometimes with increasing acts 
of vandalism in public spaces and an afnity for extremist positions (Heitmeyer 
1996), but also with the revitalization of inner-city areas, as today’s youth are out 
and about the city carrying mobile devices rather than sitting at home in front of 
the television. 
Circulation and mobility 
Mediatization visibly afects mobility and, consequently, the process we call “cir-
culation” in that it can enhance and accelerate the movement of people, objects, 
and their communication in space, or it can intensify communication across space. 
Circulation refers to the way in which mobility creates spatial order and disorder. 
By circulation, we mean the movement of people, goods, signs, and technology 
between diferent places. Circulation is not an unsystematic, free fow of enti-
ties, but rather proceeds along orderly institutional paths, organizational felds, and 
social infrastructures with reliable transition points and follow-up operations. For 
example, food retailing is still strongly embedded in a city’s built urban environ-
ment, and the corona crisis has revealed how strongly food production and retailing 
still depend on material infrastructures such as logistics. Nevertheless, even indus-
tries closely bound to materiality such as food production and retailing are afected 
by mediatization due to the increase in online retailing or the use of digitalization 
to improve logistics, for instance, thus resulting in complex new spatial forms (Baur 
et al. 2020). 
If one thinks about the role of circulation in the refguration of spaces, one 
quickly gets the impression that spaces of circulation are a consequence of social 
transformations. A closer look, however, shows that these trajectories (predefned 
paths of circulation, lines, routes of trafc) in which circulations occur have always 
been a necessary component of the construction of modern-day spaces. Routes, 
lines, paths, and tracks of various kinds (such as rivers, railway lines, public trans-
port networks, motorways, footpaths) are the underlying material structures that 
have a propensity towards mobility, in homogenously designed urban spaces, for 
example. 
Taking Le Corbusier’s urban utopias as case studies, it is possible to understand 
how the contemporary city was consistently divided into spatially distinct, formally 
and functionally diferentiated zones, and how the trajectory was implicitly estab-
lished as a new leading fgure, initially in urban planning (Vinken 2008). 
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Ulrike Jureit (2012) demonstrates in the context of the discovery of colonial 
space that this dynamic in modern society is not only visible in cities. Explor-
ers, land surveyors, and adventurers followed clearly defned routes on foot or on 
horseback, with the clear intention of expanding the knowledge of space. In fact, 
the linearity of their routes transformed these paths into trajectorial space. The 
information gathered along the way fowed into a single map, with the spaces 
beyond the route remaining blank and thus perceived as empty space. The trajecto-
rial space, which, in this case, is the precondition for the enforcement of territorial 
space, unfolds its pervasive logic of circulation, as postulated by Robert Venturi, 
Denise Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour (1977), in the form of the highway and 
automobile-driving subjects. It is evident in many newly founded cities outside 
Europe that an orientation towards roads, bicycle lanes, sidewalks, lanes for elec-
tric scooters, underground waste transportation systems, and information highways 
radically structures daily life. 
The Korean city of Songdo, for example, which we are studying in various 
individual projects within the framework of our Collaborative Research Center 
(Löw and Stollmann 2018), stands out as a trajectorial space par excellence: With a 
target population of 70,000 (currently 35,000), the city boasts a number of eight-
lane streets, assorted sidewalks that are several meters wide, and numerous cycle 
paths (although hardly any Koreans ride a bicycle). The shopping mall in Songdo 
was designed by the architect Minsuk Cho so that it could be easily crossed with 
electric scooters. Garbage is transported underground on conveyor belts and pro-
cessed centrally. All these paths, lines, tracks, and routes that facilitate circulation, 
mobility, and displacement have not yet been sufciently factored in as signifcant 
spatial areas in their own right in relevant research and theories (with the possible 
exception of research in urban planning departments). It is, however, trajectorial 
space (which also includes shipping and air routes) that organizes social coexistence 
and societal relations at the most fundamental level. The spatial analysis of Twit-
ter networks demonstrates, for example, that statements of solidarity after terrorist 
attacks are sent not primarily from the region or from neighboring cities, but rather 
from cities with the most efective and lowest-priced fight connections to the 
attacked city (Lin and Margolin 2014). 
Trajectorial spaces of circulation are especially relevant to the understanding of 
refguration, since they literally “pave the way” out of the spatial homogenization 
of modern spaces with their clear functional diferentiation or vertical hierarchical 
order right from the start. For Rudolph Schwarz, the general planner in the recon-
struction of Cologne (after its destruction in WWII), for example, the transport 
system was a means to connect the homely city (a concept of place) to the world (a 
concept of translocality by circulation and trajectorial space). 
In the very way that we conceive refguration of present-day societies to follow 
two dominant conficting spatial logics of “container” and “network” simultane-
ously, which are interdependent, circulation linked to territoriality is both part 
of modernity and a precondition for digitalized mediatization and deterritorial-
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Translocalization designates the linkage of diferent places. It does not necessar-
ily mean the dislocation or even annihilation of place but instead can serve to 
boost the constructions of locality. From this perspective, places are simply no 
longer regarded as self-evident, and circulation forces us to develop an even stron-
ger notion of place. We have to consider what is happening in Songdo and all over 
the world: If spaces of circulation and mobility become stronger, then we witness 
an increased emotional need to create spaces as networks of places (e.g., the rein-
vention of traditional Korean houses as meeting places and landmarks). Territorial 
spatial forms co-exist, interlock with, and spread out alongside, over, and beneath 
more fuid, more explicitly relational spatial networks, connections, and fgura-
tions. It is the very empirical task in our study of refguration to answer the ques-
tion: How do they do this? The forms of spaces (territorial space, trajectorial space, 
network space, etc.) are of interest for empirical spatial research, but the socio-
spatial aspect is best researched (in our opinion) with an emphasis on refguration. 
Conclusion 
As mentioned at the beginning, the ideas presented here are not straitjackets but 
rather are considered sensitizing concepts. The refguration of spaces, therefore, 
should be specifed by means of the empirical studies conducted within the context 
of our collaborative research cluster as well as in neighboring research endeavors. 
The chapters in this volume constitute examples of such research. We also hope to 
learn from future research about the qualities and the range of the social transfor-
mations of space that we call refguration. 
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Types, categories, and processes of a 
crucial factor in social life 
Karl-Siegbert Rehberg 
It is not from space that I must seek my dignity, 
but from the government of my thought. . . . 
By space the universe encompasses 
and swallows me up like an atom; 
by thought I comprehend the world. 
—Blaise Pascal ([1670] 1958, Chapter VI: 
The Philosophers. Fragment 348) 
Norbert Elias as methodological stimulator for the 
analysis of spatial transformations 
Norbert Elias would have been pleased to contribute to the approach of analyz-
ing the “refguration of spaces” (Löw and Knoblauch in this book) because he was 
particularly proud of having “discovered” the signifcance of fgurations for socio-
logical analysis. Elias was deeply convinced that a focus on relational fgurations was 
an integral yet missing key to recognizing and understanding causal relations and 
coherences within societies. This is why he developed a methodological approach 
to historical sociology that carried the spirit of the longue durée-orientated Annales
School. Based upon his understanding of relationality and processuality within 
social relations, Elias ([1939] 1969, [1939] 1982) intended nothing less than to re-
calibrate and re-establish sociological research. 
Elias insinuated that historical and sociological sciences alike are habitually con-
cerned with states—in the sense of static conditions, not of course in the political 
sense—instead of processes, without even diferentiating according to the objects of 
their inquiry. In contrast to his idea, today’s research mainly focuses on probabilities 
and contours of a possible “next society” (Baecker 2007). Even those require relat-


















Following Elias’s insights, in this chapter I address the beginning of spatial his-
tory and its interwoven myths of origin, corresponding mentalities, and strategies 
of entitlement (Rehberg 2014, 73–75, 257–286) to exemplify the interdependence 
between geo-physical spaces and culturally created ones. Both dimensions always 
act simultaneously as natural conditions of life and as objects of reorganization in 
conjunction with the interpretation of their associated magical, religious, com-
mercial, ruler, or whatever. What matters most to me is the indispensable interplay 
of these diferent aspects over time, such that spatial efects always appear simul-
taneously both as perceived and interpreted realities, and as spatial designs and 
fantasies shaped by their materiality. The relevance of correspondence between 
physical efects of space and cultural infuences on space becomes obvious when 
one analyzes spatial transformations in the longue durée. The fruitfulness of such a 
processual perspective is evident in the historical–sociological approaches of Max 
Weber, Norbert Elias, and many other authors, such as Edward P. Thompson, 
Michael Mann, Immanuel Wallerstein, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Stefan Breuer, or 
Fraya Frehse (in this book). 
In his History of Rome, Theodor Mommsen’s condensation of the connection
between the natural and cultural power of spaces—for which he was awarded the
Nobel Prize in Literature—becomes almost visual. Mommsen (1862) depicts the spa-
tial relations formed and infuenced by the Mediterranean in a quite revealing way: 
The Mediterranean Sea with its various branches, . . . alternately narrowed
by islands or projections of the land and expanding to considerable breadth, at
once separates and connects the three divisions of the Old World. The shores
of this inland sea were in ancient times peopled by various nations belong-
ing in an ethnographical and philological point of view to different races, but
constituting in their historical aspect one whole. This historic whole has been
usually, but not very appropriately, entitled the history of the ancient world.
It is in reality the history of civilization among the Mediterranean nations;
and, as it passes before us in its successive stages, it presents four great phases
of development—the history of the Coptic or Egyptian stock dwelling on the
southern shore, the history of the Aramaean or Syrian nation which occupied
the east coast and extended into the interior of Asia as far as the Euphrates and
Tigris, and the histories of the twin-peoples, the Hellenes and Italians, who
received as their heritage the countries on the European shore. 
From an early “Eastern” point of view (ex oriente lux), the Mediterranean was 
conceived of as “upper ocean of the dawn” and became a point of reference in a 
coordinate system consisting of “Europē” and “Asia,” extended by a third part of 
the world, namely “Lybia” or “Africa” as described by Herodotus (Berger 1907). 
The hubris of Xerxes was dramatically staged in Aeschylus’s The Persians (472 BC), 
while Herodotus (1920, 7.8C) bears witness to the Persian king’s intention to 
expand his land by making “the borders of Persian territory and of the frmament 
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Even then a diferentiation was achieved that simultaneously expressed a unity— 
not one of diferent countries but rather their connection and separation by the
Mediterranean. The Mediterranean was already considered “mare grande” or “mare
nostrum” in antiquity. That name was later used by Mussolini’s fascist regime for the
legitimation of its colonial engagements and was recently brought back into our
awareness through the headlines about the criminally organized passages by refugees.
This image of natural infuences on spatial structures that are conversely modifed by
human interventions connects spaces of power with their original natural territory. 
Interplay of the appropriation of physical space and the 
construction for large-scale territories in the longue durée 
Migration in early human history 
It may well be said that human history begins with homo erectus around 1.5 to 1.8 mil-
lion years ago. As suggested by the Out-of-Africa theory, humans frst migrated
from East Africa to today’s “Asia” about 50,000 to 70,000 years ago, before reaching
“Europe” and “North America” later on. To understand the further development of
these huge spaces, paleontologists rely on evidence of material culture, that is to say
archaeological remains by means of which forms of settlement, production methods,
and ways of life can be reconstructed (Parzinger 2016). The same is true for any other
cultural traces like “works of art” (especially cave paintings), which began to emerge
around 30,000 BC (Rehberg 2009). All of these indicators suggest that humans
appropriate and confgure space. More precisely, perhaps, they reveal a fundamen-
tal “openness to the world” (“Weltofenheit”) (Scheler [1928] 2009), which enables
human beings to actively adapt their cultures to a wide variety of spatial and climatic
conditions. Therefore, mankind is the only species—as Arnold Gehlen ([1940] 1988,
30) put it—that is not bound to a specifc “climatic, ecological, etc. milieu,” but is
“viable all over the world, under the pole and the equator, on the water and the land,
in the forest, swamp, mountains and steppes.” In all these environments, humans can
survive when succeeding in establishing their “second nature” by adapting to spaces
as well as transforming them through cultural changes. This is profoundly constitutive
for the basic concept of “culture” developed from settlement-based agricultural soci-
eties. The Latin word for “farming”—“colere”—does not simply mean the sowing
and harvesting of crops but also implies the development of rites corresponding to the
highly essential cultivation of soil. Therefore, possibilities and probabilities of survival
have always been laid out in terms of spaces, which themselves were always reformed
and redesigned in long-lasting and continuously ongoing processes. 
Early empires 
In order to outline the importance of migration and manorial land grabbing for 
spatial transformations, it is helpful to regard the earliest human migrations, which 
were driven by the search for habitats. The appropriation of spaces had been closely 
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connected to large-scale, often nomadic migration, at least since 4000 BC. Since 
the settlement processes during the Neolithic, the spatial contacts between nomadic 
groups—mostly hunters and gatherers—and settled farmers had been extensive. 
Early rulers combined transcendent claims—namely that their empires were des-
tined to include the “whole world”—with interconnections in the central areas of 
the Old World and stabilized them with trade (cf. Rehberg 2019). 
A good example of how constantly unstable was this spatial control is the City 
of Babylon, which was continuously conquered, repeatedly destroyed, and rebuilt: 
dating back to its mythical period, there are Babylonian, Hebrew, Greek, and Per-
sian narratives of Babylon’s history. As the most signifcant state foundation in the 
Tigris–Euphrates region, Babylon came under Assyrian (8th century BC), Persian 
(6th century BC), Hellenic (4th century BC), and Parthian (2nd century BC) 
foreign rule. This famous metropolis for a time had more than 200,000 inhabit-
ants and was said to be the largest city “in the world,” fourishing numerous times 
in diferent periods, among them under the rule of Hammurabi (1792–1750 BC), 
Nebuchadnezzar (1140–1127 BC), Cyrus the Great (6th century BC), and Alex-
ander the Great (4th century BC). 
While nowadays, invisible power structures increasingly show themselves in an 
apparently “spaceless” mediality, in earlier history, rulers longed for and determined 
their respective ranks by subjugating the largest possible territories. The large-scale 
early empires that defned themselves as “global” also often claimed the divinity of 
their rulers or an omnipotence associated with their divine supremacy on earth. 
This can be seen as early on as in “old Babylonian times” in the “best known Ballad 
of Early Heroes,” the lament of a mythical fgure of divinity of the ancient Egyptian 
Hurrians (3rd until 2nd millennium BC): 
Where is King Alulu, who reigned for 36,000 years? 
Where is King Etana, the man who ascended to the heavens? . . . 
They are no longer engendered, no longer born, 
Like the remote heavens, I cannot overtake them, 
Like the deep netherworld, no one can know them, 
Life, in all its form, is but an illusion. 
(Michalowski 2014, 165) 
In the Sargonian Empire (2334–2154 BC), the most powerful rulers named them-
selves the “Master of the Universe” (Michalowski 2014, 151). Fustel de Coulanges 
(1877, 231) shows that in ancient Rome—long before the “Axial Age” so recently 
and prominently rediscovered (Eisenstadt 1986)—the dignity of the priesthood 
emerged, and even in earlier times central rulers invoked the idea of their close-
ness to the divine—from which they derived their own divinity and drew the 
conclusion that they could dispose of the world (Michalowski 2014, 151; Rehberg 
2019, 38–40, 49–52). This is refected in a wide variety of ideas and formulas 
that signify requirements with regard to heaven: in the “Sumerian Kings List” 
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was handed down from the heavens,” a concept of self that was still evident in the 
Divine Right of Kings claimed by European monarchs. This concept simultane-
ously distinguished genealogically and spatially, as Naram-sin’s (2273–2219 BC) 
claim to rule “extended to eternity” or the idea of a “Roma eterna”—albeit much 
later—exemplify. Typical metaphors for claims to world domination were images 
of a disposition of the whole space to the end of the world (Haubold 2013)—a rule 
over “four vertices” (Michalowski 2014, 155). Hammurabi (1793–1750 BC), the 
Babylonian “King of Justice,” had a monumental legal code carved into stone in 
order to make his universal rule visible to everyone and, at the same time, appro-
priating not only space but also time by postulating that his “name be remembered 
favorably for all times in the Esaĝila temple in Babylon, which I love,” whereby 
he also regarded his city as the “Center of the Universe” (ibid., 153–154). The 
Assyrian kings also sought to expand their empire “beyond the shores of the sea” 
(Rollinger 2014, 199). 
Cyrus II, “the Great” (559–530 BC) and sixth king of the Achaemenid Empire 
(Holy Bible, Isaiah 44.28, 45.1; Daniel 10.1; Ezra, 1.1–2, 1.7–8, 3.7, 4.5, 5.13–14, 
5.17; II Chronicles 36.22–23), constructed himself simultaneously as the descen-
dent of a long genealogy of rulers and as the “king of the universe, mighty king, 
king of Babylon, king of Sumer and Akkad, king of the four quarters” and so on 
(Rollinger 2014, 191). The reign of Cyrus II was supposedly conferred on him by 
the God Marduk, whose name in the Old Testament means “Bel, son of the sun” 
and who in the course of history had changed from being the Babylonian city god 
to the father of the gods. Marduk appointed Cyrus as a just ruler, overlord, who 
called “all kings who sit on thrones, from all sectors of the world, from the upper 
sea to the lower sea” and from more distant districts to Babylon so that they could 
submit to him and kiss his feet. And yet, from a Jewish point of view, Marduk 
encountered an even more powerful deity—the tribal god Yahweh (Deutero-Isaiah 
44, 23, and 45:1), who made Cyrus the tool of repatriation of the Jews held in 
Babylon (including the restoration of the temple in Jerusalem) and simultaneously 
confrmed his universal claim to rule. Similarly, when depicting the war campaigns 
to expand his empire, Darius (549–486 BC) announced that his empire extended 
to the shores of the sea that surround the world and claimed to have even con-
quered cities “beyond the sea.” 
This way of afrming dominion in ancient Mesopotamia and Persia persisted 
until the Habsburg Charles V (1500–1558), who was said to rule “the empire on 
which the sun never sets,” a formula that was later used for the British Empire as 
well. 
The process of conquests and appropriation of spaces and their ontological and 
practical importance started in Babylonian times and can also be observed in the 
Persian Empire (from 555 BC). Two hundred years later, Alexander the Great’s 
cosmopolitanism strongly infuenced the Hellenistic world’s political and cultural 
landscape during the imperial expansion of Macedonia. The Roman Empire’s 
expansion of its imperial territory roughly half a millennium later can be under-












the great Empires of Old” (Yang and Mutschler 2008, 110). China and the Indian 
subcontinent can also be regarded as other formative examples for constructing 
large-scale territories. 
Man’s ability to symbolically interpret and process realities is intrinsically 
entwined with the materiality, controllability, and, more importantly, uncontrol-
lability of spaces: as spaces can be both life-giving or life-threatening, chances of 
human survival are necessarily connected to the culturalization of spaces. There are 
two main strategies of securing and stabilizing control over large-scale domains: 
Assimilation includes forms of habitual alignment with the cultural center—for 
instance, both Babylon and Hellenistic Greece allowed for the integration of immi-
grants with local elites (Stevens 2016). Rome granted citizenship to nationals of 
the conquered states because “the Romans . . . showed an unparalleled readiness to 
incorporate subalterns into the metropolitan political community” and allowed for 
creating a “truly trans-regional aristocracy” (Lavan, Payne, and Weisweiler 2016, 
23). The “previously powerful” were often drawn from the periphery to the cen-
tral court, often with an increase in symbolic prestige and a simultaneous loss of 
power—a strategy that was used up until the times of Louis XIV. Incidentally, 
the ability of formerly mobile groups to self-assimilate should not be underesti-
mated. Think of the Vandals, who have become proverbial as barbarian destroyers 
of Rome, whose leadership classes imitated and mimicked Roman customs in a 
special way and even tried to overbid Roman habits during their kingships in Car-
thage (after 429 AD). 
Alternatively, space can be appropriated using various forms of subordination
(Lavan, Payne, and Weisweiler 2016, 1–28), for example through the use of satraps 
or representatives of the central power and equipping them with regional and local 
titles, which could also be associated with relative autonomy. In the latter case, 
the residents who could not be homogenized by the central power lived in a wide 
variety of spatial conditions, customs, and traditions. They were hierarchically 
subordinate, but often their linguistic and cultic peculiarities were tolerated and 
acknowledged by the rulers. Similar processes had already taken place in Babylonia 
and in Macedonian-dominated Hellenistic Greece, namely through the integration 
of local elites into the imperial order, often combined with an identity dominated 
by the center. It is therefore also possible to work out diferent forms of manorial 
world disposition, which are closely linked to the conquest and the confguration 
of space. 
As rule over conquered areas is risky and mobile forces pose a threat, it is also
possible to stabilize territories by waiving expansion or shifting towards guarantee-
ing internal order. Applied to Rome, the term “imperial” is an ambivalent one.
Thus, one could say that Rome became “imperial” twice: for the frst time when it
expanded its rule over “almost all the inhabited world” (Polybius I. 1.5), so that after
the destruction of Carthage (146 BC) “sea and land lay everywhere open to its way,” 
and for the second time when Augustus ended the civil wars that had disrupted the
Roman Republic and introduced a monarchical form of government (Mutschler
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the long-lasting “Pax Romana”—the pacifcation of the empire’s interior became
the central goal of imperial rule (cf. comparative studies on the Roman Empire
and the Chinese Empire in Mutschler and Mittag 2008). In a similar way, China’s
later Ming dynasty (16th century) was characterized by a relative self-closure, which
however is often overestimated: despite the “ideal of ‘Great Unity’” and the idea of
rule “All-under-Heaven,” which emerged in the context of imperial unifcation in
221 BC, the Ming dynasty was also fragmented, comparable to a “multistate system” 
(Pines 2012, 11–16), and China never self-closed itself as much as Japan between
the Tokugawa shogunate (1630s) and the forced opening of the country in 1853. 
As already in the case of the Scythians (6th century BC) and the Parthians
(4th century BC), the equestrian peoples from Northern Asia—such as the Huns
and the Mongols in the 6th and 13th century AD—practiced expansive conquest
for centuries. This was also the foundation of other struggles for great empires in the
8th century AD, including the Arab expansion from the Indus River to the Iberian
Peninsula (711–719), which was fnally halted by the Christian Reconquista of Anda-
lusia. During its most intense phase in 1492, the violent displacement of the Arabs
also resulted in the Jewish population being forced into exile. While the Germanic
expansion into the Roman Empire is only perceived as the proverbial Völkerwande-
rung, the “Mongol storms” destroyed empires, such as in India where the Mughals
installed indirect rule in the 16th century (comparable to later English colonialism).
Later, between the 15th and the 18th centuries AD, the Turkish expansion continu-
ously posed a challenging threat to the territories in Southeast Europe. 
Land-based feudalism 
Whenever hierarchical systems of land ownership emerged in agricultural societ-
ies, warrior elites would come into being and consolidate their power by establish-
ing complicated formal relationships of granting protection and exploitation. This
can be seen, for example, in the nomadic “overlapping” (Überlagerung; Gumplowicz
1905, 28) of early peasants. After the division of the Carolingian Empire, in the
10th century, the process of “feudalization” involved splitting up formerly integrated
domains. Norbert Elias saw this as a starting point for century-long territorial strug-
gles, which—at least in France—fnally led to a new centralization of land ownership
and a royal position of authority binding everyone. Elias ([1939] 1982, 104–116)
called this the “monopoly mechanism,” which—as a predecessor of the structures
of modern statehood—led to a monopoly of tax collection and a standing military.
As a consequence, claims of power were radicalized up to the point that Louis XIV
enforced ceremonialization of his court in Versailles and thus paradoxically succeeded
in separating the aristocracy from their land bases. In this way, agricultural land was
merged into territories of sovereignty with complex internal structures. 
Sociological system theorists in the tradition of Niklas Luhmann often overlook 
the fact that functional diferentiations do not just exist in modern times. Instead, 
when combining the use of space with feudal stratifcation, societies have invented 











his classic analysis of the feudal system, Marc Bloch ([1939] 1982) assumes that the 
specifc structure of power relationships induced how space was distributed and 
what efect these distributions of space had. Similarly, Fernand Braudel ([1949] 
1996) did not assume that the geological–geographical material properties of space 
determined how the Mediterranean was constructed as a connection of the Middle 
East, Africa, and Europe. Instead, this connection was socially constructed by pow-
erful actors and mediated by social structures. 
Colonialism 
In the “Eurasian” context, all spatial categories changed again radically due to the 
discovery of the “New World” (as it was aptly named from the European per-
spective), ushering in global European colonialism. During this period, the Popes 
co-created a “landless,” “meta-feudal” concept of a “universal lordship,” which 
seems to confrm Georg Simmel’s ([1908] 2009, chapter IX) argument that the 
state’s attachment to land is opposed to the universal “spiritual rule” of the Roman 
Church. The Borgia Pope, Alexander VI, however, “lent” the newly discovered 
lands in South America to Spain and Portugal, making the “landless” church an 
actor beyond its ability to proselytize the pagan masses. 
During the age of modern colonialism, the world was redistributed by Spain, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, later France, and, most pervasively, Great Britain, 
which “occupied the sea” (Seenahme), as Carl Schmitt ([1942] 1997, 47) hymnally 
described by quoting Sir Walter Raleigh: 
Whoever controls the sea controls the world’s trade, and whoever controls 
the world owns all the treasures of the world and indeed the world itself. 
Nation-building and geopolitics 
When modern nations emerged—based on the rule over a demarcated territory and
its inhabitants—new ideas of spatial exclusivity and the relationships between diferent
states evolved. In science, this was refected in new subdisciplines. For example, Fried-
rich Ratzel introduced “Anthropogeography” (1882, 1891) and “Political Geography”
(1897). Both works naturally presuppose colonialism to be legitimate on the basis of
racial categories. Ratzel (1897, 17) also links land-based states with the metaphor of a
“living space” (Lebensraum) and argues that “every political entity seeks a connection
to the ground.” The appropriation of space was always about power diferences. These
power diferences, which “naturally” (naturwüchsig), as Karl Marx would have said, and
“necessarily,” as Ratzel (1897) argued, linked conquest to colonization: 
The size of the space we think and plan into politically depends on the size 
of the space we live in. . . . The large space encourages bold expansion, the 
small one leads to tentative crowding. 
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Therefore, people would have to be educated toward expansion. Using these ideas,
the Nazi regime later pushed the long history of spatial occupation to an extreme,
and it was that kind of argument that Karl Haushofer—Ratzel’s student and Rudolf
Hess’s confdant—used to justify Hitler’s expansion plans. It is evident that the
emerging modern nation states created new spatial competitions, which they justi-
fed using the semantics of past rule. For this purpose, Carl Schmitt—who was often
described as the “Nazi’s Crown Lawyer”—with stylistic bravery and dangerous acu-
men provided a legal justifcation for “large territories.” From the perspective of
fascist (and implicitly also Soviet) rule, Schmitt envisaged the rise of a new order
that was linked to the old empires. In this view, Hitler’s expansionism was meant
to establish a new empire “of a thousand years” that was to determine the future
of Europe and the world by breaking Britain’s undisputed supremacy as the leading
naval power—as Wilhelm II had already intended during the First World War. 
When the European empires collapsed—the Russian Empire (1917), Habsburg 
Monarchy and German Empire (1918), the Ottoman Empire (1922) and 27 years 
later the British Empire (1945)—the mostly multiethnic and multicultural impe-
rial domains dissolved and the number of nation states with nationalist delusions 
of grandeur increased even further. In the 20th century, ideologically founded 
“empires” re-emerged, such as the Soviet Union—which served as a multieth-
nic-state blueprint for working-class societies all over the world—or the fascist or 
National Socialist regimes. For example, Benito Mussolini tried to employ this 
kind of imperial strategy by cruelly conquering Abyssinia. The Allies’ victory over 
Nazi Germany made reality of what Alexis de Tocqueville had already prophesied 
in 1835 (1961, 479)—namely that, according to a secret plan of the divine, the 
Russians and the Americans “each seems called by some secret design of Provi-
dence one day to hold in its hands the destinies of half the world.” During the 
Cold War, both superpowers’ priorities were no longer of an imperial nature but 
rather hegemonic: the Eastern Power dominated the “brother states,” the United 
States the Latin American countries. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the number 
of nation states increased further to 193 members of the United Nations plus the 
Vatican, together with 12 controversial cases, resulting in a profound reorganization 
of European space as well. 
Regardless, Ulrich Beck (2005, 7) was wrong when he claimed “Germany 
no longer exists; neither France, Spain, Italy, even Great Britain” and argued that 
imagining societies as contained by nation states was a model to overcome socio-
logically (Beck 1997, 49). I believe that for a long time to come, nation states will 
continue to provide institutions of political legitimation and mechanisms for trans-
lating transnational decision-making for their own political system. Incidentally, it 
seems to me that the term “world society,” as based on Niklas Luhmann’s (1975) 
very plausible initial consideration that there is a “logical” limit to human com-
munication, is misleading. First of all, it implies the development from “empire” 
to “world-state.” However, the strategies of world domination described earlier 
show that these ideas already existed in ancient times (Weisweiler 2016). Second, 




incomparably denser worldwide networks surely play a crucial role in shaping all 
current societies, this assumption seems problematic: the coronavirus crisis reveals 
the simultaneity of the mondialization of the spread of the virus and nationally dis-
tinct measures and fates of the people—validating the term “glocalization” coined 
by Roland Robertson (1994). 
Interplay of social and sociological refections on space 
Making space invisible 
Both “space” and “time” are key categories for defning humans’ relationship to the 
world. Both are simultaneously physical a priori and socially constructed. Depend-
ing on the historical times and cultural contexts, sometimes one category is stressed 
more, sometimes the other. “Time” is always highlighted during times of fun-
damental social change. This is by no means only true for the modern age. For 
example, just think of the chiliastic “Third Reich” of Christ’s return promised by 
Joachim of Fiore in the 12th century. 
How the relationship between “space” and “time” is conceived is afected by 
the respective historical circumstances and Zeitgeist. It is characteristic for modern 
progressive societies and the way they self-refect to dominantly treat “time” with 
a view towards a future to achieve anticipated goals, which starkly contrasts with 
past societies: with the exceptions of revolutionary turmoil or utopian visions of 
imagined futures, noble societies were oriented towards a genealogically afrma-
tive past. All modernization theories are shaped by this manner of conceptualizing 
temporality. This fascination with the future is rooted in monotheistic religions, 
the secularizing enlightenment, and the associated changes in historical conscious-
ness—Reinhart Koselleck (1972), for example, observed “a profound change in 
the meaning of classic topoi” in the Sattelzeit (“Saddle Time,” 1750–1850) and made 
this the starting point for the historical analysis of semantic changes in a multi-
volume lexicon. According to Koselleck, since then, semantic changes of political 
and social terms have mainly been driven by a “temporalization of the categorical 
meanings” as well as their “politicization” and “ideologization.” 
During the Industrial Revolution, new means of transport and machinery accel-
erated social life, which evoked fears and anxieties from early on. In 1843, Hein-
rich Heine wrote: “Space is being killed by the railroad and we will be left with 
time alone” (quoted by Günzel 2010, 204). At the same time, rapid urbanization 
caused an explosion of space that at the same time can be conceived as a diminu-
tion of space: “With the advent of modernity time has vanished from social space,” 
as Henri Lefebvre (1991, 95–96) put it. Other formulas claimed the “expulsion 
or erasure of time” and that “time has been murdered by society.” This dominant 
subjugation of space combined with the technical media-induced suggestion that 
space was diminished or even destroyed may have contributed to the fact that the 
domination-related categories of space seem to have lost their prominence today. 
As a result, power relationships are hidden, too. While it was once indispensable 
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to present power publicly, today power is increasingly becoming invisible (Reh-
berg 2014, 287–323), and this is refected in the way the social sciences conceive 
“spaces,” and therefore also “places,” “territories,” and “empires.” 
Concepts of space in social science 
One of the key authors in the current sociological debates refecting the relevance 
of space is Martina Löw (2001, 58–63), who—in reference to Georg Simmel— 
developed a relational sociology of space, emphasizing that space is constructed by 
“spacing” (Löw 2001, 158–161). Using this term, she describes placements based 
on perception, memory, eforts at synthesis, and the resulting abstraction processes. 
Simmel ([1908] 2009, chapter IX) had argued that no independent entities exist, 
since their social meaning lies precisely in the “structuring that is based on the 
soul,” in other words, in the psychological function of a “synthesis of the space.” 
That is why the term “place” is “purely sociological” and “absolutely nothing sub-
stantial or individual, but a mere form of relationship.” 
Elisabeth Holzinger (2007) systematically compares diferent concepts of space 
and shows that in diferent phases of the theoretical debate, gains and losses of 
space are asserted to diferent degrees. Often, theorists conceive new technologies 
and global media networks as an “end of space.” Indeed, keywords like “global-
ization,” “acceleration,” “ubiquity,” and “virtualization” reveal an “atmosphere of 
de-spacing” (“Entraumstimmung”). At the same time, theorists perceived the fore-
cast “loss of distance” and “proximity” as threatening. “Technologies transcending 
space” (Raumüberwindungstechnologien) co-evolve with digital stock markets in the 
economy and a refguration of the relationships between decentrality and centrality. 
Together, they drive the fear that “space will be killed.” 
Social theories also argue that industrialization in the 19th century induced a 
specialization of space—such as the separation of private spaces (the family, the 
home) from public spaces (workplace, political sphere), which in turn resulted in 
a “loss of proximity.” Note that the current COVID-19 pandemic has induced a 
recapturing of private spaces or, more precisely, real-life private places for profes-
sional and commercial purposes. The “loss of proximity” also changes forms of 
familiarity with spaces. For example, in big cities with an urban sprawl on the out-
skirts, space is often experienced as many small and unconnected “islands.” 
Furthermore, extensive privatization poses a threat to solidarity or any kind of 
community. Arnold Gehlen ([1957] 1980, 59–65) predicted in 1957 that people 
would increasingly live from an “opinion as second-hand experience.” Today, more 
recent theories take up this idea when they discuss people’s increasing dependence 
on the omnipresence of the media, which in turn relates to all possible levels of 
experience and opportunities for action. In particular, humans are increasingly 
unable to infuence larger-scale relationships. At the same time, the range of expe-
riences conveyed by the media is expanding. 
It is striking that the currently dominant concepts of communication seem to 









Luhmann and Jürgen Habermas and their respective adepts. Based on her analy-
sis, Holzinger (2007, 62–66) proposes a typology of spatial terms with categories 
such as “material” versus “immaterial/abstract,” “one-dimensional” versus “com-
plex,” “deterministic” versus “non-deterministic,” “rigid” versus “process-based,” 
and “absolutistic” versus “relational”. Her extensive research led her to a rather 
one-sided conclusion: “Space is not something that exists in itself, but a process of 
permanent (re)-production” (66)—the self-evident human condition, that all per-
ceptions are constructs of the perceived matter, stands in opposition to the equally 
true claim of independent space as an inherent force. 
Changes in terminology on spatial control 
In the frst part of this chapter, I traced the relationship between societies and space 
in an historical sociological analysis. Why is this of any relevance for today’s spatial 
sociology? I argue that humans are simultaneously exposed to spaces and actively 
create new spatial relationships, which they constitute by practices and experiences. 
The interplay of the two processes only unfolds in the longue durée. 
This is not a new idea. Even in ancient Greece, the subjective constitution of 
spaces was a dominant theme. For example, when Aristotle refected on human 
orientation, he granted reference to the cosmos as well as to diferent world models 
(Zekl 1992, 68). The permanent infuence of spatial conditions on people’s lives 
necessarily implies that the way the animal symbolicum (Cassirer 1972, 44) conceives 
space cannot be thought of anthropologically without taking humans’ actions and 
sense-making into account. Humans also diferentiate between spaces defned by 
their potentiality and specifc locations (Rehberg 2006b, 45–47). 
If the historicity of the relationality of actors and spaces is emphasized, then humans’
corporeality comes into play in a specifc way. Helmuth Plessner ([1928] 1981, 360– 
365, 181–187) explained this connection between humans’ “eccentric positionality”
and the resulting “spatiality” (Raumhaftigkeit) in his main anthropological work. Since
the “spatial turn,” the infuence of (natural) spatial conditions on social and cultural
phenomena have been brought into focus again, and Markus Schroer (2006, 176)
reminds us that “space [shapes] our behavior and . . . puts his stamp on” us. 
Strangely enough, this has been criticized on several occasions. I disagree: this is 
not “geodeterminism.” Rather, relationality as a method should bear in mind that 
material or imagined space can have an efect. This does not mean that material 
space itself has no efect without being mediated by human interpretation, nor 
does it mean that material space is mere imagination. Instead, the challenge lies in 
understanding the interplay between the efective power of material objectivity and 
subjectivity. Due to living in cities built by humans, we may have lost our experi-
ence of the efects of natural space—and expressing this loss is often branded as 
outdated romanticization. Nevertheless, even today, when encountering our inter-
dependencies with nature—for instance, in the high mountains, in the savannah, 
or in coastal regions at the mercy of the sea—the way we adapt to nature impresses 
our perceptions and afects our ways of defning, processing, and interpreting space. 
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It is well known that the Nazi regime not only killed millions of people and
destroyed large parts of Europe, but also made many substantial words of the Ger-
man language unusable, including Nation (“Nation”), Heimat (“homeland”), and
Raum (“space”)—which in contemporary German do not spark associations with
the familiar land and soil of one’s own origin but instead with the Nazis’ spatial
expansion projects, such as the “SS Plan East,” which envisioned Aryanization
(Arisierung), enslavement (Versklavung), and resettlement (Umvolkung). The imag-
ery of this once murderous spatial policy is now used in populist and right-wing
rhetoric to warn against the ethnic threat to its own people. This line of thought
has a long tradition in the theme of a “shortage of space” (Raumnot) that made
expansion seem a necessary task for Germany, which had been feeling enclosed
in central Europe at least since the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). While Ger-
man lands were destroyed, some great European nations in the second part of the
17th century experienced their “Golden Ages,” which caused an often conjured-
up trauma. German philosopher and sociologist Helmuth Plessner ([1935] 1982,
17) even spoke in his book, Die verspätete Nation (with reference to German
Nobel laureate in literature Thomas Mann’s Refections of a Nonpolitical Man), of
Germany as a country that “missed” the 17th century. In post-war Germany, this
resulted in avoiding all German terms related to space, corporeality, and race.
Even in institutions that had to deal with demographic issues, the categories
used in analysis cause suspicion and discomfort. When politicians talk about
“space,” they appear presumptuous, indeed revanchist. For example, the post-
war dispute over the recognition of the Polish–German border conjured Hans
Grimm’s (1932) propagandistic motto “People without Space” or Carl Schmitt’s
The Nomos of the Earth ([1950] 2003) or Land and Sea [1942] 1997). In order
to discuss topics that can only be mentioned using taboo words, contemporary
Germans often use the English expressions as a detour to avoid a certain histori-
cally charged tone, for example, “community” instead of Gemeinschaft, “leader” 
instead of Führer. 
Global versus local life 
Although social science discourse on space has dismissed many essential spatial cat-
egories, the current densifcation of the world and increased interconnectivity have 
not resulted in one unifed monolithic culture but rather in a cultural syncretism 
combined with diferent ideas and practices (Pieterse 1998, 101). It is therefore 
fruitful to speak of “globality” and diferentiate between “globality” as a real fact, 
“globalization” as a process of acceleration, and “globalism” as a neoliberal market 
illusion created by capitalism (Beck 1997). 
Describing society as having evolved into a “global class” (Dahrendorf 2000) 
that lives “everywhere” seems more like a superfcial bird’s-eye view from the per-
spective of transnational elites such as global players in the areas of diplomacy and 
transnational organizations, business, architecture or arts, and highly specialized 







Portable communication devices may even simulate this delimitation in the 
everyday life of the masses. Nevertheless, most people live locally—no matter how 
far they travel for their vacation trips with low-cost airlines. So, indeed, social 
life becomes more and more dense spatially and accelerates temporally. While at 
the beginning of cartographic representations fantastic monsters were needed to 
somehow enliven the blank spaces on maps, the blue planet can now be visualized 
right down to the last corner. In Google Street View, one can see streets and house 
facades. Using Google Earth, one can obtain an overview of landscapes or zoom 
into a living room. Above all, geographic information systems have been developed 
with multi-dimensional markings and layers of landscapes, integrating data about 
their history and much more. Transport, travel, and the imagination of personal 
accessibility to any place or territory at any time decrease spatial distance and thus 
create a feeling of a densifcation of the world, too. 
In stark contrast to these processes, the worldwide right-wing populist move-
ments, with their hate-fueling, contagious, and fearmongering rhetoric, have 
become the latest carriers of the call for an uprising of the “sedentary.” Underlying 
this process is a class struggle because, at an objective level, social inequality has 
been increasing and the opportunities for overcoming it have been decreasing, 
while subjective values and aspirations are converging on a global scale (Rehberg 
2006a). 
Apocalyptical spatial materiality? 
With the exception of the analysis of the Egyptian and Asian hydraulic cultures, 
scientists have rarely taken into account the role of ecological conditions of space 
for the rise and fall of great empires. However, at various periods, European intel-
lectuals have projected their fears about uncontrollable infuences over society onto 
the decline of Rome. They pointed out its decadence, decay of morals, extensive 
militarization, increasing contrasts between poor and rich, and failure as a state. 
One of the causes for the decline of this ancient empire was also the depletion of 
natural resources. Adam Ferguson, in 1766, or later Justus von Liebig, postulated 
that at all times it is the land that “holds human society together or drives it apart 
and makes nations and states disappear or makes them powerful” (Demandt 1984, 
348). Alexander Demandt argued that depletion of the soil resulted in the impov-
erishment of free farmers over “plantation cultivation of large landowners with 
their troops of slaves,” leading to increasing grain prices and fnally to a population 
decline (ibid.). Georg Sigwart hypothesized in 1915 that the decline of Sparta, 
Athens, and Greece in general and the decline of Etruria, the Roman Republic, 
and the Roman Empire were all caused by the leaching of the soil, leading to 
“impoverishment, infation and a reacting despotism” (ibid., 349). In this view, 
every culture that produces a desert eventually annihilates itself. 
Today, in the—rather repentantly than proudly—so-called Anthropocene, most
people are—at least abstractly—aware of the fact that nature increasingly seems to
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Vulgate and Luther’s Bible presented it, as a mission directly out of the mouth of the
world’s creator: to “subdue the world.” Key terms of the anticipated ecological disas-
ter include “global warming,” “desertifcation,” “acidifcation,” “overfshing of the
oceans,” “destruction of rainforests,” and many more. The United Nations estimates
the livelihood of 1.5 billion people to be under threat, and humanity literally “is los-
ing its footing” (Latour 2018, 13): climate is changing and will cause an increase in
natural disasters, as has become noticeable in recent years, even in Central Europe. 
These essentially humanmade phenomena require us to develop new percep-
tions and categories of spatial presence and perceptions, as nature intrudes into the 
virtual spaces of comfort provided to us by the media. One might think of the 
return of an unsolicited presence of space, which is no longer a symbol of great 
power but rather of a self-inficted impotence. Jakob van Hoddis had already antici-
pated this in a vibrant expressionist manner in 1911 (1977): 
World’s End 
From burgher’s pointy head fies the hat. 
In all quarters resounds hullaballoo. 
Roof tilers plummet down and break in two. 
Along the coasts—one reads—the foodings rise. 
The storm is here, wuthering seas are hopping 
Ashore to crush dams as if they were midges. 
Most people have a cold that is not stopping. 
The railway waggons tumble down from bridges. 
Acknowledgements 
For their contributions to this chapter, I wish to sincerely thank Martin Siebert, 
who translated the text, Richard Groß for copyediting, Zoya Solovieva and Zach-
ary Mühlenweg for their language editing, and Stephen Mennell and Christian 
Sander for their thoughtful remarks. I also thank Carolin Thiele, Bettina Haßkamp-
Böhmer, Rose Marie Schulz-Rehberg, Laura Förster, and Gerrit Morrin for their 
support and helpful suggestions. I would like to especially thank Nina Baur for her 
very constructive and committed editorial revision and stylistic advice, as well as 
the Dresden Latinist and China connoisseur Fritz-Heiner Mutschler for imparting 
important literature and valuable pointers regarding cultural comparisons between 
the ancient empires. 
References 
Baecker, Dirk. 2007. Studien zur nächsten Gesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Beck, Ulrich. 1997. Was ist Globalisierung? Irrtümer des Globalismus—Antworten auf Globalisier-
ung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 




Berger, H. 1907. “Europe.” In Pauly’s Real-Encyclopädie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, 
Vol. 11, edited by Georg Wissowa, 1287–1310. Stuttgart: Metzler. 
Bloch, Marc. (1939) 1982. Die Feudalgesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Propyläen. 
Braudel, Fernand. (1949) 1996. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of 
Philip II, 2 Vols. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Cassirer, Ernst. 1972. An Essay on Man. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Dahrendorf, Ralf. 2000. “Die globale Klasse und die neue Ungleichheit.” Merkur 54 (619): 
1057–1068. 
Demandt, Alexander. 1984. Der Fall Roms: Die Aufösung des römischen Reiches im Urteil der 
Nachwelt. München: Beck. 
Eisenstadt, Shmuel N., ed. 1986. The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations. Albany: 
SUNY Press. 
Elias, Norbert. (1939) 1969. The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations. 
Vol. 1: The History of Manners. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Elias, Norbert. (1939) 1982. The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations. 
Vol. 2: State Formation and Civilization. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Fustel de Coulanges, Numa Denis. 1877. The Ancient City: A Study of the Religion, Laws, and 
Institutions of Greece and Rome. Boston: Lee and Shepard/New York: Dillingham. 
Gehlen, Arnold. (1940) 1988. Man: His Nature and Place in the World. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Gehlen, Arnold. (1957) 1980. Man in the Age of Technology. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Grimm, Hans. 1932. Volk ohne Raum, München: Langen-Müller. 
Gumplowicz, Ludwig. 1905. Ausgewählte Werke, Vol. 1, edited by Franz Oppenheimer and 
Gottfried Salomon. Innsbruck: Universitätsverlag. 
Günzel, Stephan, ed. 2010. Raum. Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch. Stuttgart: Metzler. 
Haubold, Johannes. 2013. Greece and Mesopotamia: Dialogues in Literature, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
Herodotus. 1920. The Persian Wars, Vol. III: Books 1–7. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Hoddis, Jakob van (1911) 1977. World’s End. Manchester: Carcanet New Press. 
Holzinger, Elisabeth. 2007. “Raum verloren, Räume gewonnen—Veränderungstendenzen 
der räumlichen Organisation der Gesellschaft.” In Lebensstile, soziale Lagen und Sied-
lungsstrukturen, edited by Jens S. Dangschat and Alexander Hamedinger, 51–70. Han-
nover: Verlag der ARL. 
Koselleck, Reinhart. 1972. “Einleitung.” In Geschichtliche Grundbegrife. Historisches Lexikon 
zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Vol. 1, edited by Otto Brunner, Werner 
Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, XIII—XXVII. Stuttgart: Klett. 
Köster, Werner. 1992. “Raum, politischer.” In Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Vol. 8, 
edited by Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer, 122–131. Basel: Schwabe. 
Latour, Bruno. 2018. Das terrestrische Manifest. Berlin: Suhrkamp. 
Lavan, Myles, Richard E. Payne, and John Weisweiler, eds. 2016. Cosmopolitanism and 
Empire: Universal Rulers, Local Elites, and Cultural Integration in the Ancient Near East and 
Mediterranean. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lefebvre, Henri. 1991. The Production of Space. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Löw, Martina. 2001. Raumsoziologie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Luhmann, Niklas. 1975. “Die Weltgesellschaft.” In Niklas Luhmann. Soziologische Aufklärung, 
Vol. 2, 51–71. Opladen. Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Michalowski, Piotr. 2014. “The Presence of the Past in Early Mesopotamian Writings.” In 
Thinking, Recording, and Writing History in the Ancient World, edited by Kurt A. Raafaub, 






44 Karl-Siegbert Rehberg 
Mommsen, Theodor. 1862. The History of Rome, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Mutschler, Fritz-Heiner. 2008. “The Problem of ‘Imperial Historiography’ in Rome.” In 
Conceiving the Empire: China and Rome Compared, edited by Fritz-Heiner Mutschler and 
Achim Mittag, 119–141. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mutschler, Fritz-Heiner, and Achim Mittag, eds. 2008. Conceiving the Empire: China and 
Rome Compared. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Parzinger, Hermann. 2016. Abenteuer Archäologie: Eine Reise durch die Menschheitsgeschichte. 
München: Beck. 
Pascal, Blaise (1670) 1958. Pensées. New York: Dutton. 
Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. 1998. “Der Melange-Efekt: Globalisierung im Plural.” In Perspe-
ktiven der Weltgesellschaft, edited by Ulrich Beck, 87–124. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Pines, Yuri. 2012. The Everlasting Empire: The Political Culture of Ancient China and Its Imperial 
Legacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Plessner, Helmuth. (1928) 1981. Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, Vol. IV of 
Helmuth Plessner. Gesammelte Schriften, edited by Günter Dux, Odo Marquard, and 
Elisabeth Ströker. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Plessner, Helmuth. (1935) 1982. Die Verspätete Nation, Vol. VI of Helmuth Plessner. Gesa-
mmelte Schriften, edited by Günter Dux, Odo Marquard, and Elisabeth Ströker. Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Ratzel, Friedrich. 1882, 1891. Anthropogeographie. 2 vols. Stuttgart: Engelhorn. 
Ratzel, Friedrich. 1897. Politische Geographie. München: Oldenbourg. 
Rehberg, Karl-Siegbert. 2006a. “Die unsichtbare Klassengesellschaft.” In Soziale Unglei-
chheit, kulturelle Unterschiede: Verhandlungen des 32. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft 
für Soziologie in München 2004, edited by Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, 19–38. Frankfurt am 
Main: Campus. 
Rehberg, Karl-Siegbert. 2006b. “Macht-Räume als Objektivationen sozialer Beziehungen.” 
In Machträume der frühneuzeitlichen Stadt, edited by Christian Hochmuth and Susanne 
Rau, 41–55. Konstanz: UVK. 
Rehberg, Karl-Siegbert. 2009. “Kunst.” In Handbuch Anthropologie: Der Mensch zwischen 
Natur, Kultur und Technik, edited by Eike Bohlken and Christian Thies, 359–363. Stutt-
gart: Metzler. 
Rehberg, Karl-Siegbert. 2014. Symbolische Ordnungen: Beiträge zu einer soziologischen Theorie 
der Institutionen, edited by Hans Vorländer. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Rehberg, Karl-Siegbert. 2017. “Diferenzierungs-Transformationen gegen eine theoretisch 
verdeckte soziale Ungleichheit: Anmerkungen zu Niklas Luhmanns historisierender Sys-
temtheorie.” In Un/Ordnungen denken: Beiträge zu den Historischen Kulturwissenschaften, 
edited by Anne Gräfe and Johannes Menzel, 188–215. Berlin: Quintus. 
Rehberg, Karl-Siegbert. 2019. “Herrscher als Typusfguren der Verkörperung institutio-
neller Macht im Kampfeld von Spannungsbalancen.” In Die Macht des Herrschers: Perso-
nale und transpersonale Aspekte, edited by Mechthild Albert, Elke Brüggen, and Konrad 
Klaus, 27–68. Göttingen: Bonn University Press. 
Robertson, Roland. 1994. “Globalization or Glocalization?” Journal of International Com-
munication 1 (1): 33–52. 
Rollinger, Robert. 2014. “Thinking and Writing about History in Teispid and Achaemenid 
Persia.” In Thinking, Recording, and Writing History in the Ancient World, edited by Kurt A. 
Raafaub, 187–212. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell. 
Scheler, Max. (1928) 2009. The Human Place in the Cosmos. Evanston: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press. 
Schmitt, Carl. (1942) 1997. Land and Sea. Washington, DC: Plutarch Press. 
 Occupation—destruction—virtualization 45 
Schmitt, Carl. (1950) 2003. The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum 
Europaeum. New York: Telos Press. 
Schroer, Markus. 2006. Räume, Orte, Grenzen: Auf dem Weg zu einer Soziologie des Raums. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Simmel, Georg. (1908) 2009. Sociology: Inquiries into the Construction of Social Forms, Vol. 2. 
Leiden: Brill. 
Stevens, Kathryn. 2016. “Empire Begins at Home: Local Elites and Imperial Ideologies in 
Hellenistic Greece and Babylonia.” In Cosmopolitanism and Empire: Universal Rulers, Local 
Elites, and Cultural Integration in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean, edited by Myles 
Lavan, Richard E. Payne, and John Weisweiler, 65–88. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Tocqueville, Alexis de (1835) 1961. Democracy in America. New York: Schocken. 
Weisweiler, John. 2016. “From Empire to World-State: Ecumenical Language and Cosmo-
politan Consciousness in the Later Roman Aristocracy.” In Cosmopolitanism and Empire: 
Universal Rulers, Local Elites, and Cultural Integration in the Ancient Near East and Mediter-
ranean, edited by Myles Lavan, Richard E. Payne, and John Weisweiler, 187–208. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Yang, Huang, and Fritz-Heiner Mutschler. 2008. “The Emergence of Empire: Rome and 
the Surrounding World in Historical Narratives from the Late Third Century BC to the 
Early First Century AD.” In Conceiving the Empire: China and Rome Compared, edited by 
Fritz-Heiner Mutschler and Achim Mittag, 91–114. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Zekl, Hans Günter. 1992. “Raum, griechische Antike.” In Historisches Wörterbuch der Phi-
losophie, Vol. 8, edited by Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer, 67–82. Basel: Schwabe. 
4 
THE HISTORICITY OF THE 
REFIGURATION OF SPACES 
UNDER THE SCRUTINY OF 
PRE-COVID-19 SÃO PAULO 
HOMELESS PEDESTRIANS1 
Fraya Frehse 
The implicitness of historicity 
This chapter aims to contribute to the “refguration of spaces” approach by criti-
cally addressing the concept of historicity on which it relies. Assuming historicity 
as a “time determination” based on links between past, present, and future events 
(Weidenhaus 2015, 24), the issue concerns the historicity that underlies this fgu-
rational approach to the so-called production of space, which in sociology sum-
marizes the macro- and micro-social processes involved in the generation and/ 
or regeneration of space as a set of bodily and materially mediated social relations 
(Frehse 2020, 3–4). 
Since Karl Marx’s pioneering conceptualization of societal historicity (Weiden-
haus 2015, 194), various social scientists have developed their own approaches 
to the socially specifc rhythms of historic change in diferent societies. If we, 
against the backdrop of this debate, consider that the refguration of spaces was 
conceived as a “diagnosis of the present time” (Knoblauch 2017, 16–17, 381–398) 
that “makes it possible to explain the dynamics of contemporary societies” (Knob-
lauch and Löw 2017, 16), the historicity of the sociospatial process inquired by the 
approach becomes a conceptually unescapable issue. 
So far, however, the historicity of the refguration of spaces has only been 
addressed implicitly. By assuming the “acceleration of social life” as an overall 
empirical assessment, Hubert Knoblauch and Martina Löw (2017, 1) empha-
size their conceptual commitment to Hartmut Rosa’s (2005, 11) thesis on social 
acceleration as a historically speedier-than-before orientation of social change that 
particularizes “our present society.” Indeed, Rosa’s temporal diagnosis also cor-
roborates alternative conceptualizations of the relationship between time and the 
production of space by authors who use the “refguration of spaces” approach 
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A second indirect allusion to the historicity of the refguration of spaces sub-
stantiates the conceptual construction of the approach. Its authors are interested in 
threefold spatial changes from the last ffty years regarding bodily and materially 
mediated communicative action amid specifc post-war societal processes that social 
theory termed “modernity” and later “globalization” (Knoblauch and Löw 2017, 
6–11). The multiplication of both contexts of meaning (“polycontexturalization”) 
and the forms of communication (“mediatization”) go alongside “the embedment 
of social units, such as families, neighborhoods and religious communities” into 
increasing physical and digital mobility circuits (“translocalization”) (Knoblauch 
and Löw 2017, 11–14). Based on Norbert Elias’ fguration concept, the authors 
propose that polycontexturalization, mediatization, and translocalization are pro-
cesses of spatial refguration, or the spatial transformation of the “centralized fgura-
tion” that characterizes “modern society” (Knoblauch and Löw 2017, 10). 
Both implicit references to historicity suggest that the refguration of spaces is a 
linear transformation of a relatively slow past into an accelerated present. It does not 
matter that “social acceleration” implies a possible “frantic standstill” (Rosa 2005, 
460). Indeed, according to the authors of the “refguration of spaces” approach, 
not even COVID-19 has changed the “general spatial pattern” in focus (Löw and 
Knoblauch 2020, 222), although “particularly the western world” will “witness a 
refguration” of the “established ‘interaction order’” (Gofman 1983) after quar-
antine (Löw and Knoblauch 2020, 224). Therefore, it is more precise to propose 
that the model of historicity implicit in the production of space from the 1970s is one 
of poly-linear acceleration. Its linearity is as multiple as the communicative actions 
through which spaces have been refgured. 
In the wake of two former critical appraisals of approaches to historicity in 
the sociology of relational space from the 1950s (Frehse 2017; 2020), this chapter 
addresses the operational consequences inherent in the historicity model of poly-
linear acceleration on the empirical reach of the “refguration of spaces” approach. 
I argue that this model restricts the mobilization of the approach in empirical felds 
marked by alternative models of historicity. This especially applies to empirically 
given patterns of spatialization implicit in social interaction: their temporal immediacy is 
underpinned by a plurality of social temporalities of a historical nature that challenge the 
unicity of the poly-linear acceleration model. 
In order to demonstrate this proposition within the limits of this chapter, I focus 
on Knoblauch and Löw’s hypothesis on the increasing physical and digital mobility 
implicit in translocalization. I frstly confront this statement with a sociospatial phe-
nomenon that has increasingly characterized São Paulo, the biggest Latin Ameri-
can city, precisely within the time span curtailed by the “refguration of spaces” 
approach: homelessness. More specifcally, in the second section, I apply a specifc 
dialectical-cum-phenomenological methodology to the historicity implicit in the 
patterns of spatialization of bodily and materially mediated (non-)verbal interaction 
by specifc homeless pedestrians in São Paulo’s pre-COVID downtown streets and 
squares in order to depict what the underlying model of historicity discloses about 
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forefront is a historically at the very least bitemporal process of dialectical space
(re)production, which transcends the implicit poly-linear acceleration of the refgu-
ration of space. This model conclusively signals to three contributions of this chap-
ter for expanding the empirical plausibility of the “refguration of spaces” approach. 
Homelessness as empirical counterevidence 
to increasing mobility 
Since the 1980s, rough sleeping has been added to the social–political, geographi-
cal, and sociological agendas in cities as diverse as Los Angeles, New York, Lon-
don, Toronto, Paris, São Paulo, Singapore, and Melbourne. Given the continuously
expanding urban palette, homelessness has become a worldwide issue (Bainbridge
and Carrizales 2017), often in connection with other materializations of housing
that policyholders qualify as “inadequate”: temporary shelters, evictions, and “illegal
campsites” (FEANTSA 2015). Particularly in São Paulo, roughly 45% of the almost
24,500 homeless people identifed as such (2019), among the city’s 12.5 million total
inhabitants are demographically settled in the city’s downtown district Sé. 
International scholarship on the bodily dimension of homelessness—in other 
words, on the interference of simultaneously physical and symbolic human skills 
on the phenomenon at stake—often alludes to “mobility” in order to heighten the 
role played by physically moving through urban public places on a regular basis in 
characterizing homeless people (see, for example, Kawash 1998; Mitchell 2005; 
Frangella 2009; Blomley 2010). This conceptual association comes as no surprise if 
we remember that the homeless’ mobility is often explained with the aid of empiri-
cal references to police repression against these people’s daily physical presence in 
streets, squares, parks, and other places. 
Given that “in recent decades” (Clarke and Parsell 2018, 1952) the surveil-
lance and punitive practices in Anglo-American cities have co-developed with 
policies aimed at turning downtowns into “sites of consumption and leisure,” it 
becomes conceptually tempting to pair the physical mobility implicit in homeless-
ness with the historical increase in digital and physical mobility that is addressed 
by the “refguration of spaces” approach—and hence, with its implicit model of 
poly-linear acceleration. 
However, things are conceptually more complex when we focus on one defnite 
bodily and material evidence of homelessness in the pre-COVID São Paulo down-
town streets and squares during the shop opening hours: the “maloca” (Figure 4.1), 
a popular Brazilian label for for “indigenous hut,” which is used by homeless people 
in Brazilian cities to identify their daily face-to-face gatherings in public places 
(Frangella 2009, 153, 184; Frehse 2013, 119–122; Robaina 2015, 328–330)—at 
least until corona entered the scene. 
There are still no research data about these gathering-malocas in COVID São 
Paulo—meaning the time between the municipality’s ofcial closure of commer-
cial and service establishments as well as parks (March 2020) and now ( July 2020). 
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FIGURE 4.1 Research clues of a gathering-maloca in São Paulo’s cathedral square on a 
Wednesday afternoon, 20 April 2011 
Source: Photo by Fraya Frehse/private collection 
at least three homeless men, less frequently women, and more rarely children, sur-
rounded by specifc material goods. These ranged from plastic bags and backpacks, 
blankets and sometimes mattresses or pillows, to trolleys and buggies as well as 
second- or third-hand cardboard boxes and chairs from surrounding rubbish bins, 
in addition to second-hand clothes and accessories such as caps and sunglasses, 
umbrellas, shoes, and clandestine merchandise from the discreet clandestine fair 
(“feira do rolo”) nearby (Frehse 2014, 254). All of this coexisted in these essentially 
symbolic places devoid of objective physical borders, which the homeless used to 
call malocas, together with low-cost variations of the sugar-cane drink “cachaça” 
and tobacco alongside marijuana cigarettes, cocaine stones, and crack pipes. It did 
not matter that mobile police stations lay only a few meters away, or that mobile 
policemen and women patrolled the sites daily amid the to and fro of other, more 
or less mobile pedestrians. 
This empirical evidence undeniably challenges scholarly international common-
sense about the prevailing physical mobility of homeless people in urban public
spaces. The challenge becomes conceptually even more vexing when we consider
that the number of regular homeless gatherings in São Paulo’s downtown streets and
squares was also remarked on in the frst studies about begging and homelessness in
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1977) and physically remained in what have been referred to as spots (“pontos”)
of São Paulo’s downtown public places. Individual begging (Stoefels 1977, 123),
rough sleeping (Vieira, Bezerra, and Rosa 1992, 49), resting, or “the earning of
subsistence” (Simões 1992, 37) were safe due to group strategies (Stoefels 1977,
123). Hence, it makes sense that in the early 1990s the spots were recognized as “the
preferred gathering locales of the street population” (Simões 1992, 37). 
All in all, what we observe is not increasing mobility but rather persistent physical 
immobility amid mobility. This state of afairs has persisted despite the fact that the 
São Paulo municipality abolished park benches and any other functional seating 
devices from downtown streets and squares in 2007. 
Therefore, homelessness in pre-COVID São Paulo’s downtown public places is 
clearly useful for the purposes of this chapter. As we will see with the aid of a four-
step methodological approach that brings together Erving Gofman and Henri 
Lefebvre, the empirical assessment in focus contradicts the hypothesis of increasing 
mobility that underpins the “refguration of spaces” approach due to the model of 
historicity implicit in the patterns of homeless interaction that become spatial in 
the malocas. 
The production of space through the historicity implicit 
in the spatialization of interaction 
My methodological sensitivity to what I term spatialization patterns of social interac-
tion stems from Erving Gofman’s analysis of the temporality and spatiality of face-
to-face interaction (see Frehse 2020, 10–12). He focused in analytical terms on the 
(temporal) immediacy of (spatial) situations comprising bodily and materially medi-
ated non-verbal and verbal conduct—in other words, communicative rules that are 
respectively forged in the individuals’ “body idiom,” put into action by means of 
material objects in places (Gofman 1963, 33–42), and shared by groups of “adher-
ents” (Gofman 1967, 49). Thereby, this author drew sociologists’ attention to the 
symbolic regularities involved in (non-)verbal interaction becoming spatial—and 
hence, for example, bringing to the conceptual forefront “regions” and “territo-
ries” (Gofman 1959; 1963; 1967; 1971; Frehse 2020; 2021; forthcoming/2021). 
From this standpoint, the spatialization of interaction implies the temporally 
immediate production of various social orderings of space—or spatialities—within 
the spatial boundaries of social interaction—or situations (Frehse 2020, 8, 11). 
Hence, my search of spatialization patterns of interaction becomes operational: 
once the patterns of (non-)verbal interaction are analytically identifed, we may 
address the spatialities that humans produce immediately by means of these same 
bodily and materially mediated interactions. 
In this methodological step, the historicity of the spatialities of interaction enters 
the analytical scene—and Gofman leaves it. Although admitting that not every-
thing that occurs (immediately) “in a situation” is “of ” it, his focus was on the 
interactional dimension of what I term spatiality—in his words, the “situational
aspect of a situated activity” (Gofman 1963, 22; 1983, 2; original emphasis). 
 
 
Pre-COVID São Paulo homeless pedestrians 51 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the historicity of interaction is absent from 
Gofman’s work (Frehse 2020, 21), and also from recent international scholarship 
that mobilizes his space concepts (Frehse 2021). 
But the historicity implicit in the spatialization of interaction remains underex-
plored in other current sociological strands as well. One relatively recent historical– 
sociological approach to historical transformations in patterns of interaction (Baur 
2005, 100, 103–107) emphasizes the causality of timing, the form and duration 
of these changes rather than what is of interest in this chapter: the entanglements 
of historical temporalities within the temporally immediate spatialities of interaction. 
Nevertheless, even that approach remains rare in a scholarly landscape that usually 
privileges the temporal immediacy of interaction. The same applies to the debate 
on the production of space (Frehse 2020; for an exception, see Frehse 2017). 
Subsidized by a former empirical demonstration that the historicity of the empir-
ically inquired sociospatial processes infuences their production (Frehse 2017), my 
specifc statement here is that the historicity of the spatialities of interaction by 
the homeless pedestrians in São Paulo’s pre-COVID malocas interfered by means 
of these homeless bodies with the production of space in the city’s downtown— 
and hence also, in theoretical terms, with the sociospatial processes addressed by 
the “refguration of spaces” approach. What remains open is the “how” of this 
interference. 
In search of an answer, I again (Frehse 2014; 2017) turn to Henri Lefebvre’s 
three-step regressive–progressive method (2001, 73–74). Although developed 
in the early 1950s, it remains unique in combining the ethnographic “descrip-
tion” of social relations and material elements in various empirical felds with the 
“analytical-regressive” depiction of their historical dates, or ages—in other words, 
the specifc temporal moments of social history in which they emerged (Lefebvre 
2001, 65–66). The aim is a “historical-genetic” interpretation of what their his-
torically more or less contradictory temporal coexistence discloses in dialectical 
terms about wider social transformations—and particularly about phenomenologi-
cal and historical trends in the “production of space” (Lefebvre 2000; Frehse 2020, 
12–15). Given that homeless people are not subjects of historicity in Lefebvre’s 
sense—which stems from Marx’s refections on the historicity of mankind—and 
that Lefebvre addressed neither social interaction nor its spatialities (Frehse 2017, 
518), I freely adjust his method to my aim of describing, analyzing, and interpret-
ing how the historicity of the spatialization patterns of social interaction interferes 
with the production of space. 
Therefore, in theoretical terms, this interference is dialectical instead of causal. 
Without resorting to historical determinism, Lefebvre (2001, 22) argues that “the 
historical” persists and acts upon “the actual” everywhere, given that “the soci-
ety in act, the result and product of the social activities” is “inscribed” in space 
through the mediation of (past) time. Hence, “the space generated by time is always 
actual” (Lefebvre 2000, 131). Methodologically, this implies privileging the analyti-
cal tool that I term historical dating rather than the pair chronology-timing, which is 
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(Baur 2005, 81–83; Hergesell 2019, 56–58; Hergesell, Baur, and Braunisch 2020, 
276–280). 
As we will see from this point forward, the overall methodological outcome
of this singular theoretical encounter between Gofman and Lefebvre is a regres-
sive–progressive procedure that descriptively departs from (i) rules of (non-)verbal
interaction in order to analytically depict (ii) their spatialities, whose historical
dates may then (iii) be scrutinized with the aim of (iv) interpreting what the
underlying historicity discloses about the production of space. When applied to
my ethnographic feldnotes and interview transcriptions about one maloca in par-
ticular that regularly took place in São Paulo’s cathedral square (Praça da Sé) from
February to July 2013, this approach evinces a peculiar historical poly-temporality
that mediated the bodily (re)production of an immobile public space by the pre-
COVID São Paulo homeless amid their own and other pedestrians’ mobility in
the city’s downtown. 
Step 1: descriptively identifying rules of (non-verbal) interaction 
I was introduced to the sugar-cane drink maloca on the frst day of my thirteen-
month period of systematic feldwork in the fve major squares of downtown São 
Paulo during the shop opening afternoons (2–6 p.m.) on Mondays and Fridays. 
Based on (non-)verbal interaction with twenty-seven maloca members during 
participant observation of the maloca, and with ten members during in-depth 
interviews “in” the same setting, I grasped a social structure composed, on the one 
hand, of a nucleus ranging from three to eight homeless pedestrians (at least three 
men, at maximum fve men and three women). They physically stayed on a regular 
basis either at or around one specifc spot around the low walls that separated the 
square’s gardened area from the cathedral’s rectangular forecourt. On the other 
hand, the maloca comprised a periphery of mobile (ex-)homeless pedestrians, who 
used to visit the nucleus somewhat regularly (of the aforementioned twenty-seven 
pedestrians, ten were homeless and seventeen ex-homeless and/or loiterers). Visits 
occurred especially on Friday afternoons, when a samba circle (“roda de samba”) 
enlivened the maloca with the aid of drums improvised out of cans and wooden 
or paper cardboard boxes. On workdays, the gathering regularly vanished from the 
square after 6 p.m. This was when the stores and government agencies started to 
close their doors and the public shelters started to open theirs. Hence, passers-by 
and non-passers-by (Frehse 2014, 252) such as the maloca members made their way 
to their (rough) sleeping places. 
The social structure at stake became analytically visible to me due to six rules 
for what I have termed body conduct (Frehse 2017, 518). It was by means of these 
patterns that the reproduction of spatialized (non-)verbal interactions took place in 
the maloca, at least on workdays: 
1	 The gathering’s bodily and material layout stemmed from the aforementioned 
temporally regular physical behavior of immobility amid mobility, which the 
maloca members shared in the square; 
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
1	 
Pre-COVID São Paulo homeless pedestrians 53 
2	 As for the maloca’s access to (limited) material resources, a straightforward 
division of labor aimed at the acquisition of food for all. Twice a day, two nucleus 
members departed in order to either beg for food or to identify sources of col-
lective food distribution; 
3	 There was a similarly straightforward collective division of gains. Any money 
obtained by the members was converted into cachaça or marijuana contribu-
tions to the maloca; 
4	 The collective attempt to protect the members’ individual stuff peculiarly condenses 
the former three rules. The (only sparsely extant) personal belongings of each 
member were not to be touched by anyone, and the nucleus tried to defend 
them jointly—depending on their degree of soberness; 
5	 As for the maloca’s intramural sociability, there was the interactional valorization 
of identity labels regarding specific family members. Each nucleus member had a 
family-role label: “father,” “mother,” “sister,” “brother,” “sister-”and “brother-
in-law,” and “mistress.” Moreover, the maloca hosted a variety of these nuclear 
families (the members verbally informed me of at least four). By the same 
token, the maloca’s female members verbally conveyed that they wished to be 
“married” to male members instead of being single—a condition they equated 
to socially despised prostitutes; 
6	 Regarding extramural sociability, there was the members’ (non-)verbal welcoming 
of (non-)passing-by visitors like myself and other passers-by—but never the police! 
When arriving for the first time, visitors were invited to eat and drink for free, 
mainly at a Friday afternoon chicken barbecue that was improvised around the 
square’s low walls with a whole chicken and a gas cooker. 
Step 2: analytically identifying spatialities within 
the rules of interaction 
As to the spatialities of the six patterns of body conduct, they are twofold: 
The (non-)everyday: The maloca members mobilized the rules at stake in the 
temporal immediacy of situations that were reproduced at least on workdays. 
This circumstance suggests that their spatiality is “the everyday” as the spatial 
realm of socially repetitive and doxic uses of cyclic and linear rhythms (Frehse 
2020, 8). Indeed, the maloca’s physical size in the square also varied on a daily 
basis: its spatially systolic–diastolic feature repeated itself indefinitely. Simultane-
ously, however, these spatial repetitions did not follow cyclic or linear rhythms. 
Instead, they applied to the socially forged propensity for physical immobility 
amid mobility, for the collective search for food, for money gains, for the pro-
tection of belongings, and for socializing within the maloca’s imprecise spatial 
borders. Temporal routines did not apply to the factual effectiveness of this pro-
pensity,which was completely arbitrary: the maloca’s bodily and material repro-
duction depended on the individual degree of soberness to the also random 
repressive initiatives by the police. Therefore, I consider the dialectical (non-) 
everyday a decisive spatiality of the six rules of body conduct. 
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2	 The factual(-imaginary) social space of marginalization(-integration): In sociological 
terms, the rules suggest that each maloca member was factually alone within the 
joint marginal social space that encompassed them altogether due to common 
biographical traits (mental health conditions, family and migration background, 
socioeconomic poverty). At the same time, however, the patterns were framed 
within an alternative joint spatiality concerning the maloca members’ positions 
in social space. Their factual social positions did not prevent them from imag-
ining, that is to say, mobilizing their intrinsically human ability to symbolically 
produce images, which are “forms” of “the imaginary” (Lefebvre 1980, 240). 
From this theoretical viewpoint, the imaginary is one historically specific “rela-
tion between the (reflected, subjective) conscience and the real as such”—in 
other words, “the immediate” (Lefebvre 1980, 56, 42)—which is “mediated” 
in symbolic terms by the massive, industrially driven production of images that 
prevails in post-war capitalism (Lefebvre 1980, 56). Therefore, the factual social
space of social marginalization that involves the maloca’s members simultaneously
encompasses an imaginary dimension of social integration: a large family that comprises 
indefinite smaller, nuclear families and acquainted visitors. This essentially sym-
bolic space of belonging socially integrated the maloca members in a way that 
was denied to them by the social space where they were located in sociological 
terms due to social indicators. Both spatialities coexisted dialectically. It does not 
matter that the family compounds were contingent, stemming from affective 
affinities between daily (re)established heterosexual couples, solo members, and 
passing-by acquaintances. Under the aegis of such affinities, the rules of interac-
tion between all of these pedestrians were quickly reordered within a categorial 
set of parenthood terms that bore its own sociospatial margins: “wives” despised 
female members “without a family” as being socially marginalized “mistresses.” 
Step 3: analytically dating the spatialities of interaction in 
historical terms 
Regarding this methodological phase, a backward reading (Baur 2005, 84) of the 
corresponding social–scientifc and historical literature is especially suitable: 
1	 As for the (non-)everyday, studies on various empirical objects implicitly offer 
empirical evidence of the historically persistent (non-)everyday routine of the 
poor in São Paulo’s streets and squares: the experience of homeless children 
therein during the 1990s (Gregori 2000); the corporality of homeless adults 
during the 2000s (Frangella 2009); the bodily uses of this city’s downtown 
streets and squares by pedestrians in different historical moments ranging from 
the colonial and slaveholding early nineteenth century to the 2010s (Frehse 
2011; 2017; 2018a; 2018b); the historical contradictions implicit in conceptu-
ally mobilizing the everyday in order to understand the “conscience of the 
ordinary man” in early twenty-first–century Brazil (Martins 2008). These data 
testify to a historically long-standing routine that is made up of the temporally 
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and spatially aleatory character of at least two sociospatial traits of São Paulo’s 
downtown public places, starting in the officially post-slavery late nineteenth 
century (i.e. as of 1888). I am referring, on the one hand, to police repression 
regarding social activities by the poor (street vending, loitering etc.) and, on the 
other hand, to the situational components implicit in these pedestrians’ (non-) 
verbal interactions with other pedestrians and workers or inhabitants of the 
surrounding buildings. 
These findings not only confirm that, as pioneered by Lefebvre (1968), the 
everyday is a particular historical product, which emerged in the modern late 
nineteenth-century capitalist world, but also indicate that the (non-)everyday of 
the maloca on workdays dates back in historical terms to the late nineteenth century. 
2	 As for the factual(-imaginary) social space of marginalization(-integration), 
crucial historical dating references stem from a wider anthropological debate 
about family structure and female identity among the poor in urban Brazil as 
of the 1980s (Corrêa 1982; Sarti 2003, 19). This literature addresses human 
types whose factual marginalized social space owes everything to the fact that 
they lack the means that assign power, wealth, and prestige to individuals in a 
capitalist society (Sarti 2003, 19–20). At the same time, the studies suggest that 
the maloca’s imaginary large family of families and visitors can be accounted 
for by the spatially far-reaching role played by the family as a distinctive moral 
set of consanguinity and affinity relations among the urban poor in São Paulo’s 
peripherical districts at least since the 1980s. Grounded on a patriarchal and 
hierarchical structure within which the “whole” prevails over its “parts”—the 
individual members (Sarti 2003, 20)—and in which the woman holds a subor-
dinate position (Sarti 2003, 20), the family’s symbolic reference is a hierarchical 
moral code that transcends the “house” (casa), which has been a referential 
social and physical space in Brazil since colonial times (for a summary, see 
Frehse 2013,102). Comprising neighborhood and work relations, too, this code 
“expands to the outside, and configures a system of values that impacts the ways 
in which the poor conceive and face the social world” (Sarti 2003, 21). 
In light of these references, the maloca’s social space, which is factually mar-
ginalized and imaginarily integrated, originated in the 1980s. 
Step 4: interpreting the production of space through the 
historicity implicit in the spatialities of interaction 
Given that both historical dates refer to spatialities of (non-)verbal interaction, they 
necessarily interfered with the bodily and material layout of São Paulo’s cathe-
dral square during the frst semester of 2013. During the maloca’s existence, the 
immobility amid mobility that characterized that public place was also due, on the 
one hand, to a (non-)everyday invigorated by the temporal coexistence between 
the post-slavery nineteenth and the early twenty-frst centuries; and, on the other 
hand, to a factual(-imaginary) social space constantly enlivened by values of the 
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Hence, we notice one entanglement of historical temporalities. The frst one
is more than a century old, whereas the second is aged almost forty years. Their
empirical simultaneity in the same square conceptually suggests that the sociospatial
phenomenon maloca bears a bitemporal historicity model at minimum—that is to say,
a historical poly-temporality. Now we may at last address the “how” of the interfer-
ence. The historicity model indicates that during the maloca’s existence, São Paulo’s
cathedral square was reproduced in bodily and material terms, on workdays, by means
of the spatially productive temporal coexistence of at least the late nineteenth and the
late twentieth centuries within the temporally immediate interactions of the square’s
(im)mobile homeless pedestrians. If we follow Lefebvre’s (2001, 74) suggestion that
the historical–genetic interpretation of the previously dated structures depends on
assessing their transformations against the background of the further (internal or
external) development and these structures’ subordination to the overall structures
(Frehse 2017, 517), a methodologically tempting reference of such an overall process
(Lefebvre 2001, 74) is the production of urban public space within the aforemen-
tioned societal processes addressed by the “refguration of spaces” approach. 
From this standpoint, the production of public space in pre-COVID São Paulo 
was a bodily and materially reproductive process spurred, among other things, by 
two spatialities of interaction whose (temporally immediate) production (i.e. spatial-
ization) was due to the historical poly-temporality of the (non-)verbal interaction 
of homeless pedestrians in public places such as Praça da Sé. It was a sociospatial 
process of a dialectical nature, indeed a bodily (re)production of space underpinned 
in historical terms by a time-span that ranged from the late nineteenth to the early 
twenty-frst century, and which temporally coexisted with the poly-linear accelerated 
vigor of mobility that has refgured this very space along with several others since 
the 1970s. 
Conclusion: the relevance of historicity 
Hence, we may return to this chapter’s original objective. In order to increase the 
empirical plausibility of the “refguration of spaces” approach, it would be advisable 
to turn the historicity models implicit in the production of space into an analytical 
issue. My regressive–progressive approach to the historicity of the patterns of spa-
tialization implicit in the social interaction of particular homeless pedestrians in the 
pre-COVID São Paulo downtown public places demonstrated in a synthetic way 
that (i) space is produced by means of spatialities of social interaction that bear vari-
ous historical dates; (ii) diferent models of historicity may simultaneously underpin 
one and the same societal process of space production; (iii) no societal process of space 
production is overarchingly linear in historical terms. As a whole, these fndings show that 
specifc historicity models interfere in various ways with empirically given processes 
of space production, and hence with their conceptualization. The models implicit 
in the spatialized interactions that empirically underlay the (im)mobile sugar-cane 
drink maloca indicate a dialectical (re)production of a persistent (im)mobile public 
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In light of these conceptual outcomes, a second contribution of this chapter 
to the “refguration of spaces” approach may come to the fore. It would be worth 
engaging with dialectical approaches to the production of space in greater detail. 
Whether or not the dialectical method is “unique in addressing the multiple deter-
minations of what is concrete” (Martins 2013, 74) should be of interest to a theory 
that addresses the spatial dynamics of contemporary societies. The aforementioned 
three conceptual fndings of my method, for instance, indicate an absolute histori-
cal diversity within the temporally both immediate and simultaneous production 
of coexisting diverse spaces. Alternative temporal patterns may thus conceptually 
emerge and enrich the fgurational understanding of spatialization processes. 
This chapter’s third and last input into the refguration of spaces particularly 
concerns the relationship between homelessness and the production of space. A 
historically sensitive approach to the spatialization patterns of social interaction 
ofers alternative fndings to this debate. Instead of a commonsensical “social prob-
lem,” homelessness is a sociospatial process, a specifc way of producing (public) 
space within the wider set of spatial changes of the last ffty years encompassed 
by the “refguration of spaces” approach. In pre-COVID São Paulo, the vigor of 
the immobility amid mobility of the homeless testifes to the fact that surely for 
economic, but also for sociocultural reasons related to the historicity of the bodily
(re)production of public space by homeless pedestrians, mobility as a spatialized pat-
tern of interaction was never fully established among homeless people in the city. 
But what can be said about post-COVID São Paulo? In light of the epide-
miologic intensity of COVID in this city, we could at frst glance expect that the 
city’s daily (im)mobile gatherings of homeless pedestrians have disappeared, thus 
confrming the aforementioned refguration of the established interaction order. 
However, things are again more complex than that. The sociopolitical combina-
tion of a long-standing social inequality with an unprecedented social-political 
irresponsibility, which has recently prevailed in Brazil, implies that the current São 
Paulo streets and squares are increasingly the home of whole families. Therefore, 
although new spatialization patterns of interaction are certainly underway, they are 
supported by vivid reproductive rules. Public space continues to be (re)produced 
bodily. 
Note 
1 This research received grants from the Brazilian National Research Council (from 2018), 
the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (2019), and the Centre of Latin American 
Studies of the University of Cambridge (2020). All translations from languages other 
than English are my own. 
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Insights from history 
Susanne Rau 
Introduction 
While there is much to be said for investigating the infuence of current social pro-
cesses (such as digitalization or globalization) on spatial arrangements, as sociolo-
gists Hubert Knoblauch and Martina Löw (2017) have set out to do, it is equally 
important to analyze the relationship between space and time or between spatiality 
and temporality. Spaces or spatial arrangements change in the course of transforma-
tion processes, but so too does the relationship between space and time. 
Since it is not possible to tell the whole story of space-time in this context, I 
instead refer to the work of the “SpatioTemporal Studies” group, a research group 
at the University of Erfurt, and briefy outline its guiding principles. Furthermore, 
since the history of the interrelationship of space and time cannot be described in 
just a few pages, I will fall back on a few illustrative examples that show how space 
and time have been graphically and cartographically represented in their interrela-
tion. The examples come from the European Middle Ages and the early modern 
period. These singular examples can at least serve to illustrate that even in the 
pre-modern age, there must have been—if not a theory of space-time—at least an 
awareness of the entanglement of space and time. 
I will start with a counterfactual argument (“history without time?”), then move
on to a short presentation of the ideas and ongoing research activities of the Erfurt-
based “SpatioTemporal Studies” group before I discuss the pre-modern understand-
ing of the relationship of spatiality and temporality, followed by some examples. 
History without time? 
A counterfactual argument should be considered frst (Rau 2019, 40–41). What 
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in relation to space.) In recent years, spatial theories and, in particular, Löw’s (2001) 
sociology of space have been widely received in the historical sciences. Löw’s rela-
tional approach has focused primarily on the constitutional processes of social 
spaces (operations of placement or “spacing” followed by operations of conceptual 
synthesis). The reception of the spatial turn in history has sometimes led to the para-
doxical situation that spatial orders have been given priority over temporal ones. 
With a more specifc defnition of space—as an organizational form of coex-
istence that makes synchronicity or simultaneity visible—we reach a point where 
we must ask what history we are actually writing when we continue to ignore 
temporal aspects such as succession, sequentiality, diachronicity, procedurality, or 
acceleration. It would of course be worth trying to write a history in a purely loca-
tive mode. But, as long as we human beings experience time as passing and spaces 
as changing, this would hardly make sense. We should thus continue to combine 
spatial aspects with temporal aspects. 
Space, namely, cannot be understood at all in its complexity if we do not include 
the factor of time and multiple temporalities. This interrelatedness of spatiality and 
temporality can be founded both theoretically and practically in relation to our 
everyday lives, since we would not even be able to think or live in just one cat-
egory or the other. Whoever wants to remain standing in just one place, to neither 
move nor change anymore? The same holds true for the historical subjects and the 
spatial phenomena under examination. When we take interest in historical subjects 
and their environments, practices, feelings, and interpretations in a comprehen-
sive human sense, taking both dimensions into consideration cannot be avoided. 
If the intention is to capture subjects within their complex relations with their 
environment—and not, in other words, only through their spatial relation with 
their surroundings—everything suggests that we should call our considerations 
“historic-anthropological.” 
The second reason for choosing the designation “historic-anthropological” is 
that these relationships do not remain anthropologically constant but rather change 
over time, diachronically, and these changes are in no way simply linear. This per-
spective thus difers from many historical–geographic approaches inasmuch as time 
appears to stand still in these approaches, or because changes are represented as 
linearly homogeneous (for example, in a scheme of before/after). This can often be 
seen, for example, in topographic charts of cities in older history books. 
A third reason for calling our approach “historic-anthropological” is that histo-
ricity also means taking into consideration the potential diference of spatial con-
structs and constellations in diferent cultures or contexts. However, this is not as 
yet sufcient to propose a thesis on the indivisibility of spatiality and temporality. 
In creating and developing such methodological instruments, we need not start
from scratch: various non-historical disciplines have already brought forth interesting
approaches to this problem which we can use as a point of departure. For geogra-
phy, the Swede Torsten Hägerstrand developed a time-geography in the early 1970s.
Through the translation of his works into English, his approach has gained international
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Anthony Giddens (Giddens 1997, 168; Gregory 1984; Stjernström 2004). On the one
hand, Hägerstrand (1970) engaged with large-scale geographies. Yet, on the other, he
also examined movements of people in what he called “action spaces,” defned as the
set of spatial possibilities and limitations of action available to an individual. As a geog-
rapher, Hägerstrand set out to examine all spatial and temporal levels that play a role in
the life of an individual—from their living quarters to the globe, from a single day to
the span of their life. Temporalization of space can thus be examined from perspectives
of limitation of use (of space), the specifcation of duration, or the elasticity of activities. 
By contrast, the spatialization of time can be understood as the “patterning of 
time” by individuals who are in turn dependent on the distribution of spatial pos-
sibilities (Carlstein, Parkes, and Thrift 1978). 
As can easily be seen, temporality is an important dimension of space, both 
theoretically speaking and in everyday life, then as now. The Erfurt research group 
therefore thinks of spatiality and temporality together, as will be briefy explained 
hereafter. 
The “SpatioTemporal Studies” group 
From a conceptual perspective, “SpatioTemporal Studies” assumes that, in everyday 
life, spatiality and temporality cannot be separated from each other in their con-
structedness. This interdisciplinary research group strives to provide new impulses 
in the theoretical debate on space in the social and cultural sciences as well as to 
promote the regionalization and historicization space and time. Its members come 
from the felds of history, literature, religious studies, geography, art history, phi-
losophy, and theology. 
Another focus lies in the spatial and temporal practices of historical actors and 
groups. As historians, we see as one of our tasks to historicize spatial theories and 
to discover spatiotemporal concepts and practices in times long before the so-
called spatial turn—which is an empty shell, as it does not ofer any agreed upon 
methodology or common language. We should therefore speak of “spatial turns,” 
in the plural, instead. Either way, theories about and beyond the “spatial turn” have 
taught us that spaces are no longer regarded as something simply physically given 
(Lefebvre 1991; Werlen 1995–1997; Löw 2001), but rather as something socially 
constructed. Spaces are the result of negotiations and designs, and these take place 
in time. An example of this approach and interdisciplinary collaboration is the proj-
ect on the spatiotemporality of imperial practices of governance and ruling. In the 
course of imperial aspirations, new space-time constellations have been not only 
created but also represented in a wide range of media since antiquity (Meyer, Rau, 
and Waldner 2017a). The positive echo of the conference “Spacetime of the Impe-
rial” and the homonymic volume highlight the growing interdisciplinary interest 
in an integrated view on the history of spatial patterns and their dynamics (Kirch-
berger 2018; see also Dorsch and Vinzent 2018; Bauer and Fischer 2019; Schmo-
linsky, Hitzke, and Stahl 2019; for further volumes, see Dorsch et al. 2017–2020). 
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Another project on historical urban planning processes, conducted within the 
same framework a couple of years ago, also revealed the fruitfulness of such an 
integrated view, in the sense that it could further the understanding of a com-
plicated spatiotemporal process—especially when taking into account that many 
spatial expansion projects have been discussed but never realized. This is probably 
still the case today, but it has not yet been applied to urban planning history. The 
study dealt with two major expansion projects in the city of Lyon in the 18th 
century (Rau 2013). The crucial point here is that one should not look only at 
the physical results of this process. Through a detailed analysis of historical sources 
(from architects, the city council, the Academy of Sciences, and travel reports) over 
a period of more than one hundred years, it was possible to demonstrate that the 
history of planning and process of shaping the urban periphery often resembled a 
dialectical movement of spatial visions and partial failure, entailing temporal set-
backs that, in the end, led to a synthesis of the half-planned and half-unforeseen. 
Yet, many spatial theories, including those that emphasized the role of capital in 
the production of space, ofer insufcient explanations of the complex spatiotem-
porality of urbanization processes. It was thus proposed against the backdrop of 
the Lyon projects—which were already doing much of what was happening in 
many European cities in the 19th century—that a description of processes of urban 
(meaning spatial) expansion must take into account such temporal phenomena as 
vision, retrospection, hope, and delay. 
Theories and methods of cultural space-time 
The main theoretical input for the Erfurt research group stems from Mikhail 
Bakhtin, Henri Lefebvre, and Michel de Certeau. 
One of the most well-known models of spatiotemporality is the concept of 
the “chronotope,” derived around 1940 from the ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin, which 
strives to fnd a modeling of space and time that is characteristic for a particular 
epoch or formation (Meyer, Rau, and Waldner 2017b, 4). Bakhtin understood 
chronotope to mean the “intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relation-
ships that are artistically expressed in literature.” (Bakhtin 1981, 84–85) 
Derived from mathematics and Einstein’s theory of relativity, Bakhtin used the 
category to examine the relations of time and space in literature. According to 
Bakhtin, the two categories belong together, forming each other and structuring 
any narrative. Time only gives meaning to places and spaces in narratives (or nov-
els). The chronotope is therefore somewhat like the condition of the possibility of a 
narrative. First developed for the analysis of narratives, the concept can be extended 
and applied to the changing spatiotemporal structures (of images) of the world and 
of humankind (Rau 2019, 96). That would not have been against Bakhtin’s inten-
tions, as he also saw himself as a cultural scientist. 
To Henri Lefebvre, the group owes the emphasis on the historicity and cultural-
ity of spaces. In essence, Lefebvre expressed this through the following statement: 
“Every society . . . produces a space, its own space. . . . [example:] . . . the ancient 
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city had its own spatial practice: it forged its own—appropriated—space” (translation 
from the French original text by Rau 2019, 28). Historicity in this context means 
that each time or epoch must be seen under its specifc conditions. Besides historic-
ity (as past temporality), Lefebvre (1991, 48) also defended a concept of processes 
and of epochal divisions, which was strongly infuenced by Marxist historiography: 
The history of space cannot be limited to the study of the special moments 
constituted by the formation, establishment, decline and dissolution of a 
given code. It must deal also with the global aspect—with modes of produc-
tion as generalities covering specific societies with their particular histories 
and institutions. Furthermore, the history of space may be expected to peri-
odize the development of the productive process in a way that does not 
correspond exactly to widely accepted periodizations. 
The new periodization or epochal classifcation claimed here must by no means 
follow Marxist historiography (such as: ancient slaveholder society, the medieval 
feudal society, modern capitalism, communism). Those who recognize Lefebvre’s 
appeal will look for a periodization that turns the important changes in spatial con-
stellations into epochal turns, which can vary from region to region. 
The third favorite theoretician of the research group is Michel de Certeau, with 
his emphasis on stories and practices of space. 
In his Practice of Everyday Life, published in French in 1990, Certeau writes that 
narratives “organize” places; they single them out and connect them with each 
other. He formulated the saying “every story is a travel story,” a spatial practice 
(Certeau 2011, 115; Rau 2019, 70–73). Narratives, in other words, do not sim-
ply transpose steps into the level of language. They organize these steps, make 
the “journey,” and create geographies of action. By combining syntax and prac-
tices, Michel de Certeau brought together spatial stories and spatial practices. This 
means, for example, if we describe a walk through a city, we are not simply describ-
ing a distance from one place to another, but rather are subjectively organizing an 
urban space and appropriating it, ensuring we can remember it and make it avail-
able to others. 
These approaches from the social and cultural sciences dating back to the 20th 
century are also refected in the semantic history and even have an older history. 
Views from conceptual and semantic history 
In most languages, the word combination “spatiotemporal” or “spatiotemporality” 
does not appear before 1900. Moreover, Albert Einstein was probably the frst to 
provide a theory of “space-time” in which time, as a fourth dimension, is closely 
linked to the three dimensions of space. But this is physics (for a sociology of space-
time, see Weidenhaus 2015). As far as everyday language is concerned, we fnd 
references in the Merriam-Webster dictionary where “spatiotemporal” is defned 
in two senses: 
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1	 “Having both spatial and temporal qualities” 
2	 “Of or relating to space-time”1 
According to the dictionary, which was founded in 1828, the frst known use of the 
adjective “spatiotemporal” appeared in 1900, in the meaning of the frst defnition. 
However, these fndings do not necessarily mean that the notion or idea of an 
entanglement of space and time did not exist in earlier times. We can also fnd them 
in practices and in media such as tables and maps. 
Although it may be quite clear that before the 20th century there was no theory 
of space-time (and also no notion of time as the fourth dimension of space), the 
history of language has left traces of the connection between space and time. 
Thus, for example, “space” (espace) can be proven in the meaning of “dura-
tion” (durée) in French as early as the 12th century. In other words, if someone 
spoke about an extended time, or a period of time (from—to), they used the word 
“espace.” 
The adjective “geraum” exists in German, which was initially only used for 
spatial determinations. Since the 15th century, it has also appeared with a temporal 
meaning—as we still say today, “seit geraumer Zeit,” which translates to “for quite 
some time.” If this idea is expressed diferently—for example, using the phrase “seit 
langem” (“for a long time”)—one can assume that the speaker has a three- if not 
four-dimensional conception of duration. 
Entanglements of space and time as refected in historical 
discourse and media 
Representations of the spatiality of time can also be found in the history of histo-
riography and cartography. Time courses and stories were conveyed in not only 
text form but also in graphic representations of time. Basically, this began with the 
medieval annals, in which year after year the most important events were written 
down, which in principle must have evoked a linear course of time when reading 
(see Figure 5.1). 
The chronicle of Eusebius was written at the beginning of the 4th century but 
was copied and amended several times during the Middle Ages. Thus, the graphic 
form of the history in tables, in which events of diferent empires are arranged in 
columns next to each other and listed in annual steps, was also handed down until 
early modern times. 
In this tradition, European circles of scholars graphically represented time and 
history in the form of “tabulae,” “tables historiques,” “tables universelles,” “chrono-
logical tables,” “views of universal history,” or “Tabellenwerke.” These history tables 
and diagrams are often provided with vectors or at least suggest a temporal sequence 
through the viewing and reading direction. Above all, however, the temporalized 
events take up space: frst of all, space on paper. In the fgurative sense, however, 
time periods (alias duration) are symbolized again: time period of an event, time 
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FIGURE 5.1a Example for graphic representation of time as chronological table 
Source: Chronicon Eusebii, a sancto Hieronymo latine versum et ab eo, Prospero Britannico et Matthaeo Palmerio 
continuatum, editum cura C. L. Johannis Hippodami. Venice: E. Ratdolt, 1483. Bayerische Staatsbibliothek 
München, 4 Inc.c.a. 290, fol. 14v and 15r. 
 
 
Spatiotemporal entanglements 67 




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
68 Susanne Rau 
the context of the concept of the four-monarchy or seven-empire doctrine. An 
example of this is the “Chart of History” by British polymath Josef Priestley, who 
designed the chart as teaching material for students and put on it—according to his 
claim—the entire history of the world with its most important events and localities 
(see Figure 5.2). 
In contrast to Thomas Jeferson’s “Chart of Universal History” of 1753, Priest-
ley regularized the distribution of dates on the chart and oriented it horizontally 
to emphasize the continuous fow of historical time (Rosenberg and Grafton 2010, 
120–121). In this sense, the historical chart is a space-time medium. 
A further development of these chronological tables is historical maps, which 
sometimes also contain temporal information or are even converted into graphical 
form. These hybrid maps then combine geographic and temporal information. An 
early example of this is the “Carta istorica dell’Italia e d’una parte della Germania,” 
drawn and published by Girolamo Andrea Martignoni in 1721 (see Figure 5.3). 
Compared to Priestley’s charts, Martignoni’s historical maps used typical ele-
ments of a map—territories, bodies of water (oceans, lakes, rivers), geographic 
names—but less text than on the charts, together with a series of symbols and 
icons. But the rivers are not simply geographical elements. Especially on the upper 
map sheet, they represent the fow of time (Rosenberg and Grafton 2010, 108). 
FIGURE 5.2 Example for graphic representation of time as spatialized charts 
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FIGURE 5.3 Example for hybrid map 
Source: Girolamo Andrea Martignoni and Giovanni Petroschi. 1721. Carta istorica dell’Italia, e d’una parte 
della Germania dalla nascita di Giesú Cristo all’anno millesettecento. Rome. Institut Cartogràfc i Geològic 
de Catalunya (ICGC), RM.220396 
Thus, these “rivers of time” on the historical maps depict the fact that history is in 
motion, that it itself changes geographical objects (e.g., the “Impero Romano” at 
the top of the map). 
Conclusion 
My starting point was that spatiality cannot be understood without temporality 
(the reverse is also true), because they are mutually dependent on and form each 
other. The demand of the various voices in the “spatial turn” to pay more atten-
tion to space and to analyze the constitutional processes of social space in a more 
diferentiated way is certainly justifed. However, this claim has also led in part to 
one-sidedness, such as the paradoxical neglect of temporality. With my consider-
ations, I have attempted to show that this does not make sense from a historical– 
anthropological point of view, because people need spatial and temporal categories 
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fact that it is only since Einstein that we have had a(n initially physical) theory of 
space-time should not prevent us from looking into history and other cultures and 
asking about their perceptions, practices, and representations of this relationship. 
My short contribution was only able to present a few highlights in this regard. Both 
conceptual history and various attempts to represent history graphically (in tables 
or on maps) bear witness to older eforts to think of space and time together and to 
represent them in their interdependence. Considering the multiple temporalities of 
space could also be a meaningful extension of the concept of “re-confguration of 
spaces,” since it is used to investigate processes in the social world that are certainly 
not linear. 
Note 
1 Space-time, “a system of one temporal and three spatial coordinates by which any 
physical object or event can be located” (see www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
space-time [8.2.2019]), appeared for the first time in 1910. Spatiotemporal: www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/spatiotemporal#examples (8.2.2019). The entry 
“spatiotemporality” does not exist. For German language usage, see DWDS: www.dwds. 
de/. “Raumzeitlichkeit” appears only in the 20th century. No entry in the Wörterbu-
chnetz, a digital platform for historical dictionaries: www.woerterbuchnetz.de/cgi-bin/ 
WBNetz/setupStartSeite.tcl. Only the Grimm contains the keyword “temporality” in 
the sense of transience. 
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SLOW MOVEMENT ON THE 
SLOPE 
On Architecture Principe’s theory of the 
oblique function and the role of circulation 
in architectural and urban design 
Christian Sander 
Movement along the straight path or free exploration 
In 1977, Paul Virilio’s book Speed and Politics ([1977] 2006) was frst published 
in France with the subtitle Essai de dromologie (Essay on Dromology). The term 
“dromology” is a neologism derived from the Greek word dromos, meaning race 
or racecourse. According to Ian James, the theory deals “specifcally with the phe-
nomenon of speed, or more precisely, with the way speed determines or limits the 
manner in which phenomena appear to us” (2007, 29). Broadly speaking, Virilio’s 
main hypothesis is that modern means of communication and transport are based 
on military technologies, the speed of which is fundamentally changing the global 
political geography in the sense that it produces a hegemony of “real time” to the 
disadvantage of “real space” (Virilio and Lotringer [1983] 2008, 230). In a conser-
vation with Sylvère Lotringer in the early 1980s, Virilio stated: 
Space is no longer in geography—it’s in electronics. Unity is in the terminals. 
It’s in the instantaneous time of command posts, multinational headquarters, 
control towers, etc. Politics is less in physical space than in the time systems 
administered by various technologies, from telecommunications to airplanes, 
passing by the TGV [French high-speed train], etc. There is a movement 
from geo- to chronopolitics: the distribution of territory becomes the distri-
bution of time. The distribution of territory is outmoded, minimal. 
(ibid., 126) 
To discuss the connection between space and time, Virilio repeatedly referred to
physics, particularly to Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity, based on which
Hermann Minkowski, at the beginning of the 20th century, developed his theory
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scientifc terminology; for example, he was one of the authors attacked by the physi-
cists Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont in their book Intellectual Impostures: Postmodern
Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science, frst published in French in 1997 ([1997] 1998). In
1998, media scientist Kay Kirchmann published a “decidedly critical monograph” 
(1998, 7; own translation), in which he accuses Virilio of “methodical arbitrari-
ness” (ibid., 9; own translation). However, he failed to look at Virilio’s early work,
which is not unimportant for an understanding of dromology. From 1963 to 1968,
together with architect Claude Parent, Virilio formed the Architecture Principe
group, which in its 1966 eponymous magazine—the group’s manifesto—developed
the theory of the oblique function. The idea was to design the building and the city
exclusively using horizontal and inclined planes, on which the residents would have
to exert themselves physically in order to get around (Figure 6.1). Architecture
Principe’s drawings show topographical architectural reliefs, so to speak, that were
intended to generate new types of perceptual experiences and encounters. 
In their contribution to this book, Martina Löw and Hubert Knoblauch empha-
size the role of circulation in the refguration of spaces. They point out the impor-
tance of trafc routes, for example, in Le Corbusier’s utopian cities, which are divided
into diferent functional zones by means of a geometric network of expressways. One
FIGURE 6.1 Claude Parent. Sketch illustrating the theory of the oblique function, the roof 
of the building becomes a pedestrian area, 1970 
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can also think of the famous quote from Urbanisme (Urbanism), Le Corbusier’s urban
design treatise from 1925: “The curved street is the path of donkeys, the straight
street the path of men” ([1925] 1994, 10; own translation). For the speed critic Paul
Virilio, however, the geometric organization of urban space, together with mediati-
zation, leads to an alienation of the city dweller from his environment; this involves a
temporary climax in the spatio-temporal organization of global air trafc: 
when you look at Greek urban planning (the city of Miletus for example),
colonial planning or that of the Roman camps, you see quite well that the roads
are rectilinear. It’s an organization of speed to drain the populations as fast as
possible toward the city gates, toward the outskirts. A city is not simply a place
where one lives, it’s above all a crossroads. . . . This is why the airport today has
become the new city. . . . People are no longer citizens, they’re passengers in
transit. . . . The new capital is no longer a spatial capital like New York, Paris, or
Moscow, a city located in a specific place, at the intersection of roads, but a city
at the intersection of practicabilities of time, in other words, of speed. 
(Virilio and Lotringer [1983] 2008, 77–78) 
In November 1965, together with architecture critic Patrice Goulet, Claude Parent
criticized Le Corbusier for making the pedestrian “a slave to the car” (1965, 2; own
translation). With the oblique function, published a year later and focusing on the phe-
nomenological body, the goal was to “reconnect” the city dweller with the physical
urban space by forcing him to move around on foot. There should be no defned
pathways on the sloping foors; in his short text “Pulsions” (Drives), published in
July 1966 in the ffth issue of the Architecture Principe magazine, Parent writes: 
The oblique function allows for travel. Architecture becomes the support 
of displacement; the movement is freed from the constraint and precision of 
the distance traveled, and the choice of the itinerary is left open. No longer 
is there canalization or constraint, but distance crossed and conquered; the 
human fluid can pulse at his own rhythm, upheld by the spatial structure, yet 
independent of the formal organization of the support. 
(Parent [1966] 1997b) 
The example of Architecture Principe’s theory will be used in the following to fur-
ther investigate the role of circulation, which refers to the movement of people in
this chapter, in architectural and urban design. To do this, it is frst necessary to take
a look at the tradition of space-time in the frst half of 20th-century architecture. 
Streamline architecture and the city dweller’s haste 
The theory of four-dimensional space-time directly infuenced the founders of 
modern art and architecture. In his book Space, Time and Architecture, frst pub-
lished in 1941, Sigfried Giedion writes about “unconscious parallelisms of method 
in science and art” (Giedion [1941] 1949, 14)—a statement that has already been 
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put into perspective. The supposed space-time in art and architecture was mostly 
a matter of simplifcation or creatively misunderstood takeovers from the scientifc 
debates of the time (Noell 2004, 308). Minkowski’s theory was infuential because 
the perception of space and time was indeed altered by the technical innovations 
of the 19th and early 20th centuries, especially modern means of transport. In 
1914, architect Peter Behrens published the article “Einfuss von Zeit- und Raum-
ausnutzung auf moderne Formentwicklung” (The Infuence of the Use of Time 
and Space on the Development of Modern Form) in the yearbook of the Deutsche 
Werkbund (German Association of Craftsmen), which focused on city trafc. 
This “development of modern form” became particularly evident in corner 
buildings. In reference to his redesign of the so-called Mossehaus in Berlin (Fig-
ure 6.2), to which he added additional foors and a new façade with a seemingly 
aerodynamic shape, Erich Mendelsohn stated in 1923: 
the building is not a disinterested spectator of the rushing cars and of the 
advancing and receding flow of traffic; rather it has become an absorbing, 
cooperating element of the motion. The building both visibly encompasses 
in its overall expression the high speed of traffic, where the tendency toward 
motion is raised to an extreme, and at the same time the balances of its forces 
soothes the frenetic pace of the street and of the passersby. . . . By dividing 
and guiding the traffic, the building, despite all tendencies of its own towards 
movement, becomes an immobile pillar amidst the turbulence of the street. 
(Mendelsohn [1923] 1992, 28) 
FIGURE 6.2 Erich Mendelsohn, Richard Neutra, and Paul Rudolf Henning. Renova-
tion of the Mossehaus, Berlin, 1921–1923 
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Thus, in order to “calm” the city dweller, according to Mendelsohn, one only has
to balance the technologically enhanced speed with a “dynamic” architectural form.
In his 1947 book Vision in Motion, in the subchapter “Speed” of the section “Space-
Time Problems,” László Moholy-Nagy explains that one must clearly distinguish
between the perception that is infuenced by a means of transport and the percep-
tion when walking ([1947] 1969, 245–246). Another subchapter of this section is
called “Mobile Architecture,” in which the artist allows himself to be carried away
into calling it “space-time reality.” For example, he claims that Walter Gropius and
Martin Wagner “are advocating demountable, movable houses for future cities” and
that there “are projects not only of movable but of moving houses too; sanitariums,
for example, turning with the sun” (ibid., 256–257). In his book, Moholy-Nagy
celebrates the artist as a pioneer of developments in the technical-scientifc feld; for
example, artistic experiments with positive and negative forms would have provided
the basis for the design of streamlined products (ibid., 58–61). However, Moholy-
Nagy makes it clear that he rejects the infationary use of the streamlined shape: 
The speed and motion of our period justify “streamlining.” But streamlining 
was originally invented for moving objects and there is hardly any reason 
for an ashtray to be streamlined. Thus, when every product is blown up 
like a balloon—we have to fight against it, as formerly we did against the 
mechanical utilization of symmetry with which everything, in previous peri-
ods, could be made “harmonious and balanced.” 
(ibid., 34) 
All quotes from Vision in Motion that have been cited here were published in
French in 1950 in the ffth issue of the second series of Art d’Aujourd’hui (Art of
Today). The art magazine was in a way the publication organ of the Espace (Space)
group, an association of artists, designers, architects, and engineers founded by
the painter Félix Del Marle together with the artist and editor André Bloc to
promote the synthesis of the arts in the reconstruction of France after the Second
World War. Before meeting Paul Virilio, Claude Parent was a member of Espace,
where he mainly worked with Bloc and the sculptor Nicolas Schöfer. The latter,
because he called for the integration of technology into art, can be seen as the
exemplary artist of the Trente Glorieuses (The Glorious Thirty), the years between
the end of the Second World War and the mid-1970s, which were characterized
by economic prosperity and technological progress. In 1965, Schöfer was one
of the founders of the Groupe International d’Architecture Prospective (GIAP)
and, as such, primarily concerned himself with his project on a Ville cybernétique
(Cybernetic City). This city model adopted a number of elements from the
radical projects of the interwar period, for instance the division of the city into
functionally diferentiated zones, such as work and living. According to Schöfer,
“man, caught in a spiral of acceleration and accumulated eforts, feels the need
to diferentiate his working environment from that of his residence” (Schöfer
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between work and home, fast means of transport are needed: in the drawing of
the Ville résidence-dortoir (Commuter Town) (Figure 6.3), which is a part of the
cybernetic city project, cars race past the elevated apartment buildings, which
Schöfer designed together with Parent in the mid-1950s. 
Parent shared Schöfer’s opinion that architects and artists alike should open 
up to the latest technical developments. In his article “Les corps en mouvement” 
(Bodies in Movement), published in 1960, the architect formulated this conviction 
by referencing the streamlined shape: 
It is said with enthusiasm in the art community that BRANCUSI’S sculptures 
preceded the appearance of aerodynamic forms. This fact, quite unverifiable, 
is extremely characteristic of what the world expects of the architect. It will 
be necessary to make the choice, to express it, to pronounce it by means 
of a form, which will no longer be only the consequence, the result of a 
sum of minor conditions, but rather an artistic choice, a choice on the part 
of a sculptor, who can act with the greatest degree of freedom, where the 
coefficient of penetration of a volume in the air will perhaps be one of the 
important elements guiding and exalting the research. 
(Parent 1960, 6; own translation) 
FIGURE 6.3 Nicolas Schöfer. Ville cybernétique, Ville résidence-dortoir (ville horizontale), 
around 1969 
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Parent had very large structures that are exposed to strong winds in mind. Never-
theless, his own preoccupation with aerodynamics was limited to means of trans-
port; later on, in his article, he discusses the shapes of cars, planes, ships, and trains. 
From the oblique function to dromology and the city of slow 
movement 
The collaboration with Paul Virilio, who was critical of technology as early as 
the 1960s, marked a turning point in Claude Parent’s work. In a 1997 text on the 
oblique function, Virilio criticizes Nicolas Schöfer’s cybernetic city project, in which 
the buildings are equipped with helicopter landing pads: 
The heretical nature of this detour through the techniques of the body can 
be easily imagined, related to the problem of lodgings, that of a body having 
become self-moving again in contradistinction to prostheses of displacement 
of all sorts which had already invaded the city, waiting for the moment of the 
“cybernetic city” imagined at that time by Nicolas Schöffer. 
(Virilio 1997, 11) 
At the beginning of this chapter, it was pointed out that Virilio regularly empha-
sized the supposed military origins in modern means of transport—in “prostheses 
of displacement”—and communication devices. As an excerpt from the 1978 essay 
“Le monument irréel” (The Unreal Monument) on Erich Mendelsohn’s Einstein 
Tower in Potsdam shows, he also recognized it in streamline architecture: 
In the wake of the intensive production of dynamic (aerodynamic) means 
of transport by an arms industry that has essentially switched to the manu-
facture of means of transport and communication, architects have denatured 
the building, a static means of transport, in order to turn it into a dynamic 
(aerostatic) pseudo means of transport, as if the roofs and façades had sud-
denly turned into ship keels—recreating the ruins of this First World War, 
when the sky darkened with metallic thunder. Dramatic symbols of a disfig-
ured, threatening space, the dissolution of the sky, and a premonition of those 
later storms in which the intense motorization of the crowds ultimately led 
to their deportation, in a “blitzkrieg” that saw Erich Mendelsohn flee from 
Nazi Germany after succumbing to the fateful lures of the Italian futurists. 
(Virilio 1978, 366–368; own translation) 
Thus, Virilio did not criticize streamlining for being decorative, as László Moholy-
Nagy did. Rather, he used it as a representative example to highlight the alleged 
ubiquity of military structures. In a 1995 conversation with architect Enrique 
Limon, he clearly separated the two phases of his theoretical work—the Archi-
tecture Principe manifesto and the dromological writings—and even dismissed his 
collaboration with Parent as “a kid’s game”: “Groupe Architecture Principe was 
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about space and politics whereas the issue of speed is about time and politics, 
which opens a whole new vista of research” (Limon and Virilio 1995, 184). What 
is problematic about this clear separation of space and time, however, is that Virilio, 
like the above-mentioned modern architects and artists, repeatedly referred to the 
theory of four-dimensional space-time and thus to the mutual dependence of space 
and time. What distinguishes Virilio’s considerations from the enthusiasm felt by 
artists such as Nicolas Schöfer for machine-produced space-time phenomena is 
not the separation of space and time but rather the radical criticism of the devalua-
tion of space by the technically enhanced speed as it is developed in the arms indus-
try and then introduced into everyday life. This conviction forms the theoretical 
basis for Virilio’s “whole new vista of research.” 
The main diference between the Architecture Principe manifesto and dromol-
ogy is in fact that the latter presents a cultural pessimistic perspective, whereas the 
former develops an alternative model of architectural and urban design. For Parent, 
his membership in the Architecture Principe group was no less important. While 
the architect in the 1950s followed Nicolas Schöfer in his technological zeal and 
in 1960 even pleaded for an aerodynamic design of the architectural form, in his 
text “Le temps mort” (Time Out/Moribund Time), published in March 1966 in 
the Architecture Principe manifesto, he suddenly advocated a city for pedestrians: 
The displacements in cities will be slow, their speed will be that of the pedes-
trian. The concern for speed will be found elsewhere, in other galaxies or 
in entertainment. Displacements necessary to life will become active. The 
notion of “wasted time” will disappear. Speed will no longer be necessary, 
nor a condition for survival. 
(Parent [1966] 1997a, VI—VII) 
Not just because of the capital letters, “Le temps mort” could also be taken for a 
chapter from one of Virilio’s dromological essays: 
We must first of all determine our position with respect to SPACE-TIME. 
Current thought in urban planning comes down to estimating geographical 
displacement in “units of TIME” instead of in units of linear measure pro-
portioned to the displacement. We want nothing to do with this proposition 
based on “speed”. We reject this view. Exploration in space invalidates and 
outdates the very notion of speed. In the new urban agglomerations, speed 
will not be considered a fundamental factor. It will no longer exist. As a 
result, the universe of aerodynamism will crumble. 
(ibid., VI) 
Parent stuck to this anti-speed stance after his collaboration with Virilio; in his 
book Entrelacs de l’oblique (Interlacing the Oblique), a kind of catalogue raisonné of 
his own work published in 1981, he continued to imagine the city of the oblique 
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patients or deliver goods (Parent 1981, 30). This can be read in a chapter entitled 
“Phénoménologie du mouvement oblique et potentialisme” (Phenomenology of 
the Oblique Movement and Potentialism), which once again reveals the infu-
ence of Virilio, who in several interviews emphasized the impact of Maurice Mer-
leau-Ponty’s phenomenological philosophy on his thinking (Armitage and Virilio 
[1999] 2001, 15 and 18). Yet, the oblique city remained utopian, and in 1969, one 
year after the Architecture Principe group split up, the Concorde embarked on its 
maiden fight, capable of fying faster than twice the speed of sound. According to 
Virilio, it engendered “a deregulation of distance which causes time-distances to 
replace space-distances” (Virilio and Lotringer [1983] 2008, 74). 
Circulation translated into architectural form versus 
its fracturing by Architecture Principe 
While Nicolas Schöfer’s cybernetic city project, due to its geometric organization
for the efective (fast) movement of vehicles, can be regarded in line with the urban
utopias of the interwar period like Le Corbusier’s city projects, the oblique function
must be understood as a kind of phenomenological countertheory to this techno-
philic approach of urban design (Busbea 2007, 7 and 160–167). Thilo Hilpert put
it very clearly: “As an artifcial relief, the city [of the oblique function, C.S.] should
remain a physical space for movement and be accessible on foot, such that an archaic
relationship to space is maintained despite the technical age” (Hilpert 1997/1998, 54;
own translation). But circulation, that is, the movement of people in this chapter, is
not just involved in the organization of the city; it also infuences the shape of our
built environment. With the car came the idea to design the buildings lining the road
according to the perception infuenced by the speed of the vehicle, and computer-
based design now allows for even more elaborate ways to translate circulation into
architectural form. In the 1990s, architect Greg Lynn used animation software from
the flm industry to document data such as wind movement, car trafc, and pedes-
trian fows in order to develop an animation from which he could generate a spatial
structure (Ruby 2002, 42–43). For the Yokohama International Port Terminal, For-
eign Ofce Architects (Farshid Moussavi and Alejandro Zaera-Polo) worked with a
“no-return diagram” (Figure 6.4), that is, “a feld of movements with no structural
orientation.” For the architects, this diagram was their “frst attempt to provide the
building with a particular spatial performance” (Moussavi and Zaera-Polo 2002, 11).
The resulting pier can be described as paths turned into architectural form. 
Due to its variously inclined surfaces, the Yokohama International Port Termi-
nal was repeatedly associated with the theory of the oblique function (Bideau 2002, 
17; Simonot 2010, 167). However, in Claude Parent’s drawings of the church of 
Sainte-Bernadette du Banlay (Figure 6.5), built by Architecture Principe in the 
central French city of Nevers in the 1960s, the arrows do not represent the move-
ment of people in the building. Here, it is the architectural form that, in the archi-
tect’s drawing process, moves to fnally become a spatial structure in which one is 
forced to fnd one’s own way. When Architecture Principe designed the church, 
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FIGURE 6.4 Farshid Moussavi and Alejandro Zaera-Polo (Foreign Ofce Architects, 
FOA). Yokohama International Port Terminal, no-return diagram, around 1995 
Source: © AZPML 
FIGURE 6.5 Claude Parent. Sketch illustrating the form-fnding process for the church 
of Sainte-Bernadette du Banlay, built in Nevers in 1965/66 
Source: Parent [1994] 2012. © Claude Parent Archives 
highly complex plan, was built in the early 1960s. In a 1967 article, Parent writes 
about Scharoun’s building: “In the interior spaces, one is at times faced with such 
a complex network of paths and circulation that one’s attention is necessarily in a 
state of permanent alert” (Parent 1967, 38; own translation). It is this permanent 
alertness to our built environment that is taught to us in Architecture Principe’s 
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PART II 
Spatiality, social inequality, 




A postcolonial critique 
Gurminder K. Bhambra 
Postcolonial challenges to spatialisation 
Our times are marked by the unprecedented attention given to the movement of 
people. This has been highlighted in recent years as a consequence of what is gen-
erally called the ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe. However, I prefer to see it as the crisis 
produced for refugees by our—that is, European—failure to abide by the norms 
and obligations set out in various international human rights treaties to which we 
are signatories. For all the attention—media and political—given to this movement 
of people, one would expect the ensuing numbers to be far in excess of the 0.31% 
increase in the total population in Europe that successful asylum applications have 
otherwise constituted over the last few years (Bhambra 2017a). Even if we were to 
add the numbers of those who come for what are termed ‘economic’ reasons, the 
movement of people in our contemporary times is far smaller and less signifcant 
in terms of its impact on land and local people than earlier movements. Here, I 
am alluding to the mass movement of Europeans from the seventeenth century 
onwards to what came to be known as the New World. 
Indeed, across the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, over 60 million 
Europeans moved to the lands of others, far exceeding in scope and impact the 
numbers moving today (Miège 1993). Europe could, but for the most part chooses 
not to, absorb others into its societies; however, they were forced to give way to 
Europeans and to their domination over them. Yet, almost without exception, 
those writing on migration today do so without any reference to that earlier move-
ment. Nor do they understand how it is part of the explanation of contemporary 
inequalities and, as such, would need to be part of any solution. 
Even those commentators on public policy who see migration as the most efec-
tive way to address issues of global inequality—such as Branko Milanovic (2016)— 
do so through a presentist lens, which sees migration primarily in terms of the 
DOI: 10.4324/9781003036159-9 
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problems posed by ‘open borders’ for the host societies. It is in this context that 
Milanovic (2016), formerly lead economist in the World Bank’s research depart-
ment, proposed in an op-ed in the Financial Times whether a trade-of might not 
be made between citizenship and migration to resolve this contradiction. He argues 
that while open borders are likely to be the most efective way of reducing global 
inequality, this would require a trade-of between citizenship and migration on the 
part of those moving; they might be allowed to move, but they should be denied 
citizenship and the associated rights. 
In contrast, as I will go on to argue, the postcolonial challenge to the contem-
porary spatialisation of modernity requires us to consider the extent to which our 
current neoliberal times reproduce earlier colonial logics that facilitated movement 
for some while establishing hard borders for others. As Knoblauch and Löw (2017) 
argue, modernity can be seen in terms of violent processes involving the extension 
and enforcement of boundaries and the homogenisation of spaces and popula-
tions. The solution to the identifed problems consequent to this spatialisation 
of the world does not, for me, rest on the idea of ‘open borders’, particularly as 
this is being conceptualised by some economists. Nor does it lie in the alternative 
promoted by those such as Wolfgang Streeck (2018) of a hostile environment for 
migration and refugee aid close to the source. Rather, it lies in a collective account-
ability that can only be met through a process of social democratic reparative action; 
that is, through a generalising of social democracy rather than the establishment of a 
nationally specifc social democracy available to some but denied to others. 
Global inequality, open borders, and differential citizenship 
The idea that issues of global inequality can be addressed through the movement 
of individuals across open borders in conjunction with limiting the rights of those 
who move has been put forward by a number of economists and other scholars. 
Eric Posner and Glen Weyl (2014, np), for example, argue that ‘the most power-
ful force to reduce inequality worldwide’ is a system of ‘open migration laws that 
are coupled, paradoxically, with caste systems’. They suggest that we look to the 
Gulf nations, which, by welcoming migrant workers, ‘do more than any other rich 
country to reduce global inequality’. They recognise that migration to these coun-
tries is facilitated by limiting the rights of migrant workers in these authoritarian 
states; but suggest that ‘reducing inequality will require uncomfortable tradeofs’. 
Branko Milanovic (2016) similarly aligns himself with this position. 
Milanovic (2018) sees the problems associated with the movement of people as 
resting in two phenomena. First, that globalisation has made knowledge of income 
diferentials between countries better known and, relatedly, that transportation 
costs are much lower than was previously the case. Second, that there are increasing 
gaps in real incomes between wealthy countries and poorer ones. Milanovic (2018) 
argues that, whereas previously the locus of global inequality could be identifed in 
class diferences, as had been argued by Marx and Engels, it now rests in aspects of 
location. While the available datasets from the nineteenth century confrm Marx 
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and Engels’ assumptions about the ‘similarity in the economic position of workers 
across the world’ (Milanovic 2012, 126–127), Milanovic suggests that this changes 
by the early twenty-frst century. At this point, he argues, inequality comes to be 
predominantly determined by geographical location and not economic class. That 
is, as he states, the poorest citizens in the richest countries have incomes higher 
than the richest citizens in the poorest countries. It is this income diferential across 
locations that drives people to migrate because, as he argues, ‘people can increase 
their incomes several fold if they migrate from a low mean income location to a 
high mean income location’ (Milanovic 2012, 130). 
As such, Milanovic (2016, np) claims that ‘migration does more to reduce global 
poverty and inequality than any other factor’, but that the problem with this solu-
tion is that the ‘arrival of migrants threatens to diminish or dilute the premium 
[generally understood in terms of access to the welfare state] enjoyed by citizens of 
rich countries’, who are then hostile to the new arrivals. In part, he argues, this is 
a consequence of those who are the poorest in rich nations being ‘the biggest los-
ers’ of globalisation (Milanovic 2013, 202). The shift from the end of the twentieth 
century to the early twenty-frst century saw real incomes rise for almost every-
body globally, except for the very poorest 5% or those within the ‘75th and 90th 
percentiles of global income distribution, whose real income gains were essentially 
nil’ (Milanovic 2013, 202). These people—on lower incomes in rich countries, 
whose income has not increased, but who are still part of the 25% of highest earn-
ers in the world—are presented by Milanovic as the ‘nonwinners’ of globalisation 
and as the people most likely to be threatened by and hostile to immigration. And 
whose hostility has been acknowledged as legitimate. 
Milanovic (2018), somewhat inconsistently, concedes that there is only a slight 
negative impact on wages as a consequence of migration from poorer countries. 
This suggests that domestic policy rather than globalisation might explain the stag-
nant incomes of the ‘nonwinners’ of the West. However, it is the cultural impact 
that he treats as signifcant and requiring accommodation. That is, he suggests 
an approach is needed that would balance the economic needs of a country for 
migrants ‘with the preservation of certain cultural norms’ (Milanovic 2018), as if 
migrants necessarily disrupt those norms. This could be done by restricting migra-
tion to those workers who ‘come to do specifc jobs for a limited period of time’ 
and who would then return to their countries of origin (Milanovic 2018). Another 
solution would be to restrict the citizenship rights of migrants in the countries 
of arrival and make them pay higher taxes given the benefts they gain by being 
granted entry to these countries. This, Milanovic (2016, np) argues, would ‘assuage 
the concerns of the native population, while still ensuring the migrants are better 
of than they would be had they stayed in their own countries’. 
Notice that the world’s poorest are asked to pay taxation to support those within 
the 75th to 90th percentile, while the top 10th percentile appropriates the proft 
from their exploited labour and has experienced a signifcant reduction in their 
tax burden. It is the world’s poorest who, as a price for their mobility, are asked to 
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well as a further tax (or rent) for simply working in wealthier countries. This is 
Milanovic’s compromise solution, which, he suggests, is ‘in tune with globalisation 
but also with legitimate concerns for national heritage’ (Milanovic 2018, np). As I 
will go on to argue, this compromise solution is only a solution in the context of 
accepting neoliberal norms and precepts as defning not only our contemporary 
times, but also our normative understandings. 
Indenture as a ‘choice’ to reduce global inequality 
Eric Posner and Glen Weyl (2014, np) state quite openly that ‘Gulf states explicitly 
seek non-Arab, dark-skinned migrants so as to minimize the risk that nationals will 
sympathize, fraternize, or intermarry with migrants (who would then demand per-
manent residence, if not citizenship)’. Further, they suggest that migrants should 
be paid signifcantly lower wages than those typical of even low-paid workers in 
the host society. They must also be deprived of rights to organise and protest, and 
are to be delivered into a strict subordination to employers as indentured labour. 
While the exploitation of indentured labour will be to the beneft of employers 
(and some consumers) in the north, they claim that it will also be to the betterment 
of indentured labourers themselves, who are escaping the worse conditions they 
otherwise face ‘at home’. 
This, as I have argued with John Holmwood (Holmwood and Bhambra 2015)
elsewhere, is a ‘pro-slavery’ argument for the free movement of unfree labour. Sig-
nifcantly, Posner and Weyl seem to repeat arguments last articulated in defence of
Jim Crow policies in the southern states of the United States of America, specifcally
that slavery itself was relatively benefcial for transported Africans compared with
the circumstances in Africa from which they came. Quite apart from the distaste-
ful nature of the argument, its sociological or political naivety is also evident. They
write as if the colonial process of enslavement had no impact upon the populations
that were left behind in terms of their possibilities for subsistence and collective
determination (see Manning 1983; Lovejoy 1989). ‘Belonging’, and with it the
right to have social and political rights, is presented as a privilege of local (European
and European-descended) citizens; migrants are displaced from where they belong
and are to be ofered no recognition or rights in the places to which they move. 
This is exacerbated by Posner and Weyl’s (2018) further proposal for relatively 
disadvantaged citizens in wealthy countries to be able to ‘sponsor’ or ‘rent’ migrants 
as a way of binding them to the overarching project of alleviating global poverty 
by providing them with a direct return. They explicitly advocate for a segregated 
system dependent on patronage and enforced through the maintenance of ascribed 
diferences (see also Weyl 2016). Domestic capital should be free to exploit inden-
tured labour, while migrant labour should be policed and prevented from claiming 
rights enjoyed by other citizens (though it is unlikely that local populations in the 
global North could be insulated from the efects of divided citizenship and merely 
enjoy the fruits of the indentured labour in the form of rent or cheap services). 
In efect, they implicitly recognise that enforcing cheap labour creates a windfall 
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proft for those who can access it, but seeks to resolve that inequality by widening 
the pool of exploiters. This represents not so much a universal basic income as a 
racialised income supplement. 
Such arguments are contingent upon the idea that the global North bears no 
collective responsibility for the conditions found in the global South. The issues 
are framed simply in terms of our charity and benevolence towards others in con-
strained circumstances with little refection on how we may be responsible for the 
commission and maintenance of those very circumstances. Furthermore, it relies 
on the notion that, however constrained, indentured labour represents a ‘choice’. 
The question that we must ask, however, is at what point does ‘indentured labour’ 
become so constrained that it represents enslavement? As Chris Bertram argues, 
such a posited solution ‘distorts our moral understanding, specifcally, our under-
standing of justice, to represent a pragmatic compromise with unjust attitudes as 
exemplifying what justice itself demands’ (2019, 290). Further, denying rights to 
alleviate global inequality, he continues, ‘when we could achieve the same out-
comes by acting otherwise, involves the [active] commission of injustice’ (2019, 
295). Global inequality is not a natural condition that requires ‘us’ to address it 
through acts of willed generosity; instead, it requires a more thoroughgoing under-
standing of its production and our related obligations as a consequence of this 
shared and unequal history. 
Histories of global inequality 
There is a general recognition that the process of moving as a means of addressing 
issues of local impoverishment and inequality is not new. Yet, there is little discus-
sion of how that migration—what used to be called in nineteenth-century Ger-
man national economy ‘emigrationist colonialism’ (Smith 1980)—itself contributes 
to the process of creating the vast diferentials between incomes on a global scale. 
Today, European and North American debates make no reference to colonialism 
and scarcely allude to that movement of people, for the most part Europeans, who, 
whether intentionally or not, come to be part of the project of settler colonialism 
and the processes of dispossession, elimination, and extraction that have signif-
cantly contributed to the specifc confguration of contemporary inequalities. 
Across the nineteenth century, as mentioned earlier, around 60 million Europe-
ans left their countries of origin to make new lives and livelihoods for themselves 
on lands inhabited by others (Miege 1993). Each new cohort of Europeans was 
allocated land at the edges of the territory that had already been colonised. This 
was done in order to extend political control over contested border territories. In 
this way, Europeans from across the continent participated in the elimination and 
dispossession of the populations who were on that land and were thus complicit in 
the settler colonial project. 
At least 7 million Germans moved to these lands—to what was to become the 
United States in the north and to Brazil and Argentina in the south—becoming, 
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(Bade 1995). Large-scale Polish emigration started in the period after the Franco-
Prussian war, and by the turn to the twentieth century, over 2 million Polish people 
had moved to the Americas, with about 300,000 settling in Brazil, another settler 
colony, by 1939 (Zubrzycki 1953). Two million subjects of the Dual Monarchy of 
Austria-Hungary travelled to the Americas (Zahra 2016), as did over 8 million Irish 
people (Delaney 2000)—including a million as a consequence of the mid-century 
famine induced by British colonial rule. By 1890, nearly a million Swedes, one-
ffth of the total Swedish population, were living in the lands colonised by (and as) 
the U.S. In addition, 13.5 million British people moved to white settler colonies 
across the globe (Fedorowich and Thompson 2013). National migration associa-
tions were set up to facilitate the movement of poor and unemployed Europeans 
to the New World and beyond. Those who left remitted money back, pointing 
to the ways in which the wealth accrued through colonial endeavours was directly 
linked to the development of the economy, and particularly local economies, ‘back 
home’. European empires also taxed the peoples they dominated, appropriating 
not only a surplus for the management of the colony, but also a surplus for the 
building of state institutions in the metropole, what Milanovic calls the ‘national 
patrimony’. 
The movement of peoples, of such magnitude, is implicitly claimed to have 
been unproblematic and in some of the literature is called the age of ‘free migra-
tion’, referring to the ‘open border’ of the United States during most of this period. 
Milanovic, for example, suggests that the issue in terms of people’s movement 
today, as compared to movements in the past, is that today ‘the impediments are 
greater’ (2012, 131); that is, there are walls, barriers, fortifed borders, which there 
had not been in the past. This appears to suggest that the mass European move-
ment of the nineteenth century occurred without any contestation. What is not 
accounted for in such a presentation is the preceding movement, also of Europeans, 
that had largely eliminated the prior populations of these lands to enable them to 
be seen as ‘free soil’, to use Weber’s term (quoted in Mommsen 1984 [1959], 83, fn 
56). The ‘open border’ of the United States might have been open on the eastern 
edge, but this was only as a consequence of Europeans having eliminated indig-
enous peoples and appropriated their lands. It was not ‘open’ prior to being made 
so through European colonisation. 
As such, not only are European imperial powers implicated in the production 
of global inequalities, but also broader European populations who, by moving to 
these lands, consolidated the ‘manifest destiny’ of expansion at the expense of the 
prior inhabitants. 
This earlier movement of people was diferent to contemporary migration not 
least because those who move across borders in the present live according to the 
rules and norms of the societies of the lands to which they come—this was not 
the case with Europeans moving to the lands of others. Those who moved in the 
age of ‘free migration’ are better understood as colonial settlers, and colonial settlers 
are not migrants even if much of the scholarship confuses them as such. To natu-
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and legitimates violence in the past as the condition for continued violence against 
others in the present (who bear that violence as their ‘patrimony’). The violence 
of imperial rule and colonial settlement disappears from histories of the nation— 
happening, as it does, outside of the borders of the national state—at the same time 
as arguments about national sovereignty and national heritage are used to securitise 
borders in the present and to argue for diferentiated citizenship for those with the 
temerity to move across them. Milanovic (and others, such as Streeck) argues for a 
legitimate national heritage and perceives problems in the integration of diference, 
yet it is colonialism itself that racialised diference and made it difcult to consider 
treating ‘diverse others’ as equals. On this, there is little to no comment. 
European colonisation and the production 
of global inequality 
Milanovic (2012, 132) is not unaware of Europe’s long history of colonisation; it 
is just that he euphemises the process as one whereby Europe ‘exported its people 
elsewhere’. As such, he does not seem to regard it as signifcant to the shaping of 
the world or to the establishment of inequalities within it. For example, he states 
that India, today, similar to China, ‘is also recording high rates of growth and has 
also started from a very low baseline’ (Milanovic 2013, 200). This is presented 
without any comment about the drain of resources that had occurred from India to 
Britain over two hundred years of colonial rule (Patnaik 2017) and the similar prac-
tices imposed upon China by the West to create the ‘very low baseline’. Instead, in 
their modelling of incomes over time, economists use national categories to discuss 
territories that were in fact colonised. For example, Milanovic (2013, 205) writes 
that Marx’s presentation of proletarians in diferent parts of the world—that is, 
‘peasants in India, workers in England’—sharing the same political interests was ‘a 
broadly accurate description of the situation at that time’. This is because, he states, 
‘equally poor people of diferent nations faced equally rich people in their own’ 
(Milanovic 2013, 205). This rather neglects to address the fact that peasants in India 
were not being exploited by rich people within their ‘nation’, as India was at that 
time under colonial rule exercised by Britain and the profts of exploitation were 
appropriated by the colonial power, and only partly by local elites. 
This form of methodological nationalism—or what I have also called ‘meth-
odological whiteness’ (Bhambra 2017b)—within the social sciences, while leading 
to inadequate scholarship in its own terms, also has pernicious consequences in 
the debates on migration and citizenship. Milanovic, for example, states that the 
reason poor migrants should not have access to full citizenship rights is because it 
would be viewed as unfair by local citizens whose ‘citizenship premium’ would 
be diminished. This is because, as he states, rich countries accumulate wealth and 
transmit it ‘along with many other advantages, to the next generations of their 
citizens’ (Milanovic 2013, 207). ‘We take it as normal,’ he suggests, ‘that there is 
a transmission of collectively acquired wealth over generations within the same 
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been arguing, European states were not constituted simply as nations, but as impe-
rial powers, and that a signifcant proportion of what is presented as their national 
wealth historically is attributable to the coerced labour and appropriated resources 
of others, then what does it mean to argue for the protection of that wealth solely 
for one’s own citizens? Notice, too, that Milanovic is also silent on the decline of 
that public capital through policies of privatisation. 
The idea that most European countries were simply nations, generating wealth 
endogenously, is a fundamental misreading of the historical processes that pro-
duced Europe. Even those countries that are not explicitly regarded as having been 
colonial powers partook nonetheless in the wealth of the European colonial proj-
ect through the involvement of their populations in emigrationist colonialism and 
through being the benefciaries of ‘colonial drain’ (Patnaik 2017). The wealth that 
is claimed by nations in Europe has a much broader provenance and, if we were 
to accept this, then we might be persuaded to reconfgure our politics in the pres-
ent such that addressing global inequality would not require a trade-of between 
social and political citizenship and migration. Even Milanovic (2018) recognises 
that there are other ways to address global inequality, including global redistributive 
schemes. He just does not believe that such a scheme would be feasible. I would 
argue, in contrast, that not only is such a scheme feasible and just, but also that it is 
the only way in which we can tackle the confuence of neoliberal and the increas-
ingly authoritarian politics of the present. 
Conclusion: for postcolonial reparative action 
European colonialism was a collective and individual endeavour that established, 
determined, and perpetuated the forms of global inequality that continue to dis-
fgure our contemporary world. Its address requires us to acknowledge the ways 
in which we beneft from this structuring of the world and act to resolve those 
structures in a fully inclusive and social-democratic, not a nationalist, way. The 
injustices that disfgure the world we share can only be addressed by acknowledg-
ing the histories that have produced them as well as the historiographies that have 
obscured them. 
This requires refection upon the past and what I call postcolonial reparative 
action in the present. Perhaps unconditionally accepting refugees, asylum seekers, 
and other migrants to Europe would mitigate the actions of earlier generations that 
have precisely made the places ‘they’ come from unliveable? Could rethinking and 
reformulating trade and other policies, which are entirely to Europe’s advantage, be 
an act of reparative justice? Might relabelling ‘aid’ as ‘reparations’ create the space 
for conversations about how little Europe gives and how much of what is given 
returns to Europe anyway and facilitate the possibility of doing more? 
Europe is the wealthiest continent on the planet. Its wealth is an ‘inheritance’ 
derived from the very same historical processes that have left other places in pov-
erty. Migration is an inadequate solution to the problem of global inequality. The 
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European movements. The only efective solution to issues of global inequality is 
to acknowledge and address these histories through forms of global distributive 
justice. 
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THE CENTRALITY OF RACE 
TO INEQUALITY ACROSS THE 
WORLD-SYSTEM1 
Old fgurations and new reconfgurations 
Manuela Boatcă 
Linking the increase in inequality and 
the reconfguration of space 
In its latest report, entitled “Time to Care,” Oxfam International (2020) pointed 
out, as it has done several times in the past decade, that global economic inequality 
is out of control. Other global organizations and academic publications have also 
sounded the alarm about a rapidly polarizing world. Yet until rather recently, the 
fact that the inequality of wealth and income had increased since the 1980s within 
rich countries—notably the United States and Great Britain—only spurred debates 
about how social inequality was “bad for growth” (The Economist 2012). At the 
same time, news of the decline of income inequality in Latin America, viewed as 
the world’s most unequal region for decades, increasingly made the headlines as 
“Gini Back in the Bottle” (The Economist 2012)—a pun on the Gini coefcient, a 
common measure for income inequality, and the hit song “Genie in a Bottle.” The 
fact that the unprecedented changes had suddenly rendered the United States more 
unequal than much of Latin America further spurred debates on inequality in rich 
countries (Light 2013). 
However, only a few voices pointed to how the increase in inequality world-
wide was contributing to a reconfguration of space and to the shifts this reconfgu-
ration occasioned in charting elites and underclasses across cores and peripheries 
of the world-system. In world-system scholarship, the capitalist world-economy 
that emerged in the sixteenth century with Europe’s colonial expansion into the 
Americas is the basic economic entity. It comprises a single division of labor in 
which diferent areas perform diferent economic tasks—typically, industrial pro-
duction in the core, raw material production in the periphery and a mixture of the 
two in the semiperiphery. While the unequal division of labor ensures the steady 




98 Manuela Boatcă 
within the global division of labor shifts in time and mechanisms of surplus transfer 
change. The system develops as a whole in a “pattern of interplay between cyclical 
processes of expansion and contraction and the secular evolutionary processes that 
undermine the basic stability of the system” (Wallerstein 2000, 109), as competing 
strata, technologies, and institutions negotiate conficting interests across the inter-
dependent structural locations of core, periphery, and semiperiphery. Knoblauch 
and Löw (2020) have coined “refguration of space” to refer to the transformation 
of the social order as a result of tensions and confict between diferent social struc-
tures in a recent, “refgured modernity”; this represents, for world-system scholars, 
the very mode of functioning and underlying logic of the capitalist world-economy 
since the sixteenth century. Drawing on world-system scholarship, anthropologist 
Fernando Coronil referred to the most recent installment in this pattern of inter-
play as a refguration of space, noting that 
While the gap between rich and poor nations—as well as between the rich 
and the poor—is widening everywhere, global wealth is concentrating in 
fewer hands, and these few include those of subaltern elites. In this recon-
figured global landscape, the “rich” cannot be identified exclusively with 
metropolitan nations; nor can the “poor” be identified exclusively with the 
Third and Second Worlds. The closer worldwide interconnection of ruling 
sectors and the marginalization of subordinate majorities has undermined 
the cohesiveness of these geopolitical units. . . . The social tensions resulting 
from these processes often lead to a racialization of social conflict and the rise 
of ethnicities. 
(Coronil 2000, 361) 
It is this reconfguration of the global landscape through the unequal mobility of 
the very rich across cores, peripheries, and semiperipheries—rather than a spatial 
refguration towards the centrality of the semiperiphery alone—that will consti-
tute the focus of the present chapter. Coronil’s call for a diferentiated, basically 
intersectional analysis of inequality echoed the provocative formula that Immanuel 
Wallerstein used in his 1988 analysis of racism and sexism in the world-system in 
order to describe racialized social mobility under capitalism: 
Some groups can be mobile in the ranking system; some groups can disap-
pear or combine with others; while others break apart and new ones are 
born. But there are always some who are “niggers”. If there are no Blacks or 
too few to play the role, one can invent “white niggers”. 
(Wallerstein 2000, 350) 
In turn, in a long essay published in the Journal of World-Systems Research in 2017, 
titled “Moving Toward Theory for the 21st Century: The Centrality of Non-
Western Semiperipheries to World Ethnic/Racial Inequality,” Wilma Dunaway and 
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that sees white supremacy as the sole cause of racism and bringing the non-Western 
semiperiphery2 to the foreground instead. In world-system scholarship, the struc-
tural position of the semiperiphery has been credited with ensuring the survival of 
the capitalist world-economy since its inception—mostly because semiperipheral 
intermediate positions have served to placate the system’s tendency towards polar-
ization between an exploiting core and an exploited periphery. By preventing the 
unifed opposition of the peripheral areas against the core, semiperipheries fulflled 
not only a signifcant economic function in the capitalist world-economy but also, 
and frst of all, the major political task of providing stability to the system, one 
region at a time. As Wallerstein put it in the wake of the 1970s economic crisis: 
The essential difference between the semiperipheral country that is Brazil 
or South Africa today and the semiperipheral country that is North Korea 
or Czechoslovakia is probably less in the economic role each plays in the 
world-economy than in the political role each plays in conflicts among core 
countries. 
(Wallerstein 1979, 75) 
Drawing on this conceptualization of the semiperiphery, Dunaway and Clelland 
argue that future theory-building must pay particular attention to “the rise of the 
Asian semiperiphery, where two-ffths of the world’s population is concentrated” 
(2017, 399). It is worth engaging at length with their arguments in order to illu-
minate both the benefts and the pitfalls inherent in the (over)emphasis of spatial 
reconfguration more generally, and of the structural position of the semiperiphery 
in particular. Such overemphasis placed on shifts in the world-system hierarchy, I 
argue, obscures decisive dynamics—frst and foremost racially mediated social and 
physical mobility across cores, semiperipheries, and peripheries. 
The authors’ starting point is the observation that “more of the share of the 
world wealth that once accumulated in the core and in the European semiper-
iphery is now being appropriated by nonwestern semiperipheries” (Dunaway and 
Clelland 2017, 408). The article ofers much-needed empirical evidence against 
the recurrent catching-up development rhetoric that World Bank reports often 
derive from undiferentiated data on population size and economic growth in low-
income countries. It also makes a strong case for a more diferentiated analysis of 
hierarchies of oppression that would account for the diverse ethnic make-up of the 
transnational capitalist class as much as for the actions of non-Western states. The 
article thus strives to decenter Eurocentric perspectives by bringing non-Western 
semiperipheries to the forefront of social theory and by denouncing approaches 
centered on race as a universalization of Western knowledge. To this end, Dunaway 
and Clelland strongly emphasize the visibility of semiperipheries, yet underplay 
and even explicitly argue against the importance of white supremacy for an under-
standing of global inequality. 
While I agree, and have previously argued myself that closer attention should 
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claim that non-Western semiperipheries exacerbate and even cause racial/ethnic 
inequality to be misleading. The data provided by Dunaway and Clelland do speak 
to the role of semiperipheries more generally (Western and non-Western) in lend-
ing stability to the system by replicating, mirroring, and disseminating racialized 
mechanisms of endless accumulation of capital at diferent levels in the structural 
hierarchy. Yet this does not amount to the non-Western semiperipheries’ ability to 
overturn the racializing logic on which endless accumulation has been premised 
since the emergence of the modern/colonial world-system, and should not be 
mistaken for such. 
In the following, I thus want to caution against what I think are three weak links
in the argument about the role of semiperipheries in the increase of racial and eth-
nic inequality: mistaking visibility for causation, confating the concept of race with
the reality of racism (and its many historical and geopolitical confgurations), and
throwing the baby (white supremacy) out with the bathwater (Western knowledge). 
I will limit my comments to two aspects. The frst aspect is methodological and
concerns the unclear unit of analysis that underlies Dunaway and Clelland’s claim for
the centrality of non-Western semiperipheries to ethnic/racial inequality. The sec-
ond aspect is more substantive and targets the relationship between racism and the
emergence, functioning, and reproduction of the modern/colonial world-system. 
The unit of analysis: magnifying glass or methodological 
bottleneck? 
In order to draw attention to the role of non-Western semiperipheries in causing 
and exacerbating ethnic/racial inequality, Dunaway and Clelland observe that 
greater wealth accumulation has not been accompanied by an end to ethnic/ 
racial oppression in the core, nor has ascent to semiperipheral status led to 
less ethnic/racial exploitation in nonwestern societies. 
(Dunaway and Clelland 2017, 412) 
South Africa is mentioned as an example where the dismantling of white rule has 
even led to a Black elite oppressing a Black majority. Together with the fact that 
the richest countries now include many non-Western states and that large numbers 
of non-Westerners have joined the capitalist class in recent decades, this is viewed 
as evidence against a global apartheid thesis—according to which white supremacy 
dictates the terms and amount of wealth accumulation: 
why did “white supremacy” not operate to prevent “nonwhite” interlopers
from accumulating wealth between 1980 and 2015 that this racial dualism
reserves to “western” countries? . . . Why did “coloredness”not prevent seven
Third World countries from achieving GDPpc [gross domestic product per
capita] that was 2.3 times greater than that of the United Kingdom in 1980? 
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Answers to the questions thus formulated seem to be possible only as blatant nega-
tions of the white supremacy theory. Yet this is due to the methodological bottle-
neck inherent in the questions themselves: on the one hand, their focus constantly 
shifts from structural positions within the world-system (core, semiperiphery) 
to national units (societies, countries) to regional constructs (the West, Eastern 
Europe, the Third World); on the other hand, these units seem to operate on their 
own, rather than as parts of the capitalist world-economy. 
For non-Western semiperipheries to cause ethnic/racial inequality, mechanisms 
for the production and reproduction of diference would need to be available there 
that are unavailable elsewhere in the world-system, and that are somehow con-
fned to that particular location. For South Africa to experience the dismantling of 
exploitation and segregation of the non-white majority after the end of apartheid, 
racism would need to have worked there independently of the racism built in 
the exploitative logic of the capitalist world-economy. Yet the very contribution 
of world-systems analysis to understanding global inequality consists in viewing 
capitalism as operating at the level of the entire world-economy, rather than in 
individual countries going through diferent stages of development. Shifting the 
unit of analysis from the nation-state to the world as a whole makes it possible to 
view inequalities as intrinsic to the world-economy, their increase in the longue 
durée as part of a secular trend, and their eventual disappearance as premised on a 
fundamental transformation of the entire world-system, not just individual units— 
whether countries, regions, or semiperipheries. 
If we are to understand the ways in which racism produces ethnic and racial 
inequality in the world-system today, the unit of analysis for the questions we ask 
has to be the world-system as well. The so-called West is only “white,” the allegedly 
post-Socialist Europe “white, but not quite,” and the former Third World “col-
ored” in relation to each other and in a world-system premised on a constructed 
notion of whiteness as the norm. In this sense, they are “large scale fgurations,” as 
Knoblauch and Löw observe, drawing on Norbert Elias’ concept (Knoblauch and 
Löw 2020, 265). However, they are not new but instead date back fve hundred 
years; their current reconfguration does not change the systemic logic behind their 
creation. Indeed, Wallerstein’s early engagement with the construction of race as 
a structural category in the African context does justice to both the systemic logic 
and the local fuctuations that operate to maintain white supremacy: 
Race is, in the contemporary world, the only international status group 
category. It has replaced religion, which played that role since at least the 
eighth century AD. Rank in this system, rather than colour, determines 
membership in the status group. Thus, in Trinidad, there can be a “Black 
Power” movement, directed against an all-Black government, on the grounds 
that this government functions as an ally of North American imperialism. 
Thus, Quebec separatists can call themselves the “White Niggers” of North 
America. Thus, Pan-Africanism can include white-skinned Arabs of North 
Africa, but exclude white-skinned Afrikaners of South Africa. Thus, Cyprus 
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and Yugoslavia can be invited to tricontinental conferences (Asia, Africa and 
Latin America) but Israel and Japan are excluded. 
(Wallerstein 1979, 180) 
The world-systemic lens has the advantage of a magnifying glass that puts into clear 
relief entanglements and interdependencies between seemingly unconnected and 
spatially distant areas. If we focus instead on the role of one structural location—in 
this case, the semiperiphery—in order to explain the functioning of phenomena 
such as racism and processes such as increasing inequality, which have a system-
wide logic, we exchange the magnifying glass for a methodological bottleneck that 
prevents us from seeing both historical connections and present transformations. 
Race in the modern/colonial world-system 
However, Dunaway and Clelland further clarify their strong disavowal of white 
supremacy as an explanatory factor for racial/ethnic inequality. They argue that, 
while ethnicization and racism are built into the dynamics of the world-system, 
they operate at multiple levels across the structural positions of core, semiperiph-
ery, and periphery, rather than as a racial dualism that pinpoints “whites” as the 
only perpetrators of ethnic and racial inequality (Dunaway and Clelland 2017, 
418) across all tiers. They thus take the increasing racial and ethnic diversity of the 
transnational capitalist class in the past decades as a particularly strong indication 
of the ways in which non-Western semiperipheries will increasingly cause and/ 
or exacerbate most of the world’s ethnic/racial inequality in the twenty-frst cen-
tury. As much as 53% of the world’s wealthiest capitalists today are not Western-
ers, Dunaway and Clelland point out. And yet, the authors note, globally visible 
outlets, such as Oxfam’s 2016 report on the concentration of wealth in the hands 
of ever fewer billionaires, disregard this momentous change in the composition of 
this class. 
This evidence, pointing to an unprecedented shift in the nationalities of the 
world’s most recent billionaires, is indeed both striking and mounting. World-
system scholars found that the number of billionaires in middle-income coun-
tries tripled in just six years despite the 2008 recession, with Brazil, Hong Kong, 
and India registering a twofold, Russia almost a threefold, and China a staggering 
twelvefold increase in their respective number of billionaires from 2006 to 2012 
(Albrecht and Korzeniewicz 2018, 103). At the same time, global fnancial consul-
tancies such as Arton Capital predicted that the billionaire population was going 
to grow nearly 80% by the year 2020, an increase of 1,700 billionaires, to which 
China and India were expected to contribute disproportionately (Arton Capital 
2017). The newest data, which show Asia recording the fastest rise in billionaire 
numbers in 2019 and China alone accounting for 32 of the top 40 fastest growing 
high net worth cities for the period 2018–2023, seem to confrm these predictions. 
Although Europe and North America remain the regions with the largest num-
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with respect to its impact on global inequality—but they are neither caused nor 
exacerbated by the semiperiphery. Rather, they provide further evidence of the 
world-system’s increasing polarization into an ultra-rich transnational class and an 
increasingly impoverished 99%: as calculated by Oxfam, since 2015, the richest 1% 
have owned more wealth than the rest of the world, while the number of individu-
als who held the same wealth as the bottom half of humanity has rapidly decreased 
from 388 in 2010 to 62 in 2016 and to only 8 in 2017 (Hardoon 2017). For 2019, 
Oxfam reported that the world’s billionaires, only 2,153 people had more wealth 
than 4.6 billion people combined (Oxfam International 2020). 
Nevertheless, it is misleading to treat the (relatively and absolutely) fast-growing 
but still relatively small group of non-Western billionaires as an indicator of changes 
in the role of the semiperiphery as a whole. 
First, because even between 2006 and 2012, the period of the fastest increase 
in the number of ultra-rich non-Westerners for which there is data, the odds of 
becoming a millionaire were still twice as high for citizens of high-income coun-
tries than for citizens of middle-income countries that qualify as semiperipheries 
(Albrecht and Korzeniewicz 2018, 105). 
Second, a large number of the semiperiphery’s billionaires is made up of non-
residents who either already have a second citizenship in a core country or are in
the market for one, which is what makes them more interesting for global fnancial
consultancies in the near future than they already are. The same fnancial recession
that marked the shift towards more non-Western capitalists becoming billionaires
after 2008 also saw the proliferation of investor residence and citizenship programs
throughout the European semiperiphery (Western and non-Western). It thus became
possible to acquire a European Union residence permit or a second citizenship with
a sizeable investment in real estate or government bonds (Boatca 2016). The main
benefciaries of such programs, implemented since 2010 in Hungary, Cyprus, Malta,
Macedonia, Greece, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Spain, and Portugal, have been Chinese
and Russian but also Lebanese and Egyptian investors, who thus obtain the right of
visa-free travel to core countries, the citizenship of a Schengen-zone state (except in
the case of Bulgaria, which is not part of the Schengen zone), and the right to reside
and work anywhere in the European Union. None of these programs include strict
residence requirements for their investor citizens. Investors thus use the rights they
purchased as remote access to the wealth accumulated in Western core states, shielded
from the majority of the world’s population through Western core states’ enforce-
ment of borders, visa regimes, and citizenships. As summed up by Arton Capital: 
With more and more wealth being created in Asia, yet demand for residence in
European territories being so high, this trend of UHNW [ultra high net worth]
individuals seeking global citizenship will undoubtedly continue to grow. 
(Arton Capital 2017) 
The boom in the number of non-Western capitalists seeking the advantages of 
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to core dominance or white supremacy. Rather, their rising number points to the 
paramount role that race continues to play for a global stratifcation in which the 
“premium citizenships” of core Western states highly correlate with whiteness as 
a constructed norm; and to which only very wealthy non-whites have recently 
gained access through the commodifcation of rights in semiperipheral states that 
share a visa-free travel zone with core Western states. For wealthy non-Westerners, 
investment residence and citizenship of Western states constitute global social 
mobility as well as a means of “buying into” whiteness. 
The European Union is the historic heir to Western colonial states (Böröcz and 
Sarkar 2005) whose wealth accumulation has been highly premised on a racialized 
division of labor and a structurally unequal distribution of resources to those racial-
ized as non-white. The Henley & Partners Visa Restriction Index, produced by a 
private British consultancy in cooperation with the trade association for the world’s 
airlines, IATA, ranks Japan, Singapore, and South Korea, followed by Germany, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, and Sweden, in the top 3 passports worldwide on 
account of a total score of countries to which their citizens can travel visa-free (189, 
188, and 187, respectively, out of a total number of countries of 219) (Henley and 
Partners 2019). Of these, only South Korea is a semiperipheral country. Most pass-
port holders in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia have scores below 70, while 
semiperipheral mainland China has a barely slightly higher score of 74—equal 
to that of Lesotho, and right below that of Namibia and Thailand. This explains 
why EU residence permits are extremely attractive to Chinese investors, and much 
more so than for Hong Kong investors, who—at least at the time of writing this 
chapter, amid changes in Chinese policies regarding Hong Kong—have access to 
152 countries on account of holding “Special Administrative Region of China” 
passports—a reminder of residual colonial ties. The juxtaposition of the top 5 and 
the bottom 5 ranks on the index—only available for the 2018 ranking, and there-
fore slightly diferent from the 2019 numbers—makes the core-periphery divide in 
terms of global mobility particularly apparent. 
It is thus even more misleading to view the ethnic and racial diversity of bil-
lionaires from semiperipheral countries as an argument against white supremacy. 
A growing number of Brazilian millionaires have increasingly sought either a U.S. 
green card, the investor citizenship of a Caribbean country still part of the Com-
monwealth, or European citizenship through descent from a European ancestor 
as a means of translating material wealth into global social mobility (Fellet 2016). 
Such capital-facilitated moves up the citizenship ladder are themselves ways of buy-
ing into whiteness, or what, in the context of racial inequalities in Brazil, has been 
referred to as “whitening with money” (Hasenbalg 2005). At the global level, these 
are strategies of eluding the ascription of citizenship to one’s place of birth. As such, 
they belie the experience of the great majority of transnational labor migrants, for 
whom international migration in search of upward economic mobility entails the 
risk of downward racial mobility through reclassifcation as non-white. 
The fact that race is used as a census category in few states and whiteness is 
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should not deceive us into denying the processes of racialization being replicated 
throughout the structural positions of the world-system. Nor should the fact that 
the word “race” does not exist in a majority of the dialects of Asian semiperipheries 
(Dunaway and Clelland 2017, 448) be taken to indicate the absence of whiteness as 
the constructed norm and racial stratifcation as a reality in Asia. 
First, as scholarship on Orientalism, racism, and critical whiteness has repeatedly 
shown, prevailing norms—whether the West, Europe, heterosexuality, or white-
ness—feature as unmarked categories (Hall 2006; Todorova 2005). Their normative 
character becomes visible through the simultaneous construction of diference—of 
the Orient as the non-West, of Eastern Europe as lesser Europe, of homosexual-
ity as non-heterosexuality, and of Blackness as non-whiteness. All deviant catego-
ries thus constructed require naming, while their unmarked counterparts remain 
unnamed, unqualifed, or unstressed. The label of “Europe” always includes both 
Western Europe and its white populations, but Eastern Europe needs to be specif-
cally mentioned in order to be included in the term, while Black Europe needs 
to be argued, defended, and explained. In this context, the fact that the European 
East is often portrayed as “semi-Oriental” or “somehow Asian” not only serves to 
sanction Western Europe’s position as the norm, but also to legitimate the—geo-
graphically untenable—continental division between Europe and Asia (Lewis and 
Wigen 1997). The vast regional inequalities and trade imbalances that Dunaway 
and Clelland observe in Asia are undeniable, yet they only prove that Asia as a 
whole is not an adequate unit of analysis, but a racialized, Orientalist construct. As 
critical geographers have long pointed out, the very fact that regional commonali-
ties in Asia made it impossible to pinpoint an “Asian identity” is precisely what “has 
allowed Europeans to see the disproportionate diversity of the Asian ‘continent’ as 
a challenge for Asian civilization, rather than as a challenge to their own system of 
geographical classifcation” (Lewis and Wigen 1997, 37). 
Second, the extent to which Asian societies are impacted by racialization as a
deviance from whiteness becomes apparent, among other things, due to the fact
that economies—as well as politics—of beauty have consistently privileged white-
ness in ways that reinforce and reproduce colonial patterns of racialization despite
the absence of explicit references to whiteness (Haritaworn 2016). Instead, what is
often labeled the “Eurasian” or “Pan-Asian” look, considered more attractive than
darker skin by a large majority of men and women across Asia, is associated with
racial superiority, status, and higher income. It consequently fuels a booming cos-
metics industry that thrives on skin-bleaching. Accordingly, four out of ten women
surveyed in Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, and South Korea use skin-
whitening products, the global market for which was “projected to reach $19.8 bil-
lion by 2018, driven by the growing desire for light-coloured skin among both men
and women primarily from the Asian, African and Middle East regions” (Pe 2016). 
Does all of the above amount to evidence for the existence of the “global
racial dualism” that Dunaway and Clelland seek to disprove? Not necessar-
ily. It certainly is not evidence for a “fxed racial axis of the world-economy” 
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ethnic/racial complexity” (Dunaway and Clelland 2017, 411). When attempt-
ing to see “beyond white racists and colonists” (Dunaway and Clelland 2017,
442), however, we need to take into account that, even if not all racists are
white, racism in the world-system is premised on historically constructed and
colonially enforced whiteness. In this context, whiteness is just as much a geo-
political category as it is a racial designation. The modern/colonial world-
system piggybacked on previous forms of xenophobia and discrimination and
incorporated them as part of the logic of endless accumulation, just as it incor-
porated older regimes of labor control, such as slavery, serfdom, and tenancy.
In ancient China, India, and Japan, as well as in Europe, fair skin implied
wealth and nobility, while darker skin signaled work in the feld (Pe 2016). In
Europe, medieval Christendom ofered an entire apparatus of otherness formed
by unmarried and learned women, heretics, Jews, and Muslims. Ella Shohat
showed how European demonology prefgured colonial racism and sexism by
drawing on the stock of Jewish and Muslim stereotypes “to characterize the
savage, the infdel, the indigenous man as sexual omnivore and the indigenous
woman as sexual object” (Shohat 2017, 333). The incorporation of the Ameri-
cas into the emerging world-system entailed transforming such imperial difer-
ences into colonial ones, as well as inventing Europeanness, ethnicity, and race
(Mignolo 2006; Quijano and Wallerstein 1992). Walter Mignolo points to the
momentous shift operated by the translation of race into racism as part of the
emergence of the capitalist world-economy by noting that: 
The link between capital accumulation and a discourse of devaluation of human
beings was absent in co-existing sixteenth centuries empires like the Mughal,
the Ottoman, the Aztec, the Inca, the Chinese and the emerging Russian
one. The complicity between political economy and political theory, based
on the racialization of human beings, languages, places, cultures, memories,
knowledge . . . was the “novelty” of the sixteenth century and the historical
foundation of the racial colonial matrix whose logic is still at work today. 
(Mignolo 2006, 18) 
The coemergence of capitalism and the racial colonial matrix has provided the 
context for the global division of labor between cores, semiperipheries, and 
peripheries since the sixteenth century. Semiperipheries today are therefore (still) 
competing within a capitalist world-economy based on racism and inequality and 
their strategies are imbricated with nationalist, fascist, and racist ideologies recur-
rent throughout the system. But such ideologies neither originated with nor were 
enhanced by the structural position of non-Western semiperipheries. When we 
start paying closer attention to spatial reconfgurations in order to understand cur-
rent or historical phenomena, we should therefore make sure not to gloss over the 
very logic according to which some of these reconfgurations took place. In the 
case of inequality under capitalism, as the Black Lives Matter movement has amply 
demonstrated in recent years, racism most certainly remains a paramount structur-
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Notes 
1 This is a revised and expanded version of an article titled “The Centrality of Race to 
Inequality Across the World-System” and initially published in 2017 in the Journal of 
World-Systems Research 23 (2): 465–473. doi: 10.5195/jwsr.2017.729. 
2 In the following, I will use Dunaway and Clelland’s spelling of “nonwestern” only in 
direct references to their article. For more general statements, I will employ the more 
common spelling “non-Western” (countries, regions, semiperipheries). 
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Towards mapping the space and time 
of wealth accumulation 
Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz and Corey R. Payne 
A world-historical perspective on spatial transformations 
The present moment is one of dramatic social change. The wave of “globaliza-
tion” characterizing the world-system since the 1980s—as well as the movements 
against its harshest efects—have, in the words of the call for contributions to this 
volume, “manifest[ed] themselves in conficting approaches to interpreting spaces, 
as the Charlottesville protests and the debate about whether nation states should 
have more (or less) open borders show” and have been “articulated in beliefs about 
security and insecurity, and in processes of closures, such as the rise in initiatives to 
build new border walls” (Knoblauch and Löw 2017a; cf. 2017b). Such reconfgura-
tions are the guiding subject of this book. 
In this chapter, we aim to provide a world-historical perspective to this ongoing 
discussion of spatial transformations. We are particularly interested in addressing a 
guiding hypothesis of the Collaborative Research Center on the “Re-Figuration 
of Spaces” (CRC 1265, Berlin, Germany): 
The traditional, globally dominant model of modernity with its centralized 
nation states, borders and national economies conflicts with post- and late-
modern transnationalization with its polycentrism, globalizing scope and 
breaking down of barriers. Our hypothesis is that spatial refiguration is a 
result of this tension. 
(Knoblauch and Löw 2017a) 
Thus, the CRC calls for 
a conception of space that is no longer understood as—and simplistically 
reduced to—a fixed and homogeneous entity lying about somewhere out 
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there calling for conquest or protection, but rather as a highly complex act 
of configuration. 
(Knoblauch and Löw 2017a) 
We argue that such reconfgurations of space are intimately intertwined with reloca-
tions in space—of labor, of capital, of production, of accumulation—that have long 
characterized historical capitalism. By briefy examining such spatial relocations in 
the modern world-system, this chapter seeks to contribute a world-historical per-
spective to the discussion on spatial transformations. In short, we argue: 
(1)	 Examining spatial transformations of social relations requires a unit of analysis 
larger than the nation-state, no matter the time period we seek to understand 
(2)	 Over time, spatial transformations have interacted with what Joseph Schum-
peter calls “creative destruction,” yielding spatial innovations 
(3)	 The “local” and the “global” are not merely distinct spheres that are now in 
more complex interaction, but rather interacting, longue durée geographies 
of social and political contestation, cooperation, and identity-formation that, 
precisely as a consequence of their very interactions,have constantly undergone 
change 
The world-system as unit of analysis 
For the most part, the social sciences remain trapped in a familiar centuries-old 
paradigm wherein social interactions are constituted by, and constitutive of, indi-
vidual nation-states. Perspectives that would otherwise difer across theoretical and 
methodological spectrums converge under this paradigm to understand social pro-
cesses and social forces as the outcome or expression of interactions that take place 
primarily within national boundaries (e.g., class relations in versions emphasizing 
distributional struggles or, in others, emphasizing social integration, the particular 
solidarities produced by a growing division of labor). 
Throughout the twentieth century, social scientists scrutinized individual 
national trajectories, particularly as they manifested themselves in the wealthiest 
countries of the world, to extrapolate generalizable patterns of economic, politi-
cal, and social development. In the study of inequality, for example, moderniza-
tion scholars predicted a growing gap between urban (largely industrial) and rural 
(largely agricultural) populations in the transition from traditional arrangements to 
modernity. Such a transition was the focus of much work on stratifcation, with 
the general expectation that modernization would bring about the displacement 
of ascription by achievement as the main criterion shaping social hierarchies. The 
withering away of ascription as a basis of social hierarchy, in turn, would both allow 
and require enhanced social mobility (e.g., from rural to urban areas, from agricul-
ture into industry, from tradition to modernity). 
More critical approaches argue that the trajectories of wealthy nations cannot 
be assumed to be independent from those of poor nations, or that the specifc path 
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of wealthy nations cannot be generalized into a universal model of social develop-
ment that all nations are likely to follow. But while such critical perspectives have 
been productive in conceptualizing social inequality, stratifcation, and mobility in 
wealthy and poor nations as inter-relational, many versions of these critical per-
spectives have assumed or maintained their own unverifed generalizations. Often, 
the assessment of world-systems perspectives, for example, has come to be reduced 
to the inclusion of a few variables in quantitative models, as if such perspectives can 
be reduced simply to the notion that high levels of wealth accumulation are secured 
to a much greater extent by manufacturing production rather than raw material 
production, by production for domestic consumption rather than by production 
for export, or by domestic rather than foreign investment. 
In short, the mainstream social sciences by and large manage to hold on to the 
assumption that nation-states constitute the most relevant unit of analysis for the 
study of the social world. But nation-states are not always the appropriate unit for 
theorizing social relations. 
We can use a foundational text of the modern social sciences, Adam Smith’s The 
Wealth of Nations ([1776] 1976), to illustrate the importance of choosing an appro-
priate unit of analysis. In several passages of The Wealth of Nations, Smith discusses 
wealth disparities within and between town and countryside, in ways that echo 
discussions of such disparities within and between wealthy and poor nations today. 
Rather than following the existing common sense to explain the wealth of towns 
and the poverty of the countryside in the late eighteenth century as the outcome 
of processes occurring independently within each of these bounded territories, The 
Wealth of Nations chooses an alternative unit of analysis, one that encompasses both 
sets of spaces (town and countryside). 
In Smith’s account, the citizens of towns historically used corporate associa-
tion to regulate production and trade in ways that restricted competition from the 
countryside—useful to contrast against the assumption that towns have been built 
primarily around inclusive practices. 
The inhabitants of a town, being collected into one place, can easily combine 
together. The most insignificant trades carried on in towns have accordingly, 
in some place or another, been incorporated; and even where they have 
never been incorporated, yet the corporation spirit, the jealousy of strangers, 
the aversion to take apprentices, or to communicate the secret of their trade, 
generally prevail in them, and often teach them, by voluntary associations 
and agreements, to prevent that free competition which they cannot prohibit 
by byelaws. 
(Smith [1776] 1976, I, 141) 
As a result of such exclusionary arrangements, in their dealings with the coun-
tryside (“and in these latter dealings consists the whole trade which supports and 
enriches every town”) town-dwellers were “great gainers” able to “purchase, with 
a smaller quantity of their labour, the produce of a greater quantity of the labour of 
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the country” (Smith [1776] 1976, I, 139–140). In this account, the wealth of towns 
and the poverty of the countryside become inextricably linked, as it was largely 
to regulate and shape the fows (e.g., of goods, capital, and people) constituting 
this very relation that territorial boundaries between town and country were con-
structed and enforced. 
While such arrangements tended to raise the wages that town employers had 
to pay, 
in recompence, they were enabled to sell their own just as much dearer; so 
that so far it was as broad as long, as they say; and in the dealings of the dif-
ferent classes within the town with one another, none of them were losers 
by these regulations. 
(Smith [1776] 1976, I, 139) 
What Smith thereby describes is a process of selective exclusion. Through institu-
tional arrangements establishing a social compact that restricted entry to markets, 
town-dwellers attained a virtuous combination of growth, political autonomy, 
and relative equity that simultaneously transferred competitive pressures to the 
countryside. 
Adam Smith ([1776] 1976) provides important insights into the crucial role 
played by opportunity hoarding in shaping the relative prevalence of wealth and 
scarcity in town and countryside. But these insights would have been missed if his 
unit of analysis in The Wealth of Nations had failed to encompass both sets of spaces 
(towns and country) and their interaction in his narrative. For example, Smith 
could have attributed the wealth of towns to the individual efort, frugality, and/ 
or values of their citizens—thereby explaining the relative poverty of rural peoples 
as the consequence of insufcient achievement in each or any of these dimensions. 
But his account avoided such a naturalization of town/countryside boundaries and 
emphasized instead the relational processes (including the creation and enforcement 
of the boundaries demarcating “town” and “countryside”) that in his account play 
a central role in explaining the uneven distribution of wealth across these spaces. 
Like Smith, we fnd that the study of social relations most often requires a unit 
of analysis that is both global and historical—a perspective, moreover, that empha-
sizes the necessity of understanding these relations as embedded in space. 
Spatial “innovations” and Schumpeter’s creative destruction1 
From a world-historical perspective, spatial transformations have been constant. 
Of course, the notion that “innovation” is at the heart of capitalist accumulation 
is deeply rooted in the social sciences and a central notion in the work of Adam 
Smith and Karl Marx. While Smith and Marx difered in explaining the sources of 
such innovation—the former emphasizing its dimensions as a response to competi-
tive pressures, the latter focusing on the specifcities of labor exploitation under 
capitalist production (with an emphasis on relative surplus)—they both emphasized 
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innovation as a key outcome. This is why Joseph Schumpeter (1942, 82–3) empha-
sizes that, instead of a single transition from one state of equilibrium to another, we 
should conceive of capitalism as entailing continuous transformation: 
Capitalism is by nature a form or method of economic change and not only 
never is but never can be stationary. The opening up of new markets, foreign 
or domestic, and the organizational development from the craft shop and 
factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial 
mutation—if I may use that biological term—that incessantly revolution-
izes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, 
incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the 
essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every 
capitalist concern has got to live in. 
In the Schumpeterian model, the introduction and clustering of innovations dis-
turb existing economic and social arrangements. Over time, this is the fundamental 
process driving cycles of prosperity (characterized by intense investment in new 
productive opportunities) and depression (characterized by the broader absorption 
of innovative practices and the elimination of older activities). We would contend 
it is also key to understanding changing opportunities for mobility and experiences 
of social upheaval, as embodied in waves of spatial relocation of economic activi-
ties. This argument is substantially similar to what Harvey (2001) and Silver (2003) 
describe as capital’s “spatial fx.” 
The assortment of populations across the world into spatial territories is linked 
to processes of creative destruction. For the most part, the “wealthiest” within a 
key particular distributional array are constituted by those who are involved in the 
more “creative” end of the processes of creative destruction described by Schum-
peter. Deskilling and the creation of the unskilled is precisely the outcome of 
constant “destruction,” and processes of construction of categorical inequality are 
linked precisely to the criteria that are used at any given historical moment to assort 
populations into spaces that come to be denominated as “wealthy” and “poor,” 
“skilled” and “unskilled,” “civilized” and “barbarian.” Historically, entry into privi-
leged spaces has been constrained by the regulation of competition (e.g., as in 
the towns described by Adam Smith). We would argue that the use of ascriptive 
criteria to sort populations and thereby construct “space” (e.g., town and coun-
tryside, but also women and men, Black and white, poor nations and rich nations) 
has been, and continues to be, constitutive of the very creation and reproduction 
of inequality (see Korzeniewicz and Payne 2019 for a more detailed treatment of 
such processes). 
Schumpeter (1942) purposefully did not restrict his notion of innovation to 
technological change or manufacturing. He emphasized that epicenters of wealth 
shifted constantly and are not associated with any single particular array of prod-
ucts, market networks, or institutional arrangements. New forms of raw material 
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political power, or even rent-seeking behaviors are just as likely to be a source of 
creation and destruction as any other innovation labeled by some as more “pro-
ductive.” Hand-in-hand with creative destruction, processes of exclusion in some 
spaces both led those excluded to seek better life chances elsewhere, and at times 
provided opportunities for the use of inclusion by rulers and elites elsewhere as a 
strategy to attract greater wealth. The pursuit of inclusion, in challenge to exclu-
sionary practices, often was a driving force in the expansion of markets. In this 
sense, spatial reconfgurations—yielded by spatial relocations of economic activi-
ties—are an outcome of spatial innovations in accumulation. 
Blurred boundaries between the “local” and the “global” 
As noted by Giovanni Arrighi (1994, 4), in turn citing Fernand Braudel (1984), 
the essential feature of historical capitalism over its longue durée—that is, over 
its entire lifetime—has been the “flexibility” and “eclecticism” of capital 
rather than the concrete forms assumed by the latter at different places and 
at different times. 
In this sense, the association between wealth accumulation, industrial manufactur-
ing, and particular geographical spaces that came to prevail in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries represented a “moment” in the development of the capitalist 
world-economy—a “particular input–output combination”—rather than its “true 
identity.” Giovanni Arrighi (2001, 116) repeatedly emphasized that the constant 
mutation of world-economic processes generated difculties for social science 
research: 
Not only is the real home of capitalism a “shadowy zone.” Not only is 
capitalism sometimes at home (as in the course of financial expansions) 
and sometimes away from home (as when it plunges massively into trade 
and production). On top of all of that, it becomes identified with states of 
ever-changing form and substance. No wonder that economic sociologists 
focusing on specific places and specific times find it hard to turn capitalism 
into a meaningful object of analysis. 
Thus, transformations in patterns of wealth accumulation during the late nineteenth
and twentieth centuries should be understood as a unique confguration of ongoing
processes of creative destruction, just as much as the late twentieth and early twenty-
frst centuries (or, for that matter, the sixteenth century itself ) represent another
unique confguration. This is perhaps another way of stating that “as the form of
organization of the juxtaposed, spaces epitomize simultaneities” (Löw 2008, 25). 
Constitutive of these patterns of change, there has been a recurrent tendency 
by those successful in business to frmly locate themselves in place and/or specifc 
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the members of the Sceriman family who settled in Venice and Livorno 
followed the same economic strategies as the local upper classes: they had 
accumulated wealth through their trading activities, yet when profit margins 
from international commerce diminished they expanded their banking busi-
ness and invested in property. 
This was a general pattern, visible in all merchant communities, as illustrated by 
another example: 
The wool trade had first brought the Castilians to Bruges, but in the mid-
sixteenth century the members of the Castilian community were buying real 
estate and making other local investments. Such diversification served them 
well and reinforced their other local ties. As a consequence, the Castilian 
Consulado of Bruges lasted until the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
long after its initial raison d’etre, the wool trade, had ceased to be fundamen-
tal for its members’ economic concerns. 
(Phillips 1986, 48) 
Genoa serves as another example of such relocations. The city-state had played
an important role in the maritime European expansion of the sixteenth century
“by seizing the opportunity for enormous gains through fnancing the empires
of Charles V and Philip II” (Kirk 2005, 196). By the seventeenth century, Dutch
and English merchants would become the ones to be on the ascendancy. Geno-
ese fnanciers, moreover, while drawing signifcant profts from their activities,
faced suspension of payments and/or bankruptcies by the Spanish Crown in
1575, 1607, and 1627, and by the late 1620s. Events such as these, and mili-
tary reversals for Spain, came to be followed by gradual disinvestment—frst
from shipping and commercial activities, later from fnancing Spanish debt (Kirk
2005). Merchants and fnanciers came to see Dutch and English ships as pro-
viding more efective and secure protection than Genoese galleys. By the late
1650s, the main Genoese merchant companies (such as Compagnia di Nostra
Signora di Libertá, the Compagnia Maritima di San Georgio, or the Compagnia
delle Indie Orientali) found themselves “to be at a continual disadvantage with
respect to the (by then) consolidated presence of the Dutch and, perhaps even
more so, to the English” (Kirk 2005, 132). For Kirk (2005, 149), the decline of
Genoa at sea demonstrated that its ruling class had become “very far removed
from the reality of Liguria’s seafaring men and from the day-to-day world of
maritime commerce.” 
But, of course, locating themselves more frmly in place and/or specifc eco-
nomic activities made elites more exposed to potential obsolescence in ongoing 
processes of creative destruction. Just as in the case of black pepper and spices in the 
early sixteenth century, specifc commodities and their chains of production, trade, 
and consumption were subject to shifting fortunes—and we have many contempo-
rary examples (vide late twentieth century Detroit and its automobile industry) of 
 
 
116 Roberto P. Korzeniewicz and Corey R. Payne 
such perilous outcomes. Thus, the ability to escape the constraints of obsolescence 
always has been unequally distributed across populations. 
This is behind Pritchett’s (2006, 5) “much less relentlessly happy story about the 
consequences of the proliferation of sovereigns and globalization of everything but 
labor.” As geographic space is sliced into smaller nation-state units, some regions 
will experience large, persistent, positive shocks to labor demand and become 
“boom towns” with rapidly rising wages and incomes. But other regions may well 
experience large, persistent, negative, geographic-specifc productivity shocks that 
reduce labor demand and lead to incipient “ghost countries.” However, if outward 
labor mobility is limited, this will lead the adjustment to come not in changes in 
population but in wages, so countries will be “zombies”—the “living ghosts”— 
with falling wages and incomes. 
Perhaps the most useful instrument to escape such fxed rigidities, avoid obso-
lescence, and limit the potential of confscation was the transformation of capital 
into its most liquid form: fnance. Despite signifcant changes (e.g., money in the 
sixteenth century did not “look” the same as it would in the nineteenth century, 
nor did its networks of circulation and exchange), fnance has remained, since the 
early days of historical capitalism, a key arena of apparent safety for capital avoiding 
rigid investments in space or activities. 
To take an example. Ehrenberg’s ([1928] 1963) detailed study of fnance in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries emphasizes that state-building and war-making 
eforts at the time were made possible by the “pure capital companies” developed 
by fnanciers in the Italian city-states and Southern Germany. Through their 
concentration of great quantities of capital with individual intermediaries on 
the exchanges . . . these companies (in their earlier versions, the Bourses of 
the trade fairs), made large money amounts more available (for example, for 
rulers engaged in territorial expansion and/or preservation). 
(Ehrenberg [1928] 1963, 376) 
But the further expansion of such new fnancial and lending instruments, pro-
moted substantially in the seventeenth century by the large capital needs of the 
companies seeking to capture “trade with the East Indies” (and, most notably, in 
the Amsterdam Chamber of the VOC), was key to overall capitalist development. 
Of course, Ehrenberg in 1928 is also trying to argue that speculation is part and 
parcel of the very character of fnancial and lending institutions. 
In short, when taken from a transnational and historical perspective, it becomes 
clear that there has been a changing relevance of various kinds of territorial and 
institutional networks over the longue durée. Such variegated importance of net-
works, associations, cultural afliations, and political containers challenges the 
often-prevailing emphasis on a gradual transition, characterized by the rise of 
towns, to a deepening divide between the urban and the rural in the rise and 
growing prevalence of national states, and an eruption of the global at the end of 
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interacted in complex ways, both shaping (and given shape by) specifc confgura-
tions of time and space. After all, “(s)pace makes action possible and is itself the 
feld of action” (Löw 2008, 28), so space “can be seen as a relational ordering of 
living entities and social goods,” and specifc spaces are “products of action which 
at the same time have structuring power” (Löw 2008, 33–5). Likewise, fows have 
been as constitutive of space, as spaces have been constitutive of fows. 
From a historical perspective, the spatial transformations taking place today, 
with the deindustrialization of the formerly prosperous areas of the mid-twentieth 
century and the rise in inequality in many wealthy countries, together with the 
populist right-wing challenge to globalization, can be seen as yet another iteration 
of confict between practices of exclusion and practices of inclusion, over whether 
institutional arrangements (such as those embedded in national identities) should 
selectively continue to exclude the vast majority of the world population from 
access to opportunity. 
Conclusion 
This returns us to the three core arguments of this short chapter: First, no matter 
the time period we seek to understand, we should make sure to use an appro-
priate unit of analysis for the research through which we examine space and its 
transformations, and we argue for a world-historical perspective—understanding 
transnational geographies and longue durée evolutions—as a productive lens for 
examining the questions at hand. 
Second, historically, waves of spatial transformation have interacted in funda-
mental ways with what Joseph Schumpeter calls “creative destruction”—for cre-
ative destruction always has entailed, simultaneously, both the opportunities of 
social mobility and the constraints of social dislocation, or, just as importantly, 
both social inclusion and social exclusion. Such spatial relocations of economic 
activities—or spatial innovations—are critical to understanding capitalism over its 
historical evolution. 
Finally, from a world-historical perspective, the more “local” and the more 
“global” are not merely distinct spheres that only now are coming face-to-face 
in more complex interaction, but interacting geographies of social and political 
contestation, cooperation, and identity-formation that have always been present 
but, simultaneously and often as a consequence of their very interactions, are con-
stantly undergoing change. Through the extension of networks and fows of rule 
and wealth, time and space become mutually redefned, changing the meaning of 
“place”—simultaneously at the most “local” and at the most “global,” and inter-
secting with processes of inclusion, exclusion, and contestation. 
These arguments, derived from past empirical work on the development of the 
capitalist world-system, point to the need for more rigorous future research on the 
links between the socioeconomic and the cultural-symbolic dimensions of spatial 
transformations. It may be that spatial reconfgurations are thus sparked by spatial 
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require further investigation. For now, at least, it is clear that these processes— 
reconfgurations of space and relocations in space—are intimately intertwined in the 
longue durée of the capitalist world-system. 
Note 
1 Several of the arguments in this section draw on previous work, such as Korzeniewicz 
and Moran (2009); Albrecht and Korzeniewicz (2014; 2017); and Korzeniewicz and 
Payne (2019; 2020). 
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GLOBAL PRODUCTION IN 
ETHIOPIA AND ARGENTINA 
Commodity chains and urban spatial 
transformation 
Elke Beyer, Lucas-Andrés Elsner, and Anke Hagemann 
Global production networks and spatio-material 
infrastructures 
This chapter investigates the provision of infrastructures for the processing, manu-
facturing, and global circulation of commodities as a mode of the transnational 
production of urban space. It focuses on specifc architectures and infrastructures 
that have been developed in Ethiopia and Argentina in recent years in cooperation 
with international partners—such as railway lines, shipping terminals, or industrial 
parks. By taking a closer look at infrastructure provision and the actors involved, 
the chapter aims to build a deeper understanding of the spatio-material dimension 
of globalized production systems. Physical infrastructures of commodity process-
ing, manufacturing, and circulation create necessary preconditions for exploiting 
spatial diferences and thus shape and (re)produce the spatial patterns of uneven 
development (Sheppard 2016; Smith 1984). In the following, we chart an agenda 
for analyzing the provisioning of infrastructures for global production and circula-
tion as spatial interventions that mediate and alter these dynamics, and thus con-
tribute to the refguration of urban spaces. 
In order to study the relational and transnational constitution of spaces of pro-
duction, urban and architectural research can productively build on commod-
ity chain approaches (Geref and Korzeniewicz 1994; Bair 2005), especially the
Global Production Networks (GPN) approach (Henderson et al. 2002). The GPN
framework places emphasis on studying the dynamic supplier relations of global
“lead frms,” the territorial dimension of global production networks, and the
role of non-frm actors on various scales. Seeking to understand the spatially dis-
persed organization of industrial production for global markets, proponents of this
approach proclaim a strong interest in the regional embeddedness of economic
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falling short of actually “unpacking the nodes” within production networks below
the scale of the region (Kleibert and Horner 2018), and also for a lack of attention
to the “dark sides” of network inclusion, such as local struggles and polarization,
and to disinvestment as a consequence of the constant restructuring of global
production networks (Bair and Werner 2011; Werner 2016; Phelps, Atienza, and
Arias 2018). If this critique is taken into consideration, the GPN approach ofers
valuable analytical tools for multi-sited research on the urban impacts of trans-
national production arrangements (Beyer and Hagemann 2018; Hagemann and
Beyer 2020). 
In order to fully comprehend the material and processual dimensions of infra-
structural constellations on multiple scales, we suggest bringing the GPN frame-
work into conversation with diferent strands of research on urban development.
A valuable counterpoint to the GPN perspective is provided by work in a Marxist
political economy tradition, as this strand of literature addresses and theorizes the
uneven developmental benefts emerging from a place’s connectivity and identi-
fes how they are linked to the physical, built infrastructures of transport (Smith
1984; Sheppard 2016). Fruitful insights on how the provision of infrastructure
networks inscribes and reinforces spatial inequalities and transforms urban land-
scapes and governance regimes have also been ofered by recent scholarship on
urban infrastructures (Rode, Terefe, and la Cruz 2020; Kanai and Schindler
2018; Lara 2012; LeCavalier 2016; Cidell 2015; Graham and Marvin 2001),
including refections on how infrastructures transform urban space through
their disposition, inscribed logics, restrictions, and possibilities, and thus may
be understood as “active objects” (Easterling 2014) shaping urban development
trajectories. An integration of commodity chain research and urban research has
also been demanded by scholars working on the transnationality of cities (Krätke,
Wildner, and Lanz 2012). In this context, Parnreiter (2012) proposes assessing the
transnational constitution of urban spaces specifcally with regard to the mate-
rial, built environment and the transnational ways it is negotiated, planned, and
constructed. In recent years, an instructive research literature on the translocal
constitution of planning knowledge and practices has emerged (Harris 2013;
Söderström 2014; Grubbauer 2015). 
Building on this spectrum of research literature, we regard specifc production 
environments—infrastructure complexes enabling the circulation and processing of 
goods within global production networks—as transnational urban spaces. In our 
view, diferent scales of analysis are required to build an understanding of how they 
are constituted and which actors are involved in their making: 
• Global production systems, both of commodities and physical infrastructures 
• National and international development agendas and policies 
• Commodity hubs, i.e. spatial concentrations of industry, logistics, and infra-
structure facilities, including the institutions linked to a specific GPN (Giraudo 
2015) 
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In the next section, we discuss two case studies on commodity hubs and infrastruc-
ture provisioning with signifcant involvement of international actors, specifcally 
from the PR China, with regard to transnational production relations and spatial 
transformations. In Mekelle, Ethiopia, a large export processing zone has been built 
with road and rail connections to international sea ports as an aspiring hub of global 
garment production. The Greater Rosario metropolitan area hosts Argentina’s 
most important ports for soy export and is receiving vast investments in cargo rail 
and port facilities. The case studies draw on ongoing research, including site visits 
and stakeholder interviews in Ethiopia (2017 and 2018)1 and Argentina (2018). 
Case 1: global clothing production and infrastructure 
provision in Ethiopia 
Ethiopia’s current ambitious economic development agenda includes the goal to 
integrate the country into global production networks, especially of clothing and 
other light industries (National Planning Commission 2016, Ethiopian Investment 
Commission 2020). Related to this, major infrastructure developments are under 
way in cooperation with international partners (Map 10.1). They imply signifcant 
spatial transformations on diferent scales: While transport infrastructure systems of 
country-wide and transcontinental reach are being built, large export manufactur-
ing zones are being established in the peripheries of major cities, in some cases in 
parallel to major residential development. In designing and building the physical 
structures enabling global manufacturing and the required connectivity, the PR 
China has become Ethiopia’s most important international partner, as well as pro-
vider of capital and source of foreign direct investment ( Jalles d’Orey and Prizzon 
2017; Delz 2016; Nicolas 2017). At the time of writing, however, violent intra-
regional conficts in Ethiopia are casting doubt on the outcomes of infrastructure-
led development as well as the future commitment of the notoriously volatile 
global clothing industry. 
Ethiopia is seen as a major market for power and transport infrastructure in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Delz 2015; Foster and Morella 2011). The road network is 
being expanded, along with dry port facilities for international freight logistics 
(UNDP Ethiopia 2017), and a national electric railway network is envisioned. As a 
frst leg, a new 791 km standard gauge railway between Addis Ababa and the port 
of Djibouti, the crucial entry and exit point of goods for land-locked Ethiopia, 
was built by the China Railway Construction Corporation and the China Civil 
Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC), and has been operated by a 
Chinese–Ethiopian company since 2018. A large share of the project was fnanced 
by the China Export Import Bank, reportedly involving the import of about USD 
1 billion worth of equipment and construction materials from China (Sun 2017). 
Construction of the second leg, extending nearly 600 km northwards to Mekelle, 
was taken up with engineering companies and fnancial backing from the PR 
China and Turkey. The railway construction is a strong signal of Ethiopia’s commit-
ment to state-led infrastructure development and of Ethio-Chinese cooperation, 
but its high cost and its actual exigency for textile export producers are subject 
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MAP 10.1 Industrial park and infrastructure development in Ethiopia (2018) 
Map: Anke Hagemann, Elke Beyer, Rucha Kelkar 
Sources: Google Maps, OpenStreetMap, maplibrary.org, Ethiopian Investment Commission, Industrial 
Parks Development Corporation, Embassy of Ethiopia (Brussels), Ethiopian Shipping Lines 
to contrarian debate among transport planners (authors’ interviews 2018; see also 
Rode, Terefe, and la Cruz 2020). 
The Ethiopian government is also staunchly pursuing the development of
another type of physical infrastructure to facilitate globalized production: By
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built in several cities across the country, mostly specialized in export-oriented
clothing production (Map 10.1). These parks are developed by the Industrial
Park Development Corporation (IPDC) in close cooperation with the Ethio-
pian Investment Commission (EIC). China’s experience in special economic
zone development is an important reference (UNDP and IPRCC 2015; Weld-
esilassie et al. 2017; Zhang et al. 2018), and for the design and construction
of the parks, mostly experienced Chinese state companies such as the China
Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and CCECC were com-
missioned. The parks ofer very competitive conditions for leasing sheds or
land, cheap water, and energy supply to foreign investors.2 In addition, there
are several private industrial park developments, including signifcant Chinese
investment projects such as the Eastern Industry Zone south-east of Addis (Dan-
nenberg, Yejoo, and Schiller 2013; Giannecchini and Taylor 2018) and major
industrial zones in Adama and Dire Dawa. All these projects are located on or
near the privileged rail and road connections established with Chinese fnancing
and engineering capacities. 
In terms of global clothing production networks, the industrial parks ofer
a physical platform attracting established suppliers to big European and US
clothing brands and retailers, predominantly from South and East Asia, to move
part of their sewing operations here. Transferring this segment of production
requires the least amount of investment and commitment but still enables com-
panies to proft from preferential trade frameworks with the USA and the EU,
in addition to low production costs. In parallel, several big Chinese fabric pro-
ducers are setting up facilities in some of the parks as potential suppliers to the
sewing factories (on the importance of industry park clusters and established
supplier relations, see Altenburg et al. 2020, 54–55, 60). This allows them to
cut supply routes signifcantly while benefting from the same incentives as
export producers. 
In terms of transnational actor constellations, the parks constitute arenas of
collaboration between not only Ethiopian government institutions, transna-
tional players from the clothing industry, and global construction companies,
but also international banks and development agencies. Ethiopian authorities,
international economic consultants, and development agencies advocate the
industrial parks as high-potential locations for the labor-intensive clothing sec-
tor, as incubators for environmental sustainability and “good governance,” and
as proftable opportunities for investment and sourcing, as well as technology
export from the agencies’ home countries.3 However, observers point out the
risk that nearly no backward or forward linkages to the domestic economy are
being formed at such export processing enclaves (Nicolas 2017; Staritz, Plank,
and Morris 2016; Weldesilassie et al. 2017; but see Altenburg et al. 2020, 58 for
a cautious revision of this assessment). Beyond ofering very low-wage jobs, the
value captured in Ethiopia may therefore remain very low (Whitfeld, Staritz,
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Mekelle: a commodity hub in the making? 
Mekelle city, capital of Tigray Regional State in northern Ethiopia, is an instruc-
tive case for studying how infrastructure provision contributes to shaping global
production networks and how transnational actors become signifcant players in
negotiating and physically transforming urban space. However, military confict has
fared up in the region in late 2020, critically afecting civilians and creating much
uncertainty about the future. In late 2018, there were four large export-oriented
industrial zones under construction on greenfeld sites, all specializing in garment
production and aspiring to employ more than 10,000 workers each (Map 10.2). In
addition to the IPDC’s Mekelle Industry Park (MIP), private industrial parks and
major clothing production complexes were being developed by investors from India,
the UAE, Bangladesh, and Italy. Similar global production relations are formed as in
other Ethiopian industrial parks: Mostly suppliers of ready-made garments to global
brands or retailers in Europe and North America are expanding their production
from South-East Asia or Egypt to Mekelle in order to proft from preferential trade,
incentives, and low costs. Initially, all supplies are imported, but some companies
plan to set up vertically integrated factories. Moving production to Mekelle was
supported and even pushed by major European clothing retailers with a fresh Cor-
porate Social Responsibility strategy, seeking a new and cheap production region
not yet associated with inhuman and dangerous working conditions. These retailers
and brands entered notable collaborations with development agencies from Euro-
pean countries like Swedfund or Germany’s Ministry for Development Coopera-
tion, for example, in projects to train and educate workers. 
Our research focuses on MIP as a physical infrastructure for global clothing 
production, developed by Ethiopian government authorities in cooperation with 
international partners. The regional government delineated an area of 1000 ha 
for textile and garment production at a site between villages in the south-west 
periphery of Mekelle (Map 10.2). The frst development phase of 75 ha with 
15 turnkey sheds, ofces, road, and engineering networks was designed and built 
by Chinese contractor CCCC, fnanced by Ethiopia’s government. By 2018, the 
park commenced operations with sewing companies from India, Bangladesh, and 
Pakistan among the frst tenants. A second construction phase of 163 ha is to 
be implemented through a loan contract with the European Investment Bank. 
However, due to the military confict between Ethiopia’s federal government and 
Tigray Regional that started in late 2020, operations in the park were temporar-
ily suspended and also the implementation of the infrastructure projects aiming at 
coupling Mekelle with global production networks is highly uncertain. 
MIP constitutes a large monofunctional enclave of export manufacturing in a 
dry landscape of seasonal pasture land dotted with small village houses in tradi-
tional stone masonry, where water scarcity was already an issue before the arrival 
of large industrial consumers (PWC, IPE Global Triple Line, and EDRI 2017). 
Plugging this enclave into transport and supply networks, and establishing the 
urban fabric of social reproduction necessary to keep transnational commodity 
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MAP 10.2 Infrastructures of manufacturing and circulation in Mekelle (2018) 
Map: Anke Hagemann, Elke Beyer, Ilkim Er 
Sources: Google Maps, OpenStreetMap, Industrial Parks Development Corporation 
production running, emerges as a partly incremental process of spatial planning 
and infrastructure provision from the top down and bottom up. In conversation 
with the authors, local urban planners hinted at a rather retroactive integration of 
the industrial areas into structural planning. As in other Ethiopian industrial parks, 
housing for the expected tens of thousands of workers was still a matter of delib-
eration and improvisation: According to the park management, low-cost housing 
development schemes were still in search of funding, while some tenant companies 
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had requested land on the park outskirts to build their own dormitories. At the 
time of our research, major transport infrastructure construction was under way 
in order to connect the export industry to the international ports (Map 10.2). 
In addition to the railway terminus planned relatively far east of the city center, 
adjacent to the main overland road, CCCC was building an 18 km circumvention 
road between MIP and the future road and rail junction. Close by, a new dry port 
for customs procedures and transferring containers from road to rail was in the 
planning stage—designed by CCCC for the Ethiopian state-owned Shipping and 
Logistics Service Enterprise (Kang’ereha 2017; PWC, IPE Global Triple Line, and 
EDRI 2017). Thus, one huge and globally active Chinese construction corpora-
tion acquired responsibility for the execution and design of most major infrastruc-
ture projects aspiring to transform the peri-urban landscape around Mekelle into 
an export commodity hub. 
Marketing brochures for potential investors in Mekelle IP depict a high-standard 
manufacturing zone connected to global distribution networks by an environmen-
tally friendly railway. Despite all the money already invested to create this physi-
cal infrastructure and confictual land procurement negotiations, however, global 
supply chains to and from the emerging commodity hub might ultimately follow 
diferent routes: Railway construction was interrupted in 2019 due to fnancial dif-
fculties, while the peace with Eritrea seemed to soon allow goods to be shipped 
through Massawa port, at a half-day truck-ride of just about 400 km, much closer 
to Mekelle than Djibouti at 670 km. 
As large export production enclaves are built and linked to privileged transport 
corridors, the formation of global production networks and transnational involve-
ment in infrastructure provisioning are closely linked and markedly impact urban 
development in Mekelle. We argue for a closer investigation of how urban spaces 
are co-produced in this asymmetrical interaction between transnational, national, 
and municipal actors with potentially diverse agendas as well as the workers and 
local residents whose changing livelihoods are fundamentally implicated in the 
major spatial transformations taking place. 
Case 2: infrastructures for soybean processing 
and logistics in Argentina 
Argentina’s economy has been based on the export of agricultural products for 
more than a century. Soybeans and by-products in particular made up more than 
25% of the national exports in past years, creating a critical dependency on the 
global market. The country is the world’s third largest producer of soybeans, and 
the largest for processed soy-based products (Berndt and Bernhold 2017). The 
most important market for Argentina’s grains is the PR China, receiving 96% of the 
country’s soybean exports in 2018 (Bolsa de Comercio de Rosario 2019a). The soy 
industry is mostly organized in global production networks, and the sub-sectors of 
soybean processing and trading are dominated by a few large, vertically integrated, 
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has transformed Argentina’s landscape and social structure in recent decades by 
re-enforcing existing and creating new patterns of inequality. For instance, pro-
cesses of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2006) occur in relation to the 
spatial expansion of industrialized soy cultivation, and its intensive pesticide use 
and monoculture farming cause environmental degradation. In this context, for-
mer peasants have been excluded from participating in agricultural activities, and 
migration to cities has increased (Lapegna 2017; Gras 2013). 
Transport infrastructure development has been mired in extractivism and
particularly the agroindustry in Argentina: Major road and railway corridors
as well as inland waterways primarily connect growing areas to ports that pro-
vide links to global markets. The expansion of transportation networks is of
great importance with regard to integrating new territories into global agro-
industrial production networks (Gómez Lende and Velázquez 2018). The
agroindustry is also an important player in transport operations, as large pro-
ducers and traders have made the operation of port terminals, railway lines,
and truck feets part of their business. Currently, soy is mostly transported by
truck (Gómez Lende and Velázquez 2018) as the railway network has eroded
since the late 20th century due to neoliberal restructuring and the promotion
of road-borne transport. Our research focuses on the state-run Belgrano Cargas
cargo rail network. Its main corridor is currently being renovated in order to
improve connectivity between the major grain ports in the Rosario area and
the agrarian regions by reducing travel times. The renovation project is being
fnanced by the Argentinean state and a USD 4 billion loan from the China
Development Bank Corporation and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China Limited. Under the direction of Argentina’s federal transport minis-
try and coordinated by a state-owned railway infrastructure company, project
implementation was commissioned to the China Machinery and Engineering
Corporation (CMEC) (Ministerio de Transporte 2017). Construction work is
being carried out by Argentinean companies, but the fnancing contract for the
Belgrano Cargas project foresees the acquisition of rolling stock and construc-
tion materials from Chinese companies. In December 2019, about half of the
targeted 1845 km railway line had been renovated. The project is part of larger
Chinese infrastructure initiatives in Argentina, such as loans by state-owned
Chinese banks for further railway projects and energy infrastructures (Inter-
American Dialogue 2019). 
Gran Rosario: a global center of the soy industry 
Gran Rosario is the third largest metropolitan region in Argentina with about 1.3 
million inhabitants. The city evolved around a port at the Paraná river and has 
been a center of grain trade, transport, and processing for many decades. Its urban 
form has been shaped by infrastructures such as railway lines, grain ports, silos, and 
mills, which made it the central hub connecting the vast agricultural areas of the 
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of Rosario stretches more than 60 km along the bank of the Paraná river and incor-
porates around 20 deep-water ports that account for around 80% of the country’s 
exports of grains and by-products (Bolsa de Comercio de Rosario 2019b). Many 
of these complexes also comprise processing facilities such as soy crushing plants 
and bio diesel refneries. Compared to other major soy-producing countries, the 
facilities in Argentina are characterized by large sizes and high volumes (Schweitzer 
2011). Altogether, the region represents one of the world’s centers for the shipping 
and crushing of soybeans. 
On the northern fringe of the Rosario metropolitan region, the Belgrano
Cargas project also implies the provisioning of new rail tracks to the ports and a
large new rail yard in the small town of Timbúes (Map 10.3). This section will be
fnanced by the three international companies operating the ports and processing
facilities and those actors developing new facilities at the same location: China
Oil and Foodstufs Corporation (COFCO), Aceitera General Deheza (AGD),
Renova, Dreyfus, and Asociación de Cooperativas Argentinas (ACA).4 COFCO,
a Chinese state-owned food processing and trading company, is a major actor in
the context of infrastructure development in the Rosario area and has become an
important player in Argentina’s agroindustry in recent years through the acquisi-
tion of two large competitors operating large facilities in Rosario. At its site in
Timbúes, COFCO is planning to expand its processing and logistics complex. 
The companies whose terminals are being connected to the Belgrano Cargas 
network have been involved in the development of the project in several other 
ways: They are all members of the Rosario Board of Trade, a local business orga-
nization representing the interests of the agroindustry and considered to be highly 
infuential in local, provincial, and national politics (authors’ interviews 2018). 
In addition, most companies with facilities in Timbúes are listed as customers of 
Trenes Argentinos Carga, a state-owned freight railway company. Grains and by-
products made up between 50 and 80% of the volume transported by the Belgrano 
Cargas network in the past ten years. Thus, it can be assumed that these companies 
generate a signifcant part of the cargo transported and also the future demand for 
which the services are planned. 
The railway project and the expansion of port capacities in Gran Rosario con-
tribute to the consolidation of the region’s function as a central commodity hub 
within the global soy production networks, and thereby to the industry’s spatial 
concentration. However, the railway line, which serves almost exclusively the 
needs of the export-oriented primary sector, and the other massive infrastruc-
tures provided for the processing and transportation of grains reinforce Argen-
tina’s extractivist development model, which produces social and environmental 
problems in the regions where the crops are cultivated and the urban areas where 
the processing and logistics facilities are located (Schweitzer 2017). In the case of 
Gran Rosario, the impacts of the operation and provision of infrastructures include 
pollution and massive trafc congestion in the suburbs as well as the displacement 
of small-scale fshery at the river banks (Schweitzer 2017; Cloquell et al. 2011; 
Roldán and Godoy 2020). 
 
 
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
130 Beyer, Elsner, and Hagemann 
MAP 10.3 Infrastructures of manufacturing and circulation in the north of Gran Rosa-
rio (2018) 
Map: Anke Hagemann, Ilkim Er, Lucas Elsner 
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Spatial transformation through infrastructures 
of global commodity production and transnational 
actor constellations 
It has been illustrated how the provisioning of large physical infrastructures is 
deeply entangled in the integration of Mekelle and Rosario in global produc-
tion networks and thus the exploitation and reproduction of spatial inequalities. 
Looking beyond the two cases, this is not such a new insight but an aspect that has 
widely been neglected in GPN research. In order to position the two places within 
specifc global production networks as a part of national developmental strategies, 
the urban areas of Mekelle and Rosario are currently being reconfgured as com-
modity hubs through the deployment of infrastructure projects that are among the 
largest in the respective regions. In both cases, Chinese construction engineering 
companies and banks play a key role among multiple international and domestic 
actors. They orchestrate a large network of Chinese companies from the infrastruc-
ture, transportation, and construction sector involved in the projects by acting as 
intermediaries for loans and by coordinating the provision of construction materi-
als and technology as well as the respective expertise from the PRC. 
The urban impact of the infrastructure projects is massive in both cases—in terms
of land and resource consumption, land-use changes, social impacts including rural– 
urban migration, the improvisation of afordable housing for workers, and envi-
ronmental externalities. The large-scale spatial interventions constitute important
vectors of spatial transformation and future urbanization processes. Obviously, the
spatial logics and transnational actor constellations of global clothing production
and the soybean agroindustry difer in signifcant ways. Enhancing connectivity in
Rosario promises stabilization of China’s import supply with agricultural staples and
qualifes the region’s function as the industry’s major hub. In contrast, infrastructure
in Mekelle and other Ethiopian cities is set up to encourage the relocation of pro-
duction capacities in the low-wage textile industry and simultaneously foster the
export of commodities, industry supplies, and construction technology from China
to Ethiopia. In both cases, these relations are physically inscribed in the provided
infrastructures and thereby in the specifc built environments constituting transna-
tional urban spaces. The ports and railway infrastructures in Rosario are constructed
according to the specifc technical demands of grain shipping, and the transportation
network is designed to enable unidirectional fows from the agricultural hinterlands
through the ports in Rosario to global markets. In Ethiopia, large clothing pro-
duction facilities are set up within reach of international ports and with advanced
“green” and automated technology to meet global buyers’ demands, but only basic
dormitory accommodation is provided for workers arriving from distant villages to
work at the lowest wages to be found among clothing exporter countries (Altenburg
et al. 2020, 57). Considering the spatial transformation of the peri-urban landscapes
under study, instances of “splintering urbanism” (Graham and Marvin 2001) can be
observed in both cases: Niches and enclaves of globalized production beneft from
infrastructure provision enabling privileged connections, while the municipalities
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water scarcity, pollution, housing needs, and high trafc volumes. At a national
and regional level, the infrastructure initiatives discussed in this chapter primarily
strengthen major urban centers, fostering processes of urban–rural polarization. 
Although the precise roles and power relations of corporate and state actors 
vary, the two cases reveal instructive similarities regarding the governance of infra-
structure provisioning in the context of larger bilateral cooperation initiatives with 
the PR China and other international partners. In both cases, the leading role of 
planning authorities at the national level results in challenges for planning on an 
urban and regional scale. Transnational enterprises are deeply involved in fnancing, 
ownership, operation, and construction of the infrastructures under study and thus 
in channeling the global fows of commodities (inter alia to and from China) and 
the value generation enabled by these structures. In this specifc way, the emerging 
urban spaces and the modalities of spatial transformation and commodity produc-
tion must be understood as transnational and relational. Studying the provision 
of infrastructures for global production networks substantially adds to the knowl-
edge on the precise links that mediate and co-produce interdependent dynamics 
of uneven spatial development and the resulting inequalities. The discussion of the 
two case studies has shown that examining the transnational actor constellations 
of infrastructure provision is crucial for understanding the uneven spatialities of 
global production networks as both networks are closely entangled. We argue that 
an in-depth analysis of these spatialities requires an integrated approach, taking into 
account both the networks of commodity production and the networks of infra-
structure provision in order to fully comprehend their interdependent character. 
Such an analysis also ofers valuable insights for spatial planning, specifcally when it 
comes to aspirations to participate in global production networks and the resulting 
challenges related to the (re-)production of uneven spatialities. 
Notes 
1 Including findings of the “Transnational Production Spaces” research project (DFG no.: 
MI 1893/2–1) on clothing industry sites in Turkey, Bulgaria, and Ethiopia. 
2 As “renewable” power supply to manufacturing industries, giant hydropower dams are 
under construction on the Blue Nile and the Omo rivers. 
3 We would like to thank our research partners, Melaku Tanku Gebremariam and Eyassu 
Kumera, for sharing their observations at the 2019 International Conference on Sus-
tainable Industrial Areas in Addis, organized by the German Organization for the 
Development of Cooperation in partnership with Ethiopia’s IPDC and EIC, the UK 
Department for International Development, and the International Finance Corporation. 
4 Together these companies accounted for 43% of Argentina’s exports of grains and by-
products in 2018 (Bolsa de Comercio de Rosario 2019a). 
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EXPLAINING THE CURRENT 
WAVE OF REGIONAL 
ECONOMIC POLARIZATION1 
Michael Storper 
Regional inequality is proving too politically dangerous to ignore. 
(The Economist 2016) 
The challenge 
Over the past 40 years, globalization has spread development to many parts of the 
world. But within countries, development has become more uneven, a phenom-
enon known as interregional divergence or polarization. This phenomenon poses a 
major challenge to theories used in economic geography and regional economics. 
In this chapter, I discuss some of these challenges and argue for a broader and more 
enriched framework moving forward. I refer mostly to the US–American case, but 
the phenomenon is widespread throughout the world, and the lessons for theory 
and evidence are similar for these other cases. 
The variance of per capita personal income among US metropolitan areas was 
30% higher in 2016 than it was in 1980 (Ganong and Shoag 2017). In the Euro-
pean Union, inequality among NUTS-2 regions, after falling in the 1990s from a 
high level in 1980 (prior to intensifed European integration), has turned sharply 
up again in the new millennium. In the United States, interregional migration 
has dropped to half of its century-long average up to 1980, and it is more spatially 
selective by skill level (Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl 2012; Giannone 2017). At the 
same time, labor force participation rates have a higher interregional variance in 
the EU and the US than since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Intergenerational 
mobility increasingly difers by region (Chetty et al. 2014). The divergent new 
geography of employment and incomes thus seems to correspond to a divergent 
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This polarization contrasts with the broad geographical development pat-
terns from the middle of the 20th century. From 1940 to about 1980, variation in 
interstate incomes in the United States steadily narrowed, and suburbs and met-
ropolitan hinterlands grew more in terms of population and incomes than inner-
metropolitan areas. It is for this reason that we refer today to the geography of the 
last few decades as a ‘great inversion.’ 
The geographical polarization of opportunity seems to be mirrored in geo-
graphical splits in political attitudes and voting behavior (Spicer 2018). In the 2016 
Brexit referendum and US and French (frst round) presidential elections, there 
were sharp divisions between urban and less urban, prosperous regions and less 
prosperous ones, regions with higher average levels of education and those with 
lower levels, and regions with less ethnic diversity and those with more. The basic 
density gradient of employment, income, and opportunity creates sharp cleavages 
in perceptions and politics. Thus, to take the US example, Hillary Clinton pre-
vailed in just 473 of the 3144 US counties, but with supermajorities in the most 
densely populated areas. Trump prevailed, but with generally narrower majorities, 
in the vast majority of counties that were on average much less densely popu-
lated. Generally speaking, there is long-term geographical polarization of the US 
House of Representatives (Bishop and Cushing 2008; Sussell and Thomson 2015). 
It seems as if, increasingly, people from diferent regions within the same country 
are living in subjectively separate worlds. 
We should be concerned about these forms of polarization for both economic 
and political reasons. As the Economist (2016) points out, ‘orthodox economics has 
few answers to the problem of regional inequality,’ and I will argue that the same 
could be said for the allied feld of economic geography. Regional economics and 
economic geography together face the challenge of developing analytics that can 
explain these outcomes and designing better policies so as to spread prosperity 
because, as the same Economist article states, ‘if economists cannot provide answers, 
populist insurgents will’ (The Economist 2016). 
Spatial equilibrium theories: revisiting the roles 
of amenities, housing, and jobs 
In the past 20 years, the feld of RSUE has developed a set of general equilibrium 
models that place factor mobility (and hence, the sorting of factors among regions) 
at the center of its narrative. 
In the strongest standard version, households choose regions by arbitraging a 
wide variety of preferences, with the key ones consisting of nominal income, hous-
ing type and cost, and a variety of priced and unpriced amenities, while avoiding 
disamenities (Glaeser 2008). The model generates a powerful narrative about US 
regional development over the past 50 years. During a frst wave of migration 
beginning as far back as the 1960s, people picked up and moved from the North-
east and Midwest Rust Belts of the USA to the Sunbelt in search of warmer winters 
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regions of origin, but their resulting real incomes were at least equal due to access 
to cheaper housing, or—in an alternative version—their total utility increased due 
to better and more housing and amenities, such as warmer winters or lower density 
living and more recreation. 
Spatial equilibrium researchers later turned to the selective resurgence of certain
cities such as New York and Boston in the Rust Belt, as well as the strong growth of
high-cost cities such as San Francisco or Seattle. These accounts center around a switch
in preferences on the part of higher-skilled workers to interact in close proximity with
other skilled people (Glaeser and Maré 2001). These skilled people, represented by the
creative class, also wanted access to newly resurgent urban amenities, such as gyms,
restaurants, parks, and hip entertainment and urban buzz in general. Notice that spatial
equilibrium theory is methodologically very individualist: it focuses on choices made
by individuals and households in light of their preferences. While there are some
exceptions, most spatial equilibrium papers do not mention structural forces such as
the shift in the location of jobs and industries or changes in income distribution, that
is to say, the economic and geographical restructuring of work. 
A second feature to underscore is that the key point of all the work involving 
spatial equilibrium is the idea of tradeofs or arbitraging. More importantly, in 
order to understand the economics, this encompasses the idea that some places 
might have high nominal incomes and others lower nominal incomes, but that the 
real divergence between them is much lower, because the former are likely to have 
high costs of living or undesirable quality of life characteristics, while the latter will 
have a low cost of living. This is the diference, in these theories, between ‘real 
income’ and ‘real total utility’ and money income. 
However, since the early 2000s, there is increasing evidence of growing diver-
gence in not only nominal (money) wages between regions but also real terms 
(i.e., after adjusting for the cost of living, see Figure 11.1). Real wage convergence 
in the United States, a slow trend from 1880 onward, basically came to a halt some-
time during the 1980s (Moretti 2012; Diamond 2016; Giannone 2017). Autor 
(2019), moreover, demonstrates that for college-educated workers, there were only 
very small gaps in wages between the regions of the US prior to 1980, on the order 
of 5% from the lowest to highest-wage region; but these gaps have now widened to 
roughly 30%. Meanwhile, for workers with less than a college education, the gaps 
have narrowed. Given diferences in cost of living, a less-educated worker faces a 
much larger penalty for living in an expensive region than before, whereas an edu-
cated worker enjoys a much greater wage beneft. 
Even this is likely to underestimate the total divergence, because high-income 
people increasingly get access to non-priced amenities such as urban buzz simply 
by virtue of living where they do (Diamond 2016). The converse of this is that 
lower-wage workers are moving to regions where their total utility or satisfaction 
is now lower, and increasingly diferent from, the average high-wage worker in a 
region with a high cost of living. 
The stakes in these academic exercises have now become political. This objective
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FIGURE 11.1 Amenities and real income in US metropolitan areas. 
Source: Kemeny and Storper (2012). 
Trump elections, as well as survey data, can be interpreted as indicating that in some
regions, many people perceive their total utility to be unsatisfactory, whether or not
their locations represent some type of interregional equilibrium in the distribution
of people. This notion of a high level of dissatisfaction is supported by the grow-
ing literature describing how people in less prosperous regions perceive prosperous
urban regions such as New York, London, Houston, Boston, and San Francisco to
be better of than where they live, with the others enjoying rigged benefts, a phe-
nomenon labeled ‘the politics of resentment’ (Graeber 2009; Cramer 2016; Guilluy
2016; Hochschild 2016; Isenberg 2016; Vance 2016; Gest 2016). I will return to
this subjective dimension later in this chapter, when discussing values and narratives. 
Slower and more selective labor mobility: is it housing 
and amenities? 
The changing geography of wages and employment presents another challenge 
to urban and regional economics. If the good jobs and wages are piling up in 
some places rather than others, theory suggests that people will move from the 
low- to the high-opportunity regions. Yet, since the 1980s, there has been a sig-
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more geographically selective mobility, where skilled persons migrate among high-
income places and the less skilled stay in low-income places more than they have 
historically. The slowdown applies to virtually all age and skill categories (Kaplan 
and Schulhofer-Wohl 2012; Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2014). 
Why would people not move? The mainstream literature on spatial economics 
turns to housing markets as the main source of the slowdown. The general back-
drop for the slowdown in migration is that interregional housing price gaps have 
grown considerably since the 1990s. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was low demand 
for housing in the Northeast coastal cities, and an expansionist housing policy in 
the South and interior West. Since then, the major metropolitan regions in the 
Northeast and Pacifc Coast have had big housing price increases compared to 
the rest of the country (Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks 2005). This is a phenomenon 
found in major metropolitan areas around the world. 
Mainstream urban economists mostly attribute high housing prices to over-reg-
ulation, and they tend to blame neighborhood groups who defend their privileges
through zoning. They line up, in a rather odd coalition, with many self-styled pro-
gressive urban planners, who wish to promote dense transit-served neighborhoods
and see homeowners as blocking agents. Their claims are sweeping. In a widely cited
analysis, Hsieh and Moretti (2019) assert that if city-regions such as San Francisco,
NYC, Washington, London, or Paris would open the foodgates for housing con-
struction, then there would be a considerable increase in migration from the regions
characterized by high unemployment and relatively low wages, such as the Upper
Midwest of the USA, and the prosperous regions would grow through in-migration,
but workers would enjoy higher real wages due to lower housing prices. Interest-
ingly, a traditionally local debate about housing provision has, through the use of
spatial equilibrium theory, been elevated to one of national importance and tied into
debates about left-behind regions as well as spatial and social inequalities at large. 
However, this expanded school of thought on deregulating housing construc-
tion has very weak empirical evidence. The idea that deregulating housing would 
substantially reshape a system of cities and solve the problems of inequality through 
migration and cheaper housing is not well sustained (Rodríguez-Pose and Stor-
per 2020). A more likely explanation is the changing geography of employment 
and the growing inequality of wage income. Over the last few decades, there has 
been a great inversion in the geography of employment that continues today, such 
that metropolitan areas with more than 1 million people account for three-quar-
ters of the net employment increase in the USA from 2010 to 2016. Population 
increases seem to match more consistently the places with growing employment— 
whether in expensive, dense, highly regulated metropolitan areas or in cheaper, 
less-regulated areas. In contrast, population does not expand in cities in either of 
these categories where there is little employment growth: thus, there are expensive, 
dense old metros with little job growth (e.g., Chicago, Philadelphia), just as there 
are many cheap housing cities with little job growth (in the interior West and old 
Rust Belt). It is very unlikely, under any housing scenario, that an unskilled worker 
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for lack of housing, but rather because the employment opportunities that have 
grown in New York are in jobs that require high levels of education and skill. In 
the mid-20th century, if one were a college-educated worker, location had very 
little impact on one’s wage. Today, on average, wages for college-educated workers 
in America vary by about one-third between prosperous superstar cities and other 
regions. Meanwhile, the geography of wages for less-skilled workers has fattened. 
With diferences in cost of living between regions, a less-skilled worker is penalized 
more than in the past for living in a prosperous, high-cost region. It does not make 
sense for the unskilled to migrate, but it does for the skilled (Autor 2019). 
In other words, a structural explanation that relies on major shifts in the geography
of wages and opportunity is more efective at explaining why some people move
and others do not, and hence on the fundamental roots of interregional economic
divergence. 
Reformulation around a developmental perspective: 
the great inversion and the new geography of jobs, 
incomes, and opportunity 
How can we improve our framework to better account for the divergent develop-
ment patterns of the past 30 years? Kemeny and Storper (2020) propose that there 
are four key elements that can shape a theory and research framework in terms of 
both regional economics and economic geography. 
1	 Macro-historical perspective: waves of technological change are endogenous to 
the capitalist market system and regularly disrupt convergence and even reverse 
it. There are successive industrial revolutions that create key new, innovative 
production sectors with strong agglomeration economies, as emphasized by 
Schumpeterian economic geographers. 
2	 The geography of skilled labor in each industrial revolution: the geographical 
centers of each industrial revolution enhance divergence by maintaining their 
attractiveness to skilled workers. 
3	 Maturity and diffusion of cutting-edge industries: at certain moments in time, 
convergence forces can increase, through declining innovation-generated 
agglomeration economies as they become more routinized and the skills 
required to operate them decline. 
4	 The changing landscape of amenities and housing: amenities and housing are 
weaker long-term forces than the geography of nominal wages and employ-
ment in determining whether convergence or divergence dominates. As the 
forces of agglomeration expand, the concentration of incomes and amenities 
are generated endogenously in high-income places. As the forces of agglom-
eration weaken, the roles of housing and exogenously supplied amenities grow 
stronger in determining locational choices of firms and households, while the 
fundamental attractiveness of agglomerations weakens, thus enhancing conver-
gence processes. 
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The current regional disparities were set in motion by a major wave of technologi-
cal innovation that began in the 1970s—stimulating output in high technology, 
fnance, and advanced service sectors that depend on agglomeration economies and 
therefore whose core, nonroutine jobs favor large metropolitan areas and draw from 
pools of skilled workers in high-turnover labor markets. This wave of technologi-
cal change also allowed the routinization of previously dominant manufacturing 
sectors, thus decreasing their employment through automation, and revolutionized 
trade costs, allowing these forces to become more geographically dispersed (Levy 
and Murnane 2004). These epochal technological changes have been coupled with 
an expansion of world trade, itself an outcome of the ways in which such technolo-
gies have reduced trade and interaction costs and allowed global value chains to 
emerge due to routinization of tasks. This has hurt weaker regions and magnifed 
the forces of divergence. 
We need a framework to accommodate both times when migration contrib-
utes to divergence and when it reverses that role and contributes to convergence. 
In  the mid-20th century United States, people left the deindustrializing regions 
of the Rust Belt to move to more dynamic ones, either on the coasts or in the 
South. This served as a safety valve and opportunity-increasing mechanism for 
migrants. In contrast, today we require a deeper understanding of why certain 
categories of workers continue to crowd into expensive metropolitan areas as well 
as the apparent slowdown in mobility of the less-skilled from lower-wage or lower-
opportunity regions to the prosperous metropolitan areas. We can speak of groups 
of the workforce who are stuck in place today; it is not a matter of their underlying 
desires or preferences, but rather the structural labor market forces that block their 
path, in both the places where they are or the more prosperous places that they 
might dream of reaching. 
The institutionalization of separate worlds 
Rodríguez-Pose (2013) argues that there is a widespread consensus that ‘institu-
tions are important to development’ (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2004; 
Rodrik et al. 2004; Farole et al. 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Con-
ventionally, a broad defnition of institutions includes those that are both formal 
and informal. Formal institutions that shape development can range from very big 
framework conditions, such as constitutions, laws, and governmental structures, to 
very specifc formal rules and laws, along with organizations that apply, enforce, 
and interpret them. Institutions also refers to routines, in the form of manifold 
informal practices, norms, conventions, and beliefs, as well as informal networks 
of persons and organizations (North 1990; Storper and Salais 1997). Moreover, it 
is widely agreed that formal institutions and informal institutions (often labeled 
‘culture’) have two-way joint efects (Alesina and Guiliano 2015). 
In what follows, I discuss four possible ways that institutions are shaping current 
interregional economic polarization: institutions that capture and prolong agglom-
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skills, and sorting; set institutional structures that shape skilling and socialization; 
and feedback to politicians, which in turn afects divergence through policy choices. 
Institutions, agglomeration, and divergence 
Capturing promising new industries involves the nurturing of the entrepreneurs 
who come up with breakthrough innovations or products and transforming older 
ones involves spin-of frms who aid the major existing frms to remain dynamic 
(Saxenian 1994; Klepper 2009; Chatterji, Glaeser, and Kerr 2013). Kenney and 
Mowery (2014) emphasize the diferent ways that business and research institu-
tions network in regions, as the relational infrastructures that shape innovation and 
entrepreneurship, so that R&D is translated into development in diferent manners 
from one place to another. Feldman and Lowe (2017) use the case of North Caro-
lina to make a wider argument about the gradual enhancement of regional capa-
bilities. But the feld still lacks systematic, large-scale evidence, as well as structured 
theories, on the preconditions that enable certain regions to capture major waves 
of development and others to be excluded. 
A related topic is why, in this wave, agglomeration-driven advantages have concen-
trated in certain places, and why overall divergence has thus far been so strong relative
to convergence and spreading processes. Detailed studies on existing prosperous places
suggest that this might be because of the endogenous coevolution of agglomeration
and the local informal institutions that are specifc to certain industries and places, such
as Silicon Valley and London today or Detroit and Manchester in the past. 
In one prominent study, Feldman and Zoller (2012) identify new types of eco-
nomic intermediary agents, such as venture capitalists and deal brokers, show-
ing that their uneven geography accompanies the growth of knowledge-intensive 
industries. Other recent research along these lines has quantifed the value of cer-
tain kinds of local economic networks that underpin agglomeration (Kemeny et al. 
2016). Another key question for such institutional approaches is how entrepreneurs 
emerge, what kinds of entrepreneurs emerge, where they emerge, and whether 
they fourish or are inhibited by the regional economic environment (Kirzner 
1979; Braunerhjelm et al. 2010; Chatterji, Glaeser, and Kerr 2013; Fairlie 2013). 
Taking into account all these institutional forces—existing frms, innovation, net-
works and leadership, conventions and world views, entrepreneurship—economic 
sociologists speak of the emergence of ‘organizational felds’ or ecologies (Powell, 
Packalen, and Whittington 2012; Padgett and Powell 2012), referring to a complex 
institutionalization process. In the language of regional economics, the places that 
develop the institutions mentioned earlier, in tandem with the location of frms 
that have cutting-edge technology or knowledge endowments, develop double 
monopolistic advantages, from hard economies of scale to informal institutions 
that are difcult to imitate or transfer. This difculty of imitation may not last for-
ever, but it seems to prolong the advantage and hence interregional polarization in 
ways not fully incorporated into either RSUE superstar city approaches or NEG 
agglomeration modeling. 
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Network-embedded skills, job search, and spatial traps 
Many scholars now consider that new economy skills are not just individual human 
capital but also are acquired and exercised through networks, which are in turn 
social institutions (Granovetter 2005; Owen-Smith and Powell 2012; Deming 
2015; DeLong 2016; Kemeny et al. 2016). In this view, more formal skills are 
indeed required than ever before, but in addition to diplomas, there are also more 
experience skills that can only be acquired by ‘being there’ (De la Roca and Puga 
2017). Experience itself appears to have several diferent components and geogra-
phies. One is simply having learned the unwritten or informal aspects of job per-
formance. Another is that the high turnover and highly individualized work in the 
skilled sectors of the new economy require social networks: knowing people. The 
implication of this reasoning is that even those individuals who succeed at formal 
schooling in left-behind regions are increasingly disadvantaged by their location. 
They are less apt to acquire the informal experience, knowledge, and cues, and to 
build the networks that create advantages for individuals in the wealthier regions 
with similar levels of formal education. Such opportunities are scarcer and less ‘in 
the air’ in the less-developed regions than in those that are already ahead. If this is 
the case, then the institutions in the wealthier regions can also provide their stu-
dents with better overall capacities by means of better networking and social cueing 
than in less-advantaged regions. Such diferences then cumulate over the develop-
ment cycle through the diferential ability of families in the right regions to have 
the income and connections to aford their children such capacities. This could 
help us explain the observed increase in regional diferences in return to education, 
especially among highly skilled workers, and the relative lack of migration from 
left-behind to superstar regions. 
Research on skills, mobility, and interregional divergence should therefore con-
sider education and experience in relation to strong and weak ties and how they 
afect sorting between regions and behaviors within them. It seems likely that this 
contributes to why less-skilled people fnd themselves more spatially trapped today 
than in previous waves of economic change. 
Organizations, values, and culture: socialization and economic 
divergence 
As noted earlier, institutions are generally broken down into formal and informal 
components, with the latter consisting of a variety of elements including values, 
norms, conventions, beliefs, and customs. Some theorists argue that all these infor-
mal dimensions should be described by the term ‘culture’ (Alesina and Guiliano 
2015). There is increasing recognition that these forces can contribute to economic 
divergence. 
Scholars such as Graeber (2009), Cramer (2016), Vance (2016), Hochschild 
(2016), and Williams (2017) call attention to diferent systems of values in difer-
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individual characteristics in context, because it is experiences that count for people 
(and not just inputs such as education or outputs such as income). Operationally, 
two such experience-capturing variables are occupation and location. There seems 
to be a value split between people in manual-occupational cultures and cognitive-
occupational cultures that is sharper than the splits between people at diferent 
educational and income levels (Williams 2017). Income is less closely related to 
many attitudes than notions of dignity and expectations of social mobility or hope 
about the future (see also Inglehart and Norris 2016). 
These interpretations are supported by quantitative fndings on voting patterns. 
Gelman (2008) demonstrates that the standard individual attributes adduced to 
explain voting—income, religious observance, race, and ethnicity—change in 
importance and sometimes in direction when geographically disaggregated. For 
example, high-income people in US blue states vote much farther to the left than 
their high-income counterparts in red states, and the efect of a similar degree 
of religious conviction varies greatly across diferent places. Blue counties in the 
USA aggregate left-wing preferences from the two ends of the income distribution 
spectrum, but the upper end votes overwhelmingly right-wing in less urban places. 
This implies that interactions within places, and not just individual characteristics 
(even in combination at the individual level), determine, at least to some extent, 
attitude formation and voting (Gordon 2018). 
All of these scholars argue that individual attributes are shaped by, and mutu-
ally causal with, the collective attributes of the places in which people live and the 
process by which narratives are constructed based on observation and experience. 
The institutions of a place are in part the organizations with which people interact 
and that help to defne and mobilize their interests and interpretations of experi-
ence. Along these lines, Hochschild (2016) reports on a detailed ethnography of 
Louisiana, centering on the intersection of local institutions—churches, political 
parties, community associations, local political and social networks—in forging 
narratives or world views. 
The institutions of socialization are constructed by human actors, and some of 
them can change in relatively short periods of time. In the case of the US, the key 
institutions of ‘CIO unionism’2 and urban political machines have lost their force 
in the wake of deindustrialization in many areas of the Midwest (CIO unions were 
never strong in the South) (Davis 2017). CIO unionism was to the Northeast and 
Upper Midwest what conservative local institutions have been to the South: a key 
center of associational life and information for many people and their families, 
shaping their political choices. As CIO unions have withered due to deindustri-
alization and associated demographic change, other more politically and socially 
conservative local institutions have replaced them. As industrial cities in the Mid-
west have declined, those people who did not move out of the region have become 
more rural, and with this new rurality, their institutional attachments have changed, 
becoming more rural and more conservative in favor (Cramer 2016). 
An opposite form of institutional construction appears to have occurred in most
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of a dense tissue of organizations in local civil society, associated with a high degree
of social mobilization. These organizations lobby for inclusion of immigrants, for
multiculturalism, for amenities such as transportation and recreation, for aiding the
homeless, and for promoting urban cultural events and forums. The labor unions
involved in these places are largely those of post-industrial, service-oriented work-
ers (often non-white and female), in urban-based industries with strong immigrant
constituencies. They have largely replaced industrial manufacturing unions as par-
ticipants in big-city politics. Religious organizations are involved, but usually they
are more concerned with justice-oriented approaches to urban problems than with
religious conservatism. The civil society tissue of metropolitan areas is the source of
much of the progressive politics, multiculturalism, and global outlook there, devi-
ating substantially from the church, military, within-group, and family-dominated
afnities that prevail in other areas. We could therefore say that the content of civil
society organizations and networks has gone in very diferent directions in diferent
regions, in a way that seems to track economic geographies and their demographic
consequences. Ultimately, we need to better understand the interaction between
technological change, labor market change, the geography of work and incomes, and
political and institutional change. 
Political and policy polarization 
The fact that economic polarization gives rise to a diferentiated landscape of
objective interests is nothing new; this is the basis for a long line of literature on
sectionalism and political choices in diferent regions. The current economic
polarization has its version of this phenomenon. A key issue in determining the
economic efects of trade is distinguishing between producer (wage, employ-
ment) impacts and consumer impacts, and determining how they interact difer-
ently across regions. These efects have been considered in the aggregate, where
the evidence shows that increasing manufacturing trade has generated large net
benefts from a consumer surplus (lower prices) in developed countries and net
benefts in employment and wage incomes in developing countries. The greatest
net consumer benefts are at lower ranges of the income distribution, because
the wealthy consume more services and more locally produced goods than those
with lower incomes. In geographical terms, this probably means that regions hit
hardest by import competition with regard to wages and employment probably
exhibit rather high consumer surpluses on the consumption side (the ‘Walmart’ 
efect). People in wealthier regions also enjoy a consumer surplus from imports,
but because they consume more locally produced services, these are lower on a
proportional basis. Skilled people in prosperous regions probably beneft more
from the presence of low-wage immigrant labor, which provides them with
labor-intensive services, more than is the case in less wealthy regions. In the lat-
ter, immigrants are likely to compete with low-skill native workers more than in
metropolitan regions (Foged and Peri 2016). These structural factors will help
us explain the divergent attitudes toward globalization and multiculturalism that
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Rising to the challenge 
I opened this chapter by noting the double challenge identifed by the Econo-
mist: orthodox economics has few answers to the problem of regional inequal-
ity, and yet, if we do not provide some answers, populist insurgents will do so. I 
have attempted to propose a broader framework with which we could seek these 
answers. This framework would apply micro-economic analyses of employment 
location, wages, the role of housing and amenities, skills, and migration, and place 
them within a broad structural and developmental framework. This is ultimately 
a multi-disciplinary efort. The stakes are high because geographical polarization 
is a threat to social and economic stability and justice in the contemporary world. 
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Notes 
1 Shortened and partly updated reprint: Storper, Michael. 2018. “Separate Worlds? 
Explaining the Current Wave of Regional Economic Polarization.” Journal of Economic 
Geography 18 (2): 247–270. doi: 10.1093/jeg/lby011. 
2 CIO unionism as the progressive branch of AFL–CIO, consisting of a more politicized 
‘European style’ and class-oriented union than the AFL local unions. When the two 
merged, AFL ‘bread and butter’ unionism came to dominate in the United States, but 
locally, many CIO unions were already in place and played an important role in those 
communities long after the merger. 
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Links between everyday shopping behavior 
and changes in the retail landscape 
Elmar Kulke and Nina Baur 
Interrelations of time and space: spatio-temporal pathways 
Löw and Knoblauch (in this book) claim that since the 1970s, spaces have been 
refgured at a rather fast pace and within a relatively short period of time. Similarly, 
in accordance with most economic theories, spatial transformations should occur 
rather frequently and quickly—whenever production costs or consumer demands 
change, for example, companies should restructure their locations of production 
and retailing along with their value chains. However, at least for the economy, the 
contrary is true from an empirical standpoint. For example, Boatca, Bhambra, 
Korzeniewicz, and Payne (all in this book) illustrate at the level of the world system 
that spatial transformations occur much more seldomly than both economic theo-
ries and the concept of refguration of spaces suggest. Indeed, if they occur, spatial 
transformations unfold much more slowly, usually in the longue durée (Braudel 
1958), and path-dependently. This is important not only as an aspect in the spatial 
structure of the economy but also because of the fact that the economy is a key 
factor in (re-)producing social inequality. Similar efects can be observed at the 
national and regional levels, where regional disparities of both the economic struc-
ture and social inequality have been continuously reproducing over an extended 
period of time (Storper in this issue; Heidenreich 2003). 
Various explanations have been provided as to why the spatial structures of 
the economy are so slow to transform, including: power structures within the 
world system (Wallerstein 2004); constructions of race, nationality, and citizenship 
as aftermaths of colonialism (Boatca, Bhambra, both in this book); spatial strategies 
of transnational elites (Korzeniewicz and Payne in this book); the agglomeration 
of infrastructure and institutions in regional innovation systems (Hassink, Ibert, 
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structure of global value chains (Beyer et al. in this book); and local economic con-
ventions, values, and culture (Baur et al. 2014c, Storper in this book). 
In this chapter, we provide an additional explanation for the sluggishness of
spatial transformations, complementing these earlier accounts: the spatial and tem-
poral coupling of institutions. The idea of “coupling” is based on the observation
that space and time are inextricably entwined in both the economy and everyday
life, as geography (e.g. Massey 2005) and sociology (e.g. Löw 2001; Baur 2005,
80–82, 165–172; Weidenhaus 2015) have repeatedly stressed. In this context, it
is necessary to distinguish between people’s spatio-temporal knowledge (“Soziale
Raumzeit,” “Raum- und Zeitwissen”)—how people experience and interpret their
living spaces (“Lebensraum”) and their life histories (“Lebensgeschichtlichkeit”) in
their individual biographies (Weidenhaus 2015)—and their actions. With regard
to people’s actions in space and time, it is important to note that at any given
point in time, the materiality of the surroundings determines people’s actions and
interactions, as each person and object (i.e. good) can only be at one location (i.e.
at a specifc space-time coordinate) at a given time. In modern economies, goods
are typically transported over long distances and people commute between their
homes and work spaces. Moving people and goods through (physical) space from
one space-time coordinate to another takes time (Baur et al. 2014a), which is why
specifc spatio-temporal pathways (“Raum-Zeit-Pfade”) can be observed (Cromley
1999, 64–82, 104–116). 
In order to save time and facilitate coordination across time and space, diferent 
activities are often “coupled”—that is: combined—at the same locations. This has 
been demonstrated both in geography and sociology for consumers’ everyday lives 
and in geography for economic activities. Using the example of consumer-retailer 
interactions when shopping for groceries in West German cities, we take this one 
step further in this chapter: We will not only show (a) how consumers (demand 
side) couple shopping with other everyday activities and (b) how retailers (supply 
side) couple their outlets with other retailers and social institutions but also (c) how 
demand and supply side are coupled and (d) how this coupling is embedded in the 
material urban structure, (e) which in turn is at the root of the slowness in spatial 
transformations. 
Consumers: the driving forces behind coupling on the 
demand side 
When analyzing consumer-retailer interactions on the demand side, one can 
observe that in theory, consumers today should both go shopping more often and 
spend more time on shopping than was the case 70 years ago due to increasing 
incomes, new lifestyles, and a new household division of labor. 
First, people’s ability to aford products has dramatically increased. Up to the 1950s 
in Germany, markets were characterized by insufcient supply, and a lack of food 
was an everyday experience. Since then, however, grocery stores have been satu-
rated and driven by excess supply. In parallel, real household incomes have increased 
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continuously (Ermann and Pütz 2020). As a result, in 2019, the average income 
was 33 times higher than 70 years ago (Destatis 2020, Figure 12.1). 
Increased income encourages changes in consumption behavior, which is 
described by the classic Engel curves (Engel 1857; Kulke 2017): Low-income con-
sumers can only aford to buy a limited number of goods and have to spend most 
of their available money on basic necessities (such as food), which therefore are 
not income elastic. When incomes increase, consumers both buy more goods and 
spend a larger share of their income on income-elastic, high-quality, or expend-
able goods (e.g., durable consumer goods, entertainment, electronics). Consum-
ers typically do not buy more necessities but rather buy similar goods of a higher 
quality, for instance, by switching from cheap no-name articles to brand products. 
Regardless, in 2013, German couples with children still spent about 15% of their 
household income on food (Destatis 2016, 158). Higher income also equates to 
an increase in individual mobility, as households increasingly own private means of 
transportation, especially cars (Achen et al. 2008). Cars allow consumers to travel 









1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010 2020 
FIGURE 12.1 Average monthly gross income of German full-time employees 1913– 
1919 (in Euro) 
Source: Own calculation based on Destatis 2020. The working population consists of the employees in 
production and services of the respective territory at the time, namely the German Reich 1913–1944, 
the American-British Bizone 1945–1949, the territory of the former Federal Republic of Germany 
since 1949 (without Saarland and Berlin 1950–1959, without Berlin 1960–1963, including West Berlin 
1964–2006, including Berlin since 2007). 
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increases should impact spatio-temporal pathways, as buying more goods—at least 
in theory—requires more time dedicated to shopping and going to more shops. 
Second, shopping behavior is only one of many daily activities needed to main-
tain a family. Modern urban West German families—for example, consisting of 
two adult partners with small children living in a single household—typically per-
form unpaid work (housework and care work) in addition to enjoying some leisure 
activities (e.g., watching TV, playing, receiving visitors) at home. If the household’s 
adults perform their paid work outside their homes, they need to commute to/ 
from their ofce. They also have to ensure that their children are transported to/ 
from their (nursery) schools. Additional journeys result from diverse leisure activi-
ties (e.g., sports, day trips, meeting friends, eating out, visiting concerts) as well as 
housework and care work (e.g., shopping, seeing a doctor). In other words, the 
daily routines of a family’s members are linked. 
As people’s overall time budget is limited, in order to save time, there typically 
is a household division of labor between the adult family members, which can take 
on diferent forms. From the nineteenth century to the 1950s, the “male bread-
winner/female homemaker model,” in which the man concentrates on work and 
the woman takes care of housework and carework, was common practice. Since 
the 1960s, due to changes in both the welfare state and social norms, the “dual 
career model,” in which partners share these tasks evenly, has increasingly become 
more common (Baur 2007). This is refected in female labor market participation: 
In many countries (including Germany), only 40% of women were employed in 
the 1960s and 1970s, while 55% were employed in 2016 (Grunow 2019, 258). 
Although gender ideologies have expanded since the 1950s (Baur et al. 2019; 
Grunow 2019), there is surprisingly little change in the general structure of the 
household division of labor (Grunow 2019, 260, 276): In 2012/13, men spent 
about 57% of their total work hours on paid work and 43% on unpaid work—for 
women, it was the opposite with a ratio of 35% to 65%, meaning that, on aver-
age, men spent nine hours more per week on paid and ten hours less per week 
on unpaid work than women, and the gender gap in overall work time has even 
increased still further since the early 2000s (Destatis 2016, 263). 
What is rarely taken into account in debates on the household division of labor 
is its implications for spatio-temporal pathways: Diferent activities—such as clean-
ing and cooking, shopping, paid work, dropping of the children at school, visiting 
doctors, banks and public administrations—take place at diferent places scattered 
around the city: the home, shops, the ofce, childcare facilities, schools, govern-
ment ofces, etc. Consumers do not have a choice in the matter because, during 
the period of industrialization, the division of spheres was materially engrained in 
the urban structure—referred to as objectifed form-investions (Hering and Baur 
2019). Consumers are therefore forced to spend time commuting between these places. 
As a result, more than half of housework is dedicated to commuting, shopping, 
and cooking: Of the 29.5 hours per week women dedicated to housework in 
2012/13, they spent 2.7 hours per week commuting, 6.1 hours per week shopping 
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men spent 5.7 hours per week less on these tasks. Namely, men spent 2.1 hours 
per week commuting, 4.9 hours per week shopping, and 3 hours per week cook-
ing (Destatis 2016, 263). Depending on the database, in the 2010s, Germans went 
shopping between 3.5 times (Papastefanou and Zajchowski 2016, 120) and 4.5 
times (Procher and Vance 2013, 8) per week. When Germans left their homes, 
two out of three trips involved some form of shopping (Destatis 2016, 343). The 
working population commutes much more often and over longer distances: On a 
given working day, nine out of ten Germans leave their homes and make an aver-
age of four journeys, mostly by car. In doing so, commuters cover about 10 to 
12 kilometers per journey, requiring between 84 and 90 minutes in total (Destatis 
2016, 341–342). 
Due to the above-mentioned changes in the household division of labor, com-
muting times at least should have increased since the 1960s: In the male bread-
winner/female homemaker model, commuting time is minimized as men travel 
to work places that are typically located in a diferent neighborhood or even city 
than the home, while women perform all tasks that can be completed in the home 
neighborhood, including shopping (Figure 12.2a). In contrast, in the dual career 
model, both partners have to travel to all places because they share all tasks, thus 
multiplying overall commuting time (Figure 12.2b). 
Consequently, all in all, both commuting time and time spent shopping should 
have increased since the 1960s, due to both increasing incomes and changes in 
the household division of labor. However, paradoxically, since the 1980s—when 
mobility patterns were frst systematically measured in Germany—both the per-
centage of commuting persons and the average time spent commuting have not
increased but rather have stayed more or less constant (Destatis 2016, 341–342). 
Similarly, both men and women only spent about half an hour more shopping in 
the 2010s than in the early 2000s (Destatis 2016, 263). 
The reason for this is that couples’ overall time budget remains the same—if new 
tasks are added, couples have to reduce the time spent on other tasks (Hofmeister 
and Moen 2012). To a certain extent, working hours have been decreasing since 
the 1960s (Grunow 2019). However, as working hours are partly regulated nation-
ally and partly negotiated by labor unions, couples have a limited infuence on their 
total working hours if both want to work. Instead, couples have been saving the 
most time by spending less time on housework since the 1950s (Baur et al. 2019). 
Women’s average time spent on routine housework decreased from more than four 
hours per day in 1965 to less than three hours in the 2000s. At the same time, men’s 
average time spent on routine housework has only increased from 17 minutes in 
1965 to 49 minutes in 2001 (Grunow 2019, 258). As a result, the total working 
hours—for paid work, housework, care work, shopping, and commuting—have 
been steadily decreasing since the 1950s and decreased further by about 45 minutes 
between 2001/2002 and 2012/2013 (Destatis 2016, 263). 
This reduction in housework was partly driven by technological change (Baur 
et al. 2019). However, and more importantly, consumers have reacted to time pressure
by coupling activities in their daily life. In the 2010s, when going shopping, only one 
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(a) Male breadwinner and female homemaker family, 19th century to 1950s 
(b) Dual-earner family, 19th century to 1950s 
(c) Dual-earner family, 1960s to 1970 
FIGURE 12.2 Typical spatio-temporal paths of couples with children on workdays 
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(d) Dual-earner family, since 1980s 
FIGURE 12.2 (Continued) 
in three trips was solely dedicated to shopping, while two out of three trips coupled 
shopping with other activities (Destatis 2016, 343). In addition, consumers also couple 
diferent types of shopping activities. 
In connection with rising income and mobility, motives for shopping have
become increasingly differentiated (Kulke 2005; Weiss 2006). Entertainment
shopping (coupling shopping with leisure activities such as visiting a restau-
rant), discount shopping (buying in stores with an assortment of articles at
low prices), and smart shopping (buying well-known brand products for low
prices) are gaining in importance. In the course of this differentiation, the
connections within closest proximity—the so-called nearest-center-connec-
tions—have dissolved and more distant shopping locations are visited more
often (Martin 2006). 
Temporal coupling of retailing with other social institutions 
It is important to note that individual people do not have much choice about
how to organize their everyday lives, because when people (e.g., the members of
a family) interact, their actions need to be spatially and temporally synchronized
(Maurer  1992; Baur 2005). Therefore, people’s spatio-temporal knowledge and
spatio-temporal pathways (micro level) are embedded in spatio-temporal regimes
(macro level), which are both material (objectifed) and social. Although temporal
and spatial regimes are obviously linked, so far, sociology has mostly focused on time
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As sociology has shown, any social group—such as a family or a company— 
is synchronized by means of a time regime (“Zeitordnung”) (Buchmann 1989;
Fürstenberg 1986): Based on collective temporal knowledge (“Zeitbewusstsein”) 
(Bergmann 1983), the social group defnes a set of temporal rules that structure
people’s schedules in a typical and binding way, so that anyone can rely on
the others’ schedules. In Germany, for instance, the traditional working hours
(“Kernarbeitszeiten”) are 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (Monday to Friday). Time
regimes are embedded in and at the same time enforced by institutions (e.g.,
companies, kindergartens, schools). If diferent institutions do not coordinate
their individual time regimes (“Eigenzeit”) (Luckmann 1986), this might result
in time conficts (“Zeitkonfikte”) at the individual level (Fürstenberg 1982). For
example, if the employer expects an employee to be at the ofce from 9:00 a.m.
to 5:00 p.m. but kindergartens and schools are open only between 8:00 a.m.
and 1:00 p.m., this means that the same person cannot be employed and take
care of the children at the same time. At the household level, this means that
either only one partner can be employed or the couple cannot have children
(Baur 2008). 
Time conficts are partially resolved by an implicit hierarchy that defnes which 
institution’s time regimes take precedence in cases of time clashes. In Germany, 
work usually takes priority over childcare which in turn takes priority over shop-
ping, meaning that people can only go shopping when they are not working or 
doing carework. This institutional hierarchy means that retailers are largely forced 
to react to time conficts created in other felds of social life. 
An initial confict to which retailers needed to react was the fact that shops
require employees to operate and 72% of salespersons are women (BA 2020).
This created a time confict even in the 1950s, and retailing has responded to this
by means of lobbying. As a result, German legislation defned a compromise in
1956 that stores may only open from Monday to Friday between 7:00 a.m. and
6:30 p.m. and on Saturdays until 2:00 p.m. (Papastefanou and Zajchowski 2016,
117), which allowed most workers to shop before or after work and salespersons
to shop and do their housework at a diferent time. As this did not sufce to
resolve the time conficts, the strict regulations of opening hours have been relaxed
since 1989. Since 2006, stores may open 24/6 (Monday to Saturday). This in
turn had consequences for people’s spatio-temporal pathways in their daily rou-
tines, as the average time people spend in stores has increased (Papastefanou and
Zajchowski 2016). 
A second time confict arose as a result of changing consumer demands. As 
discussed previously, these have mainly been determined by three diferent factors 
(Lange 1973; Kulke 2017): frst, the time available for shopping (shopping time); 
second, the time needed to reach the shopping locations (commuting time); and 
third, the transport capacity for articles. Available shopping time and commuting 
time (which in turn depend on the specifc household division of labor) defne the 
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capacity defnes the maximum coupling that is possible—cars ofer larger transport 
capacities (compared to walking or using a bike). Changing household divisions 
of labor and increases in income (with more articles bought) enhance the need for 
consumers to couple activities. 
Since the 1950s, retailers have been reacting to changing consumer needs using 
a series of organizational innovations consisting of two elements: internal param-
eters of action mainly address time conficts and change the store’s characteristics; 
external parameters address locational choices and increasingly couple stores closer 
together in terms of space. 
Internal parameters of action are documented in the rising importance of larger retail
formats. These larger formats have developed because they allow consumers to buy
diferent products at once, while at the same time enabling retailers to achieve
internal economies of scale, ofer more and more diverse articles, and imple-
ment diferent business strategies. According to the life-cycle model of retail for-
mats (Dannenberg, Franz, and Leper 2016; Kulke 2017; Neiberger and Steinke
2020), every retail format is only competitive for a limited time span. Chang-
ing consumer preferences and changing internal cost/revenue structures drive the
development of new formats, which replace older formats that no longer suit the
market conditions. A retail format’s life-cycle begins in the phase of market entry
with only a few stores and a limited market volume of sales. If a store concept
proves successful, it enters the expansion phase, during which many additional
units of this format are established and the market share increases rapidly. After
some time, the maturity phase is reached. The market share remains more or less
constant and no additional units are opened. Finally, the format reaches the phase
of decline, during which the units of this type are replaced by new formats and
the market share declines. 
There is strong empirical evidence for the life-cycle model. For example, in 
food retailing, until the 1950s, small service stores dominated the market (Figure 
12.2a/b and Figure 12.3a), which were replaced by store concepts that allowed 
consumers to minimize their time spent shopping by combining activities, namely 
buying diferent goods in the same store and decreasing the time needed for paying 
and commuting: self-service stores in the 1960s and 1970s (Figure 12.2c) and later 
larger supermarkets (more than 400 m2 of retail space). Since the 1990s, super-
markets have been under pressure due to the rise in discounters—which are more 
or less the same size as supermarkets but ofer a smaller range of goods for lower 
prices—and hypermarkets—which are larger (more than 1,500 m2 of retail space) 
and ofer a wider range of products, including non-food items (such as household 
goods and clothing). Comparable developments can be seen in non-food retailing. 
The classic specialized stores have been gradually replaced by larger, self-service-
based, specialized markets and discount stores. 
In addition to ofering a wider and deeper assortment, these larger stores posi-
tion themselves on the market by employing special internal action parameters. To 
boost their competitiveness and to attract consumers, they use either the “price 
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(a) Closed traditional food store 
(b) Modern inner-city shopping center 
FIGURE 12.3 Diferent types of retail structures and urban structures 
Source: Photos by Elmar Kulke 
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Price parameter: increase attractiveness by ofering articles at low prices and 
internal cost reductions 
Assortment parameter: increase attractiveness by optimizing/broadening the 
assortment of articles ofered 
Service parameter: increase attractiveness by providing additional services 
Distance parameter: increase attractiveness by optimizing spatial accessibility 
for consumers 
FIGURE 12.4 Action parameters used by retail stores 
Source: Agergard, Olsen, and Allpass (1970), Kulke (2017) 
parameter,” the “assortment parameter,” the “service parameter,” or the “distance 
parameter” (Figure 12.4). 
Spatial coupling of retailing and changes in the retail 
landscape 
Changes in both retailing formats and action parameters result in locational changes 
for retailers because each format and action parameter implies specifc locational 
preferences—and this points to the fact that institutions are coupled together not 
only temporally but also spatially. As there are diferent ways of organizing space 
and time collectively and socially (Baur et al. 2014b, 2014c), each city has its own 
rhythm (Rinderspacher 1988; Promberger et al. 1997). Over time, time regimes 
are engrained in a city’s objectifed spatial structure (“Raumstruktur”) by construct-
ing buildings and transport infrastructure that facilitate actions in compliance with 
the city’s time regime and at the same time make deviant actions more difcult 
(Simmel 1901, 254–270; Elias [1969] 2002). In other words, both a city’s rhythm 
and its physical spatial structure assume a specifc household division of labor, and 
the city’s spatio-temporal order is structured based on that assumption (Hering 
and Baur 2019). For example, since the industrialization of the nineteenth cen-
tury, West German spatio-temporal regimes were organized according to the male 
breadwinner/female homemaker model (Baur 2008). Working time was separated 
from other activities, and the workspace (“Arbeitsort”) was physically separated from 
the home (“Wohnort”) (Maurer 1992). 
As a result, cities were designed in such a way that the (male) workforce 
needed to commute to work in diferent quarters of the city (Hofmeister 2002). 
As explained earlier, women therefore performed all other tasks, included shop-
ping, and there was an elective afnity (“Wahlverwandtschaft”) towards coupling 
commuting distances and motives for shopping. In the 1950s, (female) consumers 
typically practiced convenience-oriented shopping, that is, women visited the shop 
closest to their home ofering the goods needed (“nearest-center-connection”) 
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butcher, a baker, a milk/cheese shop, a classic grocery store, etc.—which were scat-
tered across locations close to their homes (Figures 12.2a and 3a). This resulted in a 
great deal of commuting time both from work to the shops and between shops, in 
addition to extra time spent in the shops to pay several times, for example. 
As stated previously, since the 1970s, German family ideals have pluralized, and 
more and more people have wanted to practice a dual-career model (Baur 2008; 
Baur et al. 2019; Grunow 2019). In theory, this should have increased commuting 
time (Figure 12.2b). However, this was not the case, as retailers reacted to these 
changes in consumer demand by changing their external parameters. 
External parameters are mainly connected to locational decisions and depend on
the store’s size, assortment, and strategic action. According to Nelson (1958), every
retail store is able to attract a given number of consumers on its own, which is called
“generative business.” Large units with a diversifed assortment—such as hypermar-
kets or large home depots—attract so many consumers on their own that they can
choose locations without taking into account their proximity to other stores. How-
ever, for smaller units, their generative business is limited. Therefore, they tend to
choose locations close to other stores. This proximity allows all shops to attract more
customers, which is referred to as “shared business.” This in turn fts consumers’ 
need to relieve time pressure by coupling activities (Kulke 2017). More specifcally,
since the 1960s, retailers have reacted to the changes in consumer needs by coupling
diferent retail formats such as supermarkets, discounters, and other stores with ser-
vices, leisure, and infrastructure at a single location (Figure 12.3b): Shopping centers
usually consist of several magnet stores and several smaller units, while ofering many
additional services (e.g., restaurants, bars, hairdressers, banks, cinemas) (Kulke and
Rauh 2014). Another example is that supermarkets (such as Edeka or Rewe) and
discounters (like Aldi and Lidl) are more and more often co-locating close to each
other ( Jürgens 2013). Consumers can save time by buying a larger number and wide
range of goods with various qualities in one visit (Figure 12.2c). 
In addition, external factors generating fows of people can draw additional con-
sumers to a store. Such “higher frequencies of fows”occur at train stations, airports,
or highway crossings. When stores are located at these nodes, they can proft from
the fow of people, which is called “suscipient business” (Nelson 1958). For con-
sumers, this means that—if shops are located on their way to work—they can also
couple shopping with other activities and reduce commuting times. Accordingly,
since the 1980s, progressively more stores have relocated to areas in proximity to
other stores and close to transport nodes, resulting in a spatial concentration in the
retail landscape (Figures 12.2d and 12.3b). Finally, large train stations and airports are
developing structures similar to shopping centers ( Jenne 2017; Korn 2006). 
Objectifying spatio-temporal coupling in the urban structure 
As can be seen from the previous discussion, various spheres of social life, such 
as family, work, and shopping, have to be coordinated and therefore are coupled 
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the institutional hierarchy, it can merely react and adapt to dominant spatio-temporal 
regimes and resulting consumer demands. However, in doing so, retailing may 
actually drive social and spatial transformations. For example, by introducing new 
retail formats, retailers both reacted to changing consumer demands and facilitated 
families practicing dual-career models. At the level of everyday life, spatio-temporal 
coupling reveals a paradox, namely: While people should theoretically spend more 
time on shopping and commuting, they are in fact doing the contrary. 
By means of urban and transport design, these spatio-temporal regimes are 
objectifed in the urban structure. This coupling in turn slows down the pace 
of social and spatial transformations. In fact, the case of Berlin shows that the 
spatio-temporal regime in place in an urban quarter’s formative phase (Berking and 
Schwenk 2011) has an efect on the retail structure up to the present day (Fülling 
and Hering 2020), thus slowing down the refguration of spaces and economic 
restructuring. This also explains why e-commerce does not have the strong spatial 
impact it should have in theory, because it ofers consumers fexible hours and high 
coupling potential to shop: Since 2000, online shopping has ofered consumers 
easy possibilities to see products, compare prices, and purchase merchandise from 
home or work (Dederichs and Dannenberg 2017; Kulke 2019). However, even 
in 2019, e-commerce’s market share of the total retail turnover in Germany was 
still only 11% (HDE Online-Monitor 2019). The reason for this is partially that 
perishable groceries vary so much in terms of their quality that consumers want to 
see them in real life before they buy them. However, and more importantly, while 
consumers can order online, not everything can be delivered everywhere. Rather, 
consumers can only order goods online from the retailers in their quarter (Hering 
2020). 
Finally, in the long run, spatio-temporal coupling does have an efect, resulting
in market and spatial concentration. A new household division of labor, income
increases, limited time for shopping, better mobility, and new shopping motives
have encouraged a change in the spatial distribution of demand (Kulke 2020).
Small stores in scattered locations and smaller centers are facing a severe reduction
in turnover and often have had to close. Larger stores with a diversifed assort-
ment of articles and shopping agglomerations with several stores have generated
an over-proportional increase in turnover. In most cases, they are located in cen-
tral areas of the urban agglomerations or at de-central locations with good road
connections. 
For future research, this means that diferent spheres of social life are inter-
locked, with the city as the unit of analysis. As there are diferent ways in which 
these spheres are interlocked, future research should compare diferent cities with as 
contrasting household divisions of labor and economies as possible. In addition, this 
type of research should take into account the longue durée, as many of the more 
important spatial transformations are taking place much more slowly than pre-
dicted by most economic theories and the concept of refguration of spaces. Finally, 
in order to better understand the economy, it would be benefcial to explore in 
greater detail how social institutions and objectifed space are entwined. 
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EFFECTS AND THE DYADIC 
INTERACTIONS OF VIRTUAL, 
SOCIAL, AND SPATIAL 
Marco Bastos 
Does social media exist in space? 
The proposition that online activity may be inconsequential to events transpiring 
on the ground stems from the suspicion that virtual communities are not organi-
cally tied to ofine social networks. This assumption claims that online activism 
is inefective, with no follow-through, as aggrieved individuals limit their out-
rage to online communities of acquaintances incapable of efecting change in the 
real world. This critique underpins much of the discussion about clicktivism and 
slacktivism, an assertion passionately advocated by Morozov (2013) and convinc-
ingly argued by Gladwell (2010), though a wealth of studies have since identifed 
signifcant relationships between online activism and developments on the ground 
(Bastos, Mercea, and Charpentier 2015; De Choudhury et al. 2016; Freelon, McIl-
wain, and Clark 2018). While these studies found signifcant associations between 
online and ofine activity, they rarely included granular spatial data accounting for 
the geographic dispersion of online activity. 
The relative absence of granular spatial data is a perennial challenge in Inter-
net research. Online communities are expected to operate by a set of social rules 
as complex as those observed ofine, but multidimensional network data linking 
online activity to geographic areas is rarely available (Bailey et al. 2018). The litera-
ture has thus remained relatively ambiguous about the mechanisms through which 
online social networks interact with their ofine, spatialized counterparts. These 
relationships are difcult to pinpoint and speak to the limited vocabulary available 
to address that which is social but formed largely online and that which is social 
but shaped largely ofine. Additionally, there are situations where it may not be 
possible to extricate spatial social networks from online communities, including 
communities whose members are evenly connected to each other both online and 
ofine (Subrahmanyam et al. 2008). 
DOI: 10.4324/9781003036159-16 
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Space has thus been treated as a secondary force underpinning tie-selection and 
retention in online social networks, notwithstanding the large body of literature 
evincing the bidirectional association between geography and network formation 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). There is also evidence that geo-
graphic proximity afects tie-formation mechanisms associated both with opportu-
nity and preferences, as physical places can be conceived of as a bundle of resources 
and opportunities constrained by spatial contiguity (Glückler 2007). Online com-
munities may incorporate remote strangers who are activated and incorporated as 
organic members of one’s social network (Rainie and Wellman 2012). Similarly, 
the relationship between spatial distance and social media interaction has been 
found to be signifcant (Laniado et al. 2017), with social ties on Twitter largely 
confned to distances shorter than 100 kilometers (Takhteyev, Gruzd, and Wellman 
2012). Other studies have suggested a spillover from in-person interaction patterns 
to online social media, further problematizing the hypothesis about the direction 
of homophily (Bastos, Mercea, and Baronchelli 2018). 
The overlap between ties established online and ofine also depends on the 
criteria employed to defne online activity. Face-to-face interactions invariably take 
place ofine, but phone networks, or the graphs derived from who talks to whom 
on the phone, can be defned as online networks despite the physical constraints 
imposed by the infrastructure of telephone wires and the higher billing rate associ-
ated with long-distance landline calls. Other disputed examples include the rela-
tionship one has with parents living far away; what was previously a network with 
clear physical and spatial boundaries can transition to a place that is largely virtual. 
As such, while one may communicate with their parents online, they invariably 
fall into a diferent category compared with one’s Twitter followership. Indeed, 
the perennial tension between spatial and social can be traced to seminal studies 
on dining-table partnerships coded by Moreno (1953), as the seating choices of 
students in a classroom were also spatially and segregationally patterned. 
But the diferences between face-to-face and online interaction are usually 
straightforward, and never so clear-cut as when social media bots are activated. 
Due to the high overhead involved in growing sockpuppet accounts, botnets are 
often set to retweet and comment on other bots’ messages, thereby triggering 
message cascades read by absolutely no actual person. Vast portions of the social 
media supply chain are conceivably colonized by automated posting protocols and 
quasi-autonomous parasites entirely detached from the geographies inhabited by 
users. Conversely, infuence operations often resort to zombie accounts, promptly 
revamped with stolen profle photos, to feed communities where online interac-
tion may depart radically from what is observed ofine (Bastos and Farkas 2019). 
Twitterbots are nonetheless a rather extreme case, which may include sophisticated 
networks combining human and automated accounts to manipulate public delib-
eration. The worlds of real users and automated protocols feed from each other and 
it is not always possible to separate them. 
The sudden outbreak of the COVID-19 global pandemic has paradoxically 
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and ofine social networks. The enforced policy of social distancing required 
businesses and governments to manage their workfow online, with e-commerce 
struggling to handle the unprecedented demand. As movie theaters suspended 
operations, Netfix and other streaming platforms registered record numbers of new 
customers. Universities and schools implemented measures to stream lectures and 
upload course materials to teaching platforms. Real life suddenly became detached 
from the physical world, with social relationships carried out over WhatsApp, 
work meetings moving to Zoom, and friends and colleagues socializing on Google 
Hangouts. This arrangement, however provisional, foregrounded the gregarious 
nature of human life and the perennial need to interact with real people in physical 
spaces. While the outbreak rendered network technologies instrumental in carry-
ing out routine and critical work tasks, it also expounded the limitations of online 
interaction compared with the multisensorial, time-dependent, and irrevocably 
space-constrained social network interactions that take place ofine. 
Online communities are likely to continue triggering interactions that depart 
from those observed in face-to-face communities beyond the COVID-19 out-
break. This is particularly the case in view of the growing algorithmization of 
community governance implemented by social platforms. Smartphones and 
Internet-capable household devices continuously store individual trace data in the 
cloud, which is imperfectly processed by machine-learning algorithms with limited 
precision and recall, trained with incomplete datasets, and tailored for purposes that 
are indistinguishable from those of the company collecting the data. By aggregating 
digital trace data at individual and group levels, social platforms can ofer advertis-
ers granular targets benchmarked with incomplete data and limited precision. The 
business model is nonetheless sound, as imprecisions measured at the individual 
level are likely ofset at the group level; yet, these imprecisions and incompleteness 
are then built into the system recursively. Eventually, social groups identifed by and 
modeled with digital trace data can take on a life of their own on social platforms, 
with niche subcommunities that only partially match their physical counterparts. 
Network spillover effect 
The dyadic interactions between virtual ↔ spatial, virtual ↔ social, and social
↔ spatial refect the largely unexplored connection between the online and
ofine dimensions of social activity. These dyads can reveal intricate relationships
between physical ties and online interactions encapsulated in the problem of the
directionality in social relationships, a sociological debate about the causal direc-
tion of homophily: the phenomenon that like-minded people with similar social
characteristics are more likely to be connected with each other, be it online or
ofine. Causality may of course move in either direction, but previous research
has focused mostly on the hypothesis that similarity causes interaction (McPher-
son, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001), likely a refection of the divide separating
social network analysis, leveraging social media data, and spatial analysis, explor-
ing geographic data. 
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This is unfortunate because the primary and secondary efects associated with 
the scalable deployment of social technologies are situated at the junction of net-
works that are simultaneously social and spatial, but whose social/spatial rela-
tionship is not symmetric. Individuals can partake in online communities and be 
exposed to information diets with little similarity to their ofine surroundings. 
At the limit, ideological orientation, identity formation, and feelings of belong-
ing can be pieced together depending on the networks to which individuals fnd 
themselves embedded. Perceived social memberships based on age, race, income, 
and location can be reinforced, but also potentially rewired, as one connects with 
social networks online that may difer from their proximate communities. Network 
spillover efects happen not only when face-to-face networks are replaced with 
social media, but particularly when the embedding in online networks spills over 
to geographic communities. While these interactions are not trivial, the network 
spillover efect is relatively simple: seemingly unrelated social activities online and 
ofine reinforce each other. 
Network spillover is associated with neighborhood efects that were frst 
described in the seminal studies of Butler and Stoke (1969) about the 1964 and 
1966 United Kingdom General Elections. The election cycle consolidated the 
Labour Party’s majority through a process of partisan reinforcement: the tendency 
of prevailing opinions to draw additional support to become dominant in local 
areas. The geographic or neighborhood component of network spillover was 
mapped by Miller (1977), for whom contact, largely structured by family, choice 
of friends, social characteristics, and locality such as neighborhoods, is a condi-
tion for consensus, with patterns of contact being predictive of political consensus 
within high-contact groups. The neighborhood efect is perhaps best described by 
Miller’s (1977) assertion that locality is a better predictor of how people vote than 
their social characteristics. 
Spillover efects are thus intrinsically linked to neighborhood efects due to 
homophilic interdependencies tying spatial and social cohesion. Locational deci-
sions involve a considerable degree of social selection, whereby people choose to 
live in neighborhoods populated by people similar to themselves. This results in 
social networks that are geographically delimited and socially homogenous, not 
just in their socio-economic and demographic composition, but also ideologi-
cally, behaviorally, and culturally. Although geographic constraints and ideological 
homogeneity mutually reinforce each other, neighbors may come across attitudes 
and behaviors diferent from those held within the group. Particularly those hold-
ing a minority view in the group are more likely to come across new information, 
including new ideas, behaviors, and ideologies. New information may then rapidly 
break into the group majority, as social interactions are optimized to negotiate, and 
thereby spread, attitudes and behavior. 
Johnston and Pattie (2011) provide an account of how neighborhood efects 
can be further amplifed by other network externalities, a process that may trigger 
feedback loops and spillovers. For instance, if a political debate between individu-
als holding opposing views about the best candidate in an election can persuade 
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people to reconsider their own positions (conversion), then any social network 
with a majority of the population supporting a given candidate is more likely 
to switch to the minority candidate than the other way around. This contradicts 
the assumption of research on opinion evolution, but it is conceptually accurate 
because voting preferences are socially structured not only by the characteristics of 
the voter, but also by those with whom the voter discusses politics. Contact with 
voters in a given area infuence not only the individuals directly connected, but also 
others in the neighborhood (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). On the other hand, 
and perhaps paradoxically, this process would render the majority view within 
the network even more prevalent, as dominance would be greater than expected 
from knowledge of the individuals’ personal characteristics alone. If neighborhood 
efects can be observed whenever conversation networks are spatially constrained, 
then the political complexion of areas should be more polarized than their social 
composition implies. 
Spillover efects are traditionally associated with exogenous policy interventions 
on subjects who were not originally targeted by the intervention, but who happen 
to be connected to those in the target population. Social media microtargeting can 
thus spill over to actors in local social environments who were not targeted by the 
message themselves. In this scenario, the spillover efect is the contagion efect on 
actors due to interventions targeting their friends. In contrast, endogenous peer 
efects stem directly from peers. In other word, actors in a network infuence each 
other without being subjected to any microtargeting or intervention. While the 
source of exogenous efects is situated outside of the network, in reality it is dif-
fcult to separate endogenous from exogenous peer efects, as many of the endog-
enous peer efects could originally be generated by external forces unobservable 
to researchers (An 2011). Likewise, an exogenous peer efect such as microtarget-
ing can be further compounded by endogenous efects such as the neighborhood 
efect, so that it is not always possible to untangle nested peer efects (Dufo, Dupas, 
and Kremer 2011). 
These problems have long been studied in research on opinion evolution that 
highlights the non-linear patterns through which opinions and social change 
emerge from system interactions. While opinion dynamics progress fairly linearly 
over time, they often lead to nonlinearities and complex dynamic behavior, of 
which clustering (i.e., “bubbles”) and the polarization of opinions are common 
outcomes (Nowak, Szamrej, and Latané 1990; Latané 1996). In other words, while 
changing public opinion is a process governed by intrinsic dynamics, the transition 
to a new prevailing opinion is likely linked to changes in extrinsic control factors 
that afect intrinsic dynamics (Nowak, Lewenstein, and Frejlak 1996). The negotia-
tion of social values ofine can be reinforced online, and vice-versa, thereby trig-
gering network spillover efects and feedback loops typical of regulatory processes 
with a high density of connections. 
In our study on echo chambers during the Brexit debate (Bastos, Mercea, and 
Baronchelli 2018), we found that social media echo chambers actually refect 
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contradict the prevailing narrative on echo chambers, arguing that social media 
interactions lead users to engage with political content that resonates with them 
(Sunstein 2007). The ideological clustering observed in politically homogeneous 
echo chambers would stand in contrast to the diversity of opinions found in ofine, 
face-to-face interactions. Transposed to the network of tweets about the UK–EU 
membership referendum, and following the prevailing narrative in the literature, 
we would have expected to fnd echo chambers as a communication efect result-
ing from online discussions alone. Conversely, we did not expect the geographic 
location of users to play a signifcant role in politically homogenous communica-
tion, as echo chambers reportedly result from social media interactions unafected 
by geographic space. 
Indeed, social anxieties surrounding echo chambers posit that social media is 
another force driving political polarization (Bessi et al. 2015), with a substantive 
body of observational evidence showing the role of social media in stratifying 
users across information sources (Conover et al. 2011). While the rapid growth of 
online social networks has fostered an expectation of higher exposure to a variety 
of news and politically diverse information (Messing and Westwood 2014), it has 
also increased the appetite for selective exposure in highly polarized social envi-
ronments (Wojcieszak 2010), with the sharing of controversial news items being 
particularly unlikely in these contexts (Bright 2016). The flter bubble hypothesis 
encapsulated these claims by postulating that social platforms deploy algorithms 
designed to quantify and monetize social interaction, narrowly confning it to a 
bubble algorithmically populated with information closely matching user prefer-
ences (Pariser 2012). 
The results of our study show that although most interactions are within a 
200-km radius, echo chamber communication predominantly takes place in 
neighboring areas within a 50-kilometer radius. However, the geographic trend 
of echo chamber communication was diferent between the Leave and Remain 
campaigns, with pro-Leave messages covering much shorter distances compared 
with pro-Remain tweets. The trend was also reversed for non-echo chamber com-
munication, which covered shorter distances on the Remain side. In other words, 
Leave-campaign messages were chiefy exchanged within ideologically and geo-
graphically proximate echo chambers. Although echo chambers also prevailed on 
the Remain side, the trend was inverted: as the distance between the sender and 
receiver increased, echo chambers became more common and covered increasingly 
larger areas compared to non-echo chamber communication. This reverse trend 
was captured by the mean distance covered by Leave messages, at 199 km for echo 
chambers and 234 km for non-echo chambers (x̃ = 168 and x̃ = 208, respectively). 
For Remain tweets, inversely, the mean distance of echo chambers was 238 km 
versus 204 km for non-echo chambers (x̃ = 209 and x̃ = 184, respectively). 
The study indicates that online echo chambers result from conversations that 
spill over from in-person interactions and call into question the assumption that 
echo chamber communication is driven by online interaction alone, suggesting 
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also appear to confrm the hypothesis that similarity causes interaction, as politically 
homogenous network interactions would be triggered by or from geographical 
proximity. Correspondingly, studies have found that radicalization on YouTube 
stems from the same factors that persuade individuals to change their minds in 
real life—that is to say, absorbing and interiorizing new information, but at scale 
(Munger and Phillips 2019). Instead of depending on algorithms that increasingly 
radicalize audiences, political media on YouTube would be driven by supply and 
demand, with the increased supply of right-wing videos tapping a latent demand 
previously constrained by limited ofer ofine. 
Online–offine coordination 
The extent to which online social networks overlap with the boundaries of their 
ofine communities is of course an empirical question hindered only by the chal-
lenges in collecting relational data that can be mapped onto geographic boundaries 
while also preserving metrics of online activity. In subsequent attempts to address 
the problem, we validated the use of social media signals to model the ideologi-
cal coordinates underpinning the Brexit debate. Geographically enriched Twitter 
data was coupled with a machine learning algorithm that identifed tweets along 
the ideological space of populism, economism, globalism, and nationalism. The 
granular spatial data amassed for this study allowed us to map the political value 
space of users tweeting the referendum onto Parliamentary Constituencies (Bastos 
and Mercea 2018). 
The study required the extensive collection of Twitter data supplemented by 
multiple queries to Twitter API to identify the location of users tweeting the UK– 
EU membership referendum. After adding geographic markers to the database, 
we calculated the ideological inclination of users and mapped them onto voting 
constituencies in England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The research 
was informed by suggestions of a geographical and socio-demographic patterning 
of voting preferences in the referendum explored in the literature (Rennie Short 
2016; Hanretty 2017). The geography of the vote, it was proposed, refected a 
socio-economic imbalance between an afuent metropolitan elite clustered around 
London who voted to remain and parts of England and Wales that were economi-
cally worse of and voted to leave the EU. Following this line of inquiry, the politi-
cal geography of the vote was unpicked at the level of local authority areas (Becker, 
Fetzer, and Novy 2016) to assess the extent to which users tweeting nationalist 
and populist content would overlap across geographic enclaves—and conversely, 
whether such patterns could be observed in relation to users tweeting globalist or 
economist content. 
While we succeeded in identifying the geographic location of 60% of users
who tweeted the referendum, a considerable portion of their locations could
be identifed only up to city level, but not postcode level. Upon identifying
the location of users, we removed user accounts located outside the United
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reduced the database to 565,028 messages or 11% of all collected messages.
Despite the multiple eforts to maximize the collection of geographic informa-
tion about users, research seeking to explore the overlap between online and
ofine networks must contend with smaller data samples. In this study, the
various sampling techniques applied to the data, particularly the geographic
rendering of user locations up to postcode level, reduced the universe of col-
lected tweets to only 11% of the data. 
Another challenge in this type of research consists of defning the unit of analy-
sis. In this specifc case, we selected council wards and parliamentary constituen-
cies because they provided optimal granularity relative to online and ofine data 
sources. Twitter data was aggregated frst at user level and then at constituency 
level, which was the unit of analysis employed in the study. The resulting dataset 
included multiple streams of Twitter data consolidated into a single database of 
online and ofine activity at constituency level. A scaled Poisson regression model 
was applied to incorporate demographic information from lower-level geogra-
phies, thereby aggregating the results at the ward or constituency level, along with 
voting estimates at the level of council wards for authorities that did not disclose 
the results at such granular levels (Huyen Do, Thomas-Agnan, and Vanhems 2015; 
Hanretty 2017). The resulting referendum database was relatively granular with 
data down to the ward level in England, Scotland, and Wales and Local Authority 
District in Northern Ireland. 
Mapping geographically rich social media data onto census area or electoral dis-
tricts is another challenge due to the hierarchical subdivision of UK local govern-
ment areas into various sub-authority areas and lower levels such as enumeration 
districts. As council wards comprise the most granular level to which we could 
retrieve results or estimates for the referendum vote, we mapped referendum-
related Twitter activity to this unit of geographic analysis. User locations were 
geocoded and reverse-geocoded to match postcodes to wards and Parliamentary 
Constituencies using the database provided by National Statistics Postcode Lookup 
(ONS Geography 2011). Twitter users were thus simultaneously matched to the 
felds OSLAUA, OSWARD, and PCON11CD (Local Authority, Ward, and Con-
stituency codes, respectively). The frst feld includes Local Authority District 
(LAD), Unitary Authority (UA), Metropolitan District (MD), London Borough 
(LB), Council Area (CA), and District Council Area (DCA). 
Upon geocoding the self-reported location of users, we found that only 30% 
of them were based in the UK, with 19% of users who participated in the Brexit 
debate based in the United States and nearly 30% in other EU countries. This is of 
course another marker of the diferences in political discourse online and ofine, 
as the former allows individuals from diferent locations to participate, albeit in a 
restricted capacity, in the public discourse on an issue circumscribed to the UK. 
Also surprising was the large geographic spread of the British Twitter userbase, 
with London accounting for 14%, Lancashire 7%, Kent, Essex, West Yorkshire, 
and West Midlands ranging 3–4%, and South Yorkshire, Hertfordshire, Cheshire, 
Merseyside, Surrey, and Hampshire at 2% each. Taken together, each of these 
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geographic groups are of comparable size to London in the share of users who 
tweeted the referendum. 
The results somewhat upset our expectations. Apart from London, globalist 
messages were relatively underwhelming. Nationalism was indeed quintessential to 
the referendum debate, with three-quarters of messages (74%) displaying national-
ist sentiments, as opposed to 26% that expressed globalist values such as interna-
tional cooperation. We did not fnd that economically fragile northern England, 
an area generally supportive of Brexit, was any more likely to embrace nationalist 
content. In fact, it was Remain-backing Scotland that appeared as a fertile ground 
for nationalism. Though nearly 40% of tweets contained populist sentiments, these 
messages were concentrated in a small number of constituencies. In only 10% of 
the constituencies did populist sentiments prevail, compared with economic issues, 
and in less than 5% did globalist sentiments dominate. All 72 constituencies with 
overwhelming support for Leave presented predominantly nationalist sentiments. 
Conversely, only 17 of these constituencies had a Twitter debate predominantly 
defned by populist sentiments, with 55 of them discussing mostly the economic 
outlook. 
Conclusions 
One possible explanation for the conficting evidence on the geography of echo 
chambers is that politically homogeneous communication may refect the imprint 
of deliberation driven by ofine social networks. These homophilic preferences 
can coexist with social media platforms that provide ideologically diverse networks 
(Barberá 2014). As such, the boundaries of one’s network can be simultaneously 
permeated by echo chambers rooted in ofine relationships while being exposed 
to competing opinions on polarizing topics that circulate on social media. Similar 
associational efects have been reported in the literature (Laniado et al. 2017), sug-
gesting that the geographic dependence of echo chambers would result from the 
physical clustering of fundamentally disparate social networks. 
Instead of incorporating remote strangers who are activated and incorporated as 
organic members of one’s social network (Rainie and Wellman 2012), the results 
suggest a spillover from in-person conversations to online social media interac-
tion. In other words, echo chambers connect homophilous dependencies in physi-
cal social networks that are relatively independent of social media activity. This is 
also consistent with the diferences in echo-chambers observed in the Leave and 
Remain campaigns, as the demographic makeup of these subgraphs is considerably 
diferent. In other words, the signifcant geographic variation found in the data 
would be driven not only by the locations where the two groups were clustered, 
but also the social positions embedded in the geographical location of Leave and 
Remain constituencies. 
The diferent social positions occupied by Leavers and Remainers are consis-
tent with the geographical splintering of the country expressed in the referendum 
and refect the socio-economic imbalances separating urban loci of political and 
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economic power, clustered around London, which voted Remain, and economi-
cally fragile parts of England and Wales, where the Leave vote prevailed. With 
city-dwellers spending more time shopping and exploring areas outside their 
neighborhoods, as well as living and working in hubs of the national and global 
economy (Storper 2018), it is unsurprising that the resulting social networks of 
Remain urbanites would cover larger geographic areas. The distances covered by 
their interactions should likewise be lengthier compared with those inhabiting 
rural or low-density areas of the country. This is of course only one aspect of the 
intricate relationship connecting existing physical ties and online interactions, with 
others likely at play (Takhteyev, Gruzd, and Wellman 2012; Laniado et al. 2017). 
In summary, while research on the directionality of homophily between online 
and ofine social networks is still forthcoming, there is growing evidence for the 
spatial dependencies of social media. This body of work also contradicts Facebook’s 
assumption that social platforms necessarily strengthen existing communities; that 
they invariably help individuals to come together online and ofine; or that they 
enable groups to form completely new communities that transcend physical loca-
tion (Zuckerberg 2018). Indeed, the assumption that social platforms merely con-
nect individuals online to reinforce their physical communities tends to ignore the 
complex and multidirectional association between geography and tie-selection and 
retention in online networks. It also fails to consider that the difusion of informa-
tion on social media platforms may difer from patterns observed ofine, and that 
these interactions can make or break the fabric of society. In other words, while 
interaction across social platforms can evolve in the absence of physical ties, the 
network externalities arising from interactions developed online may impinge on 
our very sense of what is real ofine. 
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TALKING TO MY COMMUNITY 
ELSEWHERE 
Bringing together networked public spheres 
and the concept of translocal communities 
Daniel Maier, Daniela Stoltenberg, 
Barbara Pfetsch, and Annie Waldherr 
Dynamic notions of two concepts: space and public sphere 
The concept of the public sphere, which ties political decision-making to (medi-
ated) public debates, has signifcantly changed with the advancement of digitiza-
tion. Thirty years ago, the reach of public debates was tied legally and economically 
to territories. Political information and opinions were broadcast almost exclusively 
through legacy media. The transmission of mass-mediated messages was closely 
related to spaces that overlapped with political and administrative units at the local, 
regional, or national levels. Media organizations, journalists, and socio-economic 
elite speakers constituted the mass-mediated arenas for these territories. Therefore, 
it is no surprise that, back then, most researchers investigated public spheres within 
national territories. 
Drawing on the work of Benkler (2006) and Neuberger (2009), we refer to 
public spheres as heterogeneous and overlapping mediated networks of publicly 
communicating persons, organizations, and institutions. In contrast to the terri-
torially aligned public spheres of the past, these mainly digital networked pub-
lic spheres elude simple territorial attachments. The communicative connections 
among humans on the web and on social media transcend the borders of cities, 
regions, and nation states. 
The advent of digital communication not only implies a structural change
of public debate. Networked public spheres are also less centered on the com-
munication of mass-mediated organizations (Benkler 2006). As a consequence,
they are also much less centered on territories. However, their spatial dimen-
sion is no less important than that of their predecessors; it just does not ft the
rigid territorial notion of space. Rather, we argue that we are better served
by also thinking of public spheres in terms of the spatial fgure (Löw 2020) of
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themselves and their social goods, network spaces shift the perspective to the
connections between these elements, even across distances (Löw 2020, 154,
159; Mol and Law 1994, 643). 
To understand and describe the spatial confgurations of networked public
spheres, we need to revisit the nature of social media communication. We
argue that the concept of communities is crucial for this purpose. Moreover,
we must acknowledge that the dwindling importance of the mass media and
their broadcasting territories is accompanied by the increased importance of
direct communicative connections between social actors, who are located in
places. That is, they are located in (geographic) locations, which are ascribed
meaning and identity and which relate to other places (Löw 2020, 156). Com-
municative relations between social actors span the distance between their
places and may be considered translocal. Here, translocality refers to the com-
municative construction of relations between (distant) localities through media
(Hepp 2009a, 330). 
On the social web (i.e., on social media platforms and in other online environ-
ments where people communicate with each other), individual users and collective 
actors assemble into social communication networks, which form larger commu-
nities with distinct translocal interaction patterns. Communities are networks of 
social actors with a shared imagination of their communion (Anderson 2006). 
Ties among members of imagined communities are based on a common sense of 
identity, such as a common language and/or socio-cultural identity (e.g., ethnic 
communities), a shared migration history (e.g., diasporic communities), interest in 
a common topic or political issue (e.g., issue communities), or afective reactions 
to events (e.g., afective communities). 
Increased mobility, Internet-based communication, and social media platforms 
in particular have elevated the translocal potential of communities. Thus, we argue 
that the study of public communication should consider the translocal potential 
of communities as a signifying feature of networked public spheres. This does not 
mean that local or national fgures have become irrelevant. Rather, we argue that 
communities with distinct translocal and fuid interaction patterns provide a use-
ful and augmented description for the spatial anchoring of public communication 
processes on the social web. 
Our argument is organized into three sections. First, we explain why territo-
rial notions have become inadequate when researching networked public spheres. 
Second, we argue that (imagined) communities of users constitute the spatially 
anchored social underpinnings of networked public spheres on the social web. 
Third, we explore how digitization has led communities to increase their mobility 
and become more translocal, and we conclude that public sphere research should 
integrate the translocal potential of communities as an important analytical cat-
egory. We also understand the digitization-induced spatial restructuring of public 
spheres as one aspect of the meta-process of what Knoblauch and Löw (2017, 3) 
coin “spatial re-fguration of the social world” (i.e., “a fundamental shift in our 
understanding of space”). 
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Territorial notions in public sphere research 
In social research, the public sphere is a basic category used to understand processes 
of will formation in society. The public sphere denotes an open communication 
system in which issues and opinions are discussed publicly and which allows the 
members of a society to observe and participate in the deliberation of issues and 
the formation of public opinion (Neidhardt 1994, 7; Habermas 1996, 360). Its 
general functions are openness toward issues and opinions, their validation through 
the public exchange of arguments, and the orientation of society on what is at 
stake (Neidhardt 1994, 8–10). In Habermas’ (1996, 356–357) writings, the public 
sphere is normatively bound to democracy since the issues and opinions that are 
processed in the public sphere stem from the lifeworlds of the citizens and are made 
salient through communication as an indication of what should be tackled in the 
political system. 
Even though Habermas (1996, 360) talks about the public sphere as the “social 
space generated in communicative action,” the term space has mostly been used 
metaphorically and has not been a focus in much of the public sphere research 
(Wallner and Adolf 2014). However, due to its normative functionality for democ-
racy (Habermas 1996), the public sphere concept is mostly and implicitly aligned 
with the boundaries of national political territories (Pfetsch, Heft, and Knüpfer 
2019; Volkmer 2014). This presupposed alignment may have been a consensus 
for traditional, mass-mediated public spheres because media systems and markets 
tended to be structured along political and linguistic borders. However, research 
into online public spheres has also adopted these national boundaries. For instance, 
research on social media communication often maps Twitterspheres or blogospheres 
at the country level (e.g., Bruns and Enli 2018; Ausserhofer and Maireder 2013). 
Meanwhile, other studies have focused on urban public spheres (e.g., von Sal-
dern 2013). Moreover, over the last two decades, the concept of transnational 
public spheres has been established with the progress of integration in the European 
Union and the search for European public spheres (e.g., Koopmans and Statham 
2010). 
Theoretical discussions propose that digital public spheres transcend the national 
scope with a potentially global reach (Castells 2008). In line with Volkmer’s (2014, 
6) critique that public communication has become largely “disembedded” from 
national territories, just like the “core assets of public ‘civil’ culture [and] public 
institutions,” this body of literature moves the public sphere beyond the scope of 
nation states. This is done explicitly in reference to the expanded communicative 
possibilities provided by the Internet (e.g., Pfetsch, Heft, and Knüpfer 2019). 
However, even while altering the geographic scope—shrinking it down to the 
level of cities or extending it to whole continents and beyond—these public sphere 
concepts arguably remain bound to a territorial notion of space. We argue that the 
merely territorial fgure is no longer appropriate for grasping the shape and extent 
of digital public spheres. Rather, the network, with its focus on relations between 
distant elements (Löw 2020; Mol and Law 1994), is a more ftting spatial fgure. 
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The nature of networked public spheres stands in stark contrast to territory-based 
concepts. The core features of networked public spheres are digital communicative 
connections among social actors, which—as we will describe in the next section— 
quite naturally transcend the borders of cities, regions, and nation states (Hampton 
and Wellman 2003). 
The inclusion of social media in many people’s communication patterns has 
changed the structure of public communication and implies a new spatiality of 
public debate. Findings from existing research foreground that the most signif-
icant ties in social media communication connect the cosmopolitan centers of 
the world (Leetaru et al. 2013; Lin, Halavais, and Zhang 2007) and constitute a 
global network. At the same time, we still witness that most communication takes 
place within relatively short distances inside the same metropolitan area (Takhteyev, 
Gruzd, and Wellman 2012). The literature corroborates a clear spatial pattern: met-
ropolitan clusters of tightly connected users emerge simultaneously with long tie 
connections between urban centers. 
Imagined communities as social underpinnings 
of networked public spheres 
In social terms, recent literature understands digital communication networks as 
the outcome of community-building processes (Stephansen and Couldry 2014). 
Social media communication structures represent not only “interpersonal commu-
nication, but also how people orient themselves to public life” (Swart, Peters, and 
Broersma 2018, 4329). These networks refect individual users’ sense of belonging 
and may be interpreted as support structures in people’s everyday lives (Gruzd, 
Wellman, and Takhteyev 2011). 
According to Gruzd, Wellman, and Takhteyev (2011), social media networks 
feature the characteristics of various community concepts (Anderson 2006; Jones 
1997; McMillan and Chavis 1986). As the concept of community is normative 
and contested (Bourke 2010; Wellman 1979), controversial debates and diverging 
traditions of theorizing the concept have developed (see Blokland 2017, 15–41; 
Jones 1995). While tracing this development goes beyond the scope of this chapter, 
a short conceptualization can provide clarity. 
Community has traditionally been a vital category in sociology and urban studies 
and is marked by two features: relationality and spatiality (Bourke 2010). In terms 
of relationality, it denotes both the result of social interactions between individuals 
and a relationship between individuals and society, driven by a desire for belonging 
(Bourke 2010). In terms of spatiality, the concept of community was traditionally 
thought of as distinctly local, namely, as “a set of social relationships operating 
within a specifc boundary, location, or territory” (Bourke 2010, 171). This ter-
ritorially bound notion of community has, however, been challenged. According 
to Wellman (1979, 1202), the notion of community as a solidarity group in a given 
local territory may obscure the search for true communities in present-day societ-
ies. Instead of focusing on local and close-knit groups, Wellman (1979) proposes 
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looking for the sociable and supportive primary ties of individuals without being 
preoccupied about their location. In other words, “community is based on sociable 
and supportive social relations, and not on physical locality” (Gruzd, Wellman, and 
Takhteyev 2011, 1298). 
That does not mean, however, that physical localities are insignifcant for com-
munities. Empirically, people maintain multiple, highly individualized, and geo-
graphically dispersed personal community networks (Chayko 2015). At the same 
time, “neighborly relationships remain important, but as a minority of ties within 
the overall network” (Hampton and Wellman 2003, 278–279). Against this back-
drop, we defne communities as follows: 
Communities consist of far-flung, kinship, workplace, friendship, interest 
group, and neighborhood ties that concatenate to form networks provid-
ing sociability, aid, support, and social control. Communities are usually not 
groups, but are social networks that are sparsely knit, loosely bounded, and 
far flung. 
(Hampton and Wellman 2003, 278) 
The advent of the digital age marks a breaking point for how we conceive of 
communities. The rise of digital communication has facilitated the emergence of 
widespread interest communities (Hampton and Wellman 2003, 281). The “space-
liberating power of the Internet” allows people to connect regardless of borders 
and distance, potentially on a global scale (Hampton and Wellman 2003, 282). 
Again, this does not mean that place becomes insignifcant. The potential to main-
tain long-distance connections must not veil the importance of physical places. 
Connections to others living in the same area or within close geographical reach 
(Gruzd, Wellman, and Takhteyev 2011; Hampton and Wellman 2003) or connec-
tions between metropolitan areas (Lin, Halavais, and Zhang. 2007) remain impor-
tant parts of personal networks. 
Social connections in personal networks are not fxed or given; they are invigo-
rated in living practices and manifest in the details of everyday life (Blokland 2017, 
2). These manifestations refect that people value their communities and that “they 
hold imaginations of what they are” (Blokland 2017, 2). Anderson (2006) argues 
that shared imaginations are crucial for communities. Members of large-scale com-
munities, such as nations, “will never know most of their fellow-members, . . . yet 
in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 2006, 6). 
Gruzd, Wellman, and Takhteyev (2011, 1297–1298) transfer Anderson’s concept 
of imagined communities to social media networks; users cannot know everyone 
in their virtual surroundings but are aware of the presence of other users as either 
their imagined audience when they write a message or their sources of information 
when they read their timeline. 
Although not usually explicitly referring to the community concept, social 
media studies abound with references to diferent kinds of cohesive networks gath-
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For example, a branch of social movement research studying new forms of collec-
tive action online has widely acknowledged the capacity of social media platforms 
to organize actors interested in specifc topics and to create so-called issue networks 
(McKelvey, DiGarzia, and Rojas 2014). 
Common interest in issues bears a strong potential for creating common
identities and issue communities; this has been shown, for instance, in the
LGBT community in London (Linfoot 2018). Likewise, although protest
movements take place at specific sites (Earl et al. 2013), they are often con-
nected translocally via social media (Bastos and Mercea 2016). Via trending
hashtags, such as #MeToo (Mendes, Ringrose, and Keller 2018) or #Ferguson
( Jackson and Foucault Welles 2016), these movements have formed counter-
public spheres. 
As framing devices, hashtags not only focus attention on certain issues but also 
ofer venues through which to share emotions and sentiment, creating afective 
publics which “assemble around media and platforms that invite afective attun-
ement, support afective investment, and propagate afectively charged expression” 
(Papacharissi 2016, 308). Such afective communities have been observed in the 
aftermath of events, such as hurricanes (Shelton et al. 2014) or terrorist attacks (Lin 
and Margolin 2014), when people from all over the world connect to express their 
sympathy and emotional support. 
Finally, in a world of digital communication and mobility, language and
ethnicity are still crucial to identities and maintaining a sense of belonging in
ethnic communities (Christiansen 2019); with respect to shared migration his-
tories, they are also crucial to deterritorialized diasporic communities (Hepp
2009a). 
All of these examples constitute imagined communities gathering around
shared identities, interests, or experiences. Their network infrastructure bears
an inscribed potential for translocality. However, communicative relationships
on social media platforms often have their origin in real-world social relation-
ships (Ellison, Steinfeld, and Lampe 2007), which tend to develop among
geographically proximate individuals. Proximity increases the likelihood of
face-to-face interaction and communication and allows individuals to explore
what they might have in common (Monge and Contractor 2003, 227–228). The
proliferation of digital media led to a refguration of communication networks,
simultaneously strengthening local and distant relations. It helped “increase our
global reach but also strengthen[ed] local communities and geographically dis-
tributed, but culturally contiguous, ‘diasporas’” (Monge and Contractor 2003,
231). Although social media platforms such as Facebook or Twitter are not
bound to geopolitical borders, a large share of the interactions between users
still takes place within a proximate local or regional radius (Takhteyev, Gruzd,
and Wellman 2012). Consequently, communicative relationships between users
who are geographically distant from one another are comparatively rare. In
the next section, we argue that the distribution of communicative relations
resembles the structures of translocal communities. 
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Translocal potentials of communities 
in networked public spheres 
Where public sphere theory still largely remains bound to territorial notions of 
space, it has much to learn from community research. This trajectory of investiga-
tion highlights that, while the local remains a powerful category, shared identities 
and support structures now extend into more complex, translocal patterns. Blok-
land (2017) argues that communities feature specifc roots and routes, which means 
that sociable and supportive ties among people are anchored in places, while also 
emphasizing the connections between them. Etymologically, the term translocality 
denotes the continued relevance of the local, but the prefx trans shifts the analytical 
focus to connections and in-betweenness (Hepp 2004, 163). 
Translocality may be interpreted as the result of both globalization and digitiza-
tion. Globalization typically describes an increase in the mobility of people, goods, 
and services. This mobility implies growing migration, commuting, and traveling 
for work and leisure for individuals and those within their network. Simultane-
ously, digitization enables “communicative relations across certain localities” (Hepp 
2009a, 330) to an unprecedented degree. While the traditional notion of commu-
nity used to be more local, digital media “allow us to communicate beyond our 
primary location, which suggests [that] geographical distance becomes less impor-
tant for the formation and maintenance of attachments” (Wehden and Stoltenberg 
2019, 1402). Translocality, therefore, focuses on interlinkages between places but 
does not assume a diminished importance of place: “The always-on, always acces-
sible network produces a broad set of changes to our concept of place, linking spe-
cifc locales to a global continuum and thereby transforming our sense of proximity 
and distance” (Varnelis and Friedberg 2008, 15). Actors link relevant places com-
municatively, cognitively, and emotionally (Lingenberg 2014). From this follows 
the notion of translocal communities. 
According to Hepp (2009b), communities emerge from processes of “translocal 
communicative thickening.” In that sense, the term translocal denotes that the local 
continues to be the prime anchor point of an individual’s lifeworld. Communica-
tive densifcations, however, are increasingly oriented toward other specifc places 
(or individuals in other places) beyond geopolitical territories. 
In line with this argument, we propose that networked public spheres often 
emerge from such communities. Of course, these communities are not congru-
ent with public spheres, and many communities do not constitute public spheres 
per se. For a public sphere to emerge from an imagined community, in addition 
to a shared identifcation and a generalized communicative densifcation between 
its members, activation around an issue is required. However, if communities are 
spatially distributed following ethnic, commercial, political, and religious com-
munitizations (Hepp 2009b), then they will strongly shape where and for whom 
an event becomes an issue. Through the formation of translocal ties, they therefore 
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Concluding remarks 
Networked public spheres provide a framework for considering the emergence, 
meaning, and consequences of digital public communication and connections. 
However, due to the lack of theorization, the concept either neglects the spatial 
dimension of public communication on the social web or adopts inappropriate 
territorial notions. We have laid out an argument for integrating the notion of 
translocal communities into this line of research. 
Under conditions of increased global mobility and connections, translocal commu-
nities form around shared notions of identity, interest, and experience. Digital media
enable this process by providing opportunity structures for members of these imagined
communities to connect with and potentially support one another. We argue that
these communities are the social underpinnings of many networked public spheres,
as they can become activated around shared issues. Conceiving of communities as the
social foundation of public spheres not only elevates the importance of space but also
emphasizes that social mechanisms are a driving force of structure in networked pub-
lic spheres. Thus, the underlying spatial fgure of networked public spheres is better
described as a translocal network of places rather than a contiguous territory. 
Translocality therefore proves to be a valuable lens for the study of (networked) pub-
lic spheres. It is our conviction that it can help us more fully understand spatially struc-
tured but non-locally bound communication phenomena, such as international protest
movements, social media trends, or discourses on transnational political problems. 
Moreover, our sketch of the spatial reformation of the public sphere concept
feeds into the meta-process of the refguration of space (Knoblauch and Löw 2017).
The social web may be understood as an opportunity structure for social actors to
build networks. Those actors are place-bound, locally anchored nodes that con-
nect with others, potentially across large distances and beyond the borders of cit-
ies, nation states, or even continents. While the network structure itself bears an
inscribed potential for translocality, research fndings support that network-building
processes are often based on homophily; shared social identities, interests, or experi-
ences increase the likelihood of community networks to be formed among similar
actors. All of these features are, of course, not independent of the local embeddings
and relational positions of actors in their networks. Likewise, transforming the com-
munity into a public sphere requires the activation of the network through a shared
public issue. Thus, we may conclude that the spatial features of networked public
spheres strongly adhere to the social mechanisms of translocal community building. 
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ANNOTATING PLACES 
A critical assessment of two hypotheses on how 
locative media transform urban public places 
Eric Lettkemann and Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer 
Locative media and their impact on urban public places 
This chapter investigates social implications of a new form of media-facilitated 
transformation of places, which is arising from an increased merging of urban 
places with digital information, driven in particular by locative media. Locative 
media is an umbrella term used to describe a new form of mobile apps that utilize a 
device’s location awareness (e.g., GPS, WiFi triangulation) to retrieve digital infor-
mation annotated to a particular physical location (Frith 2015, 2). For example, a 
mobile recommendation app displays a map of restaurants located in the vicinity, 
including their menus, experience reports, and ratings from previous customers. A 
much-debated implication of using locative media is that public places no longer 
appear the same to all people present, because their perceptions of these places are 
now based on additional information, which is represented only digitally. Depend-
ing on which apps are used and which personalized settings are selected, users may 
receive quite diferent information on the same physical location. Our chapter 
discusses whether the increasing use of locative media leads to the creation of new 
inclusive meeting places or—on the contrary—reinforces the tendency towards 
urban segregation by creating exclusive places of retreat. The discussion is based on 
the results of a pilot study on locative media users in Berlin.1 
Public places: physical, virtual, and hybrid 
By places, we refer to distinctive locations in space defned by their physical set-
tings as well as by the people who frequent these locations and ascribe some sort 
of meaning to them (see Gieryn 2000, 466–467). Places nest in larger social ter-
ritories, transcending immediate experience. In the case of urban places, this larger 
social territory is usually conceptualized as the “public space” (Lofand 1973). We 
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follow Lofand’s defnition that the public space of cities consists of freely acces-
sible places in which large numbers of mutual strangers pursue their activities— 
sometimes together, often in parallel (ibid., 19). These activities are expressions of 
diferent social worlds populating the city. According to Anselm Strauss (1978), 
social worlds organize around core activities, concerned, for example, with the 
production of certain goods or collective identities. Large cities in particular are 
a mosaic of the most diverse cultural, ideological, occupational, or leisure time– 
oriented social worlds. Each social world is a relatively independent “universe of 
discourse” assembled from specifc symbols, lifestyles, and stocks of knowledge. All 
social worlds have some kind of spatial reference points where participants share 
knowledge and perform activities, making them a recognizable place. 
One of the reasons why the diverse social worlds within a city coexist mostly 
without confict is that just a few places in the public space are frequented equally 
by all social worlds. Only in subway stations, on city plazas, in shopping malls, and 
other such areas does the entire spectrum of social worlds meet and mingle. In 
contrast, most places in the public space are accessed de facto only by small por-
tions of the city population. Examples of such places of retreat are churches, cafés, 
sports venues, parks, or similar sites, which serve as places of encounter for one or 
very few social worlds. Although access is not restricted legally, there is little prob-
ability that outsiders would seek out the dedicated meeting places of other social 
worlds. According to Anselm Strauss, this is due to the fact that urban places are 
endowed with diferent meanings, attracting some social worlds while repelling 
others (Strauss 1961, 59–67). These meanings establish a spatial order that deter-
mines which locations act as places of encounter or retreat for which segments of 
an urban society. 
Numerous activities that give a public place its specifc meaning make use of 
media. The consumption of mobile media such as newspapers or the Walkman 
have long been commonplace in public life, but digital media did not play a role 
until recently (de Souza e Silva and Frith 2012, 59–74). In the early days of the 
digital revolution, the virtual space of the Internet was largely separated from the 
physically experienced reality of urban life. Digital information was accessible only 
intermittently and temporarily—via the computer workstation at home. In other 
words, people experienced virtual space as a reality of its own, as a separate uni-
verse of discourse and as an experimentation site for new (digital) lifestyles (Turkle 
1995). This separation has undergone a drastic change within the past decade. 
With the emergence of Internet-capable mobile devices, particularly smartphones, 
digital information is now accessible at any time and anywhere. Instead of drifting 
further apart, physical and virtual space are increasingly converging (Löw, Steets, 
and Stoetzer 2008, 81). 
The mobilization of the Internet is a core element in the current phase of 
mediatization of space, which is increasingly permeating our everyday life. The 
continuously accessible digital information infrastructures result in an increasing 
superimposition and merging of virtual and physical realities to form so-called 
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resulting from the proliferation of cyber-physical systems is that the strict distinc-
tion between online and ofine communication loses its practical relevance in the 
everyday life of many smartphone users. In particular, today’s younger “hypercon-
nected digital media users” (Parisi 2015, 6) quite naturally integrate social media 
communication as part of their daily routine into a number of physical activities. 
In this way, new forms of cyber-physical reality arise that are currently spreading in 
urban life, predominantly through the adoption of locative media. 
The term locative media arose in the 2000s within the context of location-based 
computer games. The original aim of merging virtual and physical reality was to 
turn public urban places (back) into playgrounds (see de Souza e Silva and Sutko 
2009). This genre of locative media is presently enjoying great popularity, as in the 
commercial variant Pokémon Go. In the meantime, the same basic process of the 
location-based merging of virtual and physical reality is taking place in many other 
smartphone apps as well, which are also referred to collectively as location-based 
services (LBS). Today, these services include navigation, search, and advertising as 
well as tracking, dating, and many more. 
The potential of locative media to transform places gains plausibility in ethno-
graphic studies focusing on the microlevel of social interaction. These illustrate 
how the smartphone screen becomes a sensory extension: The melding of vir-
tual and physical spaces takes place on the screen of the smartphone; here, cyber-
physical reality becomes visually accessible. As conveyed on the screen, a “hybrid 
space” (de Souza e Silva 2006, 261) arises, whose constitution is equally physical 
and virtual, and which links the social media communication online back to the 
current physical location. In this hybrid space, the boundaries between physical and 
virtual reality and between face-to-face interaction and media-based interaction 
become blurred. For example, the Waze navigation app provides information on 
trafc congestion and alternative routes by automatically tracking the movements 
of all mobile devices on which Waze is installed, aggregating this data, and display-
ing it in real time as trafc fows on a digital map. At the same time, users can also 
manually enter information, showing other users on the app’s map where they have 
seen construction work, accidents, or other trafc obstacles. Based on this informa-
tion, Waze users navigate through a hybrid space constructed of physical, social, 
and virtual elements. 
This cyber-physical merging has many consequences for how people experi-
ence public places. Popular locative media include navigation apps as well as recom-
mendation services like Foursquare and Yelp or hybrid reality games like Ingress
and Pokémon Go. Via the screens of their smartphones, users have access to digital
annotations attached to their environments. From a technical standpoint, the term
annotation refers to the linking of GPS coordinates with digital information such as
ratings, photos, or comments. From a sociological point of view, annotations add
new layers of meaning to public places (de Souza e Silva and Frith 2012, 94–96; Frith
2015, 81–95). Annotations make use of a broad spectrum of media-based forms of
expression. For example, users check in at places, showing their friends where they
currently are. Others annotate personal experiences, photos, and opinions at a place. 
 Annotating places 195 
Presently, discussion is underway as to the extent to which the advancing dif-
fusion of locative media in urban everyday life is altering the interaction between 
strangers in public places. Two predominant strains of discussion can be identifed 
here, which we term inclusion hypothesis and exclusion hypothesis. The typi-
cal proponents of the inclusion hypothesis assume that the use of locative media 
increases the de facto accessibility of public places and leads to more encounters 
and to more participation in public life. Locative media are considered to encour-
age the playful and participative reshaping of public places because they circumvent 
urban rules of civil indiference and facilitate communicative exchange between 
strangers (Keijl, Klaassen, and op den Akker 2013, 10–11). According to the inclu-
sion hypothesis, locative media increase sensitivity for the urban environment and 
stimulate communication within neighborhoods as the users carry the “participa-
tive culture” of the Internet into public urban places (Hamilton 2009, 393). 
In contrast, the exclusion hypothesis maintains the position that the de facto 
accessibility of public spaces is decreased and the decline of urban public life is 
accelerated. Mechanisms of social closure, already familiar from social media as “fl-
ter bubbles,” are thought to fragment everyday reality into customized experiences 
of a “splintered space” (Frith 2015, 140f.). The fltered, selective perception and 
appropriation of places could result in a further intensifcation of urban tendencies 
towards social segregation. Instead of promoting socialization and the emergence 
of new forms of public life, locative media are considered to simply foster dialog 
between those city dwellers who already share common interpretive patterns and 
lifestyles (Crawford 2008, 91). It is expected that locative media contribute to the 
emergence of subcultural and private places of retreat within the public urban 
space, invisible to outsiders. 
From an empirical standpoint, the question currently remains open in which 
direction—inclusion or exclusion—the use of locative media will transform urban 
life as a whole. To date, no systematic investigations have been conducted to more 
accurately determine the implications of the two hypotheses and to describe the 
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. Though locative media is a recent phe-
nomenon, the number of corresponding apps is already too large to examine the 
feld as a whole. Hence, we propose investigating typical forms and consequences 
of the use of locative media. In this chapter, we focus on two popular annotation 
apps. The results will serve as a reference point for comparative case studies on 
mobile gaming, dating, and more. Naturally, the results unveiled by our research 
are infuenced by how broadly or narrowly we defne the terms inclusion and 
exclusion. No empirical research is necessary to demonstrate that locative media 
do not perform inclusion in the sense of integrating society as a whole. In view 
of the future of urban life, we deem it more interesting to pose the question of to 
what extent the digital native generation of hyperconnected users itself is impacted 
by the inclusive or exclusive efects of locative media. Although the members of 
this generation are bonded through their afnity with locative media, they also 
inhabit diferent social worlds, some of which are quite heterogeneous, each with 
its own lifestyle. In reference to Hitzler, Bucher, and Niederbacher (2001), these 
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various social worlds can also be designated “scenes.” Our primary focus of interest 
is on how the users of locative media, as inhabitants of their specifc social worlds, 
their scenes, appropriate public places and how they perceive the hybrid space of 
annotations. 
Two case studies: Foursquare City Guide and Swarm 
In our research, we have approached the phenomenon of digital annotations using 
a mix of qualitative methods to investigate how smartphone users receive, create, 
and share spatial annotations. Inspired by the “walkthrough method” of Light, 
Burgess, and Duguay (2016), we carried out auto-ethnographic self-observations 
to explore the afordances and restrictions of two apps: Foursquare City Guide 
and Swarm. Furthermore, we interviewed diferent types of users.2 The sample of 
interviewees ranged from experienced fans of the apps to inexperienced users. The 
latter group tested both apps for about four weeks, documenting their experiences 
in the form of digital diaries. The aim of the analysis was to obtain a typology of 
using annotations with regard to their inclusive or exclusive efects. 
Swarm and City Guide are good examples for studying the efects of digital 
annotations. As both apps are developed by Foursquare Labs company, they can 
be used either in combination or independently. Foursquare Labs is a pioneer in 
the feld of annotation services, exceeding over 50 million registered users in 2014 
(further information is available from Frith 2015, 96–111). A comparison of City 
Guide and Swarm is worthwhile because the two apps represent contrasting design 
principles of locative media: 
Foursquare City Guide contains mainly search-and-recommendation functions.
The app collects location-based information, which is annotated in the forms of com-
ments, ratings, and photos. This information is freely accessible to all registered users. 
Foursquare Swarm combines a location-based social network with gaming ele-
ments. The app ofers the option of connecting and competing with friends for in-
game rewards. The users of Swarm also annotate information such as their current 
location (“check-ins”) or location-based comments. 
Given the fast pace of digital media markets, it is not yet clear whether these 
apps will prevail in the long term. Social media platforms such as Google and Face-
book, however, increasingly integrate similar annotation functions into their app 
versions, imitating the interface design of Foursquare’s apps. Therefore, an analysis 
of Swarm and City Guide promises more readily generalizable insights into the use 
of annotations, regardless of whether these specifc apps will survive in the long run 
or will be supplanted by larger platforms. 
Foursquare City Guide: lurking and editing 
Foursquare City Guide suggests two complementary forms of use. When you open 
the app, the City Guide screen initially ofers various search-and-discovery options. 
For example, users can search maps, categories, or lists to obtain information on 
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their GPS location. In contrast to similar services, there is also the option of making 
full text searches within the archived annotations. After a brief period of familiar-
ization, City Guide is a suitable tool for what is termed “lurking.” Within the con-
text of social media, lurkers are typically considered users of an Internet platform 
who retrieve content but do not actively participate in generating it. 
An eye-catching interface feature that makes lurking easy is called the Four-
square score. Every location that is created in Foursquare is rated by the app with a 
score from 1 to 10. This Foursquare score is derived from various pieces of infor-
mation, such as user ratings or the total number of check-ins. The score helps the 
mobile user to quickly assess the popularity of a location at a glance. In our inter-
views, experienced users considered a score above 8.0 to be a sure indication that a 
location is worth visiting. Lurkers, who spend more time searching for interesting 
locations, can read the comments left by other users. These comments, which City 
Guide calls tips, typically consist of one or a few sentences (see Figure 15.1). They 
FIGURE 15.1 Screenshots of Kollwitzplatz in Berlin as displayed in Foursquare City 
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are often complemented by photos intended to convey an impression of the loca-
tion’s atmosphere. In contrast to purely digital communication, the constitutive 
point of reference for annotations is the physical location. Therefore, the credibility 
of tips increases in the perception of many users when the app shows that the writ-
ers have already checked in to the location several times. 
Although the City Guide uses pop-up windows to repeatedly prompt the user 
to rate the locations visited and to leave comments, the majority of users belong to 
the lurker category. For the smaller group, which is willing to share their experi-
ences with a public audience of users, City Guide ofers various options for gen-
erating content. Aside from rating locations with emoticons and uploading photos 
and short texts, users can create lists of similar locations or add new locations to a 
GPS point. In the language of experienced users, these activities are referred to as 
editing. The most important contribution of the so-called editors to the success of 
the app is the continuous writing of tips. From conversations with regular writers 
of tips, we learned that they consider the work of editing to be an authentic form of 
reporting. Although theoretically conceivable, users are not interested in endowing 
locations with new meanings or making public places more exotic. The objective 
of most editors is to share practical everyday knowledge and positive experiences. 
Although it is technically possible to explore any location in the environment and
to create new meeting places, in practice this is hardly the case. The predominant
motivation for using City Guide seems to be the desire to fnd more places that
refect a user’s personal preferences. Instead of looking for unfamiliar or diferent
places, users set the various search flters such that most of the locations in their
environment are made invisible. Many interviewees confrm that they only search
for places that resemble those that they already know and that match their lifestyle.
For example, users report that they always search for vegan products, free WiFi, or
special brands of cofee. Even though the majority of interviewees insisted that they
were defnitely interested in discovering new places, their use of the app was mainly
motivated by the desire to fnd more of the places they already favored than by the
desire to discover completely diferent places. The sheer curiosity to obtain access to
unknown locations is not a very common motivation for using City Guide—at least
not in our sample. 
However, we also found indications in our empirical material of increased 
accessibility to public places. The fact that many experienced users have “blind 
faith” in high Foursquare scores is a source of surprising encounters from time to 
time. For instance, a tax consultant who is a longtime fan of the app reported that 
while searching for pancakes he ended up in a restaurant with an unusually high 
score that he had hitherto avoided: 
A restaurant, from the outside it looks like a rocker bar. So I probably 
wouldn’t have gone in there. But on the inside it looked like my grandma’s 
living room and they had delicious pancakes! [Laughter] Well, I really would 
never have gone in there. I had based my search on the score as well. 
(Experienced user, age 37) 
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Repeatedly, our interviewees referred to City Guide as a “window” that allows 
them to look behind the walls of unfamiliar places. For example, a young historian 
reported that she often feels uncomfortable entering new places. Normally she 
enters unfamiliar places only in the company of friends. But reading the annota-
tions of other users also helps her to overcome social barriers: 
Places you don’t otherwise go into, it’s a kind of barrier, I don’t really know 
what would make me go in there, especially not alone, and I think the app 
does give you a different feeling about what you can expect there. And so 
it can kind of remove the barrier a little, or you just see, yes, no, it confirms 
my impression, but in a certain way, sure, it also takes over the role of people 
who might say to you in such a case, “hey, it’s worth going in there”, but 
they aren’t always around and not all your friends have been everywhere. . . . 
So I do believe that it [the app] is a door opener. 
(Inexperienced user, age 25) 
In other words, comments and pictures on City Guide make it easier for users to 
slip into the role of explorers discovering unknown places within their close envi-
ronment. They reduce uncertainty about what to expect. 
Swarm: lifelogging and following 
Turning to Swarm, we notice that the user interface of the app has little in com-
mon with the design used for City Guide. In Swarm, everything revolves around 
the check-in function. As soon as a user clicks on the check-in button in the bot-
tom center of the user interface, Swarm displays a list of possible locations that 
share the current GPS coordinates. Every time a check-in is performed, the user is 
prompted by the app to enter a brief comment or upload a photo. However, users 
can easily bypass this prompt. For each check-in, users receive points, referred to 
in the app as coins, and stickers. First-time and periodic check-ins are rewarded 
with additional coins. The stickers relate to the function of a location. For example, 
users receive a gas tank sticker for their frst check-in at a gas station, a shopping bag 
sticker for a shopping mall, a cocktail sticker for a bar, etc. Users can collect up to 
100 stickers that refect the variety of the places they have visited (see Figure 15.2). 
Swarm ofers two options for using check-ins. First, Swarm ofers a new loca-
tion-based form of lifelogging. A digital lifelog is a detailed chronicle of a person’s 
everyday activities that typically encompasses large volumes of technically proto-
colled data. Originally, lifelogging apps recorded ftness- and health-related data. 
In the case of locative media, lifelogging involves protocolling the locations visited. 
For instance, Swarm can show its users a list of their check-ins in chronological 
order or make them visible on a map. In this way, users can track how often and 
on which days they checked in to a health club or a supermarket, for example. In 
tandem with the comment function, this list becomes a digital journal and photo 
album. The purpose of this function is not to exchange information with other 
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FIGURE 15.2 Screenshots of stickers available in Foursquare Swarm (left) and a list of 
places checked in 
users or to augment the accessibility of a location. Rather, our interviewees were 
motivated primarily by their personal desire to preserve feeting recollections of 
locations visited and to retain such memories. For instance, an insurance agent 
who visits many places on his business trips told us that he greatly appreciates the 
lifelogging functions of Swarm: 
For me it’s a kind of memory function. A type of localization that tells me: 
You’ve already been here. And I’ve checked in to locations where I could 
swear I’d never been before, but then it seems I actually had been there 
before! And checked in there. 
(Experienced user, age 36) 
Aside from lifelogging, Swarm ofers a second function typical of social networks: 
following the activities of other users. As in social network websites similar to 
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Facebook and Instagram, users can send messages to befriended members. Far 
more important, however, is the fact that the users of Swarm can follow check-ins 
in order to keep track of their friends’ current locations. As in conventional social 
networks, the number of Swarm friends normally extends beyond the close circle 
of personal acquaintances to include other users whom they rarely if ever meet 
face to face. The inclusive potential remains low, however, as users generally follow 
people who share their same lifestyle and tastes. In her interview, an experienced 
user reported how she chooses friends and what constitutes her community of 
Swarm friends: 
Interviewer: “Do many of your friends use Foursquare [Swarm], too?” Inter-
viewee: “Nah, not many. I have my friends and my Foursquare [Swarm] 
friends. I mean, my friends from the office or my boyfriend’s friends and 
people I know. And then I have Foursquare friends, and they think like me. 
They have similar tastes. And I trust their taste. So I wouldn’t consider them 
to be friends, but rather acquaintances. But I trust their opinions. And that’s 
why I follow what they say and I believe in their ratings. But the commu-
nities are separate. Not all of them. My boyfriend is a Foursquare fan, too. 
And other friends, who I would consider friends. But not all of them. Some 
are very ‘random’. And I know them through Foursquare and not through 
anything else.” 
(Experienced user, age 34) 
In short, the emphasis of the functions in Swarm is on personal life and the net-
work of contacts that encompasses either personal friends or acquaintances with 
similar preferences. Thus, the app has more potential for intensifying exclusive 
social interaction constellations because it emphasizes and strengthens existing 
social bonds and lifestyles. It ofers only a few opportunities for interaction with 
unknown users in the immediate vicinity. 
The future of urban public places: neither inclusion nor 
exclusion 
Our two case studies, presented earlier, show that neither the inclusion hypothesis 
nor the exclusion hypothesis can adequately describe social reality. Both apps, City 
Guide and Swarm, encourage the exploration of unknown places. City Guide’s 
annotated pictures and tips as well as the check-ins of Swarm friends display nearby 
places that are worth visiting. In accordance with the inclusion hypothesis, these 
apps tempt users to extend their own mobility radius and to visit new places. Con-
trary to the inclusion hypothesis, users rarely encounter representatives of unknown 
social worlds when they visit these places. Filtering digital annotations and follow-
ing the check-ins of like-minded friends increase the likelihood that users remain 
within the borders of their own social worlds. With respect to this efect, the use 
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public space, this could mean that the places where certain scene worlds meet no 
longer need to concentrate in certain streets or neighborhoods to ensure social 
exchange between like-minded people. With the help of locative media, it is con-
ceivable that the meeting places of urban scene worlds will become more scattered 
physically across public space. 
In the frst step of our analysis, we successfully demonstrated that the City
Guide app supports the location-based use forms of lurking and editing. Although
these forms of use have the potential to increase accessibility to public spaces
because they make it easier for users to obtain information on their physical sur-
roundings frsthand, many users flter the annotated information according to
lifestyle-related criteria, with the result that they rarely cross the boundaries of
their own social worlds. Empirical reality (presently) seems far removed from the
expectation of earlier studies that digital annotation might contribute to social
inclusion by creating cyber-physical arenas that make the diverse voices of urban
life heard. The proponents of the inclusion hypothesis took the fact that more
and more public places are being annotated to draw the premature conclusion
that users receive this information unfltered. But, just as something as trifing
as legal access to public places is sufcient to make them into urban meeting
places, general accessibility of annotated information alone is equally insufcient
to counteract the segregation of social worlds. On the contrary, many users apply
the annotated information in order to maneuver more unerringly within their
own urban scenes. 
The results of our second analytical step, which focused on the social net-
work functions of annotation services using Foursquare Swarm as an example,
also seem to indicate that it would be wise to exercise caution with respect
to the expectations reported in the literature regarding the inclusive poten-
tial of locative media. The primary purposes of location-based lifelogging and
following are private recollection and the communicative exchange between
like-minded people. However, we do not view Foursquare Swarm or other
similar services as a signifcant motor of social exclusion. In fact, lifelogging
and following refect the already existing lifestyle of users who create social-
spatial distance and distinctions independently of their media use. Swarm and
other similar services ofer tools to more strongly emphasize the location-based
aspects of its users’ lifestyle. In this way, the physical contours of social world
lifestyles can be stabilized and may become more obvious. However, as we have
demonstrated, existing social barriers are not raised, either. Based on these
statements, it becomes clear that the inclusion and exclusion hypotheses denote
extreme poles of social development trends that outline a space of possibility
within which the actual development takes place. Both the fears of the exclu-
sion hypothesis and the euphoria of the inclusion hypothesis seem exaggerated.
In fact, locative media tend to modify the existing physical pattern of public
space. The spatial segregation of social worlds is likely to decrease, but that does
not mean that the social boundaries of diferent scene worlds will become more
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Notes 
1 We performed this study as part of the project “Locative Media: Inclusion and Exclusion 
in Public Spaces” (B04), which is part of the Collaborative Research Center “Re-
Figuration of Spaces” (CRC 1265) funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) 
(project number 290045248). Aside from the authors, student project team members 
Nina Meier and Johanna Weirauch also participated in the collection and evaluation of 
data, and we are indebted to them for their support. 
2 We recruited users via the project website. The sample consisted of fourteen users, six of 
whom were female and eight male. Six users had years of experience with Foursquare 
apps, while the others had little or no experience. The users ranged in age from 21 to 
43; the average age was 29 years. 
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Refguring bodies and digitally mediated cities 
Gillian Rose 
Introduction: mediating posthuman embodiment 
This chapter approaches the contemporary refguration of urban space by explor-
ing how embodiment is being reconfgured in digitally mediated cities. For Kem-
ber and Zylinska (2012, 40), mediation is ‘a multiagential force that incorporates 
humans and machines, technologies and users, in an ongoing process of becoming-
with’. Hence, 
mediation becomes a key trope for understanding and articulating our being 
in, and becoming with, the technological world, our emergence and ways of 
interacting with it, as well as the acts and processes of temporarily stabilizing 
the world into media, agents, relations, and networks. 
(Kember and Zylinska 2012, xv) 
This chapter focuses specifcally on how the fows of data that now saturate so 
many cities are mediating (post)human embodiment, and in particular how a spe-
cifc form of spatiality is part of that mediating stabilisation of corporeality—a 
spatiality that also refgures urban space. 
The chapter assumes that corporeality is a process and that diferent embodiments 
are co-produced with diferent kinds of technologies. Visual technologies are espe-
cially important in this process, particularly in cities that are full of people looking 
at images of other people, on digital screens, in that city or somewhere else. Data 
that become images of various kinds are a signifcant part of the immense streams of 
digital data fowing through and beyond cities, including images of cities and their 
inhabitants (McQuire 2016). Created and processed, distributed and redistributed, 
some will materialise as fgurative images like photorealistic advertisements, news 
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on a map, a node in a network, a category in a graph. These many image types are 
seen variously in their turn, studied, glanced at, swiped through (Rose and Willis 
2019; Krajina 2014). Made somewhere and uploaded, travelling somewhere else, 
being reconfgured, analysed, or multiplied, and then being downloaded, perhaps 
to the same device, perhaps to many others, in the same place or elsewhere: these 
are the distributed circuits of many forms of visual media now (Browne 2015; 
Casetti 2015). And at the interface between a digital image and its viewers, par-
ticular kinds of bodies coagulate. 
In urban studies, most of the attention given to digital mediation has focused 
on the ‘smart city’ and its fows of big digital data (key references include Green-
feld 2013; Hollands 2016; Hollands 2008; Kitchin 2014; Marvin, Luque-Ayala, 
and McFarlane 2016; Karvonen, Cugurullo, and Caprotti 2018). The term ‘smart’ 
refers to the use of digital data to improve urban governance. For example, city 
authorities and commercial providers suggest that smart policies and technolo-
gies can enhance environmental sustainability by enabling more efcient use of 
resources, especially energy and water; or that trafc fow or air pollution can be 
improved by using real-time environmental data; or that economic growth can be 
increased by innovating new products and markets based on digital data. Attention 
has also been given to the range of commercial platforms that collate and integrate 
urban data, such as Airbnb, Uber, and Mobike (Barns 2020). As various feminist 
critics have pointed out, however, most of this work focuses on the agency of 
digital infrastructure and the political economy of its data extraction (Leszczynski 
2019; Rose 2017). Inspired by decades of intersectional feminist work, this chapter 
instead asks how to see bodies in this context. 
This is an important question to ask since much of the data circulating
through urban spaces are related to bodies. Corporations and city authorities
produce, analyse, and visualise data about populations, citizens, commuters,
taxpayers, users, residents, and consumers, among others (Rose et al. 2020).
Residents and tourists take and look at selfes, infuencer videos, video chats,
and GIFs on WhatsApp, Instagram and TikTok. That is, much of the data
that circulate through and about cities materialise as images on some kind of
screen, showing and being seen by specifc bodies. The chapter approaches this
visuality as a form of technosociality. Ways of seeing are co-constituted by the
afordances of technologies, the social practices in which those technologies
are embedded, their discursive framings and afective dispositions (see Gordon
2010; Otter 2008; Wilson 2014). The phrase ‘ways of seeing’ was coined by
John Berger (1972). The chapter follows his use of the term to refer not only to
what is seen but also to the body doing a particular kind of visualising. ‘Though
obviously one who sees, an observer is more importantly one who sees with a
prescribed set of possibilities, one who is embedded in a system of conventions
and limitations’ (Crary 1990, 6). Berger was also attentive to (some of ) the ways
in which the relation between seer and seen is always riddled with power. If
visual images ‘body forth’ corporeality (Copier and Steinbock 2018, 924), these




206 Gillian Rose 
Many digital images mimic visual genres with long histories, which shape their 
making and viewing. Maps generated by geographical information systems may use 
the same data and be seen in the same way as earlier hand-drawn maps of census 
data, for example; three-dimensional digital models of urban morphology may be 
used in the same way as the physical architectural models. But the chapter suggests 
that these ways of seeing and constituting bodies are being joined by other ways of 
seeing other forms of embodiment, which are caught up with the specifc dynam-
ics of data circulation. Specifcally, the chapter suggests that animatic embodiment is 
part of the digital refguration of urban bodies and space. 
To make this argument, it draws on Deborah Levitt’s (2018) account of ani-
mation. Animation brings things to life. For Levitt (2018, 1), animation is ‘the 
dominant medium of our time’, moving us from ‘questions about ontology, cat-
egory, and being to ones of appearance, metamorphosis, and afect’ (Levitt 2018, 
2). Animation is both a medium and a contemporary cultural condition, according 
to Levitt. Its logic is not based on correspondence with a real; instead, animations 
envision metamorphosis, erasure, and resurrection rather than ontological pres-
ence. Schematically, the chapter argues that the spatial organisation of bodies in 
cities is also shifting between representational and animatic forms—and so, too, are 
city spaces. 
Animation, softimages, and urban bodies 
For Levitt, ‘new forms of life and vitality emerge at the spectator–screen intersec-
tion as this transforms over time’ (Levitt 2018, 3). While not directly determined by 
technological changes in the spectator–screen intersection, animatic life is enabled 
by some of the specifc dynamics of digital images. It is important, therefore, to 
say a little more about how digital visual imagery is diferent from previous image 
forms. Hoelzl and Marie’s (2015, 7) discussion of what they term the ‘softimage’ 
is useful here: 
As a program, the image, while still appearing as a geometrical projection on 
our screens, is inextricably mixed up with the data (physical and digital) and 
the continuous processing of data. What was supposed to be a solid represen-
tation of a solid world based on the sound principle of geometric projection 
(our operational mode for centuries), a hard image as it were, is revealed to 
be something totally different, ubiquitous, infinitely adaptable and adaptive 
and intrinsically merged with software: a softimage. 
A defning element of that merger is the software that allows digital images to be 
networked images (Munster and MacKenzie 2019; Rubinstein and Sluis 2008). 
The shift from analogue to digital popular photography was enabled by not only 
digital cameras but also increasingly seamless connections between cameras, other 
viewing devices such as computers, and then phones and social media platforms. 
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elaborate computer-generated images via a global division of labour (Chung 2018; 
Rose, Degen, and Melhuish 2014). Images appear on multiple screens, in diferent 
forms, at diferent sites. They are shared and favourited, liked or deleted, copied 
and posted, circulated and recirculated. There are nonhuman agencies at play here, 
too. Many visual data are processed algorithmically; indeed, Steyerl (2017, 47) sug-
gests that ‘contemporary perception is machinic to a large degree. The spectrum 
of human vision covers only a tiny part of it’. The speed of image production, 
processing, and circulation is enacting a shift to ‘something more akin to live trans-
mission’ (Rubinstein and Sluis 2008, 22). The speed and scale of image production 
and analysis suggests not so much a network as a vast 
stratified constellation of technical memory matter, composed of resources 
that shape political and cultural imaginaries .  .  . with depth, height, scale, 
extensiveness and duration . . . moving in different directions. . . . Its forms 
may change and its content migrate, accruing or shedding textures in the 
process. 
(Withers 2015, 17) 
Softimages, then, are networked, processed, live, and distributed (cf. Rose 2016). 
So, how are bodies visually mediated by softimages? The chapter will now sketch 
two visual regimes: the representational and animatic. Representational and animatic 
ways of seeing are not completely distinct, nor do they map neatly onto diferent 
technologies (as Levitt [2018] notes). Technologies, practices, discourses, and afects 
all contribute to each visual regime. Many digital images mimic the appearance of 
non-digital images and are observed in ways that those have long been observed, 
as representations of particular forms of urban life: closed circuit-television footage 
taken with digital cameras, for example, can be seen in the same way as video-taped 
CCTV. Animatic refgurations of urban environments and inhabitants, however, 
invite a diferent way of seeing—emergent, distributed, transformational—whether 
they are hand-drawn cartoons of urban superheroes or real-time maps of Twitter 
sentiment. 
Seeing cities representationally 
With those caveats in mind, the chapter now indicates how bodies and cities con-
tinue to be visualised through representational ways of seeing. Drawing on Barad, 
Kember and Zylinska (2012, 31) describe representationalism as the conviction that 
what is represented exists independently of all practices of representation. Repre-
sentational ways of seeing assume that there is a real that images—no matter how 
selective and distorted—re-present to the viewer. In terms of visuality, cinema and 
photography have both been understood as media that are themselves represen-
tational but are also parts of a wider representational visual culture, which Levitt 
calls the ‘cinematic regime’ composed of ‘light, the machine, and an analytic eye’ 
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visuality enacted by cinema. However, the dominant representational cinematic 
regime sees bodies in particular ways. What we see when we see bodies cinemati-
cally are ‘autonomous, massy entities’ (Levitt 2018, 12) that refer to a pro-flmic 
real. Twentieth-century traditions of urban documentary photography, for exam-
ple, are usually cinematic. 
For Levitt, then, the representational cinematic regime entails the seeing of 
massy bodies by an analytic eye. In terms of thinking about bodies in urban space, 
seeing bodies as feshy entities to be analysed is part of the ‘productive, biopoliti-
cal dimensions of cinema in the discourse of refection, representation, and reality’ 
(Levitt 2018, 11). That is, the representational cinematic regime is aligned with 
Foucauldian biopower (Levitt 2018, 28). This is a crucial step in understanding 
representational regimes of urban visuality. Representational urban visuality sees 
bodies as masses: as epidermal volumes with surfaces that can be analysed and 
categorised. 
In biopolitical regimes, ways of seeing analyse bodies through discursive codes 
and, in so doing, enact a range of social categories such as sex, gender, and race 
(along with distinguishing between bodies that are human and not [Butler 2007]). 
Feminist, critical race, and crip scholarship have been particularly attentive to this 
process. From hooks (1992) and Bordo (1993) to Weheliye (2014), Browne (2015), 
and Benjamin (2019), the ways in which bodies’ surfaces are marked with, and 
interpreted through, signs of social diference have been described. And this ana-
lytical, biopolitical way of seeing continues in the digitally mediated city. ‘Visual 
technologies and racial taxonomies fashion each other’ (Benjamin 2019, 99). Cor-
poreal bodies are rendered (as the) real surface on which particular social categories 
are visible. Facial ‘recognition’ software can identify the gender, sex, race, and even 
sexuality of bodies, we are told (though their failures are also regularly reported 
[Leszczynski 2019]). The notion of ‘recognition’ here exemplifes the represen-
tational regime in which a reality is there to be recognised; and also obscures the 
process by which algorithms are trained to produce that ‘recognition’ by human 
operators (Benjamin 2019). We might also consider the ways in which big urban 
data are converted into conventional demographic or geospatial categories and 
then into dashboard displays (Ruppert 2012). 
Urban spaces are also visualised representationally in the cinematic regime. 
Visual technologies of many kinds are put to work to identify truths about the 
city. Images—photographs, maps, diagrams, graphs—are understood to represent 
some aspect of an urban reality. From creating and mapping data to photographing 
housing defned as slums, visual techniques for seeing cities and their inhabitants 
became part of understanding and governing urban spaces. 
Understanding the digital mediation of bodies and cities as representational pro-
duces a particular form of critique. Much criticism of the algorithmic production 
of urban code/space (Kitchin and Dodge 2011) is based on the representational 
assertion of a ‘radical incommensurability between embodied and represented life’ 
(Agostinho 2018, 143). Assuming that incommensurability exists between a real 
and its representation, this way of seeing is challenged because it ‘renders some 
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things more visible than others, yielding new parameters of visibility that deter-
mine who or what dis/appears’ (Agostinho 2018, 132). Thus, planners’ and devel-
opers’ digital images of new urban developments are criticised for their inaccuracy: 
too clean, too sunny, too wealthy. In this regime, the who and the what exist before 
they are brought into, or excluded from, visibility. 
It is this assumption of a pre-existing real that animatic ways of seeing abandon. 
Levitt’s (2018) account of the representational cinematic regime and the animatic 
apparatus is careful not to assume a recent and complete transition from a flm-
based regime to a software-based apparatus. She is also careful not describe specifc 
visual technologies as either representational or animatory. As she notes, flms can 
be animated and animations can be representational. She does suggest, however, 
that a new technological and discursive dispositif is emerging in which ‘it doesn’t 
matter so much what life is, as rather you can do with it’ (Levitt 2018, 20). She 
suggests that this is a wider cultural shift, and, like Clough (2018), she references 
the life sciences where bodies are increasingly understood less as corporeal masses 
and more and more as information that—ever since gene-splicing, DNA mapping, 
and transgendered bodies became possible—can be transformed and recombined. 
Animatic embodiment 
The mediation of bodies into data happens in a great number of everyday urban 
contexts, as noted in the introduction to this chapter. And while some of that 
mediation may take representational forms, animation also occurs, more and more 
often. Deleuze (1992) famously argued that the biopolitical was being displaced by 
what he termed ‘societies of control’. In societies of control, the social is constituted 
through constantly mediated data and there is no sense of an incommensurability 
between that data and a real. (Incommensurability remains but is better thought of 
as glitches within and between diferent data fows, as Leszczynski [2019] argues.) 
If animation is a cultural condition, then one of its central dynamics is the 
circulation and recombination of data: ‘big data sorting that is designed to collate 
seemingly unrelated sets with the intention of producing novel relations’ (Clough 
2018, 107). Emergent patterns within and between data replace correspondence 
between image and reality and between sign and category. As Rouvray (2013) 
points out, this algorithmic logic ‘spares [humans] the burden and responsibility 
of transcribing, interpreting and evaluating events of world. It spares them the 
meaning-making processes of transcription or representation’. Animatic embodi-
ment in a smart city is confgured by such emergent, algorithmic constellations of 
data. The boundary between the corporeal body and the network no longer holds. 
‘Embodiment cannot be contained within the organic skin’ when traces of digital 
data now so fundamentally compose what has to be called the posthuman (Clough 
2018, xxxii). Bodies are turned into data and the algorithmic analysis of big data 
produces new corporeal entities (Rose et al. 2020). 
Gabrys’s (2014) discussion of smart citizenship is exemplary here. Gabrys 
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suggests that the production of digital data produces smart citizens as ‘ambividuals’: 
citizen-subjects whose emergence is contingent on events, articulated through the 
technologies and practices of computational urbanism. Citizenship, she suggests, 
can thus become less an individualised subjectivity and more a digitally mediated 
distribution, confguring ‘ambient and malleable urban operators that are expres-
sions of computer environments’ (Gabrys 2014, 42–43). 
But what does this animated embodiment in a smart city look like? If
the bodies in digitally mediated cities are not all confgured as the ‘body-as-
organism’, the body that we see pictured, the massy body bounded by skin, if
some forms of embodiment do not look like that anymore, then how do we
see them? 
Levitt’s (2018) response is to look at a range of visual animations diferently. She 
looks and reads a range of flms and books not as representations but as animations. 
In animations, says Levitt, things are only erased, mutated, or resurrected; things 
are not categorised but transformed. Her methodology is therefore to read anima-
tions not for their correspondences, references, and presences, but rather for their 
transformative generation of novel sensations. Animation must be seen as an enact-
ment; it exemplifes, not signifes; it must be looked at less for what and more for 
how. She turns her gaze to dolls, automata, cyborgs, and robots, and other urban 
inhabitants that have long featured in flms as not-quite-human. These are fgures, 
she says, that continue to look human enough for viewers to relate to them but that 
are also diferent enough to suggest other forms of lively animation. They retain 
‘just enough resemblance so that its potentials—if not the extent of its “dimen-
sions, depths, and distances”—become graspable’ (Levitt 2018, 51). This potential 
is the animatory vitality of recombinant invention and other forms of emergent 
embodiment. 
Here we might turn to semi-autonomous technologies such as food delivery 
robots, trundling alongside other pedestrians, or driverless cars; we might consider 
the ‘data doubles’ that shadow corporeal bodies in city streets (Cheney-Lippold 
2017). But we might also turn to the viewer in animatic ways of seeing. Rather 
than the cinematic regime’s positioning of the analytical spectator as separate from 
the screen, animations tend to merge and exchange image space and body space 
(Levitt 2018, 83). The screen is now an interface. ‘A user is not consolidated in 
identity but rather . . . consist[s] of roving populations of action in the network’ 
(Halpern 2015, 240). No longer a single point of view framed by perspectival tech-
niques, the spectator becomes a constantly mobile point of view, decentred, zoom-
ing and hovering through an environment that seems to have no frame. Elsaesser 
(2013, 240) describes this unanchored viewing, tracking seamlessly through spaces 
from the nano to the planetary, as ‘the default value of digital vision’ (and points to 
its non-digital precedents in a range of eforts to create convincing three-dimen-
sional flms). 
This suggests that looking for animatory embodiments means being particularly 
attentive to erasure, mutation, re-emergence, mobility, and this is a vocabulary that 
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Refguring city spaces as animatory 
If animatory bodies are organised as emergent, combinatory patterns of data, then 
so too are the spaces of digitally mediated cities. Geographers have been particu-
larly attentive to the various dynamics through which city spaces are digitally refg-
ured (Rose 2017; 2018; Wilmott 2016; Wilson 2014). Here, the plethora of digital 
visualisations that now bring urban spaces into visibility are particularly relevant 
(Halpern 2015). Cities now are insistently visualised through multiple interfaces, in 
diferent formats, genres, and media. There is no single frame, no nest of scales, no 
coherent territory. Diferent images merge and blend, and the same image reap-
pears in diferent contexts. Rather like Steinbock’s (2019) trans account of cinema, 
this is a way of seeing cities through cuts and layers, disjunctures and recombina-
tions, mutations and excrescences. References to a real become references to mul-
tiple reals, which become a seamless dissolution of one real into another, which 
in turn becomes more visual fow, exemplifed in videos evoking the smart city 
that seamlessly mutate between multiple types of visualisations of city spaces (Rose 
2018). Cities are thus also constantly transformed in the ‘mixed-space efect’ of 
animation (Levitt 2018, 68). 
An example, paradoxically, is the smart city control centre. As the site for visu-
alising many kinds of data regarding a city, a smart control centre without doubt 
works in part on a representational logic: what truth is this data representing, and 
how therefore should the city be managed? However, as Luque-Ayala and Mar-
vin (2016; Marvin and Luque-Ayala 2017) point out in their accounts of Rio de 
Janeiro’s smart operations centre, the centre is also a site that generates multiple 
spatialities through which Rio materialises diferently. It enacts an infrastructure 
through which all sorts of things move—people, electricity, rainfall, trafc—but 
which may also fail at any moment. The operations centre produces a network of 
logistical circulation but is also a nodal site for maintenance and incident control. 
Through the operations centre, ‘the city is reconfgured as a space of agility, ef-
ciency, modularity, fexibility and confgurability’ (Marvin and Luque-Ayala 2017, 
92), and these spaces of the digitally mediated urban operating system may not 
align. The city as bricolage morphs between these confgurations as the data from 
all kinds of urban sensors ficker across its screens. 
Re-refguring digitally mediated cities and bodies 
So, if we think about the digitally mediated city and ask—where are the bodies?— 
this chapter has suggested that there are several ways to answer the question. Draw-
ing on Levitt’s (2018) work, the chapter has sketched a regime of representation and 
what it makes visible, and a regime of animation and how it makes things live. The 
chapter has discussed how bodies in the digitally mediated city can be thought of 
representationally in terms of features distributed across epidermal surfaces, which 
represent certain pre-existing social categories and can be analysed. Animatic bod-
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and mutating. These two confgurations are constitutive of not only how embodi-
ments are made visible but also diferent regimes of seeing. Moreover, they consti-
tute diferent organisations of urban space. Representational and animatic bodies 
are constituted through diferent kinds of spatial organisation, and so too are the 
cities they inhabit. Urban representational regimes profer a city about which some 
truths can be known. Animatic cities, on the other hand, are fuid and emergent. 
The question of power in this visual culture remains, as always. Representational 
and animatic regimes of urban embodiment have diferent accounts of power. In 
representational regimes, power consists of the ability to analyse, identify, and label 
bodies and spaces; to misrepresent; to exclude and render invisible. The power of 
animatic regimes also rests in the power to analyse and defne, but also to extract, 
transfgure, morph, and assimilate corporealities and cities. Each requires diferent 
actions, engagements, resistances, and ethics. Urban scholars often seek resistance 
to exclusion. But animation demands a diferent critique. If the animatic apparatus 
reorders the self as data .  .  . then it is important to continue opening out 
the question of the self and its constituent, relational others in order to see 
what kinds of relations are facilitated and prohibited in the process and what 
consequences various enactments of relationality will have, for ‘us’ and ‘the 
world’ at large. 
(Kember and Zylinska 2012, 112) 
The challenge, then, is to calibrate potentials for other transformations and 
potentials (Clough 2018), and other recombinations (Rose 2017), in urban data 
circulations. 
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Transformative aspects of migration 
and tourism 
Stefanie Bürkle 
This visual essay explores the issue of “spatial transformation” through photographs 
of various places in Berlin (Alexanderplatz, Gendarmenmarkt, Lustgarten, Dong 
Xuan Center), Korea (Dogil Maeul, Seoul, Songdo), and China (Shenzhen, Win-
dow of the World), in which very diferent cultural ideas of urban space can be 
found. 
In this case, “refguring spaces” refers to an ongoing transformation of urban 
space, which is defned by means of the cultural concepts of center and rim, outer 
and inner spatiality. My photographs often capture spatially marginal situations, 
which ofer a behind-the-scenes peek into these ideas of space. The shift from liv-
ing urban spaces to empty stages, where the city appears to be nothing more than 
a backdrop, was not solely caused by the lockdown during the corona outbreak in 
spring 2020. 
The selection of photographs in this essay covers a time frame from 2006 to 2020 
and in part originated within the context of the art project “Migrating Spaces and 
Tourism” (a subproject of the Collaborative Research Center 1265 “Re-Figuration 
of Spaces”), which explores the overlapping of migration and tourism in physical 
urban space. I have arranged the single images into a series, a continuous band of 
images. The absence of captions frees the viewers from a purely content-based 
classifcation of the images, transforming them into travelers between the spaces. 
Isolated motifs reappear in the preceding or following image, thus creating new 
compositional and content-related connections beyond the images. Objects and 
perspectives link the pictures and form a new visual texture. Connections and 
transitions are the focus of the observation. Single images become interrupted, 
only to be continued when fipping to the next page. Hence, this series of images 
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Art and research project:MIGRATOURISPACE | Space Migration and Tourism 
Director: Stefanie Bürkle 
Assistant director: Janin Walter 
Scientific assistance: Ilkin Akpinar,Berit Hummel,Tae Wong Huur,Aaron Lang 
This visual essay was produced as part of the DFG-financed project “Migrating 
Spaces and Tourism.” The project is part of the CRC 1265 “Re-Figuration 





































Ilse Helbrecht, Janina Dobrusskin, 
Carolin Genz, and Lucas Pohl 
Globalization anxieties from a geographical perspective 
In the year 2016, the majority of the British people voted in a referendum to leave 
the European Union. The results of the national election in 2019 strongly reaf-
frmed this Brexit vote, and by now, the UK has already left the EU. At the same 
time, Donald Trump governs the United States of America with a new policy of 
“America First,” thereby shaking up the geopolitical order and demanding new 
foreign, trade, and military politics from most of its partners around the globe. On 
the same note, the global corona pandemic has provoked a widespread closing of 
national borders and a preliminary end of globalization “as we know it.” While 
many states and governments are predominantly engaged in reorienting their geo-
political positioning as a result, people from various crisis regions are increasingly 
claiming political asylum in areas such as the United States or Europe. Civil wars 
and both social and democratic uprisings in Syria, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iran 
have created a global refugee population, caused and accompanied by enormous 
human sufering through war crimes and forced displacement. Hence, millions of 
refugees are attempting to come by foot, boat, bus, or train in a desperate efort to 
enter the EU and the US—risking their lives at the harsh, ever more militarized 
borders of the West. And even more refugees live in “indefnite exile” in refugee 
camps across the global South, only poorly provided by the UNHRC like in Jordan 
or Kenya (Hyndman and Giles 2016, 2). 
Yet, whereas Western countries are viewed as safe havens from the perspective of 
international refugees, within Europe and North America new anxieties are being 
stirred against economic and political globalization as well as international migra-
tion. A strong right-wing populism has arisen, with populist (party) leaders like 
Marie Le Pen in France, Matteo Salvini in Italy, or Björn Höcke in Germany, who 
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even legally be called a “fascist,” as ruled recently by a German court (Verwaltungs-
gericht Meiningen 2019). This national populism has been institutionalized, either 
in new political parties all over Europe like the “Front National” in France, the 
“Lega Nord” in Italy, or the “Alternative für Deutschland” in Germany, or it has 
captured traditional, established parties like the “Republicans” headed by Donald 
Trump. Sadly enough, racism, sexism, homophobia, and islamophobia are (back) 
on the agenda. And it is through mechanisms of fear, of rising anxiety towards 
“the stranger” or “the other”—which can be the refugee, the migrant, or your 
neighbor next door—that new waves of nationalism and territorial security poli-
cies are legitimized. Hence, whereas the 20th century ended with the hopeful fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the termination of the Cold War, the beginning of the 21st 
century is marked by revanchist movements of right-wing populism, the erection 
of new (state and cultural) borders, and the return of xenophobia, of fear towards 
the stranger. 
We argue that what seems like a paradox at frst glance—the simultaneous 
existence of consummate globalization, on one hand, and the rise of xenophobic 
nationalism, on the other hand—is structurally linked. After all, it is not by accident 
that (economic) globalization irritates national identities or even deeply unsettles 
personal identities (Anselmi 2018; Steger and James 2019). Quite the opposite, we 
suggest, it is in fact the personal and deeply emotional level of the subject that is 
strongly afected by globalization, i.e. processes of increasing exchange and interac-
tion on a global scale (Nagar et al. 2002; Kinnvall 2004; Matthews and Sidhu 2005; 
Sassen 2013; Dirksmeier and Helbrecht 2015a). It is the basic trust of people in 
the continuity of their identity, the continuity of their life, and the continuity of 
their environment—in a nutshell: their ontological security (Laing 1990; Giddens 
1991)—that is challenged and at times even highly at risk through globalization. 
Thus, rising ontological insecurity can partially contribute to the emergence of 
new nationalist populist currents, besides other factors such as political persuasions. 
These far-reaching efects of globalization on personal afects and identities have 
to be scrutinized (Dirksmeier and Helbrecht 2015b) if we are to understand the 
sweeping changes of national sentiment and international resentment that can be 
observed in many countries worldwide. Thus, we uphold the argument that it is 
only through a multiscale analysis, combining the most intimate scale of personal 
development and psychological processes, on one hand, with broader national 
political discourses and/or global formations, on the other hand, that we can fully 
understand the (re)emergence of nationalism, racism, and xenophobia. Certainly, 
this is exactly what feminist scholars have long argued for: applying an embodied, 
feminist perspective to geopolitics and political geography (Hyndman 2004; 2019). 
Therefore, in this chapter, we aim to explore some of the geographical depth 
in these anxieties. What are we afraid of in times of globalization? Which kind of 
insecurity is raised through the continuously intensifying processes of economic 
exchange, international migration, and communication? And, more importantly, 
how do we reassure ourselves in times of disorienting societal dynamics? Which 
spatial routines, practices, places, and imaginations help us to stabilize our own 
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identities and the positioning of self in such a dynamically changing world? Because 
fully understanding the complete picture of the globalization-anxiety complex is 
required in order to grapple with it, address it politically and culturally, and, thus, 
help overcome the fatal return of xenophobia, racism, and their likes. 
It was Anthony Giddens who frst addressed these pressing questions. As early 
as 1991, he argued that late modernity is characterized by intense processes of 
globalization and disembedding, which strongly infuence the institutional com-
position of modern societies, as well as the very personal dispositions, emotions, 
and self-identities of each and every individual: “The reorganisation of time and 
space, plus the disembedding mechanisms, radicalize and globalize pre-established 
institutional traits of modernity; and they act to transform the content and nature 
of day-to-day social life” (Giddens 1991, 2). Giddens goes on to argue that it is a 
particularly demanding task of late modernity, that the self—as well as institutions 
and the state—has to refexively construct an identity “amid a puzzling diversity of 
options and possibilities” (Giddens 1991, 3). 
In this chapter, we will scrutinize the modern task of identity building in times 
of globalization through the lens of ontological security. We argue that the con-
cept of ontological security helps us to understand some of the more fundamen-
tal dimensions and dynamics of identity challenges caused by globalization. Yet, 
although extensive literature on ontological security is available in the felds of 
sociology and psychology, there is barely any geographical scrutiny or application 
of the concept in debates on globalization. This is all the more surprising as spatial 
questions are at the very core of processes of globalization and ontological security 
and insecurity, likewise, as we will explain further on. 
Hence, in this chapter we will apply a specifc geographic reading to the lit-
erature on ontological security. We thereby achieve a spatialization of the concept 
of ontological security, which is helpful in comprehending the role and workings 
of ontological (in)security in the face of globalization. Furthermore, we draw on 
empirical fndings from our Berlin case study on ontological (in)security and geo-
graphical imaginations. Between the years 2018 and 2020, we applied the method 
of photo-elicitation and conducted 60 qualitative interviews and three focus groups 
in Berlin (Germany). In terms of the composition of our respondents, we strove for 
a fairly mixed sample, representing diferent age groups (aged 15 to 70) and gender 
identities equally (30 female, 30 male respondents). Only in the social composition 
did we strive for a rather polarized profle, capturing the geographical imagina-
tions of globalization from 32 people with a rather marginalized background, on 
the one hand, in order to compare them with 28 people who can be considered 
elite due to their high income and cultural and social capital, on the other hand. In 
these interviews, we examined subjective notions of ontological security on vari-
ous scales from the body to the global.1 
Based on our empirical fndings, we propose three spatial modes for how indi-
viduals aim to attain ontological security by geographical means: a) geopolitical 
positioning, b) home-making, and c) nature-related routines. The geographical 
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achieved. Hence, we argue, it is only through a spatialized, geographic understand-
ing of ontological security that we fully grasp the complex relationships between 
globalization, self-identity, and ontological security. We pay particular attention to 
the manners in which ontological security is attained. In order to be accountable 
to society, the feld of social sciences must not limit itself to identifying problems, 
but rather contribute to solving them. 
What is ontological security? 
Humanist psychiatrist Ronald D. Laing frst developed the concept of “ontologi-
cal security” in order to grasp what it takes to be, to become, and to stay mentally 
healthy. Having observed and treated mentally ill persons professionally, he claims 
that it is a certain characteristic feature that distinguishes the mentally healthy (for 
example non-schizophrenic) person: “ontological security” (Laing 1990, 39). 
A man (sic) may have a sense of his presence in the world as a real, alive,
whole, and, in a temporal sense, continuous person. As such, he can live
out into the world and meet others: a world and others experienced as
equally real, alive, whole, and continuous. Such a basically ontologically
secure person will encounter all the hazards of life, social, ethical, spiritual,
biological, from a centrally firm sense of his own and other people’s reality
and identity. 
(Laing 1990, 39) 
Using the schizophrenic as a counterpoint, Laing carves out a quintessential char-
acteristic of mental health and personal autonomy: an existential and thus onto-
logical posture, where an individual feels secure about her own identity, the role 
of other persons as counterparts in life, and the existence of a continuous environ-
ment, a (material) world around them. Thus, it is the very being-in-the-world of 
the subject in a “real, alive, whole, and continuous” way that the concept of onto-
logical security grasps. Without it, mental instability or even madness lurks around 
the corner. Hence, ontological security is a “basic need” (Mitzen 2006a). 
Anthony Giddens complements this psychological insight from a sociological 
perspective. He elucidates that, in our current state of late modernity, a heightened 
need for self-refexivity, positioning, and identity formation is needed due to the 
disorienting dynamics of what geographer David Harvey has coined “time-space 
compression” (Harvey 1989, 4f ) and Giddens calls time-space distanciation: 
Transformations in self-identity and globalization, I want to propose, are 
the two poles of the dialectic of the local and the global in conditions of 
high modernity. . . . the level of time-space distanciation introduced by high 
modernity is so extensive that, for the first time in human history, “self ” and 
“society” are interrelated in a global milieu. 
(Giddens 1991, 32) 
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Almost everyone is immersed today in a globally connected world and has to posi-
tion themselves within. 
This “global milieu” through which self and society now navigate their ways 
confronts the individual—and as other authors in political geography and interna-
tional relations have argued, also the state (Huysmans 1998; Mitzen 2006a; 2006b; 
Hyndman and Giles 2016)—with the pressing task of (re)considering, (re)invent-
ing, (re)building, or (re)afrming the feelings and notions of ontological secu-
rity. For Giddens, this implies providing answers to existential “questions about 
ourselves, others, and the object-world” (Giddens 1991, 37). The less ontological 
security exists, the less agency is possible. Because it is only if we know who we are, 
and in which world we live, that we can know and decide what to do—and why. 
The threat of meaninglessness has to be countered by the construction of a reassur-
ing identity. “Armed with ontological security, the individual will know how to act 
and therefore how to be herself ” (Mitzen 2006a, 345). 
Yet, if ontological security is partial, volatile, or not fully achieved by an indi-
vidual, then—as Laing argues from a psychological perspective and Giddens from a 
sociological standpoint—anxieties are bound to arise. These anxieties are existen-
tial, because they concern the very relationship between self and world. Moreover, 
they are ontological, because they are rooted in the mode of being in the world. In 
contrast to fear, anxiety is “free foating: lacking a specifc object” (Giddens 1991, 
44). Hence, the very amorphous character of globalization processes, their disperse, 
fuid, and abstract dynamics, make them prone to stir anxieties. While fear relates 
to an “objective danger” that can be located in the world “out there,” anxiety has 
no object that could be located in a particular place. “Anxiety is characterized by 
the fact that what threatens is nowhere” (Heidegger 2001, 231). Anxiety confronts 
us with our self, our being-in-the-world. 
Consequently, refecting back on some of the phenomena discussed in the intro-
duction, such as Brexit, America First, and the rise of right-wing parties, we come 
to understand that these political currents, which are heavily based on nationalist 
identity politics, are strongly (but of course not exclusively) linked to ontological 
insecurity. Voting for national independency, strengthening national borders, and 
stirring feelings of fear towards strangers are practices of navigating the self and 
society through a global milieu. It involves taking a spatialized (i.e. often national-
ized) stance towards global challenges and thereby fostering ontological security of 
the self through—equally social and territorial—exclusion. 
Thus, besides other important factors such as political persuasions and racism, 
ontological insecurity helps to understand the multidimensional roots of right-
wing populism. It particularly adds the existential dimension of the subject, its 
self-identity, and being-in-the-world to the discourse. Long before Brexit and sim-
ilar nationalist identity movements occurred, Catarina Kinnvall was already argu-
ing in 2004 that globalization destabilizes and even threatens self-identities and, 
thereby, nationalism and religious orthodoxies become “simple answers” (Kinnvall 
2004, 742). She claims that people who are “uprooted from their original social 
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world could tend “to ‘de-modernize,’” by which she means essentializing their own 
national or religious identity and even: “Going back to an imagined past” (Kin-
nvall 2004, 744). Such a backward-oriented, essentializing securitization of subject 
identities is as powerful as it is costly for those constructed as the inferior “Other.” 
“Increasing ontological security for one person or group by means of national-
ist or religious myths and traumas is thus likely to decrease security for those not 
included in the nationalist and/or religious discourse” (Kinnvall 2004, 763). 
Therefore, the pressing personal and societal task of searching for ontological 
security in a globalized world is never innocent. It is highly power-loaded. And on 
that account, it bears an enormous responsibility for self and other. It is here, we 
argue, that a spatialized, intrinsically geographic perspective on ontological security 
can deeply enhance and complement the existing psychological refections on the 
self and sociological refections on late modernity. In what follows, we argue that 
there are particular geographical imaginations that people hold that help them to 
establish ontological security in a globalized world. 
A spatialized approach: how to achieve ontological 
security in a globalized world 
In our empirical research, we found particular spatial strategies that are deployed 
to achieve ontological security in the face of globalization in the 21st century. 
Drawing on insights from our interviews and inspired by a geographic reading of 
the relevant literature, we suggest three ways by which individuals can attain onto-
logical security by spatial means. For this purpose, the notion of a “geographical 
imagination,” which was profoundly conceptualized by David Harvey, is central to 
our argument. Because Harvey’s notion of the geographical imagination elaborates 
what is truly at stake: the geographical imagination 
enables the individual to recognize the role of space and place in his (sic) 
own biography, to relate to the spaces he sees around him, and to recognize 
how transactions between individuals and between organizations are affected 
by the space that separates them. It allows him to recognize the relationship 
which exists between him and his neighborhood, his territory, or, to use the 
language of the street gangs, his “turf.” It allows him to judge the relevance 
of events in other places (on other peoples’ “turf ”)—to judge whether the 
march of communism in Vietnam, Thailand and Laos is or is not relevant to 
him wherever he is now. It allows him also to fashion and use space creatively 
and to appreciate the meaning of the spatial forms created by others. 
(Harvey 1973 quoted in Harvey 2005, 212) 
This geographical imagination becomes central when we reassure ourselves in 
times of disorienting societal dynamics. In geographical imaginations, we enun-
ciate spatial practices and routines that help us stabilize our own identities and 
position ourselves in the changing world. Imaginations evoke power—they shape 
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practices and social orders. Moreover, imaginations are infuenced by the subject´s 
embodied intersectionality (Gieseking 2017). In what follows, we present three 
particular dimensions of geographical imaginations that help our interviewees to 
feel ontologically secure in a globalized world: through imaginations and practices 
of a) geopolitical positioning, b) home-making, and c) nature-related routines. 
Geopolitical positioning 
A fundamental task that has to be surmounted in order to establish ontological 
security is designing and developing a subjective understanding of the world in 
which the individual is living. Individuals have to situate themselves in the world. 
For this purpose, they require a conception of the social order in which they 
are living. Furthermore, an understanding of the world in the broader sense of a 
Weltbild helps to situate, locate, position, and thus anchor individuals in their lives. 
The literature often stresses the relevance of developing a notion of a social order, 
referring to a general idea about the normative and symbolic order of society, 
which helps the individual to remain ontologically secure (Huysmans 1998, 242). 
However, we argue that this rather non-spatial contemplation of social order does 
not fully address the particularly spatial identity challenges posed by globalization— 
neither for the individual nor for the state. 
The ability to “judge the events in other places” and relate them to the spaces 
we see around us, as Harvey (2005, 212) puts it, is a truly spatial positioning of 
the self and a consistent topic running through our interviews in Berlin (Genz 
et al. 2021). We encountered many narratives of geographical imaginations—for 
example, Ukraine and the Russian occupation of the Crimea, the Syrian war and 
its consequences for the situation of refugees in Germany—where Berlin citizens 
of all ages, genders, and class backgrounds tried to make sense of the new world 
order, Berlin’s situation, and their own place therein. Through photo-elicitation 
interviews, where representations of various spatial settings were provided as visual 
stimuli for narration and interpretation, it became crystal clear how extensive peo-
ple’s eforts were to try to make sense of major geopolitical shifts in order to achieve 
ontological security in their everyday lives. 
In one of our interviews, a 50-year-old man who lives in a small apartment on 
the outskirts of Berlin provided us with his account of the ‘Berlin truck attack’ in 
the year 2016, when a truck driver deliberately drove into a Christmas market in 
Berlin, leaving 12 people dead and 56 injured. This assault was vividly debated in 
the German media, primarily in the context of rising Islamist terrorism in Europe 
and the United States. Our interviewee expressed his concerns in the form of a 
geopolitical reading and positioning of the event. 
Uncertainty, ambiguous, it’s both. . . . I am just saying how much has hap-
pened since the attack here [in Berlin] last year or two years ago, the Christmas 
market. You can understand other countries that are handling these issues 
differently, of course, where that doesn’t happen, but as I said, we haven’t had 
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a war since 1945. . . . And I don’t want to experience one either, but we . . . 
don’t know where we are heading, and there is this political uncertainty. And 
that was also a reason why I wanted to stay here in Germany. 
(Interview B5, 143) 
The perceived uncertainties and ambiguity of the new geopolitical order become 
visible in the interviewee’s wish to attain ontological security by geographical 
means, geopolitical positioning, for instance: his desire to “stay here in Germany.” 
As the interview quote illustrates, it is the very spatial dimension of our positional-
ity and being in the world that requires reinterpretation. Particularly, the identity 
question has returned in its most spatial sense. This is also what the rise of national-
ist populism signifes (Steger and James 2019). 
Thus, as feminist dialectical thinking has argued all along, it is important to 
understand international politics and geopolitical events as always “co-constituted 
with the local, the intimate and private subjectivities” (Botterill, Hopkins, and 
Sanghera 2019, 468). The literature on feminist geopolitics has convincingly 
shown how important it is—in these uncertain and confusing times even more 
so—to attend to the embodied geopolitics of everyday life, and thus to scruti-
nize and understand the struggles and perceptions of ordinary people as part of 
the geopolitical (Botterill, Hopkins, and Sanghera 2019; Dowler and Sharp 2001; 
Hyndman 2004, 2019; Pain and Smith 2008). The interconnectedness of multiple 
scales related to (ontological) security run through our interviews and the narrative 
presentations of self as a recurring topic. 
Anthony Giddens has posited that ontological security is primarily based on 
conceptions of social order that are part of the unconscious and practical conscious-
ness, and enlivened in routines. Based on our research, we claim that the opposite 
holds true as well: people also struggle consciously and cognitively to make sense 
of the complex shifts in our contemporary geopolitical situation. Being refexive 
and conscious about the social order and our own positioning therein creates the 
opportunity to refect on privileges (being held, how they are distributed, or being 
lost); it could also bear the potential of an empowering moment, with the discov-
ery of people in the same (deprived) geopolitical position. In any case, ontologi-
cal security can only be attained if individuals achieve a trustworthy and reliable 
geographical imagination that frames and supports their positioning. To more fully 
understand these relations, much further feminist geopolitical research is necessary. 
Home-making 
Making yourself at home is yet another highly important spatial practice that is 
strongly linked with procuring ontological security. In our interviews, deep, sub-
jective, emotional meanings of “home” were often brought up by the respondents 
as a necessary precondition for their ontological security (Pohl et al. 2020). In fact, 
it was often the frst place they mentioned when thinking about their well-being 
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the home to be a builder of ontological security. Additionally, what makes for a 
home has been widely discussed in the literature on housing studies and geogra-
phies of home (Blunt and Dowling 2006). The following main characteristics recur 
in various studies: having a private space free of surveillance; having space to live 
one’s identity and establish it on a daily basis through recurring routines; decorat-
ing and creating one’s own space in a way that refects one’s sense of belonging 
and identity (Dupuis and Thorn 1998, 33). Furthermore, this all strongly depends 
on individual characteristics, such as age, social status, gender, and cultural back-
ground. Yet, the very need for a home in order to feel secure echoes through all 
our interviews. The home becomes a haven to retreat to and nurture one’s subjec-
tive sense of identity. 
Nevertheless, feelings of being at home do not necessarily correlate with the 
material place of living. People refer to places they have never been as their “home” 
or that they have lost after moving somewhere else. Thus, for most people, a pro-
found sense of security does not involve living at their material home as a place 
of residence, but rather is connected to the feeling of belonging. With regard to a 
more abstract understanding of home as the imagined place of belonging, we aim 
to sensitize present for wider notions of home through imaginations. 
In urban studies, home has long since been considered a space of individualiza-
tion and intimate personal development (Bahrdt 1961). Thus, it is not surprising 
that the home also plays a major role in shaping ontological security. Interestingly 
enough, though, the form of tenure is not a determining factor whatsoever. Home 
owners are by no means more inclined to be ontologically secure (Hiscock et al. 
2001). Although the ideology of a homeowner society suggests (Saunders 1990) 
that homeowners feel more secure in their lives, this does not hold true when 
tested empirically (Behring and Helbrecht 2002; Elsvinga et al. 2007). 
It was Ronald D. Laing who observed early on: “When there is uncertainty of 
identity in time, there is a tendency to rely on spatial means of identifying oneself ” 
(Laing 1990, 109). Ever since, numerous studies involving homeowners, social 
renters, and even homeless people have confrmed that “housing can provide a 
fundamental building block for ontological security” (Padgett 2007, 1937). Hence, 
ontological security is “strongly linked to the material environment” (Dupuis and 
Thorn 1998, 30) and the material practices of building oneself a home—a critical 
source of ontological security that tends to be overlooked in most sociological or 
political discussions. An embodied way of expressing the own being in the world is 
of great importance (Giddens 1991, 53f ). 
For this embodiment to take place, it is crucial to insist that no material environ-
ment can “in-itself ” bring about ontological security. What it requires is a subject 
who feels emotionally attached to their environment—the subject has to “occupy” 
this place both physically and mentally. 
If we narrow our home down to only one place, then there should be free 
space and room for oneself. Space in which you are not so restricted and can 
simply let your thoughts flow freely, for example. . . . but otherwise, it is also 
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connected strongly with feelings and people. The feeling that, if you are in 
this room with your best friends or your boyfriend, it can feel like home. 
(Interview B20, 39) 
Therefore, home is not limited to “the physical structure of a house”; rather, it 
relates to the moment “when such spaces are inscribed with meaning” (Easthope 
2004, 135). Hence, home always involves the subjective labor and process of home-
making in order to create a sense of ontological security through being at home. 
Nature-related routines 
Routines are per se a common denominator for the production of ontological 
security (Mitzen 2006a; 2006b, 349; Kinnvall 2004). Through the establishment of 
(daily) routines, frightening questions and fundamental doubts about ontological 
insecurity are kept at bay. In the literature, it is disputed whether these routines are 
rather unconscious practices, which in Giddens’ terminology are enlivened as part 
of the practical consciousness (Giddens 1991), or whether people consciously try 
to establish routines in order to tackle ontological insecurity (Dupuis and Thorn 
1998, 30). In any case, routines and customs are created over time. It is this trust in 
one’s routines and habits in particular that can act as a bufer: 
In the unstable world of endless change characterized by the trust deficit, 
the trust in habit offers a very powerful proposition on how to manage the 
discontinuity, how to enhance the predictability of surroundings through 
compressing action and how to train for embracing progression and change. 
(Misztal 2019, 57) 
Based on our Berlin case study, it is clear that people establish a routine in their 
everyday life by visiting certain places, which are often in nature. To frequent a 
certain walk through a park, along a river bank, a lake, or a forest path can help 
people to reassure themselves of where they are, who they are, and what they want 
to do. In doing so, this (re)assurance is often experienced through a moment of 
freedom and independence from social relationships with others, such as friends or 
family. For instance, in a quote from one of our interviews, a person talked about 
the reason behind his passion for lonely walks in the woods: “Because I am alone 
and I can breathe in nature or the smells there and I am shielded from the noise of 
the city” (Interview B14, 36). 
Giddens already foresaw the special role nature might play in the formation of 
ontological security today. In spaces of nature, he claimed, people could feel at ease 
with their being-in-the-world (Dupuis and Thorn 1998, 28). Our interviewees 
in Berlin confrm this assumption. People from various age groups, genders, and 
social backgrounds reported that it is in spaces of nature—in the woods, at the sea-
side, in the mountains, or wherever personal preferences take them—where they 
root, regain, and recharge their ontological security. “It is calm and also alive. I love 
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green. And I love nature anyway. I feel very connected, I can relax. So, I can thaw 
there” (Interview B13, 41). It is reasonable to assume that places in nature function 
as counterspaces to the highly engineered, urbanized, and fast-moving environ-
ment most of our interviewees experience in their globalized everyday lives. The 
possibility to see, smell, and feel utterly emerged in “pristine nature” becomes a 
rare opportunity against the backdrop of planetary urbanization. Especially in the 
Anthropocene, where it becomes increasingly difcult (if not impossible) to view 
nature as being separated from humanity, a new quest for nature and natural habi-
tats might begin. 
Global anxieties, global identity, and global citizenship 
Globalization has changed just about everything. Through processes of interna-
tional marketization, migration, communication, colonization, and economic and 
cultural exchange, the world has shrunk while expanding at the same time. Global-
ization processes have connected and uprooted, disembedded, and transformed the 
lives and perceptions of people around the globe. From Calcutta to Cologne, from 
Helsinki to Hong Kong, from Johannesburg to Rio de Janeiro: we are witnessing 
“the making and unmaking of new models of global citizenship” (Roy 2016, 27). 
This implies the many ways that people in diferent places, from diferent genera-
tions and with diferent social backgrounds, imagine themselves to be “empowered 
global citizens” who live in and shape a global milieu (Roy 2016, 27). However, 
in contrast to hopes for a global cosmopolitanism, in the UK, on the European 
continent, and in the United States, nationalism and religious orthodoxy are on the 
rise again (Kinnvall 2004). 
In this chapter, we have used the concept of ontological security to explore the 
depth and extension of globalization anxieties. When we speak of ontological secu-
rity, existential questions are always implied. If we scrutinize globalization anxiet-
ies as the emergence of ontological insecurity, and thus as an intrinsic dynamic in 
the relationship between the subject and the world, we can start to fnd answers 
to questions surrounding the new ontological positioning of the self in relation to 
processes of globalization and time-space compression. 
Therefore, we argue that a spatialized understanding of ontological security—in 
other words, the use of a geographical imagination—not only will allow us to 
understand the immense irritations and uncertainties that are stirred up by global-
ization (and the fundamental spatial transformations that are evoked in turn), but 
also becomes an alley of thought that helps us understand how to build ontological 
security in times of globalization. Based on our empirical research in Berlin and 
a geographic reading of the literature, we have shown how immensely impor-
tant a spatialized understanding of globalization anxiety is. Spatial phenomena are 
of utmost importance in order to understand how ontological security can be 
attained. 
The empirical evidence from our Berlin case points towards three modes of spa-
tial practices that people deploy to personally deal with the fundamental anxieties 
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stirred by spatial transformations: a) by developing geographical imaginations of 
new geopolitical positionings; b) by establishing imaginative practices of home-
making and attaching meaning to home; and c) by routinely seeking out spaces in 
nature that help root as well as regain and charge ontological security through the 
reassertion of one’s self-identity. We have shown how a spatial approach can help to 
understand these modes as particular strategies to resist the insecurities emanating 
from (economic) globalization. These spatial practices and strategies are ways to 
achieve ontological security in a globalized world with which we want to engage 
in the future. Our empirical research is comprised of a comparative study, in which 
we will also compare our Berlin fndings with interviews from Singapore and Van-
couver. A future task of ours will be to compare the geographical imaginations of 
nature, home, and geopolitical positions and their particular role for the projection 
of ontological security in diferent geographic settings. 
Yet, we can already surmise from our Berlin interviews that the spatial trans-
formation called “globalization” poses a signifcant challenge to most people’s 
sense of ontological security. Though our Berlin interviewees have established for 
themselves meaningful geographical imaginations that help them feel ontologically 
secure, none of our respondents have deliberately declared themselves a “global 
citizen.” Nobody saw their self-identity connected to cosmopolitanism or referred 
to themselves as Weltbürgerin (i.e. global citizen). Hence, if we refect on the para-
dox that nationalist and xenophobic attitudes are on the rise in spite of globaliza-
tion, it seems reasonable to argue that the spatial transformation called globalization 
has been fairly limited thus far. It has not achieved or led to a global identity of the 
(late) modern subject. The many spatial transformations and refgurations implied 
by globalization to date seem only to have adhered to a rather one-dimensional 
refguration of institutional spaces in politics and the capitalist economy (Helbrecht 
et al. 2021): the establishment of tarif unions, international supply chains, immi-
gration policies, new branches of the United Nations, and the like. Yet, at the level 
of the subject, limited answers to this worldwide economic and political trans-
formation prevail, such as walking in nature, making a home, and geopolitical 
reasoning and repositioning. Therefore, we would argue, it is the one-sidedness of 
current globalization processes, i.e. their economic and political reductionism, that 
hinders the formation of a subjective global identity. 
All things considered, since spatiality is an integral part of globalization and 
time-space compression, it is also within the realm of the spatiality of self, society, 
and world that we can fnd constructive answers to the current challenges and 
threats of ontological insecurity. To include the perspective of the everyday and the 
subject into research on globalization has long been an important demand of femi-
nist scholars (Hyndman 2019). Particularly on issues of security and insecurity, the 
contributions from feminist geopolitics have been numerous (Williams and Mas-
saro 2013). If we want to prevent a relapse to nationalist populist sentiments in Ger-
many (and elsewhere) and achieve ontological security in times of globalization, it 
seems mandatory that we continue our move towards feminist geopolitical research. 
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by economic globalization can we tackle the dangerous nationalist and xenophobic 
currents—on a personal as well as on a social scientifc basis. This shift in perspec-
tive towards a feminist geopolitics is at least twofold. First, it includes a focus on 
the embodied subjects and the everyday. Second, a “feminist understanding of 
globalization requires substantial conceptual, analytical, and epistemological shifts” 
(Nagar et al. 2002, 279). By this, we mean the necessity to address globalization 
and the ontological insecurity it stirs as truly spatial processes that can only be fully 
understood through the deployment of a geographic perspective. 
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WHERE WE TURN TO 
Rethinking networks, urban space, 
and research methods 
Talja Blokland, Daniela Krüger, Robert Vief, 
and Henrik Schultze 
To whom do we turn for support, and where? 
Activists and policymakers often assume that neighborhoods are signifcant for 
social support. Sociologists have a strong tradition of studying how social sup-
port develops and sustains in physical proximity of “neighborhoods.” They study 
mobility as interfering with networks, neighborhoods, and an assumed warmth and 
strength of urban communities. Public concerns with individualization, lost com-
munity, and urban loneliness (Blokland 2017) refect a re-assessment of personal 
ties in European cities in particular. Moreover, with the retreat of welfare states, 
Europeans have had to adjust to a rescaling of citizenship to the urban dimension 
(Blokland et al. 2015) and to state reorganization (Le Galès 2002). 
Organizing non-state support was always standard in most cities worldwide 
(Swaan 1990). A comparative gesture (Robinson 2006) immediately highlights 
that beyond the state, getting things done may take diferent paths than fxed forms 
of social, cultural, and economic capital (Schilling, Blokland, and Simone 2019). 
Indeed, improvisations produce unplanned exchanges: urban ways of organizing 
resources are not often included, directly or routinely, in network-based sociol-
ogy (Schilling, Blokland, and Simone 2019). Additionally, while cities have always 
attracted arrivals, globalization made routes longer. The network society (Castells 
1996) refgures space in new ways (Knoblauch and Löw 2017). Translocal mobil-
ity has increased and distance no longer poses a signifcant hindrance to staying in 
touch. Thus, support cannot be simply assumed to be local. 
Social capital, ties, closeness 
Social capital, mostly defned as people’s possibilities to get by or ahead (Briggs 
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2000; Portes 1998; Granovetter 1973), is central for measuring support. Scholars 
have mapped people’s networks and investigated how neighborhood ties provide 
social capital (Völker and Flap 2007; Forrest and Kearns 2001; Middleton, Murie, 
and Groves 2005) in poverty concentration areas (Marques 2012; Wilson 2012; 
Rankin and Quane 2000; Osterling 2007) or mixed neighborhoods (Blokland and 
van Eijk 2010; Musterd and Andersson 2005; Galster 2007). Others asked whether 
moving from deprived neighborhoods produces new capital (Goering and Feins 
2003; Curley 2010; Barwick 2016; Briggs, Popkin, and Goering 2010). Most stud-
ies share two ideas. First, they diferentiate between strong, weak, and (sometimes) 
absent or invisible ties (Felder 2020). Second, they imply similar notions of how 
inequalities operate within those ties. 
The usual diferentiation between strong/weak/absent ties draws on Granovet-
ter (1973). While absent ties—“‘nodding’ relationship between people living 
on the same street” (Granovetter 1973, 1361)—have long been seen as a non-
relationship, social scientists have demonstrated that strong ties to close neighbors, 
kin, and friends help meeting needs and overcoming crises. In this context, schol-
ars have not always clearly stated whether “closeness” is spatial or emotional, and 
what defnes “emotional closeness.” The strength of ties has been perceived as a 
“(probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the 
intimacy (mutual confding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie” 
(Granovetter 1973, 1361; our italics). Therefore, studies typically measure closeness 
by frequency and reciprocity of help (e.g., Wellman and Wortley 1990; Kornienko 
et al. 2018) or by how many people respondents know, and how they perceive 
the tie’s strength, then assuming an exchange of support (Marsden and Campbell 
1984; McCarty 2002). Weak ties expand close-knit (“core”) networks and provide 
information on important subjects such as job opportunities (Granovetter 1995). 
Scholars generally consider those ties to be unrelated to emotional, intimate sup-
port and instrumental, non-afective (Wegener 1991). Low interaction frequency 
becomes an indicator of weakness. Proximity, moreover, is generally measured by 
where network members live in relation to anchors (Mollenhorst 2015). 
All this assumes that frequency creates intimacy, and that closeness means both 
disclosing secrecy and meeting often. While, practically, spatial closeness—living 
not far apart—infuences interaction frequency even in digital times, especially for 
concrete forms of transferring things between people, emotional closeness does 
not depend on proximity. Lending sugar cannot be done over an app with far-away 
persons, but how far we (digitally) travel for emotionally supporting others may 
vary greatly. Closeness is curiously underdeveloped as a concept. 
Another set of arguments regarding ties raises a similar issue. Sociologists 
acknowledge that the networked society provokes new kinds of relationships, but 
their research designs have not changed. A strong body of research has provided 
evidence that the internet boosts existing, face-to-face ties rather than new ones. 
Rainie and Wellman (2012) speak of a network revolution, characterized by a 
shift from group embeddedness (in families, work units, neighborhoods, or other 
groups) to networked individuals who knit together loosely connected or unrelated 
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social circles. If digital technology has changed how people interact (Rainie and 
Wellman 2012), and online communication has expanded the reach, number, and 
velocity of ties (McEwen and Wellman 2013), did we also, maybe, change where 
and how we seek support? If how we interact has changed, has this also afected 
the closeness of ties? If group embeddedness has become less essential, is this true 
for all, or does spatiality afect ties in diferent ways, depending on agents’ access 
to mobility? 
Methodological discussions thus far have, frstly, often concentrated on whether 
people can recall names in name-generating questions, whether potential support is 
also activated, and whether weak ties are less commonly noted (see Brewer 2000). 
Few researchers methodologically discuss the role of space in distinctions between 
strong, weak, and absent ties. 
Secondly, the division between strong/weak ties has been widely adopted in 
studies on urban inequalities. As poverty is so often studied in geographical pock-
ets, a focus on local ties has developed since classics such as Stacks (1975) or Gans 
(1962). Studies of poor people start at where they live (e.g., Brisson and Usher 
2007; Curley 2010), studies of middle-class people start with what they do, where 
they travel, and their elective belongingness (Andreotti, Le Galès, and Moreno-
Fuentes 2014), and recent work on the super-rich focuses on enclaves (Atkinson 
2019; Smithsimon 2010). Literature addressing the value of social mix for poor 
neighborhoods assumes that weak and strong ties beneft poor urbanites (Kleit 
2008; Campbell and Lee 1992; Oliver 1988), suggesting that poor residents only 
live locally with networks of people residing in the same area, in contrast to afu-
ent residents. 
This research perspective prioritizes where we reside over where we spend time. 
Specifc localities can become resource foci (Small 2009)—but this does not imply 
that network-ties exist close to each other or that all exchanges between residents 
“grow” into close network ties that name generators can catch. With changing 
ideas of what social networks are and how they operate, how we study them must 
also change (Wellman 1996). So, what happens when we do not follow the com-
mon ideas of weak/strong/absent ties and do not make “localness” a characteristic 
of a tie based on where network-members live? In other words: if being in each 
other’s physical presence in a moment of need is an important yet overlooked ele-
ment of how people organize resources (Small and Sukhu 2016), then where do 
people receive support? 
A focus on practices 
While other scholars have also challenged conventions of support and social and 
spatial proximity (Arbter 2016; Blokland and Nast 2014), Small (2017) formulated 
the strongest critique on the conceptualization of support in survey-based research. 
Small and his team conducted two interview rounds with frst-year American 
graduate students. The students’ graduate school was often located far away from 
former networks, thus creating new demands, systems, and sociability. Instead of 
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tracing network ties and then their supportiveness, Small asked what challenges 
students faced and who supported them. The students often did not turn to strong 
ties and even kept troubles secret from them. They confded in people with whom 
they had weak ties: professionals, acquaintances, or strangers “who happened to 
be there.” Small methodologically and empirically dismantled the assumptions that 
people have a fxed, durable set of people to whom they talk, and that kin and 
friends equate closeness and intimacy (also: Blokland 2019). It is not that strong ties 
do not matter, but rather that weak ties have been underestimated. Furthermore, 
how and why we avoid strong ties has been undertheorized. Small’s interview part-
ners give up secrecy (Simmel 1906) by revealing feelings like anxieties and fears. 
We intuitively tend to say that we share these feelings with closest friends and fam-
ily. In practice, we do not always do so. 
Small (2017) eloquently illustrated that, due to the fact that sociologists have 
measured (especially emotional) support rather non-refexively from one research 
project to the next because variables “worked,” we may have failed to see what 
happens in practice. From a diferent angle, we have argued in a similar direction 
(Blokland 2017; Blokland and Nast 2014) by showing that the division between 
strong/weak/absent ties neglects the contextual or spatial dimension of tie forma-
tion and maintenance. Whereas Small (2017) shows that in whom we confde 
depends partly on who happens to be there, we argued that support must not per 
defnition come from strong or even weak ties. Instead, urban sociologists should 
pay special attention to absent ties. Neighborhood use patterns or running into 
the same people locally does not automatically result in fxed sets of ties that show 
up in network surveys, but can establish public familiarity (Blokland and Nast 
2014, 1146). While moving with ease in such zones, we can engage casually with 
people who do not ft into categories of weak/strong ties (Blokland and Nast 
2014, 1146). Yet, casual encounters may result in support and information. The 
extent to which they do so is not known: how sociologists study support has not 
included absent ties extensively (exception: Arbter 2016). Could public familiarity 
facilitate resourceful exchanges? Do only resources resulting from embeddedness 
in social networks constitute social capital, or can access to resources be acquired, 
maintained, or situationally negotiated more feetingly (see Blokland et al. 2016)? 
Part of the problem is confusion about the role of networks in social capital 
defnitions—an overall connectivity of individuals, a web of afliations (Simmel 
1955)—with their meaning in survey measurements—names egos give. An in-
depth understanding of work with social capital requires understanding it as more 
than bonds/bridges. We may want to move away from a preoccupation with ties to 
one with practices (Blokland and Nast 2014; Blokland et al. 2016). 
When we map people’s networks and then measure their actual/potential sup-
port, we assume that we only get help from people we know, that ties must exist 
before being activated, and that gifts follow from ties. Starting with practices opens 
new perspectives. A gift may initiate a tie (Mauss 2002). Confding can start a rela-
tionship, so that a person does not appear on a strong ties list when researchers ask 
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sanctions or debts. Seeking support in crises with close ties assumes shared norms. 
For some LGBTQ people coming out, religious people leaving their faith, seeking 
support with family and friends may not be an option. Less emotional labor may 
be involved when confding in non-close ties: we do not have to think as much 
about what meaning personal concerns carry for others. If sociologists rely on (and 
reify) categories like friends, family, or neighbors and assume social qualities (e.g., 
intimacy, proximity, availability), we may forget that ties change and are never fxed 
(Blokland 2017, 65; Mollenhorst, Volker, and Flap 2014). Thus, we direct atten-
tion to potential productivity of interactions outside personal networks. 
For this purpose, like Small (2017), we must incorporate contexts. The con-
text of Small’s students, however, was particular: they had institutionalized meeting 
moments. Elsewhere, Small (2009) also strongly argued that organizations may 
provide support. However, not all organizations do so equally: organizations with a 
high degree of institutionalized interactions like courts or emergency departments 
may do so diferently than those with low routines, such as cafes, bars, clubs (Old-
enburg and Brissett 1982), or bus stops (Desmond 2012). As such, the spatiality 
of meeting moments matters and provides people with diferent opportunities for 
“meeting and mating” (Small and Adler 2019). 
Studies with qualitative research designs have already made these points. Most 
network researchers work with quantitative data for good reason. To bridge this, we 
thus must construct context-based but not context-specifc surveys. Rather than 
asking issue-based questions to inquire into social networks (examples: Petermann 
2015; Pfenning and Schenk 2014; Fischer 1982; Wellman and Wortley 1990), we 
may ask people, frst, about which challenges they have recently faced, then who 
supported them, and fnally where they and their supporter physically were at the 
moment of interaction. 
Moreover, a great deal of literature emphasizes in situ face-to-face conversa-
tion for support. But increasing mobility and technological change may refgure 
the networks’ spatiality, as noted earlier. We agree that the spatial dimension “is 
not just an accidental aspect but a basic feature of sociality” (Knoblauch and Löw 
2017, 11) and, in order to be able to thoroughly analyze processes of refguration 
in social support, quantitative studies of social networks need to acknowledge the 
importance of the spatial dimension in survey tools. We may recognize, more than 
is currently the case in research on support, the relevance of spatiality and material-
ity for unequal access to social support. 
Bringing practices to the quantitative study of social support 
Qualitative analyses of people’s personal challenges could suggest that more open
approaches are not quantifable (or not comparable), or that surveys (by def-
nition) do not allow for more refexive measurements (Wyly 2011). We think
they do and propose measuring personal networks in urban settings by inverting
several common survey logics. While studies on place-based social capital and
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we propose only using the residence of people as a starting point to follow their
practices. It is common practice in survey research to pre-defne what support
means. Surveys typically inquire about events that supposedly matter most for
respondents. Many of these surveys are inspired by Fischer (1982) and revise,
extend, and modify individual items. In doing so, surveys construct a set of
fxed, hypothetical events (see ISSP 2000, 11–12): “Who would be the person
taking care of your apartment when you’re not in town,” “Who would you get
help from if you had the fu,” or “Who are you going to go to when you want
to borrow some money?” Other typical questions cover social actions within
defned timespans (Mollenhorst, Volker, and Flap 2014; Pfenning and Schenk
2014; Fischer 1982; Bernard et al. 1990; Bien, Marbach, and Neyer 1991; Mars-
den 1987): “Who did you invite for dinner at your apartment over the last three
months?” 
Most ego-centered network surveys focus on social exchanges (e.g., sociability, 
emotional trust or functional daily help), mixing questions about real and hypo-
thetical social actions and meetings (Burt 1984). This raises four issues: 
1)	 Hypothetical assessment (“Who would do XY for you?”) has a cognitive bias 
(Small and Sukhu 2016) and does not mean that respondents would actually 
receive support if the scenario were to occur (“A/B/C did XY for me”). 
2)	 Some surveys ask about events and encounters without inquiring about sup-
port: contacts are measured, not what actually happens. For example, persons 
invited for dinner over the last few months may have accepted the invitations 
for various reasons. What happens over dinner depends on who else is there, 
what the occasion was, whether kids joined the dinner table, etcetera. Was the 
dinner a moment of support? Dinners can be gaining (discussing emotional 
problems over a good plate of food in a relaxed setting) or draining (the socially 
desirable invite of parents-in-law sparks old conflicts). All in all, the names of 
who came for dinner feed equally on the social capital indicator; yet they reveal 
little more than the fact that people ate together. 
3)	 Surveys often pre-define communication modes, reproducing 1980s ideas of 
valuable support without considering digitalization. Is it always more impor-
tant to talk to someone face-to-face when having dinner than texting on the 
subway? Are voice messages less resourceful than a pub chat? Does seeing each 
other matter for all support? And if not, for which scenarios? 
4)	 Existing research makes assumptions on how respondents use space to get sup-
port. Survey questions mapping networks tend to require or imply spatial prox-
imity of the alter/ego. They specifically construct encounters in households or 
nearby facilities (such as bars and restaurants). Such constructs may overlook 
new (digital) forms of where we turn to others. 
In short, many survey-based studies of ego-centered networks assume that research-
ers know which scenarios matter most to people, in what spatial context, and 
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This contradicts, remarkably, studies on globalization and transnationalism. 
Analyses of life-style pluralization, mobility, individualization, and increasing life-
stage development varieties (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2010; Bauman 2013; Gid-
dens 2013; Brüderl 2004; Knoblauch and Löw 2017) suggest that it is increasingly 
less accurate to assume a priori what forms of support people may need (or are able 
to provide). Hence, we should follow Small’s (2017) openness to support scenarios. 
Figure 19.1 summarizes our alternative survey design. We asked participants 
in face-to-face interviews to tell us about challenges that then became provisional 
labels. We invited respondents to think of anything from long-term burdens to 
everyday challenges.1 
Using the scenario labels, we allow respondents to defne their support and 
where they were when receiving it. We do not assume that ego and alter have met 
in person, even knew each other previously, or had informal ties: we only seek 
to learn to whom people turned when facing a challenge. A geocoding tool then 
recorded where respondents and supporters were and hence the geography of their 
support. When aggregated, this data assesses the neighborhood relevance: not as 
a rather un-defned or administratively defned concept, but as a set of possible 
“hubs” where residents interact to develop and maintain forms of support. While 
shortcomings exist,2 this measurement answers the lack of attention to spatiality 
in network data. The data structure makes it possible to analyze whether social 
support is local or translocal. It allows us to see whether mobility and migration 
infuence support sites. Finally, we can analyze whether sites where people meet for 
support form neighborhood hubs, and whether (if at all) neighborhood organiza-
tions serve as sites where resources are exchanged between persons. 
Concluding thoughts on how our approach addresses 
support networks differently 
Research on support networks so far has worked with certain assumptions that
require rethinking of how we measure. Many studies reify the importance of
“tie strength” and an understanding of ties that equates closeness with intimacy.
FIGURE 19.1 Alter-ego social support questions: alternative survey design 
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This carries a Global North bias (Blokland 2019). We outlined an alternative
approach. 
Firstly, we suggest employing an open quantitative social network analysis to 
people’s range of supportive interactions. Our tool moves from (strong/weak/ 
absent) ties (and their assumed qualities) to practices. Getting support does not 
always follow a clear intentionality of contacting certain ties. Our approach incor-
porates often overlooked fuid encounters and durable engagements. 
Secondly, our tool provides new possibilities to map relations, spatial distances, 
and clusters. By means of spatial references, we can analyze social and spatial vari-
ability and inequality in support scenarios (for example, how space mediates sup-
port access for poor vs. afuent urbanites). 
Thirdly, our tool acknowledges that there are diferent ways in which people 
communicate with each other. We should not assume that one form of commu-
nication is “right” and more substantially supportive. We can ask respondents to 
evaluate this for themselves. Gravity binds people to the ground (Gans 2002) but 
does not defne what they mean to others. Mobility and digitalization may produce 
new networking routes, which we can now capture. 
Finally, we reiterate the plea to turn network research upside down (Small 2017) 
with an appeal to integrate it into spatial contexts. Not only “who we turn to” but 
also where we turn to others matters for support. 
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Notes 
1 “We are interested in where people get their support in the face of great, but also 
everyday challenges. Challenges are concerns, problems and obstacles that have to be 
overcome. This can concern work, family, school, health, emotional stress, but also 
completely different areas. What is or has been a challenge in your everyday life in the 
last 12 months?” We noted keywords of up to four challenges and used these scenarios in 
successive questions. People could name up to three alters with whom they talked about 
a challenge. 
2 Like mapping fixed coordinates for scenarios where alter and ego moved (chat during 
a car ride) or enforcing choice of “most important” interaction when respondents had 
several important interactions in different contexts. 
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RECONFIGURING THE SPACES 
OF URBAN POLITICS 
Circuits, territories, and territorialization 
Jennifer Robinson 
Introduction 
The need to rethink urban politics arises in response to empirical developments 
in urbanization—such as the vast expansion and fragmentation of urban settle-
ments, the dispersal of urban forms over extended urban regions or corridors, and 
the expanded role of globalized circuits shaping urbanization (such as policy cir-
cuits, networks of urban actors, and investment fows). The provocations for urban 
studies that have come from the insights of “planetary urbanization” represent an 
important articulation of this challenge (Brenner and Schmid 2015). But so do the 
insights developed from international urban development policy, which remind us 
that most people moving to cities arrive to live in self-constructed housing, often 
on the peripheries of cities and often facing a life-threatening lack of infrastructure 
(Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2013). In addition, if those contexts that have not histori-
cally informed urban studies serve as starting points for theorization (for shorthand, 
we might label these as “the Global South”—Parnell and Oldfeld 2014), diferent 
political issues and formations emerge: the politics of access to and titling of land 
(Gough and Yankson 2000); the diverse interests of state actors, or state efects, as 
opposed to “the state” (Eriksen 2017); varied forms of political authority (Beall, 
Parnell, and Albertyn 2015); violent and ongoing coloniality (Porter and Yiftachel 
2018); emergent associational forms of regulation, coordination of everyday life, 
and mobilization (Diouf and Fredericks 2014). 
This sits against a backdrop of theories of urban politics based on an earlier
era and on a limited range of contexts (Lauermann 2018). The classic Cox–
Harvey approach to understanding the urban politics of local economic devel-
opment focused on municipalities competing for footloose capital (Cox and
Mair 1988; Harvey 1989). This fowed from the US context, where locally
dependent municipalities and frms confgured a certain range of localized
DOI: 10.4324/9781003036159-24 
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political formations. Regime theory extended these insights to a nuanced assess-
ment of how actors with diferent local interests might assemble a growth coali-
tion, often informal, establishing a stable and consistent growth path (Logan and 
Molotch 1987; Stone 1989). These accounts traveled poorly to Europe (Harding 
1994; Ward 1996), and thus wider analyses, such as that of Kantor, Savitch, and 
Vicari (1997), expanded the range of concerns to consider municipalities in rela-
tion to their national political context and the place of cities in relation to a range 
of international economic relationships. However, even approaches such as these 
have little purchase in situations where local governance systems are more strongly 
centralized, local regimes might be more collective and redistributive (Le Galès 
2002), or the institutional basis and scope for the operation of local government 
is weak, highly informalized, or interwoven with traditional/communal forms of 
land ownership and governance (Parnell and Pieterse 2014; Beall, Parnell, and 
Albertyn 2015). In addition, a proliferation of transnational actors, such as resource 
extraction companies (oil, minerals), sovereign investors and development agen-
cies, international NGOs, and actors such as the World Bank, bring a very difer-
ent confguration to urban politics in many poorer country contexts. Some new 
starting points are needed for the theorization of urban politics in the 21st century. 
The second era and approach that frames the horizon of thinking in urban 
politics is that of neoliberalization and, more recently in a similar idiom, fnan-
cialization (Aalbers 2017). This approach takes us away from the territorially based 
competitive zero-sum game to attract investment, as articulated in the US-style 
formulation of urban entrepreneurialism. It also highlights the agency of local-
ized political formations in potentially shaping globalizing circuits of policy, gover-
nance, and investment (see Buckley and Hanieh 2014; González et al. 2018). What 
is relevant for our concerns is the spatial imagination underpinning these analyses 
of neoliberalization. Peck, Theodore, and Brenner (2009) bring forward the idea of 
a “syndrome” of neoliberalization in which there is no original or pure neoliberal-
ism, but rather circuits of policy innovation and emergent contradictions shaped 
by numerous local contexts that constantly generate variegated outcomes, in turn 
reshaping neoliberalized policy circuits. 
To some extent, these analyses have self-consciously addressed a US–EU bias 
and have attended to the dispersed origins and circuits of neoliberal policies and 
practices (Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2009). However, the experiences of poorer 
contexts are less commonly considered in urban studies, where neoliberalization 
takes place within often coercive policy circuits (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 
2007) in the name of structural adjustment policy or good governance. Further-
more, there are situations where a neoliberal state roll-back has not been possible as 
state-led institutions have never been present, are diferentially present (as a result 
of colonial inheritance), or are long absent (McDonald 2007). At times, neoliberal 
innovations have enabled developmental interventions (Ferguson 2010; Parnell and 
Robinson 2012). In addition, in many contexts, local hybridizations of circulating 
processes, policy imaginaries, and governance experimentations do not necessar-
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diferent. In the face of policy dead ends, personal appropriation, and counter-
hegemonic or even developmental outcomes, scholars need to be able to assess 
“when is it no longer neoliberalization” (Leitner et al. 2007, 10). 
These debates have demonstrated that urban politics is to be located at least 
partly in the prolifc circuits and transnational networks that frame global urbaniza-
tion. But a wider range of circuits and networks of urban development processes 
and urban policy could be brought into view. The entwining of global circuits 
and local economic development politics has formed a key terrain within urban 
studies—from place competition to world city analysis (Friedmann and Wolf 
1982) and global city formation (e.g., Firman 1998). Here I wish to consider the 
more routine ways in which urban politics is always “more than local,” encompass-
ing a range of diferent transnational circuits (Allen and Cochrane 2014), agen-
das, actors, and types of relationships. It is with this landscape of urban politics 
in mind that John Lauermann (2018), in his critical assessment of the US growth 
coalition model of competitive inter-urban politics, observes that “entrepreneurial 
cities navigate geographies of inter-urban competition and cooperation. . . . The 
expansion of entrepreneurial practices to multiple governance agendas (in paral-
lel to growth) refects the formation of extra-territorial political coalitions” (Lauermann 
2018, 3, italics added). He suggests that, as a result, “there remains a pressing need 
to trace how alternative urban politics operate alongside the growth politics of the 
contemporary entrepreneurial city” (Lauermann 2018, 15). The most important 
examples of such alternative urban politics have been seen in relation to networks 
of cities exploring urban bases for climate change action and transnational coali-
tions of urban actors promoting the UN’s urban sustainable development goals 
(Acuto 2013; Bulkeley 2010; Parnell 2016). 
Urban politics therefore needs to be theorized from diferent starting points
than the territorialized politics of competitive local governments, the circuits
of capitalist economic globalization, and their intersection. In his foundational
analysis, Harvey (1989) already noted the signifcance of state-led circuits of
investment in shaping competitive urban behavior, in which cities compete for
military contracts or to secure state projects such as health or education. Kantor,
Savitch, and Vicari (1997) expand this to a wider range of national and interna-
tional circuits that are relevant for city development politics. Moreover, the more
recent focus on the prolifc policy circulations shaping urban politics (McCann
and Ward 2011) invites us to see these circuits themselves as sites of urban poli-
tics. This draws attention to the national and supranational formations that shape
global urban “reason” (Gonzales et al. 2018): the circuits of policy makers and
city governments (Acuto 2013), collective developmental and political initiatives,
and municipal networks and associations (Parnell 2016). But it also highlights
informal associational connections, including those of trade and migration (Sim-
one 2010), and the complex spatial formations associated with those who direct
or switch fows of fnance into the built environment, including states, sovereign
fund managers, asset managers, or investment advisors (Bassens and van Meeteren
2015; Kanai and Schindler 2019). 
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Focusing on the circuits and networks of urban politics calls for more attention 
to diferent kinds of actors, as well as the various kinds of associations and relation-
ships that emerge across urban settings and in circuits. Thus, policy mobilizers, 
development agencies, charitable organizations, think tanks, networking managers, 
and national, bilateral, and multinational institutions are clearly part of the land-
scape of the urban political. Earlier theorizations of local economic development 
politics were closely attentive to the constitution of political interests on an urban 
scale, exploring the territorial basis for the distinctive interests and motivations 
of diferent actors: “local dependence” of businesses, electoral success of govern-
ments, the emergent territorially defned interests of growth coalitions in attracting 
global economic investment or expanding employment, fscal income streams, or 
other goals, including acting to secure their interests on regional or national scales 
(Cox and Mair 1988). An expanded understanding of urban politics, in the wake 
of analyses of neoliberalization and policy mobilities, points to the need for much 
more attention to the complex intersections between “locally dependent” actors, 
“urban” actors whose institutional bases might well be regional or national, and the 
circulating processes or wider networks framing “urban politics.” Here, research on 
the spatialities of policy mobilities that entrain both circuits and localities (McCann 
and Ward 2011) as well as the analysis of the politics of international development 
policy focused on the power relations operative at the interface of international 
agendas and actors and national/local actors (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007) 
both open up this crucial agenda. 
Thus, theoretical insights need to be developed across a much wider array of 
urban contexts, circuits, and actors than those indexed by the US model or its criti-
cal comparative engagement with the European experience. Here, a reformatted 
urban comparativism can support initiatives to draw a much wider range of urban 
contexts into consideration (Robinson 2011a; 2015). On the one hand, compara-
tive analyses can be enabled through a focus on circuits that entrain and involve 
many diferent urban contexts, often quite promiscuously as policy circulation, or 
as part of expanding transnational coalitions or municipal networks. Many diferent 
urban situations are brought into analytical proximity through their being involved 
in the same circuits (Porto d’Oliviera 2017; Robinson 2018b; Kanai and Schindler 
2019). Attending to a greater diversity of circuits (as processes of urbanization) and 
the diferent ways in which relationships among actors are navigated across circuits 
and localized urban concerns opens up urban political analysis to a wider range 
of experiences. On the other hand, urban territories can be compared directly. 
While territorially based comparisons of local governments are notoriously chal-
lenging (Kantor and Savitch 2005), the complex, extended, and fragmented nature 
of contemporary urbanization invites urban political analysis to begin with other 
types of territories and territorializations. For example, the proliferation of large-
scale urban developments across many urban contexts makes it possible to directly 
compare political formations emergent around similar kinds of long-term, multi-
jurisdictional, and transcalar developments (Shatkin 2017; Robinson et al. 2020). 
Such developments are also frequently interconnected through circuits of policy, 
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fnancial, and material fows which expand opportunities for comparative analysis. 
On this basis, a diversity of local governments and other urban actors come into 
view as part of the variation to be explained across many diferent developments. 
Through both these methodological maneuvers, an analytical conversation 
across quite divergent forms of urban politics becomes possible and can form the 
basis for developing wider conceptualizations of urban development. We can now 
consider some examples of how reconfguring the spaces of urban politics in these 
ways—in terms of circuits and territories—can substantially expand the repertoire 
of analyses. 
Circuits 
Connections themselves are sites of the urban political, as observed in relation to 
neoliberalization, which is constituted not only through the variegated formations 
in (urban) territories but also through international arenas, agencies, and actors. 
Urban politics happens in the circuits as much as in the territories (Roy and Ong 
2011; Acuto 2013). More concretely, the politics of circuits constitutes new “ter-
ritories” of urban politics, including, for example: networks and associations of 
municipalities inserting their interests into global policy agendas, such as the SDGs; 
processes of disseminating the urban agendas of global agencies (such as “rolling 
out the SDGs”—Kanuri et al. 2016); forming associations on many diferent topics 
from climate change to resilience (Bulkley 2010); or more collaborative advocacy-
based initiatives such as the Cities Alliance, which is discussed later in this chapter. 
Thus, the power relations and dynamics of globalized circuits and networks are 
“urban” politics and necessarily involve actors from a wide range of urban contexts. 
From the perspective of particular urban contexts, distinctive formations of 
politics, agents, and interests are often already part of globalized connections and 
networks—localized formations are intrinsically framed through circulating ideas, 
practices, and relationships. Thus, “local” actors arrive at policies in the midst of 
already present “circulating” ideas (Robinson 2016a). Urban agents are territo-
rialized as already networked and connected; networks and global platforms are 
created as competitive and collaborative formations of (localized) urban actors. 
Hence, networks become platforms for both constituting and staging urban poli-
tics. Networked interactions might be cross-cut with the dynamics of whatever the 
globally “competitive city” might be concerned with—competing for the personal 
success of city leaders, visibility in donor circuits, potential economic expansion, or 
ambitions to seek developmental global change. They might be sites for inter-ref-
erencing diferent urban experiences or carefully learning from fellow practitioners 
(Roy and Ong 2011; Robinson 2018a). But these networks can equally be sites of 
invisibility as exclusions and uneven power relations mean that network-generated 
policy innovations and investments can evade the infuence of municipal actors 
from poorly resourced contexts (Bulkeley 2010). 
Important questions for further investigation include: what are the varied poli-
tics of global platforms of urban agency? How do transnational dynamics shape 
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and in turn get shaped by the interests and activities of urban actors? How is urban 
politics simultaneously networked and territorialized? Questions also arise about 
the nature of the “relationalities” that make up networked global urban politics, 
that is, the interactions and infuences achieved in these globalized or networked 
territories of urban politics. It would be helpful to consider more carefully circuits 
associated with the largely developmental interventions shaping poorer country 
contexts, which have received far less attention in urban studies (Porto D’Oliviera 
2017). Here, analyses of urban agency need to focus more strongly on the exterior-
ized nature of the interests and capacities of ostensibly local actors and the diverse 
types of strategic agency that such actors bring into shaping networks. 
We already know well that a certain kind of spectrality, or specular politics, 
inhabits the zone of local economic development—primarily in the marketing 
relationships that promote cities through visualizations at odds with their realities; 
or the silences, deceptions, evasions, or occlusions that have been a central feature 
of the “models” or stylized best practices that support policy circulations (Wood 
2014). In relation to some developmental circuits, such spectralities are efective 
and impactful. There is scope for both ideas and resources to be mobilized for rea-
sons other than those that are apparent, to be siphoned of or captured for achieving 
entirely diferent projects and divergent outcomes than initially envisaged, or for 
signifcant decisions to be based on what are known to be inaccurate assumptions. 
In Lilongwe, Malawi, an ad hoc city strategy was formulated in 2009 through 
close cooperation with the City of Johannesburg, which had gained a strong 
reputation for preparing city strategies (Robinson 2011b; 2018a). The collabo-
ration was initiated and partly supported by the United Cities and Local Gov-
ernments (UCLG: an international network of municipalities) and partly by the 
Cities Alliance, an advocacy organization with partners including governments, 
inter-governmental organizations, and residents’ movements. However, the ensu-
ing collaboration was also substantially self-fnanced by Johannesburg and to some 
extent by Lilongwe. This exchange attracted my attention, as I was intrigued by 
the developmental focus of the policy circulation and the slow, engaged person-to-
person process of policy learning—quite at odds with the “fast policy” analyses that 
are currently dominant (Peck and Theodore 2015). The Johannesburg–Lilongwe 
cooperation to produce a city strategy illuminates the transnational nature of urban 
politics. In this case, the capacity of Lilongwe municipal employees to act both 
locally and in the global arena was founded on strong and direct engagement from 
a series of international actors—Johannesburg municipality, the Cities Alliance, 
UCLG, the Gates Foundation, JICA, and many other international organizations, 
donors, and NGOs active in the city (Robinson 2018a). 
The production of the city strategy leveraged some much-needed investment 
in upgrading services in settlements from the Gates Foundation as well as some 
earlier low-key implementations supported by Johannesburg at the end of the 
strategic planning process. Once the substantial funding was secured, however, 
Johannesburg actors were excluded, with informants cynically assuming that this 
might have been to avoid scrutiny and open up opportunities for personal beneft 
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on the part of local actors. While this lengthy, committed developmental process 
of strategic policy formulation, which stretched over more than three years, had 
come forward with a number of feasible suggestions for efective development in a 
well-researched document, the partnership was abandoned. This was also a result 
of political change and ongoing governance irregularities, which Johannesburg 
ofcials felt undermined the possibility for securing “good governance,” a pre-
requisite for their involvement. The value of this work in an administratively chal-
lenged context is refected in the fact that a newly elected mayor was still able to 
refer to the 2009 City Strategy as a valid future-oriented program of work in 2017 
(Robinson 2018a). 
We gain some insight into aspects of the transnational dynamics of urban politics 
in the way in which the city strategy was specularized for personal and institutional 
beneft. This occurred most obviously in a process of international recognition of 
the institutional collaboration. Led by a new CEO who had not been involved in 
the city strategy process, the Lilongwe partners applied for and won a Chinese-
sponsored local governance award for this work without involving Johannesburg. 
The city strategy was also “banked” as organizational capital for major transnational 
actors, including the Cities Alliance and the UCLG. The collaboration was widely 
cited as a success story (Cities Alliance 2010), part of the ongoing international city-
to-city networking programs promoted by the CA and UCLG (UCLG 2013). And 
the analysis ofered in the Lilongwe City Strategy supported decisions in the Cities 
Alliance to invest together with the Gates Foundation in settlement upgrading in 
Lilongwe, despite unfavorable assessments of urban governance capacity and integ-
rity (interview, city ofcial and consultant, 2013). Thus, substantial investments in 
infrastructure and housing in Lilongwe—the core business of international urban 
development—fowed from spectral/specular and informalized circuits of transna-
tional urban politics. 
Specular and informal dynamics of urban politics can therefore be core features 
of globalized circuits of urban development. It is not enough to see local variega-
tion adding up to yet another case of an already defned global circuit (such as 
neoliberalization) through assumed processes of policy transfer, planning, or invest-
ment calculations. As the Lilongwe City Strategy case illustrates, there are a variety 
of circuits to consider, with diferent dynamics. And there is no inevitability as to 
what a globalizing circuit ends up producing, what the networked politics of urban 
development might lead to, or through what kinds of relationality transnational 
urban political processes and outcomes might be shaped. 
Territories and territorialization 
Reconfguring analyses of urban politics can alternatively begin from the diverse 
territorializations of multiple circuits and urbanization processes. The previous sec-
tion highlighted circuits and networks as intrinsic elements in any reconfguration 
of the spaces of urban politics. In addition, it is important to consider the implica-
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urbanization as extended, fragmented, sprawling, operational (Brenner and Schmid 
2015), and the transnational politics of a “scramble for infrastructure” currently 
shaping territorial reconfgurations of urbanization as global (Kanai and Schindler 
2019). I draw attention here to an approach that can potentially speak to a wide 
range of emergent territorialized urban formations in the midst of globalized and 
interconnected but also often dispersed and fragmented urban outcomes: what 
Ludovic Halbert calls “Transcalar Territorial Networks” (Halbert and Rouanet 
2014). In my view, this analysis ofers a way forward to revisit the territories of 
urban politics beyond municipal-based global competition or the entrepreneurial 
state. 
Multiple globalizing circuits shape the future trajectories of urban settlements
and, more generally, the extended and fragmented territories that are the out-
comes of urbanization processes (Keil 2017; Schmid et al. 2018). An iconic under-
standing of this sees globalized processes of investment (fnancialization) producing
repeated, seemingly identical urban forms—the serially reproduced satellite city,
the repetition of “iconic” architecture, the endlessly borrowed concept or design.
However, our research in London suggests that each of these apparently identical
buildings requires two to three years of almost weekly meetings between plan-
ners and developers to negotiate the details of fnancing, planning gain, social
and hard infrastructure provision, and the detailed design of buildings (Robinson
et al. 2020). Actors with varying global reach and diferent capacities to localize,
together with conventions and calculative devices (Christophers 2014) as much as
a vast array of legislation and policy are at stake in each negotiated outcome. More
generally, I appreciate the Deleuzian formulation in which repetition is always
a diferentiation, a distinctive “singularity” emergent from the shared/intercon-
nected genetic processes: one of a kind but perhaps also one of a series of outcomes
( Jacobs 2012; Robinson 2016b). Thus, while attending to the multiplicity of
connections that shape urban outcomes, the repeated instance comes into view
(Robinson 2018b). 
A repeated instance might be the buildings or large-scale developments in which 
certain forms of fnancialized capital are implicated, such as asset management of 
low-income rental housing products. Or the production of new cities or infra-
structure that result from numerous globalizing or translocal circuits—of policy, 
planning visions, globally competitive economic development strategies, fnancial 
investment, or local populations positioning themselves to beneft in some way 
from planned developments, perhaps long in advance of anything ever being built 
(van den Broeck 2017; Kanai and Schindler 2019). 
In these settings, then, a range of transcalar actors and networks are territo-
rialized in the cooperation, contestation, and creative production of new urban 
territories. Halbert and Rouanet’s concept of transcalar territorial networks takes 
seriously this complexity of circulations, extensions, and territorializations: 
The concept of transcalar territorial networks (TTN) is suggested to explain 
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property development, from a fixed plot of land to capital allocated in distant 
investment committee boardrooms. 
(2014, 472) 
Allen and Cochrane’s (2007) conceptualization of “regional assemblages” is also 
helpful here—diferent “scales” are fattened into a patchwork of overlapping ter-
ritorializations of diferent institutional agency. This opens up new lines of investi-
gation for thinking about urban politics. 
Thus, across a range of territories—extended and city-regional confgurations, 
corridors, dispersed fragments of the urban—political formations are assembled out 
of diverse actors operating with varied reach, capacity, and transcalar competen-
cies. It is important to also layer in the specifc regulatory pathways that emerge 
in urban contexts, perhaps around jurisdictions or governance structures, such as 
municipalities, metropolitan areas, countries, regions. We can take a cue here from 
a regulationist idea of a rapport territorial—territorial relations of regulation emer-
gent in diferent metropolitan contexts: 
The territorial relationship generates a contradictory and complex system of 
dependencies, jurisdictions and rules . . . it consists not only of laws, bylaws 
and prescriptions, but also of diverse unwritten, implicit rules; as a result it is 
often barely comprehensible to outsiders—and even so to insiders. 
(Schmid 2015, 297) 
Thus, the territorial grounds for urban politics could be conceived as emergent 
territorializations, embracing transcalar territorial networks that constellate around 
designated urban projects and programs, as well as the complex formations associ-
ated with territorialized regulatory assemblages. Rather than competing municipal-
ities and footloose capital, we can acknowledge the emergence of (new) territories 
on which urban politics emerges, such as large-scale development projects, satellite 
cities, extensive infrastructural developments, or the transcalar regulatory contexts 
that establish pathways of development. In these settings, a diverse cast of actors 
with diferently confgured interests and concerns emerge, varying from context to 
context (even within the same city, region, or country). 
In this light, the interests and practices of actors may be surprising: “global” 
developers and architects whose local reputations and relationship inspire more 
modest goals for developments may be at odds with states whose commitment is to 
intensify extraction to support their own ambitions. Or developmental state inter-
ests in securing an adequate housing supply might be aligned with new processes of 
globalized investment—fnancialization or “build to rent” (Robinson and Attuyer 
2020; Todes and Robinson 2020). Thus, we need to take seriously the territorial 
embeddedness of both (global) developers and states. 
We also can see how, within the scope of these territorialized formations, open-
ings for efective state agency might not depend on building strong institution-
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and negotiations in relation to specifc developments. This potentially opens up
a signifcant perspective on questions of African governance, for example, where
analysts and development organizations have been perplexed by, and highly criti-
cal of, the extensive investments in large-scale urban developments across the
continent (Watson 2014; Murray 2017; van Noorloos and Kloosterboer 2018).
Here, a determinedly scalar developmental imagination of government/gover-
nance could be enriched by a view of transcalar governance and the overlap-
ping circuits (private, developmental, sovereign) shaping African cities. Rather
than a good governance agenda focused on improving hierarchical interjuris-
dictional arrangements (Pieterse, Parnell, and Haysom 2018), close attention to
the transcalar territories of urban development might indicate targeted oppor-
tunities to improve outcomes (planning gain, application of international law).
Improved understanding of the actors, interests, and scope for intervention in
these developments could yield stronger public beneft from investments (Turok
2016; Goodfellow 2020). 
More generally, the shared features of large-scale developments (multi-jurisdic-
tional, of long duration, with a complexity of interests and shifting governance
arrangements) allow them to be fruitfully compared across a very wide range of
contexts, potentially contributing to wider theorizations of urban politics (Rob-
inson et al. 2020). In these settings, the nature of the future city is negotiated,
and urban politics is revealed. For this, though, it is important not to treat the
variety of outcomes as so many diferent “contexts” making residual contributions
to wider circuits (van Loon, Oosterlynck, and Aalbers 2018). Rather, compara-
tive analysis of the (transcalar) territories (Halbert and Rouanet 2014) of large-
scale urban developments could build new theoretical insights across a diversity of
urban politics rather than framing these as “variegated” cases of wider processes
or circuits. 
Gavin Shatkin’s (2016; 2017) comparative study of three large-scale urban devel-
opment projects in Asia is especially helpful in this regard. He insists that these cases 
can be treated as starting points for new theoretical analyses, emergent from Asian 
experiences and appropriate to contemporary global urbanization. In his view, the-
orizations of urban politics need to encompass “state capitalism,” as well as the land 
grabs characteristic of peremptory states, and the often exuberant and informalized 
political contestation associated with democratic but poorly capacitated states. He 
summarizes his analytical insights in relation to the dimensions of more or less 
autonomy of state land managers, and more or less state control of land markets. 
Starting from this theorization inspired by the Asian context, a closer focus 
emerges on the interests of the state itself in urban development (Shen, Luo, and Wu 
2020). This has been occluded in favor of a focus on the politics of fnancialization, 
neoliberalization, and the role of global developers (Aalbers 2017; Robinson and 
Attuyer 2020). In a recent comparative research project (London–Johannesburg– 
Shanghai),1 we focused on three large-scale development projects and identifed 
signifcant territorializations of urban politics at the scale of the “project” (Pinson 
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view a wider diversity of ways in which states and other urban actors manage land 
value extraction to enable new urban developments. Across the three cases, we 
identifed a common state interest in extracting rents from diferent aspects of the 
newly constructed urban environment, at least partly in order to pay for the devel-
opment itself (Robinson et al. 2020). However, rather than interpreting these as 
refecting variegated forms of fnancialization or neoliberalization, our comparative 
analysis identifed three business models (distinctive confgurations of governance 
and fnancing arrangements) with diverse practices for generating and capturing 
urban value through urban development (Theurillat 2015). On this basis, we were 
able to explore the implications of diferent business models for the outcomes in 
each case. 
Our cases highlight the diference made by these business models. In London,
direct value capture on a one-of basis at the point and time of construction
(through negotiated planning gain) put great pressure on built form to gen-
erate income, leading to dense and high-rise developments with low levels of
afordable housing. A more metropolitan scale and dynamic property tax system
in Johannesburg enabled a redistributive emphasis on providing well-located,
low-income housing. And the even wider accounting of the potential returns
on urban development through taxation of new enterprises and generalized
economic growth supported transformational economic policies of industrial
upgrading in Shanghai. The scope to understand the interests and roles of dif-
ferent actors, and to inform critical analysis of diferent business models, comes
into view through comparative analysis. Thus, state actors might be motivated
by electoral concerns to promote redistributive outcomes (Harrison et al. 2019),
or by securing consent for (or at least compliance with) the processes of removal
and development (Wang and Wu 2019), maximizing income streams (Robinson
and Attuyer 2020), or efectively managing developmental growth agendas across
complex institutional spaces, in part through market mechanisms (Shen, Luo, and
Wu 2020; Wu 2020). 
As international actors ranging from sovereign wealth funds to transnational
private frms or developmental agencies turn to the urban built environment to
realize both proft and potential public beneft, including in some of the poorest
urban contexts (Turok 2016), it is important to be aware of the range of ways
in which urbanization can be secured, governed, and fnanced. The business
models of large-scale urban developments are diverse and the role and interests
of diferent actors involved in securing urban developments are highly specifc,
even as transnational processes and actors are key in most large-scale urban devel-
opments. While enhancing land value as well as securing other value streams
through development is often the foundation for fnancing urban development,
the diferent ways of mobilizing resources and realizing value to enable the devel-
opment make a signifcant diference to outcomes—in terms of the physical form
of the development, the types of activities supported, and the relative distribution
of benefts to diferent agents of development and to the wider society (Robinson
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Conclusion: reconfguring urban politics 
This chapter has explored the rich potential to reconfgure the spaces of urban 
politics. This involves expanding the territories from which urban politics might 
be theorized and encouraging urban scholars to take into account a much richer 
array of actors and more varied explanations for their actions and interests. I have 
suggested that a diversity of transnational networks and circuits represent new ter-
ritories of urban politics, which convene a range of diferent kinds of political 
interests and dynamic relationships involving urban actors from across the globe. 
In addition, by starting with the fragmented and dispersed territories that char-
acterize contemporary processes of (planetary) urbanization, such as large-scale 
urban developments, direct comparisons can be drawn across highly diverse urban 
settings, expanding and enriching insights into the interests of urban actors and 
the nature and outcomes of urban development politics. On the basis of such a 
reformatted comparative analysis, places like London can become destinations for 
theory from elsewhere, for example, learning from analyses of state interests in 
land development from Asia. More generally, in a world where all cities might be 
thought of as “ordinary” and thus assumed to contribute to wider theorizations 
(Robinson 2006), understandings of the spaces and nature of urban politics can be 
reconfgured through comparative analysis of the diverse territories and circuits of 
global urbanization. 
Note 
1 With Phil Harrison and Fulong Wu, I acknowledge funding from the ESRC for an 
Urban Transformations grant ES/N006070/1, “Governing the Future City: A compara-
tive analysis of governance innovations in large-scale urban developments in Shanghai, 
London, Johannesburg.” 
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Ayham Dalal, Aline Fraikin, and Antonia Noll 
The appropriation of refugee camps: a growing 
research agenda 
Flags, logos of humanitarian organizations, textiles, barbed wire, electricity cables, 
concrete blocks, swamps, zinco sheets, tents, and appropriated shelters are a few of 
the things that one would expect to see in a refugee camp. Since the early 2000s, 
not only has knowledge about the spatialities of refugee camps increased (cf. Agier 
2016), but their designs and layouts have also diversifed. In a previous study, we 
examined how the need to plan “better” camps in Jordan and Berlin has led to the 
creation of new camps and shelter designs that seek to foster control over refugees 
(Dalal et al. 2018). In this chapter, we will expand on this debate by showing how 
refugees fnd ways to subvert the initial designs and appropriate the camp for the 
purpose of dwelling (Heidegger 1971). 
In the literature, the appropriation of physical space is linked to the ways in which
social space is perceived and theorized (Bourdieu 2018; Lefebvre 1991). In studies
involving refugee camps, however, the appropriation of space is never addressed explic-
itly. Instead, it is perceived through two concepts: urbanization and agency. For instance,
it is generally suggested that appropriations would eventually lead to the urbanization of
camps (Agier 2002; Misselwitz 2009; Herz 2013; Dalal 2014). This would also under-
line the refugees’ agency (Sanyal 2010; Ramadan 2013), in contrast to their theoretical
passiveness (Agamben 1998), which presents appropriation as a political action (Maqusi
2017). In our research, we extend this argument by demonstrating that the appropria-
tion of these camps is driven by a confict in the understanding and use of space: 
Humanitarian technocratic planning seeks to produce manageable camps 
(using handbooks, manuals, and standardized regulations), so that refugees are 
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2	 Refugees seek to create social spaces of meaning, to inhabit the space or, pre-
cisely, to dwell 
This argument was portrayed earlier in the Zaatari refugee camp, where appropria-
tions were explained as a result of the confictual relationship between a humani-
tarian “far order” and a local and socio-cultural “near order” (Dalal 2014). In this 
chapter, we explore this relationship in the newly designed and built Tempohomes 
in Berlin. 
To understand how spaces are being planned and subsequently appropriated in 
the camp, we use grounded theory and combine various methods of data collec-
tion, namely qualitative interviews and “co-mapping” (Dalal 2020), which allow 
both researchers and interviewees to map the changes within a certain space over 
time, often accompanied by sketches seeking to document socio-spatial constel-
lations that are difcult to understand solely based on oral descriptions. More-
over, participatory observations allow the researchers to directly address particular 
appropriations within the space of the container, while observing how the space 
is being used. In addition, we conducted 18 interviews and mappings of the camp 
on diferent scales, which helped to understand the spatial arrangements of various 
Tempohomes in Berlin (Columbiadamm, Alte Jakobstraße, Wollenberger Straße, 
Quittenweg, Ostpreußendamm, and Refugium Buch) between 2018 and 2019, 
and Karl-Marx Straße in 2020; to explore how appropriations are linked to ref-
ugee backgrounds and family conditions (single travelers, extended families, or 
women-headed families); and to consequently understand the Tempohome plan-
ning and observe appropriations. It also allowed us to conduct theoretical samplings 
(Charmaz 2006), from which the case study was selected. 
Tempohome: a new type of camp 
A “Tempohome” is a specifc type of camp that emerged in Berlin as a response
to the comparatively large infux of refugees to the city in 2015. It was designed
by a special task force at the Berlin State Ofce for Refugee Afairs (Landesamt
für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten, or LAF) to accommodate 200 to 500 refugees,
supervised locally by an operator (a for-proft or non-proft organization). Inside
the camp, refugees are housed in rows of adjacent container units. Each con-
tainer unit is composed of three identical containers (2.3 × 5.9 meters) attached
to each other. The unit is accessed from the middle: a shared space used as a
small lobby, entered through a porch and cantilever, and equipped with a small
kitchenette and washroom. The two adjacent rooms are equipped with stan-
dardized furniture, which can difer slightly from one Tempohome to the next,
yet generally include: two beds, two mattresses, two wardrobes, one fridge, one
table, and two chairs. When fully furnished, however, a container room in a
Tempohome leaves its inhabitants with only 7 m2 of space to move (Darweesh
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Moreover, a Tempohome is conditioned by strict safety regulations such as “fre 
protection.” These regulations apply to all housing in Germany. In a Tempohome, 
however, they pose a major challenge for refugees due to the scarcity of space and 
the design of the container. For instance, gardening boxes or other refugee belong-
ings cannot be placed in front of the windows outside the container since they 
would hinder refugees’ exit in case of fre. Curtains, which are usually hung on the 
porches to increase privacy, cannot be attached to the metal structure of the con-
tainer as they would block the main door. Curtains and carpets inside the container 
are also frowned upon as they might cause a fre if they touch the heaters for an 
extended period of time. Nor is inserting screws or nails into the container walls 
permitted. The furniture should remain inside the container and be protected, and 
the space inside the container should be cleaned. “It is like a hotel room,” said a 
camp operator, to underline the fact that these containers are meant as temporary 
accommodations and thus not suitable for dwelling (interview in Karl-Marx Straße, 
July 2020). But how do refugees appropriate the container under these strict and 
minimal conditions? 
Leila’s family: converting a group of 
containers into a dwelling 
When visited in August 2019, Leila, her husband, and their three sons had been 
living in a Tempohome for three years. Leila is a 48-year-old Palestinian from Syria 
who left the Yarmouk camp in December 2012. Between 2012 and 2016, her 
family lived between Syria and Lebanon, until her young sons fed to Europe. In 
August 2016, they settled in a Tempohome in Berlin, and, for about six months, 
they moved between rooms until they settled down when their parents arrived at 
the same Tempohome. 
According to regulations, the family was eligible for one full container unit. Liv-
ing inside three containers of about 40 m2, the fve-member family had to appro-
priate the space and rearrange it anew. Unlike other camps where appropriations 
can be practiced extensively and are thus easy to spot, appropriating Tempohomes 
occurs within the clearly demarcated boundaries of the container and are therefore 
subtle and less visible. This does not mean that a visitor to a Tempohome would 
not notice new elements that have been added to the containers by refugees, but 
the way these appropriations are linked to each other and the rationale behind 
them is less obvious. As such, we aim to illustrate how these appropriations are 
linked to each other, and how they are intended to create a dwelling that transcends 
the initial design of the Tempohome as a standardized shelter. 
The transition from a group of containers into a dwelling began with symbolic 
gestures such as cooking, re-organizing space, and adding carpets. As the eldest son 
explained: 
When mom arrived, the first thing I noticed was that we started to use the 
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Using the kitchen to prepare meals is an important dimension that is deeply inter-
twined with the socio-spatial dynamics of dwelling (Bourdieu 1970). Bringing a 
carpet into the rooms not only adds more warmth but also makes them multi-
functional when needed. For instance, food can be placed on the foor atop a 
plastic sheet to keep it clean, and mattresses can be arranged on it to create seating 
corners when needed. In a normal context, adding a carpet to one’s own house is 
not a surprising practice. However, in a Tempohome, it requires negotiations with 
the camp managers since it contradicts the rules: a carpet inside the container can 
be dangerous as it could ignite quickly in case of fre. Luckily, Leila and her family 
managed to convince the operators of the Tempohome and were allowed to add a 
few carpets to beautify the space and increase its adaptability. 
Of course, appropriations within the container often include other practices of 
personalization, such as adding photos and decorations. But the signifcance of this 
case is its ability to show how the sum of the various spatial practices results in a 
“dwelling arrangement” in contrast to the initial “shelter design.” For instance, one 
of the rooms was appropriated to carve out a private space used as a sleeping space 
for Leila and her two youngest sons. Initially, the room was furnished to tempo-
rarily accommodate two refugees using a bunk bed and two wardrobes. Instead, 
the family dismantled the bunk bed—a practice that Leila’s sons had learned dur-
ing their stay in the emergency centers—and placed the single beds next to one 
another. Since they are fve members, the family was eligible for an additional 
single bed. The bed was added and placed next to the other two, creating a longer 
bed used by Leila and her younger sons during the night, and as a space for napping 
when the husband and the eldest son returned from work during the day. The rest 
of the room was appropriated as a storage space with a larger fridge composed of 
the two small fridges initially installed in each of the rooms. This practice was also 
observed in other containers, especially among families. 
As argued elsewhere (Dalal 2020), refugees tend to dismantle the standardized 
elements of the humanitarian technocratic planning, reassembling the objects dif-
ferently in order to create spaces for dwelling. In the same room, a small table with 
a TV and a gaming console was added to entertain the youngest sons during the 
day. A smaller table was added in the kitchen, providing Leila with additional space 
to prepare the meals. 
While not all family members were able to sleep in one room, the other remain-
ing room was utilized as a multi-functional space: a “living space” during the day 
and a “living room” during the night. Having been sheltered in limited spaces that 
often fail to accommodate extended family structures, this practice was observed 
in other camps in Jordan and Lebanon as well (see, for instance, Oueishek 2018; 
Dalal 2020). To make use of the space, the bunk bed was not dismantled in this 
room, but rather pushed towards the edge. Next to it, the wardrobes were placed 
facing each other, creating a transitional space to the beds, and leaving enough 
space for the lower bed to be used for seating during the day. The remaining part 
of the room is used occasionally for gathering and receiving guests, and primarily 
as a dining area. Initially, each room is furnished with a small table and two chairs 
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for the two refugees to be sheltered within. In Leila’s case, however, the physical 
dimensions of the shelter posed an “invisible” challenge for the family to gather at 
one table. As she explained: 
As you can see, the room is very small. When I cook, we push the table to 
the center, and try to squeeze five chairs around it, otherwise, we won’t all 
fit . . . 
After having meals, the table is pushed against the wall, freeing up a bit of space for 
several chairs or a mattress to be put on the ground, either for receiving guests or 
sleeping. As the eldest son who sleeps on the upper bunk explained: 
Every day, you need to go up and down [the bunk bed], and I barely can 
jump because the ladders are hidden behind the wardrobes. . . . Sometimes 
when I don’t have the energy, I get the mattresses down and I sleep on the 
ground. 
While functioning as a bedroom for the father and his son at night, the mattress is 
removed in the morning and placed on the bunk bed again to facilitate the use of 
the room as a “living space” during the day. 
One of the main challenges faced by refugees while trying to dwell in a Tem-
pohome, or in any camp shelter in general, is the lack of space for storing personal 
belongings. In humanitarian designs, refugees are often imagined to be escap-
ing drastic conditions, therefore arriving to camps with few or no belongings at 
all. Although this holds true for some, this is not the case for all. In fact, when 
performing feldwork in the Tempohomes, the lack of space for storing personal 
belongings was evident, with many wardrobes packed full of clothes, leaving little 
space for other activities. Luckily, in Leila’s case, the family was able to utilize an 
adjacent room entirely for that purpose. As she explained: 
We are five in two rooms, so we are eligible for one more. Thus, they [the 
management] gave the children one . . . since no one lives there, we use it for 
storage . . . and if we want to fry something, we fry it in the kitchen there 
since it is empty to avoid the smell of frying oil in our own living space. 
This means that the resulting dwelling arrangement was not only limited within 
the container unit that they initially received, but extended to practically four 
containers in which the functions and furniture were redistributed and rearranged 
(see Figure 21.1). 
Finally, and to ensure that the newly formed dwelling space has become a pri-
vate space for its inhabitants, curtains were added to the windows and door. Hang-
ing curtains in Tempohomes is one of the most practiced appropriations, according 
to observations. In some Tempohomes, these practices even extend to the porch, 
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FIGURE 21.1 The conversion of the standardized container into a dwelling space 
Source: Authors 
partly covering its sides with sheets so that it can be closed and opened as needed, 
thus functioning as a semi-private space. Curtains are so commonly used in dwell-
ings that we sometimes fail to recognize their signifcance. Nonetheless, it is only 
within shelter—an abstract humanitarian space where social relations are vaguely 
represented—that their signifcance for creating privacy appears. In a camp such as 
Zaatari in Jordan, producing a gradient of social spaces where the private space of 
the dwelling is well demarcated and, above all, protected is one of the main pro-
cesses that steered the transition from shelters to dwellings (Dalal 2020). Similarly, 
in an informal tented settlement in Lebanon, refugees built covered porches or 
“balconies” in order to create a transition from the very private space of the tent to 
the public area outside (Oueishek 2018). The reason behind this is that, in contrast 
to the shelter where notions of privacy are not necessarily present, a “dwelling” 
is frst and foremost a space where a human’s existential need for privacy, safety, 
and peace are ensured (Heidegger 1971). In order to add curtains and sheets for 
their spaces, refugees had to overcome further “invisible” challenges posed by the 
containers. Particularly, the structures of the container cannot be amended, and 
therefore installing screws or nails in its sheets is not allowed. In the Tempohome 
where Leila lived, a local technique employed to overcome this obstacle emerged: 
refugees used spoons or other metal elements to wedge objects such as sheets, cur-
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FIGURE 21.2 A perspective showing the rearrangement of elements and furniture to 
produce new spaces within the containers 
Source: Authors 
sleeping room are often closed, curtains were only added to the windows in the 
living space and to the kitchen where privacy and light are needed during the day. 
To overcome the challenging thermal conditions in the container, especially on hot 
summer days, the family added a curtain to the main door leading to the kitchen as 
well. This way, the kitchen could remain a private space, while the door could be 
opened to let a cool breeze into the container on hot days. Thus, a specifc curtain 
also serves as an important element to regulate the transition between the private 
space of the “dwelling” and the appropriated porch (see Figure 21.2). 
The spatial transformation of camps 
This chapter sheds light on how refugees appropriate space in Berlin’s Tempo-
homes. Subtle practices—such as hanging curtains, placing carpets, dismantling 
beds, assembling fridges, storing luggage, and relocating mattresses, chairs, and 
tables—showed how the standardized layout of the container was subverted. 
Although the main structure of the container and its furniture remained, refugees 
managed to produce an alternative design that maximized the use of the space for 
the purpose of dwelling. By doing so, we have contributed to the debate on appro-
priating camps in particular and to spatial transformation in general. 
 292 Ayham Dalal, Aline Fraikin, Antonia Noll 
These fndings have shown that changes within the physical space clearly refect 
refugees’ attempts to produce new social spaces. Moving beds, or squeezing them 
to the edge of the room, indicates an attempt to either create a “sleeping space” or 
a “multi-functional living room.” Here, it should be noted that our observations are 
limited to the short periods of visits, and thus refugees’ practices and uses of space 
extend far beyond what we have presented. Yet, our fndings reveal that the fac-
tors of scale, power relations, and politics must not be disregarded when producing 
new social spaces within the containers. By articulating and comparing how Leila 
appropriated their three containers, we demonstrated that the sum of these appro-
priations produced a new space at a meta level: the dwelling. This means that spatial 
appropriations cannot be understood solely based on their immediate scale (physi-
cal space); their multi-scalar impact must be addressed as well. Changing the posi-
tion of a wardrobe or adding a curtain are indeed changes to physical space that aim 
to create privacy and diversify the use of space. However, the sum of these practices 
led to the creation of a comprehensive, complex, and dynamic space, namely a 
dwelling, which the original container failed to ofer and even hindered with its 
limiting regulations. This underscores the importance of scale and the connected-
ness between appropriations in physical space. Research needs to take into account 
the multiple scales on which appropriations occur, both inside and outside camps. 
The second contribution of this chapter relates to the notion of spatial transfor-
mation and, in general, to the “refguration of space” (Knoblauch and Löw 2017). 
The case of Tempohomes in Berlin clearly illustrates that refugees’ appropriation of 
space is not only an interplay between physical and social spaces, but frst and fore-
most a political act. Through a series of “tactics” (De Certeau 2013), refugees have 
overcome the challenges imposed on them by the limited design of the contain-
ers and their strict regulations. Hanging curtains, placing rugs, or planting fower 
beds are not simple acts of personalization, for they require constant negotiations 
with the operator, who might knock on their door and demand that these changes 
be removed or placed back inside the container. The container space becomes a 
feld of spatial negotiations—a contestation of forces and power relations. Wedg-
ing a spoon between the sides of the container to hang curtains is therefore an act 
of resistance to disciplinary power, a demand to dwell. A better understanding of 
how space is transformed or “refgured,” therefore, cannot be established without 
taking into consideration how space is disciplined and politically shaped; how it is 
permeated by power relations; and, most importantly, how appropriations, though 
sometimes “subtle” or “random,” contribute to the erosion of disciplinary powers 
through space. In our case, this led to the emergence of a new hybrid spatial con-
stellation: namely, a dwelling inside a shelter. 
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“I SPY WITH MY LITTLE EYE” 
Children’s actual use and experts’ intended 
design of public space 
Ignacio Castillo Ulloa, Angela Million, and Jona Schwerer 
Introduction: intuitive versus calculated uses 
of public space 
In this chapter, we examine the tension between children’s use and experts’ 
design of public space, based on the assumption that children actually use it
in manners deviating from those originally intended by experts (Reicher et
al. 2015; Hendricks 2011). We explore the discrepancies arising therefrom
through the concepts of: affordance (the uses space enables by its material
and constituent elements as well as the interactions among them and with the
environmental settings); relational space (rather than existing independently
of objects, persons, and events, space results from their interactions); spatial
knowledge (the ways space is perceived, thought of, used, and acted out);
and spatial pedagogization (the spatialized rationale buttressing space’s topol-
ogy and asserting specific discernments and uses). By conceiving public space
here as a socially constructed arrangement of multiple material objects (with
certain qualities) and actors (with varying degrees of spatial knowledge as
well as physical qualities) that is ostensibly accessible to everyone, we pose the
question: how can the spatial knowledge of children, objectified in their uses
of spatial arrangements, be substantively integrated into the design process?
Against this backdrop, we discuss the intervention of a public space located
on the outskirts of the city of Lima, which has followed a fairly unorthodox
approach toward child participation and seems to have moved from a “pre-
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Deeming space in “four acts”: affordance, 
relationality, knowledge, and pedagogization 
Substances, surfaces, and individuals: 
intrinsic qualities and latent affordances 
James J. Gibson frst introduced the concept of “afordance” in his 1977 article “The
Theory of Afordances” and further developed it in his book, The Ecological Approach to
Visual Perception (1979). Gibson (1977, 67; italics in the original) sustains that “the afor-
dance of anything is a specifc combination of the properties of its substance and its surfaces taken
with reference to an animal.” Such a defnition of afordance points out all action possibili-
ties that, while “concealed” in the surroundings (whether built or natural), exist regard-
less of the individual’s (or, as Gibson puts it, “the animal’s”) ability to recognize them.
Hence, potential actions that something may support only become palpable in relation
to a specifc individual and its agency as well as competences. In its initial acceptation,
afordance, to Gibson, denotes a “material disposition, the consequent of which is spec-
ifed in human terms”; thus, any given “material thing may have a great many diferent
possible ways in which it can be used. Each one is an afordance” (Harré 2002, 27).
These lurking afordances, moreover, are dependent on not only the aforementioned
object-individual’s agency plus knowledge relationship, but also on environmental cir-
cumstances. As cultural sociologist Terrence McDonnell (2010, 1806) points out, the
“latent set of possible actions that environments and objects enable . . . are relationally
tied to the capabilities of the person interacting with” them. In this regard, a distinction
between qualities and afordances, McDonnell suggests, ought to be made: whereas the
former are “inherent and independent characteristics of objects and places,” the lat-
ter “are made manifest through interactions between audiences, objects and context”
(2010, 1806). In this sense, afordances can be seen as the interchanges among the quali-
ties of objects, of immediate settings, and the individuals interacting with both of them.
Out of these intersections, in the specifc case of public space, emerges a wide array
of actions. Individuals, according to their subjective interpretations, establish particular
linkages with the elements that make up public space and its immediate surroundings,
then giving way to “hidden” afordances. To sum up, in public space substances, sur-
faces, and individuals coalesce by way of intrinsic qualities and latent afordances—this,
we believe, happens inasmuch as public space, far from being absolute and static, results
from constant interrelations and their synthetizing among objects, groups thereof, and
environments. 
Not absolute, but interrelated and synthesized: 
deeming space relationally 
For the purpose of our discussion, space is deemed as being deeply entangled with 
sociality, and, as such, understood as a social product. More specifcally, we draw 
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conceptualized as “a relational arrangement of living beings and social goods” (Löw 2016, 
131; italics in the original). Social goods, according to Löw, can be primarily mate-
rial and symbolic, which in turn underpins the analytic diferentiation between one 
form of social goods and the other (Löw 2016, 130). Furthermore, space is not, in 
and of itself, a relational arrangement of persons and goods—individuals have to 
link these elements actively to compose a space. Therefore, “space is constituted by 
two processes that must be analytically distinguished: spacing and the operation of synthesis” 
(Löw 2016, 135; italics in the original). Spacing, on the one hand, refers to the 
placing of the social goods and persons in relation to other placements and the 
operation of synthesis, while on the other, it describes the process through which 
these elements are turned into one coherent whole; as Löw writes, “an operation of 
synthesis is required for the constitution of space, that is, goods and people are amal-
gamated to spaces by way of processes of perception, imagination, and memory” 
(Löw 2016, 135). While Löw accurately highlights the relevance of both living 
beings and social goods for the process of the constitution of space, we will focus, in 
our argument, mainly on the social goods—that is to say, chiefy material goods as 
the material objects afording certain actions in space. In addition to this, the process 
of the constitution of space is mediated through the individuals’ spatial knowledge, 
for it comprises how space is perceived, imagined, and remembered. Thus, given 
the several afordances that crop up, while spacing and the operation of synthesis 
simultaneously unfold, the way space is efectively conceived and thus constituted 
varies from one individual to another. In other words, the subjective knowledge of 
individuals not only renders space relevant and meaningful in variegated manners 
but also shapes the (inter)action established with its material constituent elements. 
Consequently, the veiled afordances of material objects (i.e., ensembles of social 
goods) involved in any given process of space constitution theoretically allow dif-
ferent spaces, made out of the same material components, to be constituted. Space, 
in brief, is interrelated and synthesized through the individuals’ spatial knowledge. 
Experiential, sensory, and motoric bodily practices: 
the bedrock of spatial knowledge 
Drawing on the sociology of knowledge, knowledge can be understood “as socially 
mediated meaning” (Knoblauch 2019, 26). Hence, “action is dependent on and 
defned by knowledge” (Knoblauch 2019, 26). To put it another way, our world-
views are strongly defned by what we know. Spatial knowledge, in that regard, 
comprises “the subjective or individual experiences and perceptions of space” as 
well as “imaginations, emotions and afective reactions related to space” (Löw and 
Knoblauch 2019, 11). Moreover, it is usually, though not exclusively, acquired by 
dint of sensorimotor systems as individuals move around, through, and experience 
the world. It develops, sequentially, in three phases: (i) landmark knowledge (based on 
characterizing and unique spatial features); (ii) route knowledge (the habitual move-
ments and paths that order and unite landmarks); and (iii) survey knowledge (quan-
titative in nature, it responds to the ability to simultaneously interrelate diverse 
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locations characterized by landmarks; as a result, one becomes capable of short-
cutting and detouring) (Siegel and White 1975; Montello 2001). In the midst of 
such landmark–route–survey sequences, institutional knowledge resources—such 
as those produced and conveyed in and by families, science, schools, standardized 
rule systems, or art—are fed into the constant production of spatial knowledge. 
Likewise, there is arguably a parallelism between the construction of landmark– 
route–survey sequences and the process by which hidden afordances of the ele-
ments making up space are disclosed. While moving through and within spaces, 
individuals not only associate spaces (to create routes) but also, through interactions 
with their material elements, show their concealed afordances. Provided that spa-
tial knowledge is, in and of itself, subjective, it ought to physically, linguistically, or 
materially become objectifed in order for it to be analyzed. To that end, it should 
be taken into consideration that spatial knowledge confates single spaces (“ref-
erential locations”) and systems that are built thereof (“landmark-based routes”) 
while also deriving “from actual experience within a space” (Pick Jr. 2001, 9682). 
Spatial knowledge, to wit, arises, by means of experiential, sensory, and motor 
aspects of bodily practices, from the entire host of actions that are performed in, on, 
from, with space: appropriating, using, interacting, traversing. The myriad actions 
that individuals perform, particularly regarding public space, are mediated by their 
capacity to spot latent afordances embedded in its material components, which, as 
aforementioned, enables diferent spaces to be concurrently constituted. Material 
arrangements of public space—and their concomitant afordances—are likewise 
swayed by the rationale with which they are imbued, which attempts to assert spe-
cifc perceptions and uses: that is to say, the spatial pedagogization of public space. 
Curbing perceptions, uses, and sentiments: spatial 
pedagogization 
The pedagogy that underpins space refers to the spatialization of the rationale that 
advances arrangements in order to establish specifc perceptions and uses of space— 
at times in a subtle manner, at others, more bluntly. Eventually, space is subject to 
a “pedagogization.” This term stems from the educational sciences and has been 
employed to, by and large, 
indicate the steady expansion and increased depth of educational action dur-
ing the nineteenth and particularly the twentieth centuries . . . [which] not 
only concerned the increase in the number of child-raising and educational 
governmental bodies and the greater range of child-raising and educational 
processes but also encompassed the ever-increasing central role of the peda-
gogical in the society. 
(Depaepe et al. 2008, 14–15) 
The infuence that “the pedagogical” has exerted is not limited to the formal pro-
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all strata of society and, as such, public space has been ostensibly instrumental to 
pedagogizing societies in addition to being seen as a setting for learning and co-
education (Pike 2011; Visscher and Bouverne-De Bie 2008; Rodó-de-Zárate and 
Baylina 2014). This is seen in the case of children growing up in countries through-
out the so-called Global North and their forms of play in urban areas, which, 
as Kathrin Hörschelmann and Lorraine van Blerk (2012, 104–105) explain, have 
undergone the efects of, on the one hand, commodifcation, rendering “objects, 
places and even relationships or less tangible aspects of life . . . ‘purchasable’” and, 
on the other hand, “the increasing institutionalization of afterschool leisure time.” 
Moreover, the spatial pedagogy of public space seeks to establish not only acuities 
and usages but also feelings. For example, the “development of managed adven-
ture playgrounds and parks mean (sic) that, through the constructed nature in the 
city, children are being encouraged to engage with the natural at the same time as 
removing parental fears and anxieties” (Hörschelmann and van Blerk 2012, 103). 
All things considered, the spatial pedagogization of public space seems to neglect 
aspects of afordances and therefore the simultaneous constitution of spaces. Uses 
are prominently defned through the discipline of design and are often meant to be 
pervasive and univocal. Be that as it may, the “disruptive” uses that children make 
of public space suggest otherwise. We next look into the tension between children’s 
actual use and experts’ intended projection of public space. 
Children’s advertent spatial knowledge vis-à-vis experts’ 
pedagogical design of public space 
As our research hypothesis, we propose that children, in their interaction with
the material constitutive elements of public space, make diverse latent afordances
visible and relevant, thereby objectifying their spatial knowledge. Moreover, the
diverse interactions between children and the material elements that constitute
public space and its immediate context tend, markedly, to diverge from the under-
lying spatial pedagogization of experts’ designs. From a general standpoint, as
shown in Figure 22.1, at one of the poles along the continuum of the afordances
of the material elements that make up public space, design experts objectify their
spatial knowledge and intended uses in their yet-to-materialize abstract designs.
Experts thus attempt to predetermine not only the way in which each individual
element of public space is to be perceived and used, but also the combination
among them and in conjunction with the surrounding settings. Therefore, public
space embodies a spatial pedagogization that is ultimately asserted, once designs
are materialized, in the realm of concrete space. At the opposite end of the con-
tinuum, children begin to interact with the already materialized pedagogization
of public space and consequently enable potential afordances to come into play.
Thus, the spatial knowledge of design experts signals an understanding of public
space as something that, by being malleable, fxable, and tamable, makes it possible
to establish a specifc topology and its exact perception and use. The spatial knowl-
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FIGURE 22.1 A continuum from intended (by design and planning experts) to unin-
tended (prompted by children) afordances of public space 
Source: © the authors 
and appropriations an open-ended imagination of public space and any given
topological (pre)disposition thereof. All in all, children, by using public space as
they see ft, constitute a diferent space than that of the experts, depending on
diferent stocks of spatial knowledge. In the next section, we explore, in the wake
of a progressive intervention of a public space on the outskirts of the city of Lima,
Peru, how children can be integrated into a participatory design process in such
a way that experts’ intended design and children’s actual use of public space come
closer together. 
Tahuantinsuyo Park: experts and children meet halfway 
Tahuantinsuyo Park is a section of a larger central public space in the neighborhood 
of La Balanza, located within the district of Comas in northern Lima, Peru. Both 
the park and its immediate surroundings have been gradually developed parallel 
and around the redesign and refurbishment of the Comedor Comunal San Martín
(a community dining hall)—an institution best described as a mixture of a self-
organized neighborhood kitchen (run by a group of women called “the moth-
ers of the Comedor San Martín”), a public cafeteria, a multi-purpose room, and a 
small library, situated in the heart of La Balanza. The dining hall was frst adapted 
based on initiatives put together by the mothers of the Comedor San Martín and the 
members of the artistic association Fiteca, who had been reclaiming public spaces 
throughout the barrio over the years with the aim of promoting cultural activities 
(theater, dance, and plastic arts) for children and young people. As of 2012, the 
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studio founded and headed by Peruvian architects Javier Vera and Eleazar Cuadros 
Choque, has been leading the growing intervention of the dining room, the park, 
and its adjacent settings (planned in two phases: 2012–2014 and 2015–2017). 
Once the dining hall had been revamped and expanded, its encircling spaces 
started to be transformed, drawing upon the input of children through a fairly 
unorthodox strategy. In a frst step, called “Proyecto Semilla” (“seed project”), 
wooden sticks were brightly painted and placed right outside the main entrance of 
the dining room, to “entice” children to come around and see what they would 
do with them: children started to climb up and down the poles and, eventually, 
attempted to move boldly from one to another. In addition, benches made out of 
painted tires were made available to children and a fence was replaced by a dirt 
ramp leading up to a nearby greenery (see Figure 22.2). 
The wooden sticks, benches, and dirt ramps are envisioned not as fxed and 
defnitive, but rather as adaptable and changeable elements making up public space 
(anew) and thus providing a wide array of “dormant” afordances. In doing so, they 
not only ofer alternative ways for children to devise their practices of play but also 
invite (or even pedagogize) parents and neighbors to alter their views on, and the 
ways in which they make use of, the public space right next to the dining hall: 
In order to avoid the irruption of automobiles, instead of a fence, a labyrinth
of wooden high sticks, where children climb up and down and think up their
own games, was used. To keep “potheads” away, rather than policemen, chil-
dren are keeping them at bay by simply playing with used tires, which they’ve
painted themselves. Adults may sit on benches, made out of worn tires and
located at the foot of the dining hall, to wait while their children play. Is a
green area without a spike fence unthinkable? A small slope proves otherwise. 
(Vera 2018, 87; own translation) 
FIGURE 22.2 The “seed project”: colorful wooden poles were installed using a worn tire 
flled with concrete and brightly painted as well. In addition, used colored tires were 
set right next to each other (to form a “bench”) and at intervals for children to play. 
Moreover, dirt slopes (in the background) were sown with grass 
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Also central to the argumentation underpinning the CCC’s design principles is the 
belief that, in order to design public space in Lima, 
previous experience . . . allows to see that public space is first appropriated and
then occupied. Thus, rather than “physical seizure”, what is at issue is its sym-
bolic resignification, provided that, once the function of public space has been
transgressed, it becomes a sort of creative device. To that end, prior to recover
a space, the sense of what is public must be both redefined and reclaimed; that
is, producing public space implies setting positive conflicts off.
(Vera 2018, 89; own translation) 
Bearing such aims in mind, designers and planners alike combine aspects of afordance
(also in a sense of being surprised by what children are actually capable of doing),
designedly knowing (Cross 2006) (having experienced the materiality and design of
some of the elements before—here, in particular, the wooden sticks), and spatial peda-
gogization (prompting change in people’s ways of thinking of and using public space). 
Over a period of three to four years (2015–2018), the space was increasingly 
intervened upon and, as children took it over, adapted as accordingly as possible. (It 
is worthwhile underscoring that, while teenagers and adults started to signal prefer-
ences, they were not as straightforward and upfront as those of children—though 
members of the CCC did not, at all, disregard them.) The wooden climbing poles 
were eventually replaced by more durable metal structures (some of them are now 
climbing frames, and swings were added here and there), the benches put together 
using tires are now parallelepiped elements made out of concrete, and the sur-
face adjacent to the community dining hall entrance was refurbished, integrating 
mosaics co-designed with children, which somewhat hint at a distinction between 
where to play and where to walk by. Furthermore, members of the CCC, when 
asked about the most striking disjuncture between what they had envisioned and 
what children have displayed in situ, were surprised by children’s marked prefer-
ence for using dirt slopes for climbing and sliding and, in so doing, wrecking newly 
planted green grass and fowers (Lima’s weather is extremely dry and green areas 
are therefore highly cherished, particularly in settlements throughout its disenfran-
chised periphery). As a result, the intention of proving, as pointed out by Javier 
Vera earlier, that a green area could stand alone without a “protective” fence had 
to be revised and ultimately modifed—the green areas were substantially reduced 
to give way to concrete slanted surfaces that were equipped with climbing ropes 
or turned into ramps (see Figure 22.4). Such “gymnastic” and incremental mate-
rial transformations of the public space continued, and a couple of new “concave 
pipes,” encouraging skateboarding, emerged alongside several stands meant to cre-
ate a small amphitheater (where small concerts and theater plays are organized 
periodically). In addition, a third concave surface has been constructed opposite 
the stands as a sort of backdrop. The park will eventually be connected to the main 
entrance of a nearby elementary school through a set of stairs, which are also envi-
sioned to function as potential stands. 
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The steady and piecemeal intervention on and transformation of Tahuantin-
suyo Park, when seen through the threefold lens of afordance, relational space, 
and spatial knowledge, reveals more than meets the eye with regard to its process 
of spatial pedagogization—which in turn arguably constitutes a catalyzer for the 
refguration of public space. First of all, designers of the CCC imprint the diverse 
constitutive elements with specifc afordances (for instance, the poles are sug-
gestively “ofered” to children to climb up and down) and their spatial knowledge 
is synthetized a priori in the form of the “coherent” overall redesign of the park 
(see Figure 22.3)—though such a process of spacing and synthesizing, as has been 
explained, is susceptible to the enhancements children may provide. Hence, the 
spatial knowledge of children, chiefy their “performative” articulation, could be 
integrated, not without sufering adaptions, into the future phases of implementa-
tion. To put it another way, children’s actual enactment of their spatial knowledge— 
which could be regarded as their spacing and synthetizing—revealed the pitfalls 
underlying the design experts’ pedagogization of the park inasmuch as they chal-
lenged its imbued—and brought to the fore other “hidden”—afordances. This 
becomes particularly clear in the case of the aforementioned dirt slopes: instead of 
caring for, or even nursing, the newly planted grass and fowers, children identi-
fed a possibility for sliding and climbing, thus expressing a diferent perception of 
space (and, more specifcally, of the afordances ofered by its material constitutive 
elements) than that of the members of the CCC. In efect, children constituted 
another, quite distinctive space than the one imagined and projected onto the 
abstract space of the initial design. Interestingly enough, despite being somewhat 
pitted against the expert’s pedagogical design of Tahuantinsuyo Park, the children’s 
advertent spatial knowledge provided for other demands that would normally be 
entailed in the intervention of any given public space (e.g., budget, timeline, mix 
of interests, etc.). Far from being downplayed as a delaying or even irrelevant fac-
tor, this was seriously considered by the CCC designers. Consequently, children’s 
relational take on public space (by climbing up and down the poles, using the dirt 
slopes to slide, and running aimlessly throughout the park, children were producing 
their space through experiential, sensory and bodily practices) has been aptly—for 
it is not defnitive—drawn upon to develop the space further, all the while trying 
to inscribe the unintended afordances the children made visible into its actual 
materialization. 
The case of Tahuantinsuyo Park, rather than being exclusively the outcome 
of professional design expertise, embodies an iterative process of materializing, 
appropriating, and adapting, along with a course of action underpinned by a trial-
and-error principle, whereby both designers and children willingly learn from 
each other. Moreover, the redesign of the park, as already stated, has not yet been 
completed. In fact, it may well be said that it has reached an open-ended stage. 
Moreover, among various fairly unexpected upshots, other users have responded 
quite well to the physical alteration to which the park has been subjected thus 
far. For example, the metal structure that the wooden poles were turned into 
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transformation and have made it their stomping ground (to be sure, as members 
of the CCC commented during our feldwork, there are neighbors who criticize 
these actions, though a number of bystanders were ultimately won over by the 
whole process). The park furthermore seems to already represent a referential loca-
tion within the landmark-based routes of people living nearby (most likely due to 
the existence of the communal dining hall) and, as such, is imbued in their spatial 
knowledge. However, spatial knowledge comprises not only implicit and habitu-
ated practices (such as traversing the park every day), but also, as the children boldly 
demonstrated, an array of sensory and motor aspects embedded in bodily practice. 
Including it as a central factor in redesigning and intervening upon the park meant 
paying attention and reacting to what the children exhibited was feasible using the 
constitutive material elements of public space. All things considered, the tension 
between the children’s ability to foresee, seize, and disclose dormant afordances 
by means of their singular spacing and synthetizing, and design experts’ explicit 
and implicit pedagogical design of public space, seems to have given rise to a third, 
alternative course, which has allowed designers and children to meet halfway. 
FIGURE 22.3A Poster showing the location of Tahuantinsuyo Park (top left), a picture 
documentation (bottom left) and an isometric display (bottom center) of the diferent 
phases of intervention, a diagrammatic representation of the evolution of the “seed 
project” (above the isometric drawing), a zoning and overall site design (top right), and 
two sections of the design (bottom right) 















FIGURE 22.3B The picture evinces how children bring to the fore hid- FIGURE 22.3C Children are playing hopscotch on the dirt, rather than
den afordances of the holes dug out to erect metal, instead of wooden, on the concrete surface next to it, which is arguably more suitable
poles, yet again testing the limits of the envisaged design and its gradual for it 
materialization 
Source: © CCC Archive 















FIGURE 22.4A Children sledding on one of the concave FIGURE 22.4B Metal poles and frames: a FIGURE 22.4C Children climbing up and 
concrete surfaces next to the stands more durable stage of the “seed project” down slanted concrete surfaces 
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Conclusion: learning to spy with their little eye—toward 
a “child-responsive” design process of public space 
In this chapter, we have examined the relation between children’s use and experts’ 
design of public space through the concepts of afordance, relational space, spatial 
knowledge, and spatial pedagogization. As children use the constitutive material 
elements of public space in divergent and unexpected fashions—often quite dif-
ferently than intended by design and planning experts—we pose two questions: 
(i) how can children’s spatial knowledge be more substantially and meaningfully 
integrated into the design process, and (ii) how can the notion of spatial pedagogi-
zation, which is intrinsic to the planning and design of public space, be taken into 
account more consciously by planners and designers? 
Children and young people show through their set of bodily actions that they
not only perceive space diferently but also see other qualities in its material objects
and thus potentially use them in a manner that was not expected by designers and
planners. The many “dormant” afordances children are able to “awaken” indi-
cate that there is never just one predetermined, univocal, and unequivocal use of
public space, but rather that the ambiguity of material objects—and thus of the
resulting spaces—always allows for other uses and spatial constitutions. After all,
public space is, par excellence, the domain of multiplicity. The unforeseeable uses
of spaces, made visible through the afordances children render relevant, compose a
dimension that designers and planners cannot fully foresee as they undertake their
professional work, more often than not departing from a quite distinct knowledge
base—one that regards space as malleable, fxable, and tamable. The designing and
planning of public space are therefore always faced with the conundrum of fnding
a middle ground between being able to make proposals for its use, based on experts’ 
knowledge, and actively incorporating how people may eventually use the material
objects of which public space is composed together with any arrangements thereof.
We also have to acknowledge, in this regard, that the described tension between the
spatial knowledge of children and young people and that of design and planning
experts very much applies to other social groups in public space (e.g., the elderly,
homeless, street vendors, etc.). Furthermore, children and young people obviously
do not share an entirely common spatial knowledge. Rather, stocks of spatial knowl-
edge among children and young people (as well as other social groups) are shaped
by categories such as age, class, and gender. It goes without saying that all of them
possess a distinct form of spatial knowledge, with which other hidden afordances
are brought to the fore. While it is virtually impossible to anticipate and accord-
ingly stipulate every single potential afordance the diverse users of public space
may render signifcant during the design and planning phase, such an “impossibil-
ity” may well be tackled theoretically through the concepts of afordance, relational
space, spatial knowledge, and spatial pedagogization. In practical terms, as the case
of Tahuantinsuyo Park shows with a focus on children, it would then be feasible to
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To that end, it must be acknowledged that the formalization of public space is pre-
dominantly based on experts’ spatial knowledge. This knowledge gets objectifed and
spatializes all the while a pedagogy. Every form of design and planning—and their
materialization—is therefore a kind of “pedagogization.” As reviewed in the case of
Tahuantinsuyo Park, planners and designers “invite children to play” with enticing
elements to see how children react and what they make of and with them. Modifca-
tions to the originally envisioned design are undertaken subsequently, seeking to adapt
the materialities and arrangements of public space accordingly. During this process,
the choice of sticks at the beginning also creates certain possibilities and generates
tension between an a priori spatial pedagogization and the children’s “obstinate”uses,
which render other afordances. In addition, there is the question of further con-
cealed or conspicuous spatial pedagogical intentions and aims planners and designers
have and how they are made operative within the planning and designing process.
Designers and planners of the CCC, for example, intended specifc uses and came up
with corresponding spatial arrangements for “public life” to thrive organically. Yet,
the understanding of “public life” designers and planners possess will surely difer, to
a lesser or greater extent, from that of everyday users of public space. For children,
public life may well simply mean the freedom to do what they please. Hence, both
the legibility and limits of spatial pedagogy’s goals are, in efect, challenged—the trick
is then to devise mechanisms to respond to, and not deter, such challenges. In this
case, experience functions as a catalyst: members of the CCC had already tried out
similar actions in other locations and projects in Lima (e.g., the wooden poles). As a
result, designers and planners build up over time and through iterative experimenta-
tion an epistemological basis that translates into child-responsive design decisions (as
opposed to head-on and blatant prescriptive spatial pedagogization). 
All in all, the analytical added value of critically assessing, through the lens of 
afordance, relational space, spatial knowledge, and spatial pedagogization, plan-
ning and design processes fosters a user-responsive design and planning of public 
space. That is to say, a change in the posture of design and planning practitioners 
toward a praxis more strongly connected to material elements, users’ interactions 
with them, and the interplay between the arrangements of the constitutive mate-
rial objects in public space and the (immediate and larger) context in which they 
are set up. This would require, among other things, giving up masterplan-concept 
thinking, refraining from focusing almost solely on qualities of objects and places 
as though they were inherent and independent entities, and revisiting the dictum 
“form follows function,” which designers and planners reverse all too often in 
practice. Therefore, the myriad hidden and overt afordances of space becomes an 
integral part of designing and planning processes, which in turn prompts a shift 
of emphasis from an approach based on an expert’s vision of a fxed product to an 
open-ended sequence of possibilities. Furthering such a shift is far from an easy 
task, for it would involve, on the one hand, reconsidering the language and means 
of design and planning communication (e.g., 3-D renderings and illustrations tend 
to present a ready and fnished vision of conceived projects). On the other hand, 
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of a post-reconstructing process of planning and designing. At the same time, inter-
ventions in as well as alterations of public space, led and propelled by participatory 
design and planning processes, need to be reexamined, as spatial refgurations and 
also as a mutual synergic learning process for participants and experts alike, since 
they are “not only an institutional phenomenon (sociogenesis) but also [afect] 
subjects themselves (psychogenesis)” (Knoblauch and Löw 2017, 11). When the 
“afected subjects” happen to be children, designers and planners may well lead the 
participatory process according to the children’s game precept “I spy with my little 
eye”; rather than guessing, have children, as in the case of Tahuantinsuyo Park, 
physically display what it is that they can see that neither designers nor planners 
ever could. 
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